

Pakistan Can Defy the Odds

How to Rescue a Failing State

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INTRODUCTION

Is Pakistan collapsing? How far are the Taliban from Islamabad? Can al-Qaeda grab the country's nuclear weapons? These are the types of questions raised every day by the American media, academia and policy circles. And these are critical issues, given the nature of the evolving crisis in Pakistan. The approximately two dozen suicide bombings in 2009 so far, 66 in 2008, and 61 in 2007, all of which have targeted armed forces personnel, police, politicians, and ordinary people not only in the country's turbulent northwest but also in its major urban centers, indicate the seriousness of the threat. A major ammunition factory area located close to some very sensitive nuclear installations in Wah (Punjab) was targeted by two suicide bombers in August 2008, an act that sent shudders across the country's security establishment.

Although certainly a matter of very serious concern, what is often ignored in this context is that terrorists need far more than suicide bombers to get hold of nuclear materials. More alarming, in fact, is the expanding influence and reach of the Taliban and similar groups in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). The Swat imbroglio speaks for itself. Poor law enforcement capacity and inadequate counterinsurgency know-how on the part of Pakistan's army are partly responsible for this state of affairs. Confused threat perceptions and popular conspiratorial thinking also encourages the denial of reality. The failing infrastructure and absence of good governance, as exposed through prolonged electricity shutdowns and declining economic and social indicators, further provides an overall dismal scenario. All of this, however, presents only one side – and a scary one at that – of the coin.

Close your eyes to the other side of the coin at your own risk. Pakistan, a country of roughly 170 million people, recently witnessed the fruits of a courageous and sustained lawyers' movement that led to the restoration of the deposed Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry and about 60 other superior court judges. These judges were victims of former President Pervez Musharraf's short-sightedness and selfishness in 2007 that, in turn, provoked a major movement that inspired and galvanized thousands of Pakistanis to struggle for the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and the supremacy of the constitution. The people stood up for those who defied a dictator – a rare development in the 62 year checkered history of Pakistan. The movement's leading activists were connected through Twitter.com, an indication that the middle class and pro-rule of law civil society elements are also well networked.¹

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A vibrant and enthusiastic electronic and print media helped this cause immensely – though sometimes at the cost of objectivity – but for a progressive goal. There is no dearth of Pakistani writers, artists, poets, and intellectuals who are not only continuing with their creative work, but also are readying people to stand up to the country’s challenges – especially the monster of religious bigotry. Another relevant example is the many women who are joining Pakistan’s army and air force as soldiers and fighter pilots, something inconceivable for many Pakistanis just a decade ago due to cultural as well as dogmatic religious worldviews. Lastly, the gallant and heroic way in which Benazir Bhutto embraced death while challenging extremists publicly and repeatedly – knowing exactly how fatal that could be – presents yet another picture. This is the picture of hope and change that Pakistanis are calling “Umeed-e-Sehr,” the hope of a new dawn.

Indeed, the question is which picture is the real Pakistan: those crazy militants who cherish beheading opponents and flogging women or those who stand for a pluralistic, progressive, and democratic Pakistan. The answer is both. Those who accept nothing but hard statistical data should just look at the voting pattern in the 2008 national and elections: the comparatively liberal Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), Awami National Party (ANP), and Muttihada Qaumi Movement (MQM) received

significantly more votes than the religious political parties, all of which were trounced. Those parties are, of course, not without fault, and a large bloc of votes also went to such centrist parties as the Nawaz Sharif-led Muslim League, which runs Punjab, the country’s largest province. Although the overall political trends are on the positive side, there is certainly increasing stress and strain. And unless these forces are nurtured, supported, and strengthened, there is no guarantee that Talibanization and extremism will be confined to certain areas or eliminated.

In this scheme of things, American-Pakistani relations are a very important part of the puzzle. It is a puzzle in the sense that despite a long history of relations, including times when Pakistan was called the “most allied-ally” and occasions when it became “the most sanctioned state,” both states distrust each other. The bilateral dealings are increasingly fraught with resentment, miscommunication, and a sense of caginess. Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman John F. Kerry and ranking Republican Dick Lugar, while introducing legislation on May 4, 2009, to put into effect key elements of President Obama’s new strategy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, framed the problem aptly when they said: “The status quo is not working: the United States believes it is paying too much and getting too little - and most Pakistanis



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believe exactly the opposite.”² The new bill, if approved by Congress, will triple nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan to \$1.5 billion annually for the next five years to help the country stabilize.

An earlier bill with the same intent, the one introduced by chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Howard Berman, had a long list of conditions attached to it. This list drew scathing criticism from Pakistani officials, who sent the clear message that they would not accept the aid package with such strings attached. One condition related to the terrorism issue read as: “Pakistan has to certify that there is no activity taking place against India.”³ Richard Holbrooke, the administration’s special envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan, and Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited Pakistan together in early April 2009 after these proposed conditions were made known to Pakistan government. The well-informed Shuja Nawaz, director of the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center, explains what happened during the visit: “This is probably the worst-ever visit by an American team to South Asia in history. ... It was a complete disaster. And if this is how you want to win friends, I just wonder how you want to create enemies.” He also cautioned Washington policy makers that, potentially, American-Pakistan relations were heading for a train wreck.⁴ Thankfully, a crisis-in-the-making was duly averted.

However the question remains: How can one make certain that a legitimate and reasonable oversight of the funding and support is provided to those sectors where help is needed the most? To build a deeper, sustainable, and long-term strategic engagement with the people of Pakistan, the United States must learn from its past mistakes and should not shy away from accepting its past missteps. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton deserves credit for saying what Pakistanis have been expecting to hear since late 2001. In an appearance before a subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on April 23, 2009, she stated: “We can point fingers at the Pakistanis. ... But the problems we face now to some extent we have to take responsibility for, having contributed to it. We also have a history of kind of moving in and out of Pakistan. ... Let’s remember here ... the people we are fighting today we funded them twenty years ago ...”⁵ While this honest acknowledgement made juicy news headlines in Pakistan, it should go a long way toward mending the relationship. From the American perspective, however, this also means more caution about which Pakistani institutions the United States will invest in and, at the end of the day, who will be held accountable for auditing and monitoring the funds’ disbursement.

This brief report seeks to propose exactly that, after first discussing the variables that are having a potent (both negative and positive) impact on the Pakistani polity, in order to understand the history and dynamics of the malaise afflicting the country today. This is not meant to be a short history of Pakistan, for I will refer briefly only to those factors, issues, and events that, in my view, define the Pakistani identity today. Understanding that context is an absolute necessity for

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those who wish to help Pakistan survive and emerge as a modern democratic Muslim state.

