



OCTOBER 2010

REPORT

ISPU

Al Qa'eda and Pakistan

Current Role and Future Considerations



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ISPU Fellow

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements	4
Executive Summary	5
Introduction	6
Directing Without Leading	8
Al Qaeda's Syndicate Structure	10
The Enemy's Metrics	13
Al Qaeda and Associates' Post-Flood Strategy	14
Pakistani Constraints and Ambivalence	17
The Way Forward	18

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The report was prepared with information, support, and commentary collected in 2002, 2007-2010 from many individuals in government, military, intelligence, academia, think tanks, and media in the United States, Pakistan and India. Most recently, I visited Pakistan three times in the last ten months. Special thanks to General David H. Petraeus and Derek Harvey, Director, Afghanistan-Pakistan Center for Excellence, the U.S. Central Command for their continuous support, encouragement, and guidance. My special gratitude goes to the guidance from the leadership of John P. Murtha Institute for Homeland Security at the Indiana University of Pennsylvania. I am indebted to Farid Senzai, Director of Research, and Sadia Shakir, Director of Operations, Institute for Social Policy for their timely comments and edits under strict deadlines. As always, I am grateful to my close friend Jonathan Ruhe, national security analyst at a Washington, DC, think tank for his pointed comments. The opinions expressed in this report are my personal judgments. They do not represent the policy of any organization, government, or other institution.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For more than six decades the United States and Pakistan have had a complex relationship, one in which the goal of meeting expectations and sustaining the partnership has always fallen short of the goal of meeting tactical security goals. With the advent of President Barack H. Obama's administration and his new resource-driven Afghanistan and Pakistan strategies, there was hope of finally building this relationship anew. As military and civilian aid to Islamabad increased, Washington sought to obtain better results from the Pakistani generals and politicians by forging a partnership to defeat Al Qaeda and extreme poverty. Today, many of the gains against Al Qaeda and associates are being reversed as the Pakistani military conducts the largest flood-relief effort in the country's history. The *Kerry-Lugar-Berman* bill, originally a civilian aid package has largely become a relief fund and no longer serves as insurance for the civilian government against military intervention. At this monumental time when Washington's efforts in Afghanistan are under duress and question, nuclear-armed Pakistan's stability is unquestionably essential for achieving Washington's mission to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy Al Qaeda. Not only is Al Qaeda taking advantage of the floods, but through a nine-year "train the trainer program" and symbiotic partnerships with equally dangerous organizations like Lashkar-e-Taiba, it has increased its growth, appeal, and reach. This is a clarion call for action to Washington, Islamabad, and their allies. This action must be measured, monitored, and cognizant of Al Qaeda's metamorphosis since 9/11.

INTRODUCTION

On September 25, 2010, a drone attack eliminated Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, Al Qaeda's operations chief for Afghanistan and Pakistan, in Pakistan's North Waziristan agency.¹ Twenty days later another drone strike allegedly killed Qari Hussain, Pakistani Taliban's No. 1 suicide-attack recruiter, planner and financer.² Twenty-two drone strikes in September targeted Al Qaeda and key allies suspected of planning multiple terrorist attacks in Europe.³ The number of strikes was the highest in any given month since 9/11 and equal to about two-thirds of all drone strikes in 2008.⁴ While Al Qaeda has little trouble in replacing its No. 3 person, counterterrorism operations since 2001 by Pakistani and American security forces near the porous Afghanistan-Pakistan border have consistently and considerably weakened Al Qaeda's resources, reach, and appeal.⁵ The pressure is on; however, Al Qaeda's strength was never in numbers but in its ability to replicate in Al Qaeda-like entities. That ability remains strongest in nuclear-armed Pakistan. Al Qaeda's selective dismantlement has not offset its massive duplication.

While its finances, recruits, training grounds, and approval ratings have declined, Al Qaeda is prospering through its heir-apparent organizations, most notably Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and is relishing the aftermath of the worst floods in Pakistan's history. In late July 2010, the Indus river swelled into a tidal wave that rendered 7 million people homeless, submerged one-fifth of the country (the size of New England), and diverted approximately 30,000 troops from counterinsurgency operations.⁶ The 2009 "Pakistani Surge" successfully cleared (and continues to hold) the Swat Valley and South Waziristan,⁷ but it abruptly ended after the floods, leaving the Haqqani Network, the Pakistani Taliban, and Al Qaeda in North Waziristan to regroup and wreak havoc in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While continuing to support selective attacks on U.S. soil the Al Qaeda syndicate prioritizes attacking U.S. troops in Afghanistan and destabilizing nuclear-armed and flood-hit Pakistan, killing 2,800 Pakistani civilians since January 2009⁸. Consequently, today, the threat from the Al Qaeda syndicate is the highest it has been since 9/11.

