

Helping Pakistan Defeat the Taliban:

A Joint Action Agenda for the United States & Pakistan

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INTRODUCTION

In late April 2009, taking full advantage of a failing state, the Pakistani Taliban were sixty miles away from the capital of nuclear-armed Pakistan.¹ Pakistan had capitulated in the Swat Valley by granting *carte blanche* to the Taliban to exercise administrative and judicial control, thus placing even more territory under direct Taliban rule after Pakistan lost control of most of its tribal agencies abutting Afghanistan. Two months after an unprecedented military operation,² however, Taliban forces were in retreat and more than 2.5 million denizens of the Swat valley were displaced. After five years of a failed counterinsurgency policy, the Pakistani military was finally willing to strengthen the “lessons learned loop” in its decision-making process. While this transformation is anything but complete, the civil-military complex in Islamabad has moved away, albeit slowly, from using unrestrained brute force toward using stabilization operations that focus on protecting civilians and the economic infrastructure. Moreover, Islamabad has upgraded the Taliban to the status of Pakistan’s number one enemy, even while it alleges Indian support for the insurgency in Baluchistan and its indirect support in terms of arms to militants in Pakistan’s northwest.

There are more positive signs. For example, President Barack Obama is pushing for a regional approach (AfPak) and a broad assistance package (socio-economic and military assistance), both of which are resonating in Islamabad – especially the American commitment³ to help rehabilitate Pakistan’s approximately 2.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). At present, more than 95 percent⁴ of the Swat Valley and its environs are under Islamabad’s control as thousands are being repatriated back to major cities like Mingora.⁵

Furthermore, Pakistan’s current military success against the Taliban is garnering public support,⁶ and its shift toward population security abetted by the use of precision weapons is increasing troop morale⁷ and uniting mainstream political parties.⁸ Positive developments include the timely support offered by the United States Congress, the Pentagon, and the State Department⁹ to bolster Islamabad’s efforts to win this war. Moreover, Pakistan has shifted its threat perception toward the Taliban and away from India¹⁰ even while issues of accountability, trainers, and equipment remain unresolved.

The return of the Congress government in India, with a greater majority and willingness to work toward Pakistan-India peace process, raises hopes for an extended *détente* between the two countries. The recent meeting



between Pakistan's Prime Minister Yusuf Reza Gilani and India's Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh on the sidelines of the Non-Alliance Movement meeting at Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, has broken the stalemate between the two nuclear states after last fall's terrorist attacks in Mumbai. The joint statement issued clearly states the common threat from terrorism and the need for bilateral talks to resolve all outstanding issues, including Kashmir and India's suspected involvement in Baluchistan.¹¹ If this process continues, Pakistan will be able to move more troops away from its eastern border with India and toward its western border to bolster its ongoing campaign against the Taliban, which the American military will welcome. In addition, there is reason to believe that India's recent change of heart was influenced by United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's visit.¹²

There are also major caveats: without a broad strategy to "hold"¹³ (govern, police, rehabilitate) areas taken back from the Taliban, a vicious cycle of partial enemy defeat without sustainable socio-economic and political progress to prevent its return will continue. Moreover, if the Taliban's blowback (suicide attacks in major Pakistani, Afghan, or – even worse – Indian cities) is not prevented or contained, the Pakistani military will be spread too thin and lose popular support. The lack of the fast delivery of American military equipment (night vision capable helicopter gunships and mine-proof vehicles) is made worse by the insufficient number of Pakistani military personnel trained to use such equipment effectively. While American aid dollars, helicopters, and trainers would certainly help, Pakistanis will have to sustain their victories by continuing to improve the planning, execution, and evaluation of their stabilization efforts in the Swat Valley. Prime Minister Gilani recently ordered the first phase of a large-scale offensive against the Taliban's lair in Waziristan where their leader, Baitullah Mehsud (recently killed in a U.S. drone attack¹⁴) and his aides, have forces that are six times the size (30,000) of those in the Swat's Valley and is surrounded by terrain and tribes that are historically hostile to invading armies. And one must not forget that the Pakistani military has been defeated there numerous times since 2004.¹⁵ The real test of Pakistan's emerging counterinsurgency success will be Waziristan, and Islamabad will need all the help it can get.

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While the American government cannot – and should not – take over nation-building tasks from Islamabad, improving Pakistan's institutional capacity (notably in the military, intelligence, police, and governance), providing vital equipment and targeted training will help both countries achieve their common security goal: interdiction of Taliban and Al Qaeda.

This report briefly examines how the United States can best support the shift in Pakistan's national security strategy from an enemy-centric counterinsurgency to a hybrid population and enemy-centered counterinsurgency. The next section looks at how Pakistan's *national security strategy* has evolved, including lessons-learned from past military offensives, and what it means for common American and Pakistani security goals.

COUNTERINSURGENCY IN PAKISTAN: LESSONS LEARNED AND FORGOTTEN

The following brief overview of counterinsurgency in Pakistan, as well as the lessons learned, forgotten, and relearned, provides the foundation for the next sections, which explicate the new counterinsurgency approach and how both countries can work together to defeat the Taliban in Pakistan.

AMERICAN-PAKISTANI RELATIONS IN BRIEF

The American-Pakistani relationship is the result of past security and economic agreements made during the cold war and the recent partnership against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Pakistan joined several security pacts during the 1950s, among them the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO); spied on the Chinese (1960s) for the Americans, and then facilitated dialogue between the Chinese and the Americans (1970s); participated in the large international covert operation to oust the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan in the 1980s; and, after 9/11, became a vital American partner and notable aid recipient (\$11 billion from 2002-08).

But there were also long spells of unmet expectations, mistrust, and broken promises, particularly when the United States felt betrayed by Pakistan's effort to make Afghanistan a battleground for a reciprocal proxy war with India, its continuous development and proliferation of nuclear weapon technology, and its selective cooperation against the Taliban. Pakistan, on the other hand, found American largess unreliable and episodic; viewed American reluctance to aid it against India in 1965 and 1971 as disingenuous; and saw American disinterest in Afghanistan's contagious insecurity after the Soviets withdrew in 1989, as well as its military and economic sanctions against Pakistan's nuclear program and disregard for Pakistani geostrategic concerns, insincere.

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General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, Chief of Army Staff during his visit to North Waziristan Agency.

This troubled marriage of convenience has made both partners realize over time that their common national security interests in the region (eliminating terrorist threats) outweigh their diverging ones. For the United States, these consist of unequivocally eliminating all terrorists and breaking the Taliban, supporting an American-friendly India as a counterweight to a rising China, and taming a recalcitrant Iran. For Pakistan, these consist of the selective elimination of terrorist and insurgent groups to offset India protect its nuclear weapons, selectively foment

insurgencies as instruments of foreign policy, increasing its energy trade with Iran, and strengthening relations with China and the Middle East.

There are no cut-and-dried alliances in the twenty-first century, and the American-Pakistani situation is not unique. While these reluctant partners may disagree on broad regional security and economic interests, the resurgence of a virulent Taliban insurgency in southeastern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan is forcing them to see eye to eye,¹⁶ especially after the ongoing military operations in the Swat Valley and Afghanistan's Helmand province.

Not until the summer of 2009 did Pakistan's national security outlook become centered on the existential threat from India (including Indian influence in Afghanistan) and domestic autonomist movements. For most of its sixty-two-year existence, Pakistan's national security strategy – created and executed by its military – was a mix of countering domestic separatism and foreign threats from India by means of coercive counterinsurgency, nuclear deterrence, and fomenting tit-for-tat insurgencies against India.

PAKISTAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Pakistan's national security strategy is a product of its creation, its multiethnic population, and the prevailing geostrategic threats and opportunities. Its main goal is to protect the country's territorial, geopolitical, and economic interests. After a protracted nationalist movement against British control of the Indian subcontinent, India and Pakistan gained independence in 1947. The British partition plan, which based on religious division, was erroneously simple, poorly implemented, and ended up creating two warring countries. Provinces were broken up (e.g., Punjab) and several states, notably ones close to national borders like Kashmir, were given the choice to pick their patrons – India or Pakistan. A Hindu maharaja ruled a predominantly Muslim Kashmir; he chose to accede to India, triggering the first Indo-Pak war. In 1971, after two decades of independence, Pakistan was bisected by India, which used the outbreak of civil war between West and East Pakistan to help the latter (now Bangladesh) become independent. These conflicts forever sowed the seeds of instability in the region, making India Pakistan's number one enemy.