Pakistan is a divided nation today and, as Professor Adil Najam insightfully says, it is “a democratic society trapped inside an undemocratic state.” In the West, Pakistan army is still seen as an institution that can stabilize things if need be. Perhaps, that is why TIME magazine profiled Pakistan’s army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kiani as being among the most influential 100 people in the world today in the category of “Leaders and Revolutionaries.”⁶ The one who also deserves to be profiled internationally is Afzal Lala, a now-legendary Pashtun politician associated with the Awami National Party (ANP) who, despite all the threats, is staying in Swat in his home defying the writ of the blood-thirsty Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).⁷

Some recently published reports by American think tanks are very useful, especially in terms of devising recommendations for directing Pakistan and American policy for this study. These include publications from Center for American Progress (*A New Policy Towards Pakistan* [September 2008]); Network 20/20 (*A Different Kind of Partner: A Paradigm for Democracy and Counter-Terrorism in Pakistan* [October 2008]); The Atlantic Council of the United States (*Needed: A Comprehensive U.S. Policy Towards Pakistan* [February 2009]); the Carnegie Endowment (*Reforming the Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan’s Transitional Democracy* [March 2009]), and the Asia Society (*How to Stabilize Afghanistan, Pakistan* [April 2009]). Three books that inspired this study’s theme are also worth mentioning here: Paul Collier’s *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can be Done about It* (Oxford University Press: 2008); Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart’s *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World* (Oxford University Press: 2008); and, finally, one edited by Robert I. Rotberg, *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton University Press: 2003).

A pertinent quote from Professor Robert I. Rotberg’s introductory chapter in the above mentioned book, provides a useful framework for this study: He maintains that weak states (or states in crisis) “may be inherently weak because of geographical, physical or fundamental economic constraints; or they may be basically strong, but temporarily or situationally weak because of internal antagonisms, management flaws, greed, despotism, or external attacks. Weak states typically harbor ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal tensions... Urban crime rates tend to be high and increasing. ... Schools and hospitals show sign of neglect, GDP per capita and other critical economic indicators have fallen or are falling... . Weak states usually honor rule of law precepts in the breach.” As per these criteria, Pakistan is a weak state in essence. By definition, internal corrective measures and international support can rescue such states.

PART I: UNDERSTANDING PAKISTAN

Three major interlinked issues and historical developments are vital to understand Pakistan's fundamentals today:

1. THE IDEA OF PAKISTAN IS BEING CONTESTED


At the state's inception in 1947, most of the religious parties were against the very idea of Pakistan. However, as the country was created for pursuing and safeguarding the interests of the Subcontinent's Muslims, the political leadership, during the freedom movement and despite being secular, used the slogan of Islam to mobilize the masses. Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876-

1948), Pakistan's founding father, and many other stalwarts were highly educated and liberal people who were fully committed to making Pakistan a democratic Muslim state. There is a world of a difference between a Muslim state and a theocratic Islamic state. Both Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-98), who provided an initial platform to the Muslims of British India in the shape of an academic institution (the towering Aligarh University), and Dr. Mohammad Iqbal (1877-1938), the poet-philosopher who came up with the "idea of Pakistan," were progressive and enlightened souls. Iqbal's famous six lectures, published as *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, are still popular in Pakistan. In fact, the booklet is reprinted by Ashraf publishers in the city of Lahore every few years.⁸

Perhaps one of Iqbal's famous Urdu verses aptly explains what is happening in Pakistan today – *Deen-e-Mullah fi Sabeelillah Fasad*, meaning "the religion of the mullah is anarchy in the name of Allah." In the same vein, during his first address to the country's Constituent Assembly, Jinnah declared in unequivocal terms: "You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State."⁹

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Jinnah's death 13 months after the creation of Pakistan shifted the balance of power, and the new leadership (comprising many feudal landowners) got entangled in the debate surrounding the country's Islamic identity and further resorted to Islam to create national unity and order. The state, which came into being as a federation, was trying to meld six different ethnic groups together.¹⁰

The moment this slogan was made public, none but the religious parties claimed to be qualified to pick it up and take it to its natural conclusion: the call for an Islamic state. This did not happen because very few people were interested in such an ideal – not because they were not Muslim enough, but because they knew the character and caliber of the country's religious clergy and were liberal enough, by and large, to know that a theocratic state would, in fact, automatically turn into a sectarian and authoritarian state. However, General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, as head of the state (1977-88), redefined Pakistan by pursuing

his political ambitions via appeasing religious political forces and introducing a set of archaic and very orthodox religious laws that, over time, empowered conservative and extremist elements. Side by side, the 1980s 'Jihad project' in Afghanistan sponsored by the Zia regime (through his intelligence agencies), Saudi Arabia as well as the western world (especially the US) produced a new brand of religious fanatics who were primarily interested in two things – killing the 'infidel' or getting killed while trying to do that and consider either outcome as good enough to earn a ticket to heaven. In a choreographed manner, thousands of recruits were exported to Pakistan from all corners of the world. FATA provided the platform for training, strategizing as well as hiding. This new force of armed zealots finally forced Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan but in the process they influenced the mind-set of so many Pakistanis.

The soul of Pakistan is being contested from all these directions. Islamist parties are trying hard to define it as they see it through their jaundiced vision, but have met with scant success so far as far as direct state control is concerned.

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2. THE TURBULENT HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN PAKISTAN

Despite attaining independence through a constitutional struggle, Pakistan has yet to establish a stable political system based on a broadly accepted constitutional consensus. Selected patronage, financial dishonesty, and feudalism continue to devastate its political culture. In its hour of crisis, even the proponents of democracy look to the army for “advice and guidance.” This undesirable

situation is further augmented and accentuated by the bureaucracy's emergence as a separate entity with its own aspirations and ends. Involving the intelligence agencies in national politics over the years has further weakened the already crumbling set-up. Consequently, the country has passed through four distinct phases of martial law: 1958-69, 1969-71, 1977-88, and 1999-2008. Even though each military dictator was eventually forced out through public pressure (except for General Zia, who was assassinated in a plane crash at a time when his "popularity" was at its lowest), the influence and power of the military as a potential "harbinger of change" remains. Fittingly framed as a "discrepancy between democratic creed and autocratic reality" by Professor Saeed Shafqat, the military dictatorships and dynastic succession in the political arena have introduced and strengthened authoritarianism in the state's body politic. As a result, Pakistani democracy has witnessed many ups and downs.