Figure 1 Haider Mullick getting an overview of flood relief efforts in Nowshera, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by Lt. Col. H. Kashif, September 2010



The 2010 floods are a major game changer, and Al Qaeda and associates are taking full advantage of the opportunity. They are simultaneously providing highly visible (but meager) food and medical support⁹ and unleashing suicide attacks nationwide.¹⁰ The gains from the 2009 Pakistani surge, based on a shift toward population and

presence-centric counterinsurgency prioritized troop morale, better training, intelligence and strategic communication, are in grave danger. Further still, groups like LeT, Jash-e-Mohammad (JeM), and Sipeh-e-Sahaba (SeS) – collectively referred to as LeT & Co. – remain largely unharmed and are expanding operations in southern Punjab, Sindh, and eastern Afghanistan. Since 9/11 these groups have grown in size, expertise, reach, and stature in the jihadi world. In August and September of 2010, there were six suicide attacks and seventy terrorist incidents including targeted killings and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks.¹¹ Pakistani security practitioners and analysts believe that most of these attacks were not conducted by Al Qaeda proper, but rather LeT & Co. While Al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, and some Afghan Taliban have suffered from Pakistani military operations and U.S. drone strikes, LeT & Co. has had carte blanche in Punjab and Sindh to achieve its dream of becoming a premier global terrorist organization.¹² LeT and Co. shares Al Qaeda's goal – spread religious extremism, promote fascism and defeat United States and allies through attrition – and acts as enabler, force multiplier and catalyst. This makes Al Qaeda stronger despite its selective dismantling by drone strikes and Pakistani counterterrorism operations.

Table 1: Pakistani Security Forces vs. Al Qaeda and Associates¹³

Pakistani Security Forces in KPK & FATA	September 2010	2009	2002–2008
Army	140,000	147,000	80,000
Frontier Corps	30,000	30,000	20,000
Special Services Group	7,000	8,000	1,000
Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Regular Police	30,000	30,000	40,000
Special Branch (Counterterrorism Police)	4,000	4,000	5,000
Lashkars	60,000	80,000	20,000
<i>Troops Diverted to Flood Relief</i>	30,000	-	-
Total	241,000	299,000	166,000
Al-Qaeda and Associates in Pakistan	September 2010	2009	2002–2008
Pakistani Taliban	25,000	20,000	50,000
Afghan Taliban	4,000	4,000	5,000
Al Qaeda	300	300	2,000
Haqqani Network	7,000	7,000	8,000
Lashkar-e-Taiba & splinter groups	10,000	10,000	8,000
Jash-e-Mohammad & splinter groups	10,000	10,000	8,000
Sipeh-e-Sahaba Pakistan & splinter groups	6,000	6,000	4,000
Total	62,300	57,300	85,000

Al Qaeda continues to make inroads in the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia by signing memorandums of understanding with local militants and to recruit Europeans and Americans to conduct 9/11-type attacks. For example, hundreds of Germans of Turkish and South Asian decent have trained in Pakistan's lawless tribal areas to conduct worldwide terrorist attacks.¹⁴ But Al

Al Qaeda's major base of operations, counterintelligence, strategic communications, recruitment, finances, and most lethal allies remain in nuclear-armed Pakistan. No other country is more vital for its survival and growth. Incidentally, no other country is more critical to American and international security and Afghanistan's stability.

This report examines the scope and scale of Al Qaeda's emerging strategy in Pakistan, its regional and global implications, and provides policy guidelines for the United States and its allies.

DIRECTING WITHOUT LEADING

Despite considerable degradation, twenty-year-old Al Qaeda still draws respect and instills fear in all of the major insurgent groups, including the Quetta Shura, the Haqqani Network, Tehrik-e-Taliban-Pakistan (the Pakistani Taliban), and LeT & Co. It continues to provide advanced training in third-generation IEDs,¹⁵ plastic explosives, counterintelligence, information operations, recruitment, and fundraising campaigns.¹⁶ On balance, it plays the role of a leading trainer and force multiplier from the northern tribal areas to the bustling cities of southern Pakistan. Al Qaeda's strength lies in its modus operandi, its ability to inflict harm by strategically employing chaos: a mix of defense in depth (information assurance)¹⁷, operational, training, and ideological support to affiliates and constantly updating smart and lethal tactics.¹⁸ It has survived and thrived due to a highly profitable "train the trainer program," which extends franchises to worthy applicants and partners. The trainees of this program, most notable LeT members, have increased Al Qaeda's reach and effect by continuously improving tactics and expanding operations.

In this respect, Al Qaeda successfully directs without directly leading. In the broadest terms, its consistent goal of creating a radical Islamist world government (caliphate) by bankrupting and demoralizing the United States and its allies requires teaming with national and regional ethno-sectarian insurgent groups. In Pakistan, where Al Qaeda remains the strongest surrounded by allies like LeT, it inspires, trains, and advises militant groups. All major Pakistani militant groups – LeT, JeM, the Baloch Liberation Army, the Pakistani Taliban, the SeS,¹⁹ the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) – employ terrorism to achieve their goals; and they all shop at Al Qaeda's physical and virtual warehouses.

