Strength Through Diversity: Four Cases of Local and State Level Coalition Success

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with Jelena Jankovic
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Executive Summary

Since 9/11, American Muslims have been the subject of intense negative attention. In 2010, the negative attention turned into a series of organized actions against the community, including attempts to burn the Qur’an, protests against mosque building, and state legislators introducing anti-religion bills targeting Muslims.

The Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) launched its latest research project, *Islamophobia: A Threat to All*, to contribute to knowledge about anti-Muslim bigotry. The project tracks trends related to the nation’s ongoing social, political, and demographic transformation in the years leading to 2050 and converting that data into actionable suggestions for advocates, community leaders, and legislators.

*Strength Through Diversity: Four Cases of Local and State Level Coalition Success*, is a publication from the larger research project. It documents the work of four (4) successful advocacy coalitions, and how their efforts promote pluralism and community empowerment.

The study provides insights into what helps advocacy coalitions achieve success, and lessons learned from local and state-level coalition advocacy. The emphasis is on local and state advocacy because organizing, both for and against Muslims, happens in smaller demographic units. The advocacy then works its way up to the federal level. As the late Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis said, states often serve as “laboratories of democracy.” Academic and applied research literature examining what elements lead to “successful” and “effective” coalitions is sparse, thus this report is a crucial contribution to a growing body of knowledge on this topic.
The following are the six findings that are common over our four case studies.

**Coalitions are important to securing success.** There is a need for organizations from different backgrounds to work together to achieve a particular goal.

**Funding does not determine success.** While funding is necessary and important, all of our cases showed that despite facing resource challenges, organizations can still contribute to larger changes. Pooling resources and establishing divisions of labor within a coalition based on each organization’s capacities and capabilities can efficiently distribute resources and skill sets.

**Unity of purpose is central to coalition effectiveness.** A coalition with a common vision and set of goals can establish a strategic and operational vision. This investment reduces friction in processes and personnel as the coalition grows.

**Relationships and trust matter.** Coalitions may start with formal membership requirements based on principles and procedures, but over time a level of trust develops. New organizations may formally enter these established coalitions, and must cultivate trust through engagement. Relationship building can happen through mutual interests or shared values.

Personal relationships are key elements in coalitions, as private conversations can help manage disagreements, maintain a cohesive vision, manage external criticism, create support networks, and build trust.

**There is no one model of success.** In each case study, success is determined by the nature of the goal, the types of resources available, and the scope of the advocacy. Success is determined by context, and strategy is not solely predictive of success. What is clear is that each coalition needs a multi-vector approach that may include media outreach, get out the vote actions, protests/rallies, issue/policy research, and professional lobbying.

**Success involves long-term impact.** Legislative and policy changes are important, and are significant short-term measures of success. For experienced advocates, the mobilization and creation of infrastructure, particularly in communities that are new to civic and political engagement, are important measures of long-term success. Coalition partners build strong political reputations and establish themselves as communities that must be constructively engaged.
The following recommendations are based on these findings:

**To American Muslim Advocates**

- **American Muslims need to work in coalitions to secure shared interests.** Muslim communities and organizations lack the numbers, skills, and influence to operate independently for high-impact goals. When deciding to join a coalition, prospective organizations should examine how their highest priority issue areas may overlap with the interests of others. ISPU has developed a set of tools (http://www.ispu.org/islamophobia) that demonstrates how anti-Muslim bigotry, such as anti-sharia laws, overlap with legislative attacks directed against other communities. It is important to share this data with potential partner communities and organizations, in order to start conversations around strategy.

- **Focus on shared goals and interests.** A simple period of self-reflection should help determine if an organization should join a coalition. Determine if organizational and coalition visions align; clearly state the goals and objectives of the coalition; reiterate the areas of shared interest to create a collaborative environment. The case studies demonstrate the most effective coalitions were made of a variety of groups that were able to demonstrate integrity and commit capacity to meaningful engagement.

- **Commit to what can be delivered.** Organizations should know what unique contributions they can provide to a coalition. Limited presence and participation, with sincerity and based on practical limits, is valuable. One of the advantages a coalition provides is the distribution of resources to complement each organization’s strength. There are also creative and low-cost means of contributing to coalitions. In New York City, Muslims were instrumental in organizing street demonstrations and “pack the courthouse” events. In Maryland and Washington, coalition partners facilitated meetings with key officials and offered lobbying advice.

- **Build and maintain strong relationships with coalition partners.** This helps enhance working relationships, and demonstrates shared interest and commitment. Personal relationships mitigate potential internal and external pressures that undermine the partnership. The engagement with the needs of others means that other communities and organizations are more likely to come to your organization and your community’s assistance on other issues.

**To Potential Foundations and Other Funders**

- **Play the role of the convener.** Funding organizations can call meetings to discuss strategy, shared experiences, lessons learned, and to catalyze coalitions. Not only can they bring together diverse American Muslim groups, but also other groups that operate in similar spaces.

- **Educate around resource allocation.** While direct funding is always welcome, there also needs to be more open discussion and education around resource sourcing and allocation. A resource is more than just money; it includes human capital and infrastructure. Information on anticipating needs, budgeting for growth, and management are necessary parts of any organization’s growth. Providing some of that material ensures a more efficient use of funding.
Introduction

Since 9/11, American Muslims have been the subject of intense negative attention. In 2010, the negative attention turned into a series of organized actions against the community, including attempts to burn the Qur’an, protests against mosque building, and state legislators introducing anti-religion bills targeting Muslims