The country has a unique constitutional experience, as it has witnessed frequent and drastic constitutional changes in the form of three permanent constitutions, several provisional constitutions (under military rulers), and a series of major amendments to the present (1973) constitution. All of this has forced the system to oscillate between presidential and parliamentary forms of government. These recurrent and regular changes have also created political instability and unreliability in the relationship between democratic institutions and the powerful civil-military bureaucracy. Moreover, the various regimes in power used the constitutions as instruments to pursue vested interests through maneuvering or amending them to suit their short-term objectives or expediencies.

In all of this, the judiciary played a significant role by maintaining the status quo and not obstructing the military adventurers. The courts proved themselves to be anything but the custodians of the fundamental law of the land (with the exception of the latest episode, which will be discussed later). It is also relevant to mention that Pakistan's first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, was assassinated in 1951 while addressing a public rally in Rawalpindi – the same venue where, 56 years later, Benazir Bhutto was also assassinated. In both instances, most likely powerful domestic players were involved. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the most popular democratic leader the country has produced, was hanged after a controversial and staged trial in 1979 by higher courts subservient to a military junta led by General Zia. Any other country, perhaps, would have given up its pursuit of democratic ideals after such a traumatic experience; however, Pakistan refuses to give up.

3. RIVALRY WITH INDIA

Right from day one as an independent state, Pakistan perceived itself as a state under severe threat from India – and evidently India acknowledged Pakistan's sovereignty quite grudgingly. In their

initial years, both posed a challenge to the legitimacy of the other as each was driven to try to prove that its *raison d'être* was somehow more valid than the other's. It cannot be ignored that Partition created an unparalleled devastation, for 17 million people were shunted across the Subcontinent to reach their designated homelands and around a million simply vanished.¹¹

This ideological duel, coupled with the traumas resulting from that bloody episode, created an unbridgeable gulf of estrangement and hostility. Deep suspicion and regional competition have defined the India-Pakistan relationship ever since. The dispute over “who owns Kashmir” has led to two wars and many military skirmishes. Pakistan's dismemberment in 1971, although basically a consequence of internal crisis and civil war, was strongly facilitated by India's military action in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Hence, Pakistan's fear of India drives its domestic as well as foreign policies and was responsible for provoking Pakistan's pursuance of nuclear weapons. Pakistan also supported insurgent and militant groups in Indian-controlled Kashmir in the 1990s and even later to “bleed India.” Differences also linger over Siachen, Sir Creek, and, more recently, India's retention of fresh water in the Kashmir zone (Chenab river), all of which have worsened relations. President Zardari has warned that: “The water crisis in Pakistan is directly linked to relations with India. Resolution could prevent an environmental catastrophe in South Asia, but failure to do so could fuel the fires of discontent that lead to extremism and terrorism.”¹² Its Afghan policy has similar considerations. Given the overall context, India's growing ties to Afghanistan in recent years are viewed with great suspicion by Pakistan's security apparatus. India is seen as trying to encircle Pakistan.

The net result of all this is Pakistan's massive military spending to the detriment of national development. Rather than building schools, hospitals, and dams for electricity generation, Pakistan invests in buying fighter aircraft, submarines, and heavy guns. The military establishment has expanded its role far beyond the national security requirements; in fact, it now maintains a controlling interest in the Pakistani political economy, which only perpetuates its hold on power.¹³

Although continued rivalry with India safeguards the interests of Pakistan's “military industrial complex,” India's persistent refusal to resolve the lingering Kashmir dispute also plays a central role in this matrix. In this scheme of things, Pakistan tends to blame India for everything that goes wrong in Pakistan. Ironically, despite being a mature democracy, India's worldview is not much different. This self-defeating South Asian predicament, however, has proved to be more damaging for Pakistan and, tragically, there are few signs that this mind-set can potentially change in the near future.

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PART II: THE NATURE OF THE PRESENT CRISIS

EXPANDING TALIBANIZATION

Years of criminal neglect, the sheer incompetence of Pakistan's law enforcement and intelligence services, failure of governance, and the delay in devising an effective counter-terrorism and counterinsurgency policy has helped the Taliban and other extremist groups expand their activities and influence from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and even beyond – most recently in Punjab. The continuing instability in Afghanistan and the progressive loosening of Pakistan's writ in FATA have exacerbated this crisis. The following developments are worth analyzing in order to comprehend the extent of this threat:

- With the elimination of over 500 tribal *maliks* (leaders) in FATA's 7 agencies, power has gradually shifted to the young radicals. As a result, Islamabad's representatives (viz., "political agents") there lack effective control. The performance of the Frontier Corps (FC) is improving, comparatively speaking, as is evident from the recent effective operation in the Bajaur agency. But overall, it will be many years before the government's writ will be established there. In addition, a divisional-level army deployment will be needed to conduct effective operations until the FC is fully equipped and trained to operate in the area.
- In comparison to FATA, where Pakistan's security forces face the brunt of attacks from the Taliban and other al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, in the NWFP the types and nature of attacks have a different focus: enforcing their extremist version of religious ideals and expanding their influence.¹⁴
- The devastating impact of suicide bombings around the country has created widespread fear and insecurity. On average, in 2008 Pakistan experienced one suicide bombing every five days: 66 attacks in all, which killed around 965 persons (651 civilians, 159 security forces personnel, and 155 policemen).¹⁵ According to the State Department's most recent annual assessment

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of global terrorism, which was released in April 2009, terrorist attacks inside Pakistan have quadrupled since 2006.¹⁶

- Many Punjabi militants associated with defunct sectarian and Kashmir-focused groups have joined hands with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the umbrella militant organization operating under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud in the South Waziristan agency (FATA).¹⁷ These “Punjabi Taliban” shuttle between FATA and the rest of Pakistan (mostly cities in Punjab), providing logistical support to FATA and Afghanistan-based militants so that they can conduct terrorist operations deep inside Pakistan. Between March 2005 and March 2007 alone, for example, about 2,000 militants from southern and northern Punjab reportedly moved to South Waziristan and started different businesses in an effort to create logistical support networks. Given their knowledge about Punjab’s urban centers, linkages with *madrassa* networks associated with militancy, and inroads into the state’s security structure, they are proving to be a new potent threat. Attacks in Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Islamabad have been traced to them.¹⁸
- The Swat deal, in which the government of Pakistan (practically under duress) agreed to introduce religious (*qazi*) courts for implementing a controversial version of the Sharia law, backfired when Sufi Mohammad, the leader of Tanzim-e-Nifaz-Shariati-Mohammadi (TNSM) started making outrageous statements that provoked a public backlash: “Democracy is un-Islamic,” “Islam doesn’t permit women to go out of homes except for performing Hajj in Mecca,” “Women are not permitted to get education,” and “the judiciary in Pakistan and the country’s constitution are un-Islamic,” and others.¹⁹ With the collapse of the Swat deal, however, TNSM armed vigilantes and TTP militants under Fazlullah have resurfaced in Swat and adjoining areas and are openly challenging Islamabad’s writ. These are testing times for army’s counterinsurgency skills.