The most likely group to take Al Qaeda's place is LeT & Co. LeT has long-standing ties with Al Qaeda and a common cold war history. For example LeT, which is known for its bases in Punjab and operations in India, was in fact founded in Afghanistan's Kunar province by Hafiz Mohammad Saeed


Al Qaeda continues to make inroads in the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, and East Asia ... Its major base of operations, counterintelligence, strategic communications, recruitment, finances, and most lethal allies, however, remain in nuclear-armed Pakistan. No other country is more vital for Al Qaeda's survival and growth ... no other country is more critical to American and international security and Afghanistan's stability.

in 1991.²⁰ It has networks in southern and eastern Afghanistan in partnership with the Haqqani Network and the Quetta Shura, in Indian cities, and in Indian-administered Kashmir. With a robust strategic communication campaign, LeT produces broadcast media products, and prints pamphlets, booklets, magazines, and books. LeT & Co. has many members, such as the *Al Badr mujahedeen*, who have mastered strategic communications by introducing jihadi art exhibitions, jihadi poetry readings, and jihadi marches, and JeM regularly engages with madrassas and public schools to recruit for jihadi training.²¹ LeT and Co.'s operations and innovations make Al Qaeda tougher without overt show of strength. Since 2001, Al Qaeda-inspired terrorism – acts of extreme violence to achieve political goals – has killed 7,000 civilians and 3,000 security forces in Pakistan; the highest loses for any country in the coalition.²² Today the death toll from the insurgency is higher than the conventional war between India and Pakistan in 1965.

LeT is also known to provide mid-level operations officers to Al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban. For example, the most brilliant insurgent strategists captured in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) during the last three years are affiliated with LeT, SeS, or JeM.²³ At times, Al Qaeda has formally joined forces with its allies in Punjab. For example, in 2002 *Brigade 313* was created by members of JeM, LeT, LeJ, Harkat-al-Jehad al-Islami, and Harkatul Mujahideen al-Almi.²⁴ These groups recruit as many Punjabis as Afghans for operations in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Regional Command East (e.g., Paktika, Paktia, Kunar, and Nuristan) and South (Helmand and Kandahar).²⁵

Supporting the martyrs' families is very important to retaining popular support. Usually there is a Department of Martyrs that manages life insurance policies, social security, funeral expenses, timely information to heirs, initial aid, the organizations' publications, commemorative plaques, the last will and testament, and organizing the martyrs' records and estates. The Department of Aseerin (prisoners), which is responsible for detainee operations, is equally important.

Figure 2 Al Qaeda Syndicate




AL QAEDA'S SYNDICATE STRUCTURE

Most top-level militant groups or clusters affiliated with LeT & Co. have several lines of operations run by corresponding divisions. The “governance division” is responsible for retaining and replenishing leaders. While the third-tier leadership intentionally keeps a low profile to protect their identity and mission-sensitive information, the founding members often run massive public relations campaigns through print, electronic, and online media sources. One example is Hafiz Saeed of LeT. Second, these groups usually have a “rule of law” division that acts as a human resources department and enforces financial and “moral” austerity in the early stages of development of a militant group. At later stages it creates and implements legal strategies in areas under its control, an example of which is the Pakistani Taliban’s Sharia courts in the Swat Valley.²⁶ Other groups, such as LeT and JeM, have similar divisions such as the Department of *Amar Bil Maaruf-o-Nahi annal Munkar-o-Ehtesab* (enforces virtue and prevents vice, and accountability); the Department of *Ehtesab* (justice), and the Department of *Ehya-e-Sunnah* (Revival of Sunnat).²⁷

Information operations are usually termed “critical for mission success” with the ultimate goal of retaining and expanding local pre- and post-operation support. In LeT, the Department of Broadcasting (media) and Publications devises and implements the group’s communications strategy. From chat rooms to radio talk shows, Al Qaeda and associates share resources and expertise, often overlapping messaging and avoiding duplication to cut costs. Finally, tax collection, fundraising, and recruitment are handled separately; usually, fundraising is required to expand recruitment. Finally, the Department of Liaison constantly looks for more partners and funders, including drug lords, kidnapping experts, and smugglers.

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Unsurprisingly, current militant recruitment greatly worries Washington. But long-term recruitment trends project a darker picture, one in which future Pakistani Army officers are likely to be recruited from the LeT & Co.’s strongholds.

Figure 2: Dangerous Trends²⁹

Finally, the Department of Training is the most vital. New members recruited from madrassas, public schools, or elsewhere usually follow the training curriculum and schedule listed below.