Since independence, continuous socio-economic and political woes have worsened the historical multiethnic and sectarian strife. In a country where a loud minority wants a theocratic Sunni Islamist republic while others argue for a loose federation, Pakistanis have struggled to build consensus on a broad common national purpose and identity. For most of its history (discontinuous periods of shaky democracy notwithstanding), a Punjabi-dominated military and civilian bureaucracy elite has governed Pakistan. At different times, military and civilian leaders have combined fear of Indian hegemony, Islamic identity, and external aid from the Middle East, China, and the United States to keep the country intact – the basis and core goal of the national security strategy. Pakistan has fought three conventional wars with India, eleven domestic insurgencies (Bengali, Sindhi, Mohajir, Pashtun, and Baluch), and fomented four insurgencies in India (Kashmir and Punjab) and Afghanistan (1980-89; 1989-2001, and, indirectly, from 2003-2008).

On balance, Pakistan's national security strategy centers on protecting its territorial boundaries by ensuring its socio-economic viability against internal dissent (ethnic, separatist, and religio-political insurgencies) and external threats (India) within a constitutional democratic system that is an accidental (and not a desired) outcome. Hence, at its core Pakistan is a security state fearful of India, wary of democracy, intolerant of religio-ethnic strife, inclined to use religion (Islam) as a unifier, and dependent on the United States, China, and the Middle East for military and economic aid.

To preserve its territorial integrity, Pakistan has fought more wars with its own people than with India. Following is a brief history of its counterinsurgency operations.

COUNTERINSURGENCY IN PAKISTAN 1947-2001

Since gaining independence, Pakistan has fought several major counterinsurgencies (Bengali, Sindhi, Pashtun, Baluchi, and Mohajir), many of them more than once and two that are still ongoing (Pashtun-Taliban and Baluchi). Never save one exception, has the state lost completely to the insurgents. In 1971 Indian-backed Bengali irredentist insurgents defeated the army and established Bangladesh. In most cases, army campaigns have brutally suppressed full-blown insurgencies into “dormant” ones. Pakistan has primarily followed the “coercion” or “out-terrorize-the-terrorist” school of thought: seldom focusing on socio-economic development to gain the population's trust, it has instead prioritized brute military tactics over sustainable constitutional or political compromise.

After fighting numerous insurgencies, the army learned, forgot, and relearned the goal of a successful counterinsurgency: winning the support of the people. For example, right after the loss of East Pakistan a Sindhi insurgency challenged the central government. Knowing that brute force had backfired against the Bengali insurgents, Islamabad used smart political maneuvers, albeit with the threat of force, to pacify these new insurgents. A few years later, this lesson was quickly forgotten when the army launched a conventional war against Baluchi insurgents.

Since last winter, after five years of a failed counterinsurgency strategy, there is a systematic – albeit slow and tenuous – shift away from coercion to the “winning hearts and mind” school of counterinsurgency (e.g., recent operations in Bajaur and the Swat Valley). In the “clear, hold, and build” line of thinking, Pakistani counterinsurgents have historically had little trouble “clearing”

an area of insurgents, but have failed to “hold” and “build” it. Most of the time, the “holding” and “building” parts – encouraging sustainable political reconciliation and socio-economic development – have fallen behind. While the jury is out on how sustainable and replicable the new counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy is, there is no doubt that the Pakistani military has (relative to the last fourteen operations) made population security and economic infrastructure its top priorities. Other improvements include a better campaign design and implementation and lessons-learned process – albeit slow and inefficient. Following is a brief review of major insurgencies from 1948-2001.

The Bengali Insurgency:

As mentioned earlier, territorial integrity is the primary goal of Pakistan’s national security strategy. More than 90 percent of Pakistanis are Muslim; however, Islam as a unifying force failed when, in 1971, Pakistan became the first former colonial state to break into two. Since independence, Bengalis had felt that they received the raw end of the deal. Aside from a common religion (Islam), they found themselves culturally, ethnically, and linguistically alienated from Punjabi-dominated West Pakistan.

Growing grievances reached the boiling point when West Pakistanis imposed Urdu (and not Bengali) as the national language and categorically discriminated against Bengalis for government and military jobs. In the elections of 1971, the Bengalis won a clear majority but were not allowed to form a government. Soon thereafter, the Pakistani military launched a brutal campaign to suppress the dissenters. The ensuing insurgency attracted Indian support, and within nine months 90,000 Pakistani soldiers had surrendered and 8,000 had been killed in action by an overwhelming Indian force backing the Bengali *Mukti Bahini* guerillas. Close to 3,000 Indian soldiers were killed; the number of Bengalis killed has been estimated at between 1 and 3 million. While the West Pakistani military created local paramilitary forces (*razakars* and *shantis*), the use of coercion and unfettered force left no room for political reconciliation. As a result, Pakistan was bifurcated.¹⁷ The Pakistani army lost the support of the Bengali population when it intervened on behalf of West Pakistan – and did so without mercy.

The Sindhi Insurgencies:

Although Sindhi ethnic discrimination and economic grievances against the Punjabi-dominated central government began in the early 1950s, the breaking away of Bangladesh in 1971 gave Sindhi secessionists renewed hope. More than 40 percent of Sindh’s land was owned by non-Sindhis, mostly Punjabis and Mohajirs (those who had migrated from India to Pakistan after independence). The insurgency’s rationale was simple: decades-long economic, political, and ethnic prejudices by the central government led to the desire for a separate homeland: *Sindhudesh*.

After pursuing a short politically centered counterinsurgency policy, Islamabad brought Sindhi dissidents on board for drafting the fourth (and most widely accepted) national constitution of 1973, which ensured greater provincial autonomy. As the gap between the constitution on paper and in practice increased, ethnic and provincial divisions remerged and persisted. Most recently, the insurgency was on the verge of becoming “hot” when Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan’s two-time prime minister from Sindh, was assassinated in late 2007. At present, the movement for *Sindhudesh* is largely marginalized.¹⁸

Having bled long against the Bengali insurgents, the Pakistani army had no choice but to find a political solution and succeeded in keeping Sindh as part of the republic.

The Mohajir Insurgency:

The Mohajirs are present in large numbers in the port city of Karachi and its outskirts. Having played a significant role in the creation of Pakistan, they were rewarded with high civil and military posts. Over time, however, their influence diminished as Pashtuns and Sindhis challenged their political monopoly. In response, the Mohajirs created a Leninist political party, the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), that was open to the use of violence to attain its political and economic goals.

When civil unrest reached uncontrollable levels and some MQM insurgents demanded the creation of a separate homeland (*Jinnahpur*), the Pakistani military was deployed to defeat the primarily ethnic insurgency. Several military operations were conducted periodically between 1985 and 2003, but lasting peace came only when tactics were shifted from coercion to sporadic efforts to “win the hearts and minds” of the Mohajirs. For example, in the late 1990s military rangers began disengaging from populous urban areas after years of guarding check posts with local police, winning local support, and improving the collection of actionable intelligence.¹⁹

Furthermore, in the 1990s the military outsourced holding operations to the Karachi police, a decision that yielded surprisingly positive results albeit incidents of human rights violations.²⁰ Eventually, a mix of military force, policing, and political compromise weakened the insurgency as most insurgents joined the political process under the constitution.

The Baluchi Insurgencies:

After the loss of East Pakistan, the Pakistani military inconsistently mixed political reconciliation with brute force counterinsurgency tactics. The “coercion” school of counterinsurgency, however, remained paramount. The Baluchi insurgencies (1947, 1958-59, 1963-69, 1973-77, and 2003-06) have particular relevance to the current war against the Taliban, for Baluchistan borders Afghanistan and Pakistan’s northwest tribal areas; shares ethnic (almost half of its population is Pashtun) and tribal bonds with the North West Frontier Province and Afghanistan; provides 40 percent of Pakistan’s energy needs (specifically natural gas); and is widely known to host Afghan Taliban leaders, part of the “Quetta Shura” that frequently meets and plans attacks on North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and American troops. That said, these insurgents are not synonymous with the mostly Pashtun Taliban. In fact, there is little evidence of cooperation between the two, because the Baluchi insurgents’ grievances with the central government are largely based on ethnic and economic discrimination.