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NUCLEAR SAFETY CONCERNS

Concern about the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and materials is intensifying as instability and violence continue to rise. The country’s secret nuclear sites, as well as its known nuclear infrastructure, is reportedly well guarded by multiple layers of security, which makes the risk from an outright Taliban attack pretty low. But there is some apprehension and unease about the prospect of a possible infiltration of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities by radical elements. The A. Q. Khan nuclear proliferation track record is a case in point. In its latest move, the United States is seeking guarantees from Pakistan about the security of its nuclear assets.²⁰

Following the revelations in late 2003 about Pakistan’s alleged sale of nuclear technology to Iran,

North Korea, and Libya, the country was forced to initiate internal investigations. These led to an eye-opening confession by Dr. A. Q Khan, a national hero due to his pioneer role in Pakistan's nuclear program. On February 4, 2004, while addressing the Pakistani nation on television, he confirmed: "The investigation has established that many of the reported activities did occur, and that these were invariably initiated at my behest."²¹ The informative and balanced IISS 2007 report, entitled *Nuclear Black Markets*, aptly argues that neither the official Pakistani line – that the exports to Iran, North Korea, and Libya were the work of one errant man and his duped associates – can be taken at face value, nor the claim that Khan was a front-man doing the government's bidding in each of these cases can be accepted as valid.²² The late Benazir Bhutto's assessment of the situation was more lethal, as she argued in 2004 (while in exile) that: "Dr. Khan was asked to fall on the sword in the name of the national interest, which means a cover up for Musharraf."²³

Khan was removed from his position as head of the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) in 2001, after the discovery that he was trying to arrange a secret flight to the Iranian city of Zahedan. When Musharraf confronted Khan, the latter refused to discuss the flight on the grounds that it was important and very secret, to which Musharraf replied: "What the hell do you mean? You want to keep a secret from me?"²⁴ Given these varying and alarming interpretations, it is all the more pertinent to briefly discuss and assess Pakistan's nuclear command and control system as it stands today.

For all practical purposes, the army is responsible for the management, operational control, and security of all nuclear installations, materials, and weapons. While theoretically under the civilian president's control, army commanders are in charge of guarding the nuclear stockpile. The ten-member National Command Authority (NCA), led by the president (with the prime minister as its vice chairman), is responsible for devising the state's nuclear policy (including decisions relating to the possible deployment and use of nuclear weapons). But it is the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), led by retired Lt. Gen. Kidwai that directly oversees the nuclear arsenal.²⁵ The fact that Kidwai has been kept in this position even after his retirement indicates that, possibly, there is a dearth of knowledgeable senior officers who can be entrusted with such a sensitive task.

Besides the SPD, the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) controls, regulates, and supervises all matters related to nuclear safety and radiation protection in Pakistan. In late 2006, the PNRA initiated a five-year National Nuclear Safety and Security Action Plan (NSAP) to establish a more robust nuclear security regime that would seek capacity building in Pakistan's ability to plan for, respond to, and recover from terrorist incidents in collaboration with other government agencies. According to the PNRA's publications, the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) guidelines are adhered to in this field.²⁶

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During a rare briefing to foreign media in early 2008, Kidwai said that about 10,000 soldiers have been deployed to secure the nuclear facilities and provide intelligence to the NCA.²⁷ He also informed them that his organization had developed plans for any contingency and had reassessed the militant threat in the light of escalating attacks on the security forces and intelligence personnel. In the same briefing, while commenting on media reports claiming that the Pentagon has contingency plans for seizing Pakistan's nuclear facilities if they ever fall into the hands of extremists, he argued that such an operation is very unlikely to succeed.

Such speculations, however, are known to have negatively impacted on Pakistan's cooperation with western states (especially the United States and the United Kingdom) in terms of sharing security and safety-related information, due to Pakistan's fear that any such knowledge about its nuclear infrastructure may be used in a potential operation to rid the country of its nuclear capabilities. The SPD also officially acknowledges that foreign assistance in this field helped it acquire surveillance cameras, special locks, specialized perimeter fencing, and patrol vehicles. It also states that around 10,000 personnel are involved in the nuclear program, with about 2,000 scientists working in particularly sensitive areas, and that they are subject to intense scrutiny throughout their lives, including regular surveillance of their political and financial activities as well as medical and psychological fitness tests. A screening program for employees working in Pakistan's nuclear program, the Personnel Reliability Program, based on an American model, seeks to ensure that no employees with ties to extremist political groups are hired.²⁸

The public sharing of such information indicates that the military is increasingly concerned about the international skepticism over the safety of its nuclear arsenal. In addition, the media have reported that the United States provided approximately \$100 million from 2001-07 to improve the physical security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal through the transfer of "permissive action links" (PALS) technology, which is used to keep weapons from being detonated without authorization.²⁹ According to William H. Tobey, former deputy administrator for the United States' National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and currently a senior fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School: "The government of Pakistan values its nuclear arsenal for strategic reasons, which means that they are highly motivated to protect it" and "those responsible for the weapons are dedicated and professional."³⁰ This is from someone who really knows what he is talking about.

Lastly, Pakistan's nuclear weapons are reportedly in a dissembled form for security purposes and experts believe that nuclear weapons on the move are inherently less secure than nuclear weapons at heavily guarded storage sites.³¹ Hence, unless there is a crisis situation with India, Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, although dispersed, remain more secure. By the same token, any rise in Pakistan-India tension can be potentially very alarming. Until late 2008, Pakistan had a strategically vague position on the first use of nuclear weapons, which is hardly a unique position in terms of military strategy, when President Zardari "unilaterally and without consultation with his military commanders" eschewed first use as an option while talking on the record to an Indian journalist.³² Pakistan's army has kept quiet on the subject, and Zardari has not repeated his statement – indicating perhaps that Pakistan has reverted to its earlier position.