Table 2: Militant Training³⁰

Course	Prerequisites	Brief Description	Time
Jihad 101: Tasis – Foundation Course	Applicant must be single and in good health.	No military training. Indoctrination of jihad. (Note: sectarian organizations conduct an additional 21-day course, such as <i>Ahle Hadis</i>).	30 days
Jihad 201: Al Raad – Thunder Training	Jihad 101. Applicant must remain single, have no chronic illness, be able to read and write (5 th grade education), and must pass a “true believer test.” ³¹	Indoctrination plus preliminary military training. Some organizations conduct mental and physical entrance tests.	90 days
Jihad 301: Guerilla Training	Jihad 101 and 201. Must pass true believer test and write “will” and give to <i>ameer</i> (religious leader) of the camp.	Guerilla training, setting up basic ambushes, basic explosives training, and basic weapons training (small arms, hand to hand combat, etc.)	180 days
Jihad 401: Jandla	Jihad 101, 201, and 301.	How to set up second- and third-generation ambushes using modern IED creation, placement, and detonation; automatic weapons and high grade explosives; and heavy weapons (e.g. Stinger missiles, heat-seeking missiles, and Rocket Propelled Grenades [RPGs]). Exclusively taught by trainers from large jihadi groups like LeT, HM, Harkat-ul-Islami, Tehreekul Mujahideen.	270 days
Jihad 402: Doshka (advanced elective)	Jihad 101 and 201.	Small arms training as part of quick reaction units.	10 days
Jihad 403: Domela (advanced elective)	Jihad 101, 201, and 402.	Shoulder-held arms advanced training.	30 days
Jihad 404: Zakzak (discontinued elective)	Jihad 101, 201, 402, and 403.	Taught how to use cannons and small tanks (was available in Afghanistan before 9/11); currently not offered.	30 days
Jihad 405: Launching - Senior Synthesis	Jihad 101, 201, and 402-403.	Senior instructors ask students to pick three areas of operations and then receive objectives and deployments based on specific mission demands and priorities.	5 days

Al Qaeda and associates also have an external structure that relies on madrassas and religious parties to help create “social” wings that ostensibly give charity to mask terrorist activities.³² Certain parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (JI) and the Jamiat-ul-Islam (JUI), as well as

proselytizing groups like the Tablighi Jamaat (TJ), act as enablers for Al Qaeda and associates by supporting recruitment in radical madrassas, and fundraising at mosques all over Pakistan.³³ TJ is a “gateway drug” that develops – at the very least – sympathy for jihadi groups. On the ideological and sectarian spectrum, Al Qaeda’s supporters are mostly Sunni Deobandis.³⁴ Moreover, this syndicate has developed highly dynamic symbiotic partnerships with criminal syndicates and constantly applies lessons-learned and findings from after-action reviews. For example, LeT & Co. learned the lessons from the weaknesses of the Pakistani Taliban’s 2009 strategy in the Swat Valley: instead of overtly challenging the state, LeT has adopted a mafia-model in southern Punjab to remain incognito.

On balance, Al Qaeda syndicate structure – organizational core juxtaposed with numerous malleable nodal networks - allows Al Qaeda central to remain relatively incognito, creating a false picture of dismantlement, while constantly strengthening ties with groups like LeT to wreak havoc in the world.

THE ENEMY’S METRICS

Multiple field research trips to Pakistan and numerous engagements with security analysts and intelligence officials by the author reveal a dynamic Al Qaeda that survives not because of its core membership, but because it continues to inspire, abet, and train partners like LeT. For this purpose, Al Qaeda and associates have developed manifestos, standard operating procedures, training and combat manuals, after-action review procedures, small quick-action teams, and metrics to measure success. Following is a selected collection of important examples.

Table 3: Al Qaeda’s Metrics

Al Qaeda and Associates’ Common Core Metrics	
Metric	Examples of Indicators
The ability of Al Qaeda or its associate to exercise operational mobility	Number and quality of roads and bridges Number of Pakistani forward operating bases Pakistani or foreign air surveillance and ability to strike (e.g., the number of helicopter or drone strikes) Police checkpoints Frontier Corps checkpoints Army checkpoints Speed of movement in relation to terrain
Strength in numbers	How many were killed and injured, and where? How were they killed or injured? Rate of attrition Rate of recruitment and retention
Lessons-learned	Which tactics work and which do not? Types of IEDs and rate of success Types of ambushes and rate of success

Al Qaeda and Associates' Common Core Metrics	
Metric	Examples of Indicators
Popular support	Number of spy-beheadings Rate of successfully resolving inter and intra tribal disputes How many local services provided (e.g., Taliban Sharia courts and LeT flood relief) increase recruitment and fundraising?
Resolving inter- and intra-group rivalries	Who and how often do groups within clusters (e.g., LeT & Co., separatists, and sectarian groups) fight? What works and what does not work in resolving such disputes?
Exploiting socioeconomic and ethnic disharmony in Pakistan	Number of retaliatory attacks between Pashtuns and Muhajirs in Karachi Number of Sindhi and Balochi separatists willing to partner with Al Qaeda in exchange for training in IEDs
Al Qaeda and associates' willingness to intervene	Number of likely partners Potential partners' capabilities Number of likely sympathizers Number of counterintelligence assets Type of communications infrastructure available Type of medical services available
Al Qaeda and Associates' Membership: Testing Eligibility	Group's strength (members, resources, etc.) Group's past success and failures (quantity and quality of attacks) Types of tribal and ethno-sectarian links Propensity to splinter (how often have group members disagreed, how many splinter groups, etc.)