The last two prominent insurgencies (1973-77 and 2003-06, respectively) were politico-nationalist as opposed to religio-political like the Taliban. Fearing that the two *sardars* (tribal leaders) of the Bizenjo and Mengal tribes, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and Sardar Ataullah Khan Mengal, respectively, were obtaining weapons from Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime in the 1970s, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto dismissed the Baluch provincial government. The third tribe, the Bugti, headed by Nawab Bhugti, supported the government but later joined the separatists. Helicopter gunships from Iran and 80,000 troops brutally suppressed the rebellion and led to a twenty-five-year truce.²¹

In early 2003, Baluchi dissidents, decrying the unchecked political and economic discrimination, began attacking natural gas pipelines and Frontier Corps (a border patrol force under the Pakistani army now engaged in counterinsurgency) units. Pakistan began a major military operation after a half-hearted effort at negotiations failed. Amidst significant collateral damage, a massive number of IDPs, and continuous insecurity, the insurgency began to die out in 2006 when several Baluchi leaders, notably Nawab Bhugti, were killed or forced into exile. After the February 2008 national elections, the insurgency morphed into a political movement and is so far dormant.²²

Recently, however, this insurgency has been gaining speed and the window for political compromise with Islamabad may be closing.²³ There are also accusations by Pakistani intelligence that India is supporting the insurgency and complaints by Baluchi nationalist leaders of assassination attempts launched by Pakistani intelligence. Some reports suggest that the Taliban may have started supporting the Baluchi insurgents to open multiple fronts and shift the army's pressure away from itself²⁴

On balance, the Pakistani army soon forgot the lesson of the Bengali insurgency and continued to rely on coercion, which would once again lead to a full brown insurgency, this time in Pakistan's northwest.

The Northwest Insurgencies:

Before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan's northwest frontier region was episodically hit by ethno-nationalist insurgencies. After the invasion, its tribal areas became the conduit for recruits and arms for the Mujahideen insurgents. After 9/11, their successors, the Taliban, became active against the NATO and American military forces in Afghanistan. Sometime in late 2006 the Pakistani Taliban, loosely connected to the Afghan Taliban but primarily focused on controlling nuclear-armed Pakistan, made the northwest frontier their home. The Pakistani military applied coercion against the ethno-nationalists before the Soviet invasion, then bolstered the religio-political insurgents – many of whom shared ethnic and tribal ties with the Afghans – during the Soviet invasion, and, until recently, selectively interdicted Taliban leaders. This continued until the Taliban directly threatened Islamabad and gained effective control over key frontier areas. A short history of Pakistan's counterinsurgency in the frontier follows.

Before independence, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), now home to 20 million Pashtuns, were led by the popular Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, head of the *Red Shirts*, a nonviolent secessionist movement that wanted a separate homeland for the Pashtuns (*Pashtunistan*). As envisioned by Khan, *Pashtunistan* would at a later stage encompass all of Afghanistan's Pashtun-majority areas.

Over the years the Awami National Party (ANP) (previously known as the National Awami Party), a reformed structure of the old Red Shirts movement led by Askandar Khan Wali, Khan's son, has demanded more provincial autonomy but not complete independence.²⁵ In the recent national election held during February 2008, the ANP defeated the Islamist parties by promising to bring peace to the NWFP and FATA, minimizing military operations, and maximizing political reconciliation and economic development. By early 2009, it had failed on all three accounts and the insurgency was burgeoning.

Fearing that the Pashtun nationalist party would demand more autonomy – or, even worse, independence – from Islamabad, the army historically marginalized it by using a mix of Islamist parties and their sympathizers along with a mix of police and some army action. The ethno-nationalist insurgency was quelled mainly through political maneuvering.

More recently the insurgency in the northwest is composed of the Pakistani Taliban who are currently fighting the Pakistani army. At first, the army applied the “out-terrorize-the-terrorist” approach; recently, however, it has made a significant but tenuous move toward a hybrid approach that relies on killing the enemy but minimizing collateral damage, creating a presence after “clearing” an area, and supporting local intelligence and militias for continued success.

The following table summarizes the major lessons learned and shifts in Pakistan’s national security outlook.

“When the Pakistani military did act against the Taliban, it did so without a comprehensive “whole of government” effort or a well planned counterinsurgency campaign. Ignoring important lessons learned, such as the centrality of population support and the pervasive side effects of the indiscriminate use of force, the Pakistani military went into the tribal areas with a “search and destroy” strategy that consisted of profusely using mortars, artillery, fighter jets, and helicopter gunships.”



TABLE 1 - COUNTERINSURGENCY IN PAKISTAN - BROAD LESSONS LEARNED

Insurgency	COIN School of Thought	State Strategy & Goals	Tactics	Outcome	Lessons-Captured/ Learned/ Forgotten/ Relearned
Bengali (1971)	Maximum Coercion, Minimum Political Compromise	Establish the writ of the state in East Pakistan by complete interdiction of all insurgents and their supporters; deprioritize political compromise	Apply Brute force tactics: extra-judicial detention, torture, and killing; garner support from local Islamist paramilitary forces	The state lost; East Pakistan became Bangladesh with significant external materiel and military help from India	Brute force alone cannot achieve victory in a protracted irregular war; political solution is vital; out-terrorizing the insurgents inevitably terrorizes the population, thus creating a long stream of insurgent recruits
Sindhi (1970s)	Minimum Coercion, Maximum Political Compromise	Establish the writ of the state and a pro-center provincial government; stop the creation of <i>Sindhudesh</i> by marginalizing the autonomists through political compromise	Send government delegations to Sindh; pass mutually agreed upon national constitution; Encourage Sindhi political participation (Key instrument: premier intelligence agency, ISI)	The state won; Sindhi nationalists marginalized	Political maneuvering works; in a multiethnic country constitutional equality is vital
Mohajir (1990s)	Maximum Coercion followed by Maximum Political Compromise	Establish the writ of the government in Karachi; stop the creation of <i>Jinnahpur</i> through effective army and police action; deprioritize human rights	Execute selective army action in large areas; pervasive police action with little or no judicial oversight; Execute political manipulation of the MQM leadership by creating a rival faction (through ISI)	The state won; MQM joined the constitutional political process by abandoning its overt insurgency against the state	Police action is effective in urban areas, especially if those involved are well trained and allowed to operate with minimum red-tape; political manipulation of political parties can weaken autonomist movements.

TABLE 1 - COUNTERINSURGENCY IN PAKISTAN - BROAD LESSONS LEARNED *continued*

Insurgency	COIN School of Thought	State Strategy & Goals	Tactics	Outcome	Lessons-Captured/ Learned/ Forgotten/ Relearned
Northwest – Nationalists (1950s-70s)	Maximum Coercion and Minimum Political Compromise	Interdict all groups and individuals advocating <i>Pashtunistan</i> by military action and political manipulation	Incarcerate and terrorize nationalist leaders through ISI	The state won; the ANP abandoned its demand for a separate homeland and joined the constitutional political process	A mix of coercion and political manipulation works.
Northwest – Taliban (2002-08)	Minimum Coercion and Maximum Political Compromise	Phase I: Selectively go after those Taliban directly linked with Al Qaeda. Phase II: Use brute force against Taliban strongholds; ignore collateral and infrastructural damage	Use heavy artillery and air power; don't shy away from destroying entire villages and communities to achieve strategic goals	The state lost; troop morale declined; human-intelligence network broke down; Pakistani Taliban took over most of the seven tribal agencies and the 'settled areas' of Buner, Swat, Dir, Shangla, Tank, and Dera Isamil Khan.	Lesson relearned; coercion alone does not work; a presence-oriented approach is key; saving the people is vital
Northwest – Taliban (2009)	Selective Coercion and Selective Political Compromise	Establish writ of the government in the settled and tribal areas by clearing AND holding areas (improve campaign design)	Selectively use artillery and fighter jets; smartly use helicopter gunships; shift toward patrolling areas and showing presence of troops to local denizens; persuade locals to provide intelligence	The state is winning battles but the outcome is too early to call: Swat is under control; holding operations are underway; BUT some tribal areas are NOT under the writ of the government	A hybrid model of enemy- and population-centric counterinsurgency that relies on the selective use of precise military, economic, and political force works because it raises troop morale, yields better intelligence, and wins over the population.