THE DISTRESSED ECONOMY AND DEBILITATING ENERGY CRISIS

According to the latest “Review of the Economic Situation (July-March 2008-09)” conducted by Pakistan’s Ministry of Finance, in lieu of the \$7.6 billion economic stabilization program by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the economy is regaining some confidence.³³

Pledged support of \$5.3 billion for budget support and other aid from the “Friends of Pakistan” consortium, which met in Japan in April 2009, as well as the introduction of the awaited Kerry-Lugar bill in the Congress that proposes \$1.5 billion in annual development aid, are expected to ease the financial pressure. Still, a quick economic turnaround is unlikely.

The basic economic statistics of Pakistan explain why this is so. Two-thirds of the Pakistani population lives on less than \$2 a day, with at the least one-third of the population living below the poverty line. The economic growth rate is slowing, and the benefits of the previous years of economic growth never reached the vast majority of Pakistanis.³⁴ Additionally, Pakistan has the highest interest rates in Asia, coupled with the riskiest financial obligations. As a result, the government debt is considered one of the most risky and investors are running away. As if all of this were not enough, Pakistan’s already weak currency has lost 20 percent of its value since early 2008. The country’s national debt is about 60 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), and the trade deficit is around 7.5 percent of GDP – not very encouraging signs. Agricultural industry, Pakistan’s economic backbone, employs about 44 percent of the population but accounts for only 21 percent of its GDP.³⁵

Prolonged electricity shortages are further adding to the economic woes. The country’s power problems do not stem from overuse, but from supply. For instance, according to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Pakistan’s per capita consumption is approximately one-fifth of the global average. Ironically, a country that successfully developed an extensive

nuclear program could not build enough power plants to keep up with the demand for electricity. Currently, the system faces a deficit of more than 2,000 megawatts, which is expected to grow further at the rate of approximately 7 percent annually. China, Iran, and the United States are funding different projects to help Pakistan in this sector, but given that demand continues to increase, it will take a few years before this emergency-like situation, especially in the scorching summer, can be tackled.³⁶ During the summer of 2008, rioters in Multan and Karachi attacked and damaged electricity supply offices. In the words of respected Pakistan economist Kaiser Bengali: “The economic pressure facing the vast majority of the population is severe. There is the concomitant threat of a social upheaval, especially in urban centers, which can be exploited by anti-democratic forces.”³⁷



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Two-thirds of the Pakistani population lives on less than \$2 a day, with at the least one-third of the population living below the poverty line.

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GOVERNANCE: EDUCATION AND HEALTH CARE

The deplorable situation in the healthcare and education sectors is the most glaring example of poor governance, an overall lack of vision, and bureaucratic incompetence. The figures speak for themselves:

The Education Sector³⁸

- Pakistan spends 2.6 % of its GDP on education.
- About 45% of children drop out of school without completing their elementary education.
- About one-fourth of elementary school teachers are untrained.
- More than 7 million primary school-aged children (age group 5-9 years) do not attend school.
- Nine percent of primary schools do not have a blackboard, 24% do not have textbooks, and 46% do not have desks.
- Only 36% of the public primary schools have electricity, although the picture improves further up the educational ladder.
- According to 2004 data, out of a total of 150,644 government schools (from grade 1 to 12), 3,572 have no building structure; 29,020 are without electricity; 18,515 have no furniture; 17,631 have insufficient furniture; and 21,636 have no toilets.³⁹



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Nine percent of primary schools do not have a blackboard, 24% do not have textbooks, and 46% do not have desks.

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According to the findings of Network 20/20's report, which is based on field interviews conducted in Pakistan during 2008, “Pakistani youth want to study” and “the demand for education among Pakistanis extends throughout Pakistani society and all of its provinces.” It also quotes a national survey of adolescents conducted shortly after 9/11 in Pakistan that found that 85 percent of boys wanted to study through high school or university, while 69 percent of girls aspired to at least a high-school diploma.⁴⁰ These dreams, however, remain dreams because the state prefers to continue investing in its security infrastructure to keep parity with India. The lack of public schools enables space for *madrasas* to attract students. The extremist brand of *madrasas* likewise benefit, because the rural population does not have enough knowledge to distinguish between an ordinary *madrasa* that imparts a religious education and an extremist or militant one that encourages sectarianism and violence.

The Health Sector⁴¹

- One in 23 Pakistani women die in childbirth, compared to one in 5,000 women in developed countries. Each year an estimated 17,000 mothers die from pregnancy-related causes in Pakistan. Ten percent of these die on their way to a healthcare facility due to the lack of proper transportation.
- About 400,000 infants die annually because of diarrhea, which occurs when a majority of women do not breastfeed due to malnutrition or death during childbirth.
- Pakistan is one of only four countries where polio has not been eradicated (the others are Afghanistan, India, and Nigeria).
- In FATA, 135 out of every 1,000 children under the age of five die from curable illnesses.
- Water- and sanitation-related diseases are responsible for 60 percent of child deaths.
- There is 1 doctor for every 1,300 people, 1 specialist for every 15,000 people, and 1 nurse for every 30,000 people.

According to experts in the field, Pakistan's healthcare system is beset with numerous problems ranging from structural fragmentation and gender insensitivity to resource scarcity, inefficiency, and a lack of accessibility.⁴² Dr. Sania Nishtar, who runs *Heartfile*, a Pakistani think tank focusing on healthcare reform, maintains that Pakistan has an extensive public sector service delivery infrastructure, consisting of a three-tiered healthcare delivery system, with Basic Health Units and Rural Health Centers forming the core of the primary health model. Most people, however, receive healthcare through private out-of-pocket payments made directly to the providers at the point of care.⁴³ With rising unemployment, inflation, and declining purchasing power, fewer people have access to basic healthcare. This substantially increases the government's responsibility in this sphere and also opens up an opportunity for the civilian government to deliver and earn the people's trust in the state's ability to govern effectively.

According to Dr. Samia Altaf, who recently spent a year as the Woodrow Wilson Centre's Pakistan scholar, since 1950 Pakistan received \$58 billion in foreign aid for the health and population sectors but it had little to show for it. She also maintains that the healthcare scene in Pakistan is marked by corruption, inefficiency, nepotism and lack of direction. According to her research, Pakistani officials associated with foreign-aided programs were often found interested in landing a foreign assignment or benefiting in some private and personal way from the programs that they were supposed to supervise and implement in the public interest (As quoted in the *Daily Times*, July 11, 2008 by late Khalid Hasan).

“ In FATA, 135 out of every 1,000 children under the age of five die from curable illnesses. ”

POLICE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY⁴⁴

The police infrastructure is one of Pakistan's most poorly managed organizations. It is aptly described as ill-equipped, poorly trained, deeply politicized, and chronically corrupt. It has performed well in certain operations; overall, however, that is a rare phenomenon. Arguably, the primary reason for this state of affairs is the government's persistent failure to invest in law enforcement reform and modernization. It is ironic that despite frequent internal crises since its inception in 1947, ranging from ethnic confrontations and sectarian battles to a sharp rise in criminal activity and growing insurgencies, both political and military policymakers have never given this sector top priority.