The collection and analysis of the above metrics that focus on the Al Qaeda syndicate's appeal, reach, strength, and coherence greatly benefit the group as they increase partnerships and operations.

AL QAEDA AND ASSOCIATES' POST-FLOOD STRATEGY

Al Qaeda's syndicate is taking full advantage of the 2010 floods by helping its associates open multiple fronts to overstretch the Pakistani security forces. Trainer, force-multiplier, and exporter of specific expertise, Al Qaeda believes in striking hard when the Pakistani state is in disarray and at its weakest in providing effective governance, development, and security. The table below summarizes Al Qaeda and associates' symbiotic partnership and post-2010 strategies, and shows how Al Qaeda plans to gain its strength through its allies by exploiting Islamabad's diminishing capabilities.

Table 4: Post-Flood Militant Strategy & Al Qaeda's Partnerships³⁵

Organizations	Goals	Objectives	Strategy	Post 2010 Floods Strategy	Imports from Al Qaeda	Exports to Al Qaeda
Al Qaeda	Replace current world order	Tie down the U.S. and Europe in perpetual war and gain Pakistani nuclear weapons	Work through proxies (LeT) and retain public support by perennial terrorist attacks	Simultaneously help Pakistani Taliban exploit state weakness and support LeT with flood relief	-	-
The Pakistani Taliban and its allies (national insurgency)	Overthrow Pakistan's government, gain nuclear weapons, and conduct limited attacks against Al Qaeda's enemies worldwide	Weaken security, rule of law, social well-being, governance, and the economy in FATA and Khyber-Paktunkwa	Retain popular support and outlast Pakistan's security forces	Open multiple fronts, overstretch Pakistani security forces, and gain back control over FATA and Khyber-Paktunkwa	Trainers, explosives, strategic communications, and counter-intelligence expertise	Funding, recruits, protection, and liaison with friendly tribes
The Haqqani Network (Afghan insurgency)	Overthrow Afghanistan's government (especially in the eastern Paktiya Loya region)	Weaken security, rule of law, social well-being, governance, and the economy in Paktia Loya region (RC East)	Retain popular support in Afghanistan and FATA, out-last ISAF forces, and support TTP, and the Quetta Shura when required	Use time to regroup, rearm, and reestablish bases in RC East and FATA	Trainers, explosives, strategic communications, and counter-intelligence expertise	Funding, recruits, and protection in north-eastern Afghanistan
The Quetta Shura (Afghan insurgency)	Overthrow U.S.-supported Afghanistan's government	Weaken security, rule of law, social well-being, governance, and the economy in southern Afghanistan (RC South)	Retain popular support, outlast ISAF forces, support the Haqqani Network when required, and curry favor with Pakistani intelligence (ISI)	Continue to put pressure on Pakistan's security forces and selectively seek favorable negotiations with Kabul	Explosives, strategic communications, and counter-intelligence expertise	Recruits and protection in southern Afghanistan
LeT & Co.	Replace Pakistan's government with pro-Islamist anti-Indian	Infiltrate Pakistani military and replace pro-U.S. army and intelligence	Incorporate lessons from Pakistani Taliban, expand operations	Expand flood-relief operations, increase fundraising and recruitment, and selectively attack	Counter-intelligence expertise	Recruits and protection in Punjab and Sindh