THE COUNTERINSURGENCY AGAINST THE TALIBAN: LESSONS FORGOTTEN (2002-08)

Today the American, Afghan, and Pakistani governments are equally committed to defeating the transnational Taliban insurgency. But this was not always the case. For nearly seven years before the current operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the United States and Pakistan had significantly different threat perceptions and security goals. Both countries went after Al Qaeda with full force, but the United States (due to its lack of troops and resources) and Pakistan (due to its threat perception vis-à-vis India) could not, or did not, go after the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban wholeheartedly. Pakistan considered some Taliban factions, especially the Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the Haqqani Network, as “strategic assets” against a pro-India Kabul and an insurance policy toward a pro-India Afghanistan once the Americans departed. Moreover, certain regional militant groups aligned with the Taliban from southern Punjab (Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan) were considered strategic assets against India in the disputed region of Kashmir. This resulted in a complex mix of Pakistan struggling to achieve its national security goal of interdicting Al Qaeda with the United States while simultaneously continuing a duplicitous policy of supporting or tolerating anti-Indian Taliban and Kashmiri militants.

When the Pakistani military did act against the Taliban, it did so without a comprehensive “whole of government”²⁶ effort or a well planned counterinsurgency campaign. Ignoring important lessons learned, such as the centrality of population support and the pervasive side effects of the indiscriminate use of force, the Pakistani military went into the tribal areas with a “search and destroy” strategy that consisted of profusely using mortars, artillery, fighter jets, and helicopter gunships. Insurgents would simply run off to remote terrain in agencies such as North and South Waziristan, wait for the army to return to its colonial-era forward operating bases, and then attack convoys using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and ambush soldiers. In the midst of mission ambiguity, low troop morale, and zero political and popular support from the Pakistani street, which was convinced that then-president Pervez Musharraf was fighting “America’s war,” the army began to capitulate and sign peace deals that gave the Taliban administrative and political carte blanche.

Since late 2008 and after President Barack Obama introduced his new policy emphasizing the defeat of Al Qaeda’s terrorist network in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Islamabad is reining in the Pakistani Taliban and Al Qaeda equally. Obama’s approach, however, fails to take into account the interest of the United States’ indispensable ally Pakistan, which is concerned not with just Al Qaeda but also with what it sees as India’s growing influence in Afghanistan and the threat of subversion.

“Recent interviews with senior Pakistani military officials yield that Pakistani cooperation will pivot on the Obama administration’s readiness to contain India’s anti-Pakistani efforts in Afghanistan.”

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Recent interviews with senior Pakistani military officials reveal that Pakistani cooperation will pivot on the Obama administration's readiness to contain India's anti-Pakistani efforts in Afghanistan. In the early years of U.S. intervention in Afghanistan, the leaders in Kabul failed to conciliate pro-Pakistan and moderate Taliban leaders by consistently ignoring their legitimate influence over southeast Afghanistan, thereby increasing Islamabad's worries. President Hamid Karzai gave India unprecedented access by accepting large amounts of socio-economic aid (worth \$750 million since 2001, with another \$1.6 billion pledged for the future²⁷) and military training – knowing that Pakistan, with its \$200 million program, could not compete. He also ignored Pakistani allegations of “India's financial support” for separatists from Pakistan's Baluchistan province, as military analyst Ayesha Siddiqha has noted.²⁸ This alleged support could be in retaliation for Pakistani backing for the Kashmiri insurgency and the Taliban attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul.



PAKISTAN'S EMERGING COUNTERINSURGENCY APPROACH: LESSONS RELEARNED

In late April 2009, the Taliban directly challenged the writ of nuclear-armed Pakistan²⁹ by taking over control of Buner, a region located on the outskirts of the Swat Valley. A few weeks later the Pakistani military, using helicopter gunships, fighter jets, and Special Forces, destroyed the Taliban's iron grip on the Swat Valley and pushed them northward, a development that created 2.5 million³⁰ IDPs. A new hybrid counterinsurgency strategy is now emerging, one that centers on a military institutional pride contingent upon political support and brought about by both protecting the population and interdicting the enemy.

Analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of this new approach is crucial for long-term American and Pakistani interests.



This new approach emerged last fall when Gen. Tariq Khan, abetted by junior officers, radically changed tactics and strategy for *Operation Shirdil* (Lion Heart) in Bajaur, a tribal area abutting Afghanistan and a former Al Qaeda hub. Initially relying on the “out-terrorizing the terrorist” model, he shifted to population security by ordering patrolling, supporting tribal *lashkars* (militias) and *jirgas* (tribal councils) so that they would be more willing to identify irreconcilable members of the Taliban, encouraging camaraderie between the primarily Punjabi officers and Pashtun soldiers, and, most importantly, building troop morale – what I collectively call *the Bajaur experiment*.³¹

Last fall, the military sent Gen. Khan to take charge of operations there. This was a very difficult assignment, for Al Qaeda operatives had been nested there for years, ever since escaping American firepower during the initial Afghan campaign of fall 2001. These terrorists bankrolled the Pakistani Taliban and used kangaroo courts, public beheadings, and other forms of terror to extend their sway.

At first, the Pakistani military's response to the Taliban had been disastrous. Caught off guard by their onslaught, the army had responded with brute force and thus managed to alienate the locals.

At the same time, the intelligence services advocated a duplicitous policy of trying to crack down on local Taliban while supporting them in Afghanistan in order to counter Indian influence there.

The change came in the ongoing Operation Righteous Path Part IV, the name clearly indicating that the previous three had failed. The number one reason for this failure was that even though the army had done an excellent job of clearing the area, it had been reluctant to hold it and thus outsourced this task to those who were inept in policing, incompetent in governance, and uninterested in security, roads, jobs, and schools. A weak local government would negotiate with the local Taliban by granting its members asylum and allowing them to return and kill government collaborators, which only ignited another “search and destroy” military operation. This vicious cycle of “blow up, patch up, and wait up” destroyed all “local support for military-led information and intelligence operations,” as a senior army official involved in the planning of the current counterinsurgency campaign stated. However, “the worst part was [the] corrosion of troop morale ... we needed a new plan.”

While the new plan was not very different and the positive changes only came when junior officers incorporated on-the-job creativity, central command clearly realized the existence of low morale and performance gaps. In early 2008 Gen. Ashfaq Kiani, an indispensable member of Pakistan’s leadership troika (president, prime minister, army chief), initiated a decisive shift toward counterinsurgency in arms procurement and military curriculum, symbolically calling 2008 “The Year of the Soldier” and 2009 “The Year of Training,” and also buttressing the Directorate of Military Operations (the army’s strategy think tank) and intelligence reform. But this top-down approach was slow and made worse by a dysfunctional Defense Ministry, a turf-conscious Interior Ministry, and ineffective Defense and National Security Parliamentary committees. The real change would be driven from the bottom up by junior officers, and the impetus would come from popular support for the war.

While the Bajaur experiment clearly bolstered troop morale, the Pakistani military needed a broad political consensus to apply the lessons learned. This opportunity came when the Taliban occupied Swat’s environs (Buner, Shangla, etc.) in April, called Pakistan’s constitution “un-Islamic,” and granted Osama bin Laden safe passage. In a seemingly pre-planned manner, the military did not react instantly; rather, it waited for the government to build a political consensus based upon the Taliban onslaught and international pressure. Religious organizations representing missionary groups (Tabligi Jamaat) and clerics (mullahs), such as Jamiat-ul-Ulema-Pakistan came on board³² even while mainstream Islamist parties protested (the Jaamat-e-Islami [JI] and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam [UI]). Shortly thereafter, a 152,000³³ troop military operation, the largest since 2001, centering on Swat but covering all of the northern frontier and tribal areas, notably the North and South Waziristan, began.

“Predictably, ‘clearing’ operations were easy but coming up with a winning mix of Special Forces, intelligence operations, infantry patrols, cobra gunships, fighter jets and artillery was much harder.”