Hence, poor police performance in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency is not surprising. The fact that the police successfully challenged some militant religious groups in Punjab and tackled an insurgency-like situation in Karachi in the late 1990s shows that they do have the potential to deliver the desired results when political support is present and resources are provided. Clearly, better policing standards and performance will add to the government's credibility and establish its writ more effectively in areas that are currently slipping out of its hands. Learning lessons from what transpired in the NWFP in recent years especially in order to plan for any preemptive law enforcement actions in South Punjab, where banned local militant groups like Sipah-e-Sahaba and Jaish-e-Mohammad are resurgent, is the need of the hour.

Historically, US support for Pakistan has always been skewed in favor of country's defense needs – heavy guns, tanks, officers' training and fighter aircrafts, etc. It made some sense given the nature of external threats and regional instability – ranging from Soviet expansionist designs to Indian hegemonic tendencies – but now it is all together a different ball game. The internal threat to Pakistan today from extremists is more severe than anything Pakistan has witnessed in 60 years of its existence (perhaps with the exception of civil war in East Pakistan 1969-1971, now Bangladesh).

The Bush administration as well as the Musharraf regime failed to understand what this really meant – through there was no shortage of rhetoric on the subject. Evidently, from 2002-2008, only the thinnest slice of US funds for Pakistan went to policing. More specifically, in 2007 for instance, the US allocated \$731 million to help the country's military and only \$4.9 million for its police.

To build schools and hospitals, create jobs and spur economic development, the security environment in Pakistan has to improve significantly. Police and civilian law enforcement agencies are the most appropriate institutions to spearhead that effort countrywide. The rule of law requiring an effective criminal justice system and independent judiciary also needs a competent law enforcement infrastructure.



PART III: SIGNS OF HOPE

Aside from the gloom and doom scenarios, many things are going well for Pakistan. The slow but sure transition to democracy since the January 2008 elections, and especially the way people voted in those elections, is indeed instructive. Politicians are settling down; however, if they do not deliver they will be out of a job. The army's non-interference posture in relation to the political arena also deserves to be acknowledged, although it will take a while for the civilian and democratic leadership to assume complete control and be in a position to decisively define the overall direction of domestic and foreign policy. The following factors deserve recognition as "signs of hope":

THE LAWYERS' MOVEMENT (2007-09)⁴⁵

The success of this two-year-long defiant and sustained movement in the face of an obstructive state machinery and various other roadblocks has changed the country's political dynamics. A brief background of the struggle is in order here. In March 2007, former President Musharraf surprised many by suspending Mr. Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, the chief justice (CJ) of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, claiming that the latter was involved in corruption and had violated various rules. In reality, the CJ was progressively becoming independent and some of his judgments went against the government's wishes. After refusing to resign voluntarily when asked to do so by Musharraf in his office (in the presence of intelligence chiefs), the CJ decided to challenge his suspension in the Supreme Court. While proceeding to the court for this purpose, he was mishandled by police.

The images of this condemnable incident were flashed across the country through dozens of independent news channels, and a movement was born. At that point, it also became public knowledge that Musharraf had tried to force him to resign and that he had valiantly refused to comply. This defiance made him a hero in the eyes of the people. Within days, lawyers, journalists, and civil society activists came out in the streets in solidarity. The movement soon started demanding the rule of law and the CJ's restoration. In response, the Musharraf government tried every trick in its book to discredit the CJ and repress his supporters, but to no avail.

Why Musharraf acted as he did is also relevant. In early 2007, he was readying himself for reelection by a Parliament whose term was set to expire in November 2007. He had also indicated his plans to remain chief of the army, a job he had promised to relinquish in December 2004 after

taking advantage of a three-year extension. Both of these plans were considered constitutionally questionable, and it was obvious to Musharraf that the CJ would act independently and according to the law. Realizing that a Supreme Court challenge would derail his prospective actions, he decided to suspend the CJ.

While the suspension case was being heard in the Supreme Court, the CJ decided to address various bar associations across the country, a tactic that prompted huge shows of public support. Hundreds of thousands of ordinary Pakistanis euphorically filled the streets chanting their support for him. The international media initially ignored this development, being largely unaware that the CJ had boldly used his position to check the autocratic and authoritarian tendencies of Pakistan's law-enforcement and intelligence agencies: he had taken many *suo moto* actions in support of poor and disenfranchised people who had no access to justice; ruled against vested interests in various high-profile cases; and, in an unprecedented move, had challenged the country's powerful intelligence organizations to produce citizens who were said to be "missing." Some of these people had earlier been picked up on terrorism charges, and this gave Musharraf a chance to tell the western capitals that he had removed the CJ because he was giving respite to terrorists!

Musharraf did not tell them, however, that his law enforcement agencies had found nothing against many of those supposed "terrorists," some of whom had already been sent to Guantanamo. He also used this pretext to harass his political opponents. In short, the CJ's actions had exposed the state machinery's incompetence and given some relief to ordinary people as well. Unfortunately, such defenders of the public interest are rare in Pakistan, and hence Chaudhry earned public sympathy.

In an unprecedented move, in July 2007 the full bench of the Supreme Court restored CJ Chaudhry and trashed Musharraf's charges against him. The CJ was represented by Aitzaz Ahsan, a leading lawyer and politician, and others who also strategized and spearheaded the movement. Pakistan found a hero in Ahsan, and his leadership delivered a great victory for the lawyers' movement. In fact, the movement produced many heroes who had boycotted courts all across the country at the cost of their livelihoods. Musharraf was stunned, as military rulers are not used to seeing their decisions overturned. The CJ resumed his former course of action and soon the issue of Musharraf's eligibility to run for re-election came before the Supreme Court. CJ Iftikhar decided not to sit on that bench, but it was well known that things had changed and that the judiciary was now independent and powerful.

When Musharraf realized that things were slipping out of his hands, he imposed emergency law in November 2007 (in contravention of constitutional provisions), "dismissed" the CJ, and asked the judiciary to take a new oath that called upon all judges to commit to abiding by the new emergency law and the changes it had brought about. In a major development, around 60 judges of the Supreme Court and four provincial high courts refused to do so and consequently were sent home. So by just one stroke of his pen, Musharraf truncated the state's judicial arm. He further instructed the state authorities to put many of these judges, including the CJ, under house arrest. The CJ was restricted to his residence, and even his children, one of whom is disabled, were incarcerated. Pakistanis were surprised and dismayed when western governments remained silent and wondered why the American administration kept supporting and praising Musharraf. Meanwhile, many bar associations in the United States publicly protested and showed their support for protesting Pakistani lawyers and the deposed judges.