Organizations	Goals	Objectives	Strategy	Post 2010 Floods Strategy	Imports from Al Qaeda	Exports to Al Qaeda
	military dictatorship	officials; attack India to cause an India-Pakistan war; and weaken security, rule of law, social well-being, governance, and the economy in FATA, Khyber-Paktunkwa, Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and RC East	clandestinely, and avoid openly challenging the state; instead, fund political parties and candidates and partner with criminal syndicates	Shias and Ahmedis to distract Pakistani security forces without alienating Pakistan's Sunni majority		
Sectarian groups	Replace Pakistan's government with a pro-sectarian Islamist military dictatorship	Replace opposing sect representation in intelligentsia, military, and civilian administration.	Incorporate lessons from Pakistani Taliban and partner with LeT & Co.	Expand flood-relief operations, increase fundraising and recruitment, and selectively attack rival sect members to distract Pakistani security forces	Trainers, explosives, strategic communications, and counter-intelligence expertise	Funds and recruits
Separatists	Gain independence from Pakistan (mostly in Balochistan, but there are low-level irredentists in Sindh and Gilgit-Baltistan)	Weaken Pakistan's security forces in Balochistan, especially the paramilitary Frontier Corps, and replace all pro-Pakistan political, police, and military leaders	Outlast the state and seek external support (e.g., Indian intelligence, Iranian Balochs, and Afghan sanctuary)	Open the Balochistan front to weaken Pakistan's security forces	Limited explosives and communications expertise	Indirectly provide sanctuary (e.g., northern Balochistan is controlled by pro-Taliban Pashtun tribes, and Taliban-separatists have a 'live and let live' pact.)
Enablers (Criminals)	Grow drugs and partner with kidnapping and smuggling rings	Weaken governance, rule of law, and police	Take advantage of the state's weakness and offer services to Al Qaeda, LeT, and local political parties for protection	Profiteer: support Pakistani Al Qaeda, Taliban, and LeT in exchange for larger profits	Protection	Money laundering and fundraising

PAKISTANI CONSTRAINTS AND AMBIVALENCE

Figure 3 Haider Mullick at a Pakistani counterinsurgency training institute, Quetta, Balochistan, June 2010.

Pakistan's security forces are under great stress. The army is struggling to hold the Swat Valley and southern and northern FATA as it juggles political instability³⁶ and daunting flood-relief tasks. The gains made last year³⁷ in post-conflict stabilization, such as district reconstruction teams and temporary population resettlement, are in great danger. While the American-Pakistani intelligence and military have bridged gaps during the last two years, recent crossing of NATO helicopters into Pakistani territory and

... if the Pakistani security forces and politicians fail to join hands in reconstruction and keeping pressure on Al Qaeda, the Pakistani army is likely to cut deals with insurgents from a position of weakness, as happened during 2002-2008.



killing three Frontier Corps soldiers, followed by Pakistan's retaliatory action of temporarily shutting down NATO supplies, are counterproductive and embolden Al Qaeda and associates.³⁸ Underpaid and under-resourced, the Pakistani police and paramilitary forces (e.g., the Rangers and Frontier Corps) are struggling to calm the port city of Karachi and the rustic tribal areas³⁹. Plans to attack North Waziristan, the hub of Al Qaeda, the Haqqani Network, and run-away Pakistani Taliban leaders is on indefinite hold given the troops' overstretch due to their flood-relief operations. LeT & Co. are still at large, growing their operations, recruits, and

finances, while Pakistani intelligence is ambivalent about what proxies it should continue to support⁴⁰ and how it should deal with those who are at war with Pakistan.

Since 9/11 Pakistan's ISI, military intelligence, Intelligence Bureau, and police Special Branch have undergone reforms that created new divisions focused on counterterrorism. While more groups are added to the list of enemies, such as the Pakistani Taliban and some Afghan Taliban, along with Al Qaeda, others such as LeT & Co. remain unscathed. In fact, the Haqqani Network is still considered Pakistan's "government in a box" for the ISAF Regional Command East area. The Pakistani army pushes for regional reconciliation between the Quetta Shura and Kabul, in exchange for a limited role for the Haqqani Network, and guarantees the elimination of Al Qaeda's sanctuaries on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border. Interlocutors such as Hizbul Islami's Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

are already facilitating reconciliation; however, the destruction caused by the floods has rattled the process. To make matters worse, if the Pakistani security forces and politicians fail to join hands in reconstruction efforts and to keep pressuring Al Qaeda, the Pakistani army is likely to cut deals with insurgents from a position of weakness, as happened during 2002-2008. This will grant more space to the Haqqani Network and Al Qaeda to grow, and for LeT to expand its operations.

THE WAY FORWARD

Pakistan is caught up in an unprecedented level of turmoil. Before the historic 2010 floods the Pakistani army and the Frontier Corps, aided by the American military and State Department, were inching toward applying counterinsurgency best practices – population security through troop presence and development projects. In an attempt to break the historic cycle of civilian and military rule, the United States Congress teamed up with the White House to provide up to \$7 billion of non-military aid spread out over five years commonly known as the *Kerry-Lugar-Berman* bill.⁴¹ This was essentially an insurance policy for the new civilian government of President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gillani. The bill focuses on such high-impact development projects as electricity grids and small dams, and hopes to strengthen civilian governance and civil society. All was going well until the flood disaster. Today, many of these projects are on hold, and there is a high probability that the bill will be largely diverted toward flood-relief, reconstruction, and rehabilitation activities. Moreover, Pakistani security forces are under-resourced (for example they are using combat helicopters for flood relief) and overstretched. In addition, the army is essentially running northern and southern Pakistan, providing security, governance, rule of law, and sustaining a struggling economy. In other words, *Kerry-Lugar-Berman* will not deter a covert or overt military take-over that will further distract the Army from going after the Al Qaeda syndicate. The time to act is now, by:

Double U.S. Civilian Aid Immediately: In order to sustain the current Pakistani government and push it to double its pressure on the dynamic Al Qaeda syndicate, Washington must double its non-military aid and improve oversight. Civilian aid will allow Pakistani military to do its primary job: protect Pakistan and go after Al Qaeda. Winning the war of perceptions is equally important and must be a significant and sustained part of U.S. aid. If regular Pakistanis remain confused or misled about U.S. intentions and actions in Pakistan their mistrust will soon color all of Pakistan's institutions, including the most viable security partner, the Pakistani Army. Consequently, Islamabad must show real progress through viable metrics, crackdown on corruption, increase oversight and monitoring mechanisms, and, most importantly, tax the rich.

...the army is essentially running northern and southern Pakistan, providing security, governance, rule of law, and sustaining a struggling economy. In other words, *Kerry-Lugar-Berman* will not deter a covert or overt military take-over that will only further reduce military operations against the Al Qaeda syndicate.

Help Pakistan Help Itself: Pakistan has one of the lowest tax-to-national-income ratio,⁴² which makes it impossible for its allies to help. Washington can no longer bail out Pakistan without Pakistanis making the necessary sacrifices. Increasing taxes on petroleum, utility bills, and food items is fast but counterproductive because it targets the most poor and allows the rich to pass the buck. Our goal must be stability, not taking flood-hit people out of the frying pan and throwing them into the fire. Efforts should be made to vigorously and pragmatically tax high income brackets and industries without adversely effecting economic growth through building advisory team of Pakistani economists and those from the U.S. department of treasury, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and International Monetary Fund.

Double Military Aid and Increase Police Support

Immediately: The Pakistani army and Frontier Corps have come a long way from the days of conducting “out-terrorize the terrorist” campaigns, cutting deals with the United States’ enemies, and failing to deter the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban’s expansion. Today, they have better counterinsurgency training and tools. The floods, however, have shown that the Pakistani army is expected to do the impossible – there are troops in all four provinces conducting counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, law and order, and flood-relief operations. It needs helicopters and support in building up its intelligence and police forces. Given Washington’s budgetary restraints the recently announced \$2 billion over five years is the step in the right direction⁴³, but without additional equipment now or centers of training in the long haul, the Pakistani military will most likely cut deals with its proxies to provide an ephemeral stability at the cost of grave instability in Afghanistan. That said, the Pakistani Army must mentor, enable and invest in the civilian partners like the district legislators, administrators, judges, and police officials and restrain from past tendencies to meddle and weaken civilian institutions to retain political primacy. Washington must find a balance between immediate support to the military and long-term investment in Pakistan’s democracy.

Expanding aid with more conditions will still not be easy for the next U.S. Congress as it struggles to lower unemployment and control the budget at home. But without adequate action from Washington and its allies, Pakistan, the nuclear-armed home of swelling Al Qaeda, will continue to fracture, making Afghanistan look like a cake walk.

Expanding aid with more conditions will still not be easy for the next U.S. Congress as it struggles to lower unemployment and control the budget at home. But without adequate action from Washington and its allies, Pakistan, the nuclear-armed home of swelling Al Qaeda, will continue to fracture, making Afghanistan look like a cake walk.

End Notes

¹ Author interview with Pakistani government officials during September 2010; also see "Drone strike in Pakistan kills 3," *CNN Wire Staff*, September 25, 2010, and "Pakistan Al-Qaeda chief killed by US drone," *Dawn*, September 28, 2010.

² See "TTP's Top Gun Qari Hussain Killed," *Dawn*, October 16, 2010.

³ See "Al-Qaeda terror plot targeting Europe uncovered," *BBC*, September 29, 2010.

⁴ Pak Institute of Peace Studies briefing to author, June 2010. Also see "Year of the Drone: An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan 2004-2010," New American Foundation: 2010, and Bill Roggio and Alexander Mayer, "Charting the data for US airstrikes in Pakistan, 2004-2010," *Long Wars Journal*, 2010.

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⁶ Author interviews with senior Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) and National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), August and September 2010. See also, "Pakistan floods could give Taliban time to regroup," *Dawn*, August 12, 2010.

⁷ For details see, "The Pakistani Surge: the way forward for counterinsurgency in Pakistan," Special Report, *Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, June 2010.

⁸ Author briefed by senior security fellows at Institute of Strategic Studies and Pak Institute for Peace Studies, June 2010; also see "Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2010," *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, September 2010

⁹ Senior officials, National Disaster Management Authority briefing to author, September 2010. See "Help Flood Victims or Al Qaeda will move in," *The Sun*, August 19, 2010.