Predictably, “clearing” operations were easy; coming up with a winning mix of Special Forces, intelligence operations, infantry patrols, Cobra gunships, fighter jets, and artillery was much harder. Junior officers were tired of applying counterproductive brute force tactics for seven years, pinning hopes on the swift delivery of

high-tech American gadgets, and frustrated by the American failure to control Afghanistan. Bolstered by a new-found popular support for the war, they identified the Taliban as the existential threat to their nuclear-armed country (momentarily placing arch-rival India on the backburner). Numerous captains, majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels became the bearers of change in the military's culture and tactics.³⁴



Corp Commander Lieutenant General Muhammad Masood Aslam talking to troops engaged in operation Rah-e-Rasat.

Not having any worthwhile published counterinsurgency manuals to follow helped field commanders operate freely. Using the precedent of the Bajaur experiment, junior officers asked to become part of decision-making process – especially Frontier Corps officers, who are usually considered incompetent and compromised because of their ethnic links to the predominantly Pashtun Taliban. In a country torn by religious, nationalist, and ethnic fissures, racism was the last thing that the Pakistani army needed. Consequently, Punjabi officers began courting Pashtun soldiers. In one incident, Frontier Corps Major Asad Malik (Punjabi) and his men (Pashtun) were ambushed in lower Swat in mid-May. After repelling six suicide attacks in fifteen minutes, he stood up, looked at his shaken men, which prompted them to stop their suppressive fire,, and said: “We are all soldiers ... every one of us ... together we fight for Pakistan. It is an honor to fight with you.”

Moreover, junior officers soon realized that battle fatigue was not just a function of a protracted war against one's own people, but, most importantly, was also due to a chronic lack of pride. “If we can't win ... gain back territory ... then troop morale goes down ... but now we're winning every day... and everyday morale goes up,” explained Lt. Col. Naseer Janjua.

While encouraging, this push for a more inclusive military culture that values innovation and dissent is nothing more than a dent in the military colossus. But this did not deter those junior officers bent on ingenuity. First, Unlike past operations, when selective kinetic actions were launched against the Taliban's mountainous hideouts after clearing major cities and without blocking escape routes, this time the military applied a “corner, choke, and contain”³⁵ army-air force joint strategy that interdicted high-altitude hideouts with greater precision because of the generous use lesser-guided bombs³⁶. This tactic forced the Taliban to come down and hide in mosques, houses, and schools behind human shields, all of which enraged the local population. This resulted in better human intelligence and continued political support for the military operation.

Second, while the military is still contemplating a broad holding strategy, for the first time since 2001 it has executed a presence-oriented approach: cleared areas, established small bases inside populated areas (instead of going back to large forward operating bases), enforced curfews, and begun aiding a fledgling local government.


Third, junior officers began using available weapons and equipment in innovative ways. For example, in northern Buner Major Bilal helped refugees escape before using heavy artillery against Taliban strongholds. In addition, precision has improved through the use of better human intelligence,

GPS trackers, and satellite photos. Defying outdated conventional war manuals, Captain Fahd used his tanks in urban areas by targeting watchtowers in houses against hidden snipers. “The book says do not use tanks in cities ... well they [Taliban] kept killing my men and I had to remedy the situation ... now the Brig. Gen agrees and we’re sharing this tactic,” he explained. This sharing of field experience and lessons learned was helped by the American-led “train the trainer” program graduates, who numbered approximately 500³⁷ by May and were active in the battlefields of Swat, Bajaur, and North and South Waziristans.

Fourth, while distinguishing between mainstream Taliban and the local population was nearly impossible, junior officers realized that trained snipers, commanding officers, explosive experts, and Taliban information officers were primarily Uzbeks, Chechens, or Arabs and that local Pashtun leaders were almost always with them. Many were killed using pointed human intelligence, a product of increased anti-Taliban sentiment, which caused the rest to flee or “die like headless chickens,” noted Lt. Col. Asad Janjua. Those who escaped to Swat Valley’s mountains faced stiff resistance from local *lashkars*, where their pleas to “live and die together” were brutally rejected.

Although this emerging pride- and innovation-centric bottom-up counterinsurgency model is a welcome change from the past and must be supported by the United States, it is anything but complete, sustainable or easily replicable. Without support from military headquarters and the Pakistani people, which will depend on the future of 2.5 million IUPs, this offshoot of the Bajaur experiment will fail. Successful tactics championed by individual leaders can go only so far. In addition, all lines of effort must be institutionalized, such as those related to intelligence and information operations and civil-military coordination, and placed under a “whole of government” effort.

TABLE 2 - COUNTERINSURGENCY IN PAKISTAN: SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 1947-2009



CAVEATS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES: WAZIRISTAN, BALUCHISTAN, SOUTHERN PUNJAB & KARACHI

While this new hybrid counterinsurgency approach is welcome, questions about its sustainability and replicability in future operations, notably in North and South Waziristan, remain unanswered. Two key observations are shaping Pakistan's approach to counterinsurgency.

First, the doctrinal shift away from a predominantly coercion- or enemy-centric counterinsurgency model to one of a mix of enemy- and population-focused counterinsurgency that relies on several key symbiotic relationships: political and popular support for military operations and troop morale; increased actionable intelligence and population security; higher levels of precise enemy interdiction, troop morale, and popular support; lowered collateral damage of life and property along with raised socio-economic progress and funding; and negating recruitment drives for new insurgents. This shift is unequivocal and has gained broad acceptance from senior Pakistani and American civilian and military officials.³⁸

Second is the shift in strategy and tactics, both of which have consistently improved since the Bajaur experiment was launched last winter. The hope is that the doctrinal shift will help guide the military in the upcoming offensive in Waziristan – the hub of the Pakistani Taliban and its leadership. Political and popular support continues to be against the Taliban and is symbolic of a country that has been hard hit by domestic terrorism for the last seven years, one that is ready to finish off the Taliban threat once and for all.

Here are the caveats: (a) holding operations have not yet been tested, even though the military has shown its intention to maintain a strong presence in the Swat Valley region in order to prevent the Taliban's return. This is an important test because everything else – effective governance, judiciary, and socio-economic progress – depends on it; (b) Baitullah Mehsud's aides have (30,000) – six times the number of Swat Valley's Taliban – and Waziristan's terrain and tribes are more hostile toward the Pakistani military, which has conducted numerous operations there, lost many troops (some of whom even surrendered), brokered peace deals that have only strengthened the Taliban.

“...holding operations have not yet been tested even though the military has shown the intention to maintain a strong presence in the Swat Valley region to deter the return of the Taliban. This is an important test because everything else – effective governance, judiciary, and socio-economic progress – depends on it.

”

This time, however, they plan to go in with increasing political support, high morale, and better American-Pakistani intelligence and military cooperation. The hope is that the military will apply lessons-learned. The United States Joint Chief of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen was recently given a classified presentation on the Waziristan plan by General Ashfaq Kiani and Lt. Gen. Nadeem Ahmad (in charge of rehabilitant IDPs). He announced that he was pleased.³⁹



Another emerging flashpoint is the likelihood of a full-blown insurgency in Baluchistan after the mysterious murders of Baluchi nationalists a few months ago. While the connection between the predominantly Pashtun Taliban and Baluchi secular nationalists is questionable, a new front would certainly take pressure off the Taliban and divide such precious military resources as gunship helicopters.⁴⁰ Military analysts warn that a marriage of convenience is plausible. While a reignited Baluchi insurgency would be devastating for Pakistani military operations in the northwest, a political solution to legitimate Baluchi grievances concerning economic and political autonomy is long overdue and the only viable solution.

While most Taliban recruit, arm, and fund their organization in Pashtun-dominated areas in the northwest and in Karachi, the country's largest city, there are also "Punjabi Taliban," an umbrella term for all regional militant groups, such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba (behind last year's Mumbai attacks and terrorist attacks in Kashmir and inside Pakistan) the Jaish-e-Mohammad (of the 2002 Delhi Parliament terrorist fame), and Sipah-e-Sahaba (Sunni extremist group responsible for numerous sectarian attacks on Shia that recently lost its leader Maulana Hyderi to a rival's bullet). Focused on India and domestic sectarian violence since 2007, these groups are now directly supporting the Pakistani Taliban in their attacks on the Pakistani army and institutions by providing recruits, arms, and funds. In addition, they have been linked to the Red Mosque terrorists.⁴¹ Recent attacks in southern Punjab are a troubling sign of their growing strength.⁴² While the military is focused on the frontier, it will have to create a grand national strategy to cut off all arms flows to the Taliban, especially to the Punjabi Taliban.