With the return of democracy in early 2008, these house arrest orders were immediately withdrawn, to great public applause, and most judges were restored. Still, to the surprise of many, CJ Iftikhar Chaudhry was not restored. The late Benazir Bhutto had promised to restore him in a rally held in front of his house, and now her party was in power. Various vague and contradictory legal justifications were given for this serious lapse, all of which utterly failed to convince those associated with the movement. Former prime minister Nawaz Sharif, whose party had made a pledge to the public on this issue during the election campaign, walked out of the government coalition and actively pursued the matter with the lawyers' movement.

To cut a long story short, after another period of sustained effort and the "Long March" from Lahore to Islamabad, which threatened a sit-in in front of the Parliament, the government was forced to reconsider its position and the CJ was finally restored in mid-March 2009. Many people had given up hope, but the lawyers' movement persevered and political and media support kept it alive. The message of this episode was heard loud and clear: a new Pakistan had been born. It is tragic that the Pakistani people's applause greeting the CJ's restoration was buried under the noise of bombings and gun shots in Swat; however, it is clear that their trust in the country's judiciary has been largely restored, a development that can potentially rescue Pakistan from sliding into lawlessness.

A VIBRANT MEDIA AND NEW PAKISTANI VOICES

Democracy cannot grow in a stilted atmosphere, and there can be no democracy without a free press to nurture, support, and strengthen it. A decade ago, Pakistan had just one television channel: the official Pakistan Television Corporation. Today, there are about 60 private channels, many of which showed round the clock coverage of the lawyers' movement, thereby creating public awareness about the issue.⁴⁶ Pakistani newspapers have been known for their fierce independence even during military-run regimes. In a country with a literacy rate of barely 50 percent, the liberalization of the electronic media in 2002 was nothing short of a cultural revolution. Musharraf took credit for that; however, the infrastructure that allowed this to happen had been created before his coup.

Moreover, in his last days of power, he never shied away from clamping down on the free media. For instance, he practically banned a few news channels, including the popular GEO TV and AAJ TV, both of which are known for their courageous talk show hosts.

Mushahid Husain, a former leading journalist turned politician, accurately maintains that Pakistan's media has become an influential factor and a powerful player in shaping perceptions and policies. He has called this the "most heartening and most positive development in an otherwise bleak scenario."⁴⁷ He further argues that the media have now become an "instrumental factor in unifying our federation, bringing together provinces, classes and people of different views. Now, there are no Holy Cows in Pakistan thanks to the



Pakistan's popular GEO TV, known for its courageous talk show hosts.

media.” The religious discourse is also influenced by all of this – mostly for the better. For instance, progressive Islamic scholar Javed Ahmed Ghamidi is now a well recognized figure, as his religious discussion programs are being aired by a few of the most-watched private channels.⁴⁸ His programs are often available on YouTube.⁴⁹ Religious scholars with similar views are becoming inspired, and more channels are aspiring to begin such shows in order to compete in the market. Influenced by such a discourse, a highly controversial and sectarian statement given by Dr. Israr Ahmed, a conservative and divisive religious figure, provoked such a public uproar that an important news channel had to stop airing his lectures. Discussions on religious topics that are generally considered taboo are openly taking place on these channels, and although conservative and controversial clerics are invited, they are increasingly exposed, as they often fail to explain their orthodox and narrow minded views in a rational manner.

Various new progressive voices discussing political, social, as well as religious issues have emerged in recent years. The Pakistani diaspora, especially in the United States and the United Kingdom, are increasingly more involved in Pakistani affairs through the electronic media and the blogosphere. Boston University Professor Adil Najam’s *All Things Pakistan*, Raza Rumi’s *Pak Tea House*, and Awab Alvi’s *Teeth Maestro*, and many others are making a difference.⁵⁰ Two e-mail listserves that connected thousands of pro-democracy activists during the lawyers’ movement deserve special mention: the “Emergency” listserve run by Samad Khurram, a Pakistani student at Harvard; and a listserve from Karachi named “Public Resistance,” which created new networks that are potentially strong challengers to extremist forces. In the words of Samad Khurram: “The real resistance to the emergency was built on the Internet. Millions signed online petitions and hundreds of thousands extended support as the world watched the blogosphere explode with anti-Musharraf rhetoric.”⁵¹

Likewise benefiting from newer opportunities to express and contribute, columnists and new writers are exposing and challenging the extremist Taliban worldview more energetically than ever before. In one of his recent articles in *The News*, the powerful writer Mosharraf Zaidi captures this confidence:

The key question, therefore, is not about the populism of the Taliban, the TNSM, or any violent extremists in Pakistan. It is whether Pakistani Muslims will remain hostage to their sense of religious inferiority to the mullah. In fear of violating the precepts of a faith to which most Pakistanis are still deeply committed, will the people give mullahs like Abdul Aziz of Lal Masjid carte blanche to destroy this country? ... The love affair of the Pakistani people with their country is a firewall that will hold. Violent extremists can flog the odd alleged straying couple, but they cannot flog 172 million people. They cannot win this war, and that is why they’re so angry all the time.⁵²

PART IV: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PAKISTAN'S POLICYMAKERS

The Failed States Index 2008, developed by the Foreign Policy/Fund for Peace, ranks Pakistan as one of the world's weakest countries – ninth out of 177 – most at risk of failure.⁵³ Clearly, the challenges of militancy, weak governance, and economic insecurity are feeding each other in a dangerous cycle, which must be broken if Pakistan is to be saved. Therefore, I make the following recommendations:

1. The government should offer a new social contract to the people, one designed to cure ethnic ruptures and class divisions. Feelings of alienation in Baluchistan (especially after the brutal murder of Akbar Bugti) and rising ethnic flares in Karachi (between MQM and ANP/Pakhtuns) are assuming very dangerous proportions and nothing short of major policy and administrative changes, in terms of provincial autonomy, will work. Similarly, bringing FATA into mainstream Pakistan and scrapping colonial era laws enforced there require major legal remedies. Parliament should begin a consultative and legislative process to proceed on these lines and promised and needed constitutional revisions and amendments should be made sooner rather than later.
2. Major investments in education and healthcare reform should be made without any further delay, while recognizing that making governance effective requires a set of measures to strengthen and reconfigure existing state structures and instruments of governance. Pakistan's budgetary allocation in these two sectors should be doubled straight away – to focus initially on providing text books to all enrolled students (at the least) and better incentives for doctors (and other medical staff) to go to rural healthcare centers (which are 'functioning' without doctors in many cases). Additionally, to fill the resource gap, Army Education Corps and Army Medical Corps, which are both reputable, should be co-opted to meet these targets.
3. Devise ways to defeat the "idea of Talibanization" through support for progressive religious forces by funding their publications and ensuring their security. New publishing houses to promote liberal and scholarly religious discourse should be supported through public funds. Most importantly, the communication strategy of Taliban (and similar groups) must be confronted on war footing. For instance, the CD and FM Radio campaigns launched by extremist forces in FATA and NWFP can be responded to in the same coin. Radio Pakistan which should be facing this challenge is reeling under massive financial crunch

and its old equipment is holding back its potential. This must change, and Radio Pakistan must be modernized with the clear objective to win this war of ideas.

4. Close down the *madrasas* associated with militant and banned groups. This sensitive topic needs to be handled intelligently and carefully. Taking over of all *madrasas* by the government directly may invite a backlash. Alongside strict action against *madrasas* found involved in imparting militancy training, the recognized private *madrasa* boards should be brought under a new independent regulatory authority. This body should conduct a comprehensive survey of *madrasas* first and then devise a clear criterion for curriculum of such institutions and any *madrasa* not abiding by the code should also be proceeded against. In this context, it must also be studied why Musharraf's efforts on similar lines failed.
5. Undertake the massive and long overdue overhaul of the police, law enforcement, and intelligence service – with a special focus on their institutional aspects. In the realm of police reforms, a) implementation of the 2002 Police Act (minus the 2004 amendments), b) more resources for training, equipment and forensic support, c) upgrading Federal Investigation Agency and National Police Bureau, and finally d) emphasis on 'intelligence-led policing', should be the priorities. In the Intelligence services sphere, a) coordination between civilian and armed forces intelligence organizations, b) parliamentary oversight, c) saying goodbye to 'contract employees' (who were kept after their retirement age and who are continuing with the old policies) in the Afghan and Kashmir cells of ISI, are steps that are needed desperately.
6. Revive the peace process with India with a focus on people-to-people contact and expansion of trade relations. Unconditional revival of the bilateral talks is the first step. More cooperation in the Mumbai terror attack investigations can rebuild the relations to the level observed before 2007. Clearly, India also needs to change its present stance to make it easier for the Pakistan's political government to engage them creatively. Many well informed Pakistanis as well as western experts believe that India missed the opportunity to reach a compromise deal during the Musharraf years (around 2007) due to its intransigent behavior.
7. Streamline nuclear decision-making processes, institutionalize civilian oversight of the nuclear program, and make security of the nuclear arsenal the top security goal. Though security of the nuclear infrastructure should be left to the armed forces specialized units, the civilian involvement in auditing of funds meant for nuclear program is important. It needs to be recognized that the missile race with India is something totally unnecessary and wasteful given Pakistan's economic plight.

PART V: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMERICAN POLICYMAKERS

Developing and implementing an effective policy toward Pakistan is one of the most complicated and yet important foreign policy challenges facing the Obama administration. The disciplined and effective implementation of a development aid policy cannot succeed without adequate oversight: Equally important is to be careful not to make the aid package so condition-heavy as to be viewed as humiliating:

1. Develop a comprehensive, collaborative, and transparent policy approach toward Pakistan by involving all of its major institutional and political players. The US administration should pursue institutional commitments in this regard. For instance, in addition to the government to government deliberations, the US Congress should directly engage Pakistan's parliament to discuss priority projects. Better coordination with EU and 'Friends of Pakistan' consortium should be maintained so as to avoid duplication. However, Pakistan should not be pushed in the process to develop into a full-fledged "rentier state".
2. Include India in any regional approach in order to help both countries resolve their lingering conflict over Kashmir. Support for the India-Pakistan-Iran gas pipeline should also be viewed favorably as that would send a positive message to the whole region. Specific allocation of some development funds for both sides of the Kashmir encouraging increased social, political and trade relations between the two will also increase US leverage and capacity to facilitate reconciliation between Pakistan and India.
3. Accept Pakistan as a nuclear weapons state and dispel the impression that the US is interested in targeting Pakistan's nuclear capability. Pakistani perceptions and concerns on the subject should be openly discussed in bilateral discussions as such theories are entrenched in the Pakistani mindset and consequently cause distrust. The US preferential treatment to India in this sector, as evident from significant civilian nuclear collaboration with India, is an important factor here. Pakistani expectations for similar treatment should be kept in view while asking them for more cooperation in nuclear safety issues.
4. Place top priority on education and health sector reform while ensuring that Pakistan utilizes American funds in addition to, rather than in place of, its own budgetary provisions. The focus should be on supporting greater access to healthcare especially for women and children. As regards education, the focus must be on increasing the capacity

of primary, secondary, and vocational institutions and preference should be given to those districts where there is more openness for co-education schools. Private sector in Pakistan should be involved in the process.

5. Improve Pakistan's civilian law enforcement capacity, and leaving reform of the intelligence services to Pakistan, as suggestions in this latter area are seen in a completely different light. Cooperation between Pakistan's FIA and the US FBI should be institutionalized especially in the sphere of investigations of terrorist activity and forensic support. Training facilities for junior and mid level officials (who actually work in the field) should be preferred. Institutional intelligence sharing framework will serve US interests better, rather than flying top CIA and FBI officials to Pakistan so often to discuss and deliberate upon 'urgent matters' demanding 'urgent action'.
6. For creating an effective oversight mechanism, the American government should consider the following:
 - Ensure that money is spent on the projects it is intended for,
 - Involve prominent and respected Pakistanis in the monitoring process,
 - Involve Pakistani-Americans as "bridge-builders" when differences as to priorities arise,
 - Avoid linking aid to any one party or government, and
 - Disburse the aid in a phased manner – based on periodic reviews.
7. Replace the 'Drone/predator attacks policy in FATA' with a 'Humanitarian Aid Package' for internally displaced people of FATA and the Swat region. The 2005 earthquake relief efforts by the US, which were highly appreciated by ordinary Pakistanis, should be the model. The drone attacks have increasingly proved to be counter-productive, especially in terms of its adverse affect on public opinion and its value to the Taliban as a propaganda tool. The 'collateral damage' and its impact outweighs the limited successes in accurately hitting some terrorists.

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