¹⁰ Unclassified intelligence briefing to author by Pakistani government officials, September 2010; and Rahimullah Yusufzai, "Business as Usual: Floods Have Not Slowed Militant Attacks," *Newline*, September 26, 2010.

¹¹ ISPR Intelligence briefing to author, September 2010.

¹² See Reza Khan, "Pakistan denies militant group is global terror threat," *Washington Times*, August 25, 2010.

¹³ Data collected by author in 2008-2010 from engagements with Pakistani military, intelligence, and police officials; selected journalists, academics, security analysts, and numerous Pakistani open source media, including the Urdu press, and government documents.

¹⁴ See "Germany says investigating US drone strike deaths," *Dawn*, October 5, 2010.

¹⁵ Author briefed by Pakistani counterinsurgency strategists while visiting an IED research facility in Quetta, Pakistan, during June 2010.

¹⁶ Author interview with Frontier Corps, 11th Corp, Military Intelligence (MI), Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and Police Special Branch officials during October 2009 and August and September 2010.

¹⁷ *Defense in depth* is defined as an information operations strategy to achieve information assurance by the U.S. National Security Council. See NSC paper "Defense in Depth: A Practical Strategy for Achieving Information Assurance in Today's Highly Networked Environment," Information Assurance Solutions Group.

¹⁸ See Haider A. H. Mullick, "Al Qaeda's Strategic Chaos," *The News International* (Pakistan), June 4, 2008.

¹⁹ See Mairam Abou Zahab, "The SSP: Herald of Militant Sunni Islam in Pakistan," in *Armed Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists*, by Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot, London: C Hurst & Co., 2009, p 159-176.

²⁰ See Amir Mir, *Talibanization of Pakistan: from 9/11 to 26/11*, New Delhi, Pentagon Security International Press, 2009, p 54.

²¹ Rana, *A to Z Jehadi Organization in Pakistan*, p 97

²² Author interview with Lieutenant General (retired), Mahmud Durrani, former National Security Adviser (2008-2009), November 2009, and Dr. Mqasudyul Hasan Nuri, Senior Research Fellow, Islamabad Policy Research Institute, May 2010, also see "Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2010," *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, September 2010.

²³ JeM is an offshoot of Harkat ul Mujahideen. Author interview with Pakistan's Army 11th Corps officials, June 2010.

²⁴ Author interview with Pakistani Police Special Branch officials during August 2010. See Muhammad Amir Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan* (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2009) p 10.

²⁵ Author interview with Ashraf Ali, President, FATA Research Center, May 2010.

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²⁷ See Muhammad Amir Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan*, Lahore: Mashal Books, 2009, p 229.

²⁸ Author interview with Shabana Fayaz, Associate Professor, Defense and Strategic Studies Department, Quaid-e-Azam University, May 2010.

²⁹ Data collected from officials of National Disaster Management Authority and ISI in June, August and September 2010.

³⁰ Author interview with senior Pakistani intelligence officials during August 2010, and Khurram Iqbal, fellow, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, June 2010.

³¹ Author interviews with Senior Intelligence officials during August, 2010.

³² For example, Jamaat-ud-Dawa is a front for LeT. See "Jamaat-ud-Dawa easily evades ban," *Dawn*, February 24, 2010.

³³ See "Tablighi Jamaat: Discourse and Challenges," *Conflict and Peace Studies*, Pak Institute for Peace Studies, Vol 2, April-June 2009, and Iftikhar Malik, *Pakistan: Democracy, Terrorism and the Building of a Nation*, Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2010, p 133-140.

³⁴ Alhe Hadis, Wahhabis, and Salafis are closely related to the Deobandis in that they all reject the heterodox view of Barelvis and the Sufis.

³⁵ Author interviews with senior Australian, British, and American government officials during July 2009, March June 2010, and with Pakistani army, Frontier Corps, police, and intelligence officials during September 2009 as well as June, August, and September 2010.

³⁶ See "Musharraf warns of new military coup in Pakistan," *AFP*, September 30, 2010.

³⁷ See Haider Ali Hussein Mullick, "Holding Pakistan: The Second Phase of Pakistan's Counterinsurgency Operations," *Foreign Affairs*, March 24, 2010.

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³⁹ See Khaled Ahmed, "Altaf Hussain Targets PPP," *The Friday Times*, September 3-9, 2010.

⁴⁰ For detailed look at Pakistan's historic national security doctrine to foment insurgencies (FOIN) in India and Pakistan, see Haider Ali Hussein Mullick's *Pakistan's Security Paradox: Countering and Fomenting Insurgencies*, Hulbert Field, FL: U.S. Joint Special Operations University Press, 2009, p 11-61.

⁴¹ Officially known as the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009.

⁴² See Sajid Chaudhry, "World Bank's Projection: Tax-to-FDSP ratio to be 12.7% under CPS 2010-2013," *Daily Times*, August 15, 2010.

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