Much of the Taliban's funding also comes from Karachi, which has experienced a spike in Taliban-related terrorist attacks as thousands of its members seek to escape the military's onslaught in Swat Valley. In recent weeks, up to 10,000 Pashtuns⁴³ have migrated to Karachi, one of the largest Pashtun cities. Out of its 4 million Pashtun inhabitants, fifty thousand are Wazirs (the main tribe of Waziristan). While most of them are not Taliban, a small minority has had little trouble connecting to the historical Taliban funding and recruitment network.⁴⁴ Interdicting the Taliban's support base in Karachi is vital to the military and political success in Pakistan's northwest.

JOINT ACTION AGENDA: THE UNITED STATES & PAKISTAN

Today most policy makers, practitioners and scholars⁴⁵ agree that a successful counterinsurgency strategy requires a multi-faceted government approach utilizing all elements of national power. While there is a widening gap between Pakistan's capability and the rising Taliban insurgency, since late 2001 the United States has supported Pakistan's national security apparatus primarily through military-to-military exchanges. The relationship between former President George W. Bush and former President Pervez Musharraf was largely transactional – much of the funds went to military support and had few requirements for accountability. President Obama has expanded this relationship to include critically important economic and development assistance while advocating for the deployment of more American counterinsurgency trainers. Nuclear-armed Pakistan's continued vulnerability to conflict, instability, and even potential collapse sends up red flags for United States' security interests. Consequently:

U.S. MUST SUPPORT PAKISTAN'S EMERGING COUNTERINSURGENCY APPROACH:

The United States is in a key position to understand and abet Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts by helping to fill performance gaps – training, equipment, and lessons-learned mechanisms. It took more than a decade for the American army to gain back its institutional pride after Vietnam; the Pakistani military is beginning to reclaim its institutional pride after seven years of fighting its own people compounded by ethnic tensions. High morale in any army is the ultimate force multiplier.

SEND AMERICAN EQUIPMENT AND TRAINERS NOW:

Pakistani military officers complain about the lack of helicopter gunships and armored vehicles. Pentagon officials are equally frustrated, pointing to past financial foul play and Pakistan's long history of tolerating or, even worse, abetting Taliban attacks on American troops in Afghanistan. Pakistan's emerging counterinsurgency model, which places the Taliban at the top of its threat assessment, should lay these concerns to rest as the U.S. troop surge helps secure Afghanistan for elections (fall 2009). This would push the Taliban eastward and into Pakistan, however, further destabilizing this nuclear-armed nation of 180 million people, unless the United States provides the much-needed military equipment. Instead of an "either or" approach, American trainers should come with equipment (night vision goggles, Cobra helicopters, and armored vehicles).



MANAGE EXPECTATIONS THROUGH STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION:

Expectations on both sides should be managed. Instead of demanding control of unmanned American drones, the Pakistani military should stock up on helicopter gunships (100) and armored vehicles (1,000). While continuing to put pressure on the Taliban, despite blowback in the form of multiple suicide attacks, Islamabad should seek American aid dollars to provide relief for its 2.5 million IDPs and develop a robust joint strategic communication campaign that will continue to fuel public support for its military operations.

Pakistan's emerging counterinsurgency strategy is based on building national pride that will encourage soldiers to destroy hardcore Taliban insurgents and protect the Pakistani people. Islamabad must devise an information campaign that starts with the current string of successes but one that eventually incorporates a message of American-Pakistani friendship that will resonate on the Pakistani street.

CREATE AN AMERICAN-PAKISTANI LESSONS LEARNED PROCESS:

Unlike the American army's extensive emphasis on tactical, strategic, and doctrinal evolution based on a "lessons learned loop" process,⁴⁶ Pakistan's army lacks a dynamic institutional framework that facilitates capturing, disseminating and implementing lessons learned from counterinsurgency campaigns. While its educational institutions, especially those belonging to the army,⁴⁷ have recently shifted resources toward counterinsurgency training⁴⁸ and ongoing American-Pakistani military contacts are facilitating better intelligence and knowledge of operations on both sides of the Durand Line, there is still no formal American-Pakistani lessons learned process. At present, all lessons learned or best practices are captured on the field and selectively shared in a complex and slow vertical process.⁴⁹

The advantages of a joint lessons learned process are obvious and may be prerequisites for any sustained victory against the insurgents in Afghanistan and Pakistan. For years the American army and Marine Corps have developed several educational institutions that have centers dedicated to lessons learned on the battlefield. These lessons have not always been learned, however, and sometimes have been deliberately forgotten – only to be eventually relearned, as is the case of

COIN best practices in the last forty years from Vietnam to present-day Iraq. While the Pakistani army has conducted several domestic counterinsurgency operations inside Pakistan since 1947,⁵⁰ it has only recently realized, albeit with an indigenous understanding, the value of “whole of government” *clear, hold, and build* counterinsurgency strategy.⁵¹

IMPROVE PAKISTANI INTELLIGENCE:

While Pakistani intelligence, notably the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and Military Intelligence (MI), has provided extraordinary support to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) against top Al Qaeda operations since 2001, broad joint coordination has decreased. Pakistan’s unwillingness to provide actionable intelligence against the Afghan Taliban, who plan and execute attacks against American forces in Afghanistan from safe havens in FATA and Baluchistan, and the subsequent American reliance on unmanned predator attacks against Al Qaeda and Taliban forces inside Pakistan, which are perceived as violations its sovereignty, have only widened the American-Pakistani trust deficit. On the home front, Pakistani intelligence has suffered from an eight-year-old partial national security shift from disowning former assets/clients – the Taliban and, by extension, Al Qaeda – to training and equipping intelligence officers that would actively interdict their operations. Although members of the Pakistani intelligence community are experts in fomenting insurgent and terrorist groups as leverage against India and its influence in Afghanistan from the late 1970s to early 2000s, they are only recently becoming effective in actionable human intelligence.

Moreover, civil and military efforts to protect civilians and the growing anti-Taliban sentiment have increased the quality and quantity of human intelligence. This change is evident in the better intelligence received from after two recent operations (Operation Lion Heart in Bajaur and Operation Righteous Path in Swat). This development is not a result of increased budget, training, and equipment, however, but of a realization in the military command that the Taliban may be a larger threat than India. How long this strategic shift will last remains to be seen.

That said, the United States should take advantage of this shift and push Pakistan to continue to implement intelligence reforms that will facilitate coordination between the ISI and the MI.

While the Pakistani public outcry against the unmanned American drone attacks have fractured American-Pakistani relations, both countries continue to share intelligence on high-value Al Qaeda targets in Pakistan’s tribal areas; more intelligence cooperation is expected in the form of expanded joint border control centers.⁵² Such reforms should be aided, albeit indirectly, by the United States.

SUPPORT POLICE REFORMS:

The Pakistan police, created by colonial-era Britain to control dissent in a rather brutal manner, has historically been a backwater in Pakistan’s national security apparatus. Until recently, salaries were dramatically lower than those in the military and its intelligence agencies. There are also vicious intelligence turf wars where the Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) and the Intelligence Bureau (IB) are suppressed by the big-budgeted and more influential ISI and MI. In addition, there

is little to no cooperation between the police and the military. Police neglect continues to a large extent – only .5 percent of all American counterterrorism and counterinsurgency support since 9/11 has gone toward police reform⁵³ – even while it is the only institution not trained to fight India and one that had considerable success in counterinsurgency operations in the early 1990s (the MQM urban insurgency in Karachi, Sindh, was largely quelled by the Sindhi police).⁵⁴

While the twin United States Congress bills to enhance non-military aid to Pakistan include \$100 million (significant but insufficient) every year for police training, and the departments of Defense, Justice, Homeland Security, and USAID each run small police training programs,⁵⁵ demonstrable improvement will take years. Islamabad's budgetary priorities and training capabilities are equally worrisome.

Islamabad is also targeting resources⁵⁶ and its budget toward better policing: the chief ministers of Punjab and the NWFP recently announced the doubling of police salaries.⁵⁷ In addition, efforts are being made to implement a nonpartisan bill (Police Order 2002), abet police policy making through strengthening the police think tank (the National Police Bureau), increase citizen-police liaison committees, and buttress the FIA and IB to coordinate efforts with the ISI and MI in “holding” operations after areas have been “cleared” of insurgents. These reforms should be bolstered and made continuous.

MAKE JUSTICE EFFECTIVE AND AVAILABLE:

Since late 2001, counterinsurgency efforts in Pakistan have unduly focused on counterterrorism operations leading to extrajudicial detainment, rendition, and death – in most cases from torture.⁵⁸ The famous “missing people” cases brought to the Pakistani Supreme Court since 2003 became a vexing thorn between then-president Musharraf and Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikar Ali Chaudhry that finally resulted in a pitched battle between the executive and judicial branches in 2007. In the end, the twice-removed Chaudhry was reinstated and Musharraf resigned in late 2008. At present, Pakistan is a transitional democracy with a proactive Supreme Court that continues to challenge the executive and Parliament on cases of extrajudicial arrest and allegations of rendition and torture.

Taking advantage of this internal struggle, the Taliban has exploited the six-decade-old deficiencies in Pakistan's judicial system: widespread corruption, ambiguous and parallel legal systems, inconsistent extra-constitutional amendments to the constitution, a lack of resources, and low salaries for judges. For instance, when they took control of the Swat Valley, the Taliban announced a speedy justice plan that greatly shortened the length of cases involving land disputes, a major issue for Swatis.⁵⁹ Minuscule American aid has been directed toward Pakistani judicial reform and, until recently, only a little came from Islamabad.

Realizing the dire need to reform the judicial system, and in direct competition with the Taliban's speedy alternative, Pakistan's Supreme Court is taking judicial reform very seriously. In April 2009 it set up a National Judicial Policy Making Committee to recommend a national judicial policy. Setting June 1, 2009, as the enforcement date, in May the committee proposed to impose time limits on cases related to criminal offenses, rent, land, tax disputes, bails, and preliminary hearings;

give priority to cases involving women and children; and increasing judges' salaries.⁶⁰ While the judicial reforms were put into action they have a long way to go before there is a demonstrable effect, and American and Pakistani support remains crucial to their success.

PAKISTAN MUST SHARE FEARS OF INDIAN ENCIRCLEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES:

First, Islamabad must make its security interests clear to Washington: excessive Indian economic or military influence in Kabul aimed at destabilizing Pakistan is intolerable, and continued Pakistani support for the American campaign against the Afghan Taliban rests upon American support for an Indo-Pak settlement. Moreover, Pakistani civilian and military leaders should share with their American counterparts their desire for an American/Afghan-brokered multinational agreement to help make Afghanistan a neutral country, one that welcomes reconstruction but is opposed to covert operations on its soil against Pakistan, India, or Afghanistan.

Second, if enough moderate Taliban from the southeast, currently perceived to be pro-Pakistani, participate in the upcoming Afghan elections and are allowed to share power, Pakistan's indirect support will be unnecessary. If not, then the need for covert support would remain and, in turn, expand the American-Pakistani trust deficit.

CREATE PAKISTANI PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS:

Making use of the extensive American experience with such teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, Pakistan should upgrade its army's civil engineer corps, which has a pilot provincial and district reconstruction team-type program. The recently cleared areas of the Swat Valley would be a great place to start bringing about effective governance and socio-economic progress. A viable candidate for more American aid toward the creation of indigenous reconstruction teams is Lt. Gen. Nadeem Ahmad's IDPs successful rehabilitation program.

ENDNOTES

- 1 See the editorial “60 Miles From Islamabad,” *New York Times*, April 26, 2009.
- 2 The operation is named *Rih-e-Rast* (Operation Righteous Path). For more information, see the Inter Services Public Relations Department: <http://www.ispr.gov.pk/>.
- 3 The United States State Department has pledged \$110 million and asked Congress for another \$200 million. See “Holbrooke assures full help in reconstruction phase: US announces extra \$200m for IDPs,” *Daily Times*, June 4, 2009.
- 4 See “Pakistan Wrapping Up Anti-Taliban Offensive in Swat Valley,” *Associated Press*, June 20, 2009.
- 5 See “Over 50,000 IDPs Return to Swat,” *Daily Times*, July 18, 2009. Interview with Senior Army officer aiding the repatriation of IDPs said approximately 850,000 refugees had returned to their hometowns by July 28, 2009.
- 6 While political and public support is unusually sporadic for Pakistan’s transitional democracy, the Taliban’s brutal justice and provocations after the state’s capitulation to their demand to impose Taliban-style Islamic law in Swat has united most political parties and civil society groups. This is evident from various Pakistani experts in journalism, think tanks, Parliament, the Senate, government, and military interviewed by the principal investigator and in a non-partisan (All Parties Conference) agreement signed by, among others, the Islamist Jamiat-ul-Islam party, and promoted by the Jamiat-Ulema-Pakistan a civil society group representing most Pakistani mullahs (clerics). See also the recent World Public Opinion poll that puts anti-Taliban sentiment in Pakistanis at 81 percent; and Pew Research Poll (August 2009) that showed a 77 percent support for military operations against the Taliban.
- 7 Interviews with serving Pakistani army and Frontier Corps officers involved in Operation Shirdil (Lion Heart) in Bajaur and in the ongoing Operation Righteous Path in Swat and Malakand division.
- 8 On May 18, 2009, the prime minister called an All Parties Conference (APC) to seek political consensus on the ongoing military operation in the Swat Valley (Operation Righteous Path). Most parties, with the exceptions of the nationalist Baluchi parties (BNP and NP), participated and agreed upon a sixteen-point resolution supporting the military operation and allocating funds and resources to rehabilitate the internally displaced persons (IDPs). See “APC Wants End to Terror,” *Daily Times*, May 19, 2009.
- 9 There are two bills to increase non-military American aid to Pakistan to \$1.5 billion every year for the next five (this can be extended to ten) years; a \$700 million Pakistani Counterinsurgency Fund, currently under the control of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM); and \$1 billion pledged at the Friends of Democratic Pakistan fundraiser in Japan two months ago. In addition, in June 2009 General David Patraeus confirmed at a presentation made during the annual Center for New American Security Conference that four more helicopter gunships had been delivered to the Pakistani military. Many military analysts agree that they have proved to be very effective against the Taliban in southeastern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan.

- 10 See “Zardari Assesses War on Taliban, Appeals for Aid,” interview by Margaret Warner, PBS, *The Online News Hour*, May 8, 2009.
- 11 See “India-Pakistan Joint Statement,” *Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan*, July 16, 2009.
- 12 See, “Clinton to Visit Pakistan to Push Peace with India,” *Dawn*, June 11, 2009.
- 13 While the Pakistani military has a track record of using brute force to rapidly clear areas, there very few incidents of successful holding operations (Karachi in mid-1990s and Baluchistan in the 1970s). Most recent comments of military spokesman, among them those of Maj Gen. Athar Abbas, that the Army and Frontier Corps will stay in and around Swat for at least “one year” while police are trained, are laudable but must be explored further for verification.
- 14 See, “Baitullah Mehsud is Dead: Maulvi Omar,” *Dawn*, August 18, 2009.
- 15 See “Salvation in Waziristan May Take a Long Time Coming,” *Dawn*, July 20, 2009.
- 16 For a detailed analysis of American-Pakistani relations, see Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2006); Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2005); and Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington: The Johns Hopkins University Press 2001).
- 17 For more, see Hasan Zaheer, *The Separation of East Pakistan: The Rise and Realization of Bengali Muslim Nationalism* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994) and G. W. Choudhury, *The Last Days of United Pakistan* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1974).
- 18 For more, see Theodore P. Wright, “Center-Periphery Relations and Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan: Sindhis, Muhajirs, and Punjabis,” *Comparative Politics* 23, no. 3 (1991): 299-312; and Rounaq Jahan, *Failure in National Integration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).
- 19 For more, see Christophe Jaffrelot, *Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation?* (New Delhi: Zed Books, 2002) and Owen Bennett-Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm* (Yale University Press, 2002).
- 20 See Hassan Abbas, “Police & Law Enforcement Reform in Pakistan: Crucial for Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Success,” *Institute for Social Policy and Understanding Report* (April 2009), 8.
- 21 See Frederic Grare, *The Resurgence of Baluch Nationalism*, *Carnegie Papers*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, no. 65 (January 2006).
- 22 For more, see Taj Mohammad Breseeg, *Baloch Nationalism: Its Origins and Development* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2004) and A. B. Awan, *Baluchistan, Historical and Political Processes* (London: New Century Publishers, 1985).
- 23 See, for example, “Baluchistan Conflict Gaining Ground,” *Daily Times*, July 13, 2009.
- 24 Interviews with two senior military personnel who wish to remain anonymous, July 2009.
- 25 For more on pre-9/11 Pashtun insurgencies in Pakistan, see Rodney Jones, *The Prospects for State Failure in Pakistan: Ethnic Regional and Sectarian Fissures*, quoted in Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 217.
- 26 U.S. State Department describes “whole of government” as a comprehensive effort to synchronize all elements of national power (e.g. military, political, diplomatic, development, etc.) to grapple with complex conflict situations; in this case counterinsurgency. See, *U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide*, (January 2009).
- 27 See Samit Ganguly and S. Paul Kumar, “The End of the Affair,” *Foreign Affairs Online*, June 2009.
- 28 Interview with Ayesha Siddiqi on April 14, 2009.

- 29 See Pamela Constable, “Defiant Taliban Forces Advance To Within 60 Miles of Islamabad,” *Washington Post*, April 23, 2009.
- 30 See “Number of IDPs has surpassed 2.5 million: NWFP Minister,” *Daily Times*, May 21, 2009.
- 31 I conducted several interviews with senior Pakistan military officials, journalists, and military analysts who have direct access to the tribal areas (many of whom had previously written against the military operation but began to concede when Gen. Tariq changed tactics last winter). Many of them want to remain anonymous, but some are mentioned below: Lt. Gen. (r) Talat Masood, Lt. Gen. (r) Asad Durrani, Khawar Mehdi, Hassan Askar Rizvi, Hamidullah Khattak, Jibran Khan, and Sarah Mehdi. See also Haider A. H. Mullick, “Where Pakistan is Winning,” *Newsweek*, May 2, 2009.
- 32 See “Ahl-e-Sunnat Parties to Launch Movement Against Talibanisation,” *Daily Times*, May 7, 2009.
- 33 See, “Waziristan Next, Says Zardari,” *Dawn*, May 18, 2009, and based on interview with senior Pakistani intelligence official, July 2009.
- 34 See interviews of Col. Saifullah Orakzai, “The Current War,” *Live with Talat*, Ajj TV, aired on May 28, 2009; interviews of Lt. Col. Taimor Sultan, Maj. Bilal Ahmed, and Brig. Gen. Fiaz Khan, *Live with Talat*, Ajj TV, aired on May 25, 2009.
- 35 See Haider A. H. Mullick, “Lions and Jackals: Pakistan’s Emerging Counterinsurgency Strategy,” *Foreign Affairs* (July 15, 2009).
- 36 Interviews with two senior Pakistan Air Force officials, July 2009.
- 37 Conversation with a Pakistani Brig. General privy to the American “train the trainer” program. For reference, also see “Brookings’ Afghanistan Index: Tracking Progress and Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan,” (Pakistan Section), *Brookings Institution*, June 26, 2009.
- 38 See, for example, remarks by General David H. Petraeus at the Center for a New American Security’s annual conference, June 2009. For Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s statement that “we believe there is a commitment to fight terrorism that permeates the entire government (of Pakistan),” see “U.S. Has Seen Evolving Commitment by Pakistan Govt and its People: Hillary Clinton,” *Associated Press of Pakistan*, July 19, 2009. For United States Admiral Mike Mullen’s statement praising Pakistan’s forthcoming Waziristan offensive plan, see “Kayani Briefs Mullen on Waziristan Action Plan,” *Daily Times*, July 17, 2009. For Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano’s praise of Pakistan’s efforts against the Taliban, see “Napolitano Praises Pakistan Crackdown on Taliban,” *CNN*, July 3, 2009.
- 39 See “U.S. praises Pakistan handling of Swat crisis,” *Reuters*, July 16, 2009.
- 40 See “Baluchistan Insurgency Political in Nature: IG,” *Daily Times*, May 4, 2009 and Carlotta Gall, “Another Insurgency Gains in Pakistan,” *New York Times*, July 11, 2009.
- 41 See Hassan Abbas, “Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network,” *CTC Sentinel* 2, no. 5 (April 2009): 104.
- 42 See Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “New Trends in Counterterrorism,” *Daily Times*, July 19, 2009.
- 43 See Bronwyn Curran, “Tensions Rise in Karachi as Pashtuns Flee Battle Zones,” *The National*, June 27, 2009.
- 44 See “Taliban Heading to Karachi for Safety,” *Daily Times*, May 18, 2009.
- 45 David Kilcullen, David Galula, Frank Kitson, Robert Thompson, Steve Metz, Max Manwaring, T. E. Lawrence, M. G. Chiarelli, Phillip Davidson, Bard O’Neill, John Nagl, The Marx Brothers, Lenin, Mao, Ho Chi Minh, Giap, Che, Carlos Marighelia, Lt. Gen Mattis, Gen. Petraeus, Lt. Gen. Tariq Khan, Maj. Gen. Awan, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Talat Masood, and others.

- 46 For example, the United States Army Combined Arms Center, Leavenworth, Kansas; the Center for Army Lessons Learned; the Counterinsurgency Center; the United States National Defense University, and so on.
- 47 For example, Pakistan's National Defense University and Command and Staff College, Quetta, Baluchistan, Pakistan.
- 48 Chief of Pakistan Army Staff, Gen. Ashfaq Kiani called 2008 the "Year of the Soldier" and 2009 the "Year of Training." See also *Pakistan Army Green Book* (2006, 2007, and 2008).
- 49 Pakistan Army officers interviewed say that if they find something that works in a certain terrain/situation, the information travels vertically up the chain of command from platoon to division and then is shared with another division on corps if the Brig. Gen. or commanding officer feels this to be necessary.
- 50 There have been several Pak COIN operations, including the most vivid in the memory of all army officers: the 1971 Bengali insurgency and, most recently, the one against Baluchi autonomists. In the mid-1990s a massive urban insurgency in Karachi was quelled by using Army Rangers; the final victory, however, was achieved by heavy and sustained police action.
- 51 See, for example, Mullick, "Where Pakistan is Winning."
- 52 Some media reports in the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* go so far as to state that there is a clandestine American-Pakistani agreement on drone attacks whereby Pakistani intelligence helps identify targets and Islamabad denies and publicly denounces American predator attacks but privately allows Washington to carry on as usual.
- 53 See David Kilcullen's ABC interview, "Pakistan The World's Most Dangerous Country: David Kilcullen," June 3, 2009. Online at www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/06/03/2588672.htm.
- 54 See, for example, Dr. Hassan Abbas' report, "Police Reforms in Pakistan," ISPU, April 2009. Online at <http://ispu.org/files/PDFs/ISPU%20-%20Police%20Reforms%20in%20Pakistan%20Report.pdf>.
- 55 See the International Crisis Group's report, "Reforming Pakistan's Police," July 14, 2008. Online at www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5570. Note: this report is important but outdated. Not only will this project interview numerous police officers (retired and serving) and members of the Interior Ministry involved in police reform, it will also evaluate President Obama's and Congress' resource and financial commitment to reforming Pakistan's police.
- 56 In an April 2009 meeting with the chief of the Pakistani Intelligence Bureau in Washington, the principal investigator was briefed on the needs of the Pakistani police.
- 57 See "Notification of increase in police salaries issued: Increase in ration allowance declined," *Daily Times*, May 3, 2009
- 58 See various reports of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. Online at www.hrcp-web.org.
- 59 See, for example, Aamir Latif, *Taliban's Swat Justice*. Online at www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=Article_C&cid=1233567677019&pagename=Zone-English-News/NWELayout.
- 60 See "New Judicial Policy will be Enforced from June 1," *Daily Times*, May 18, 2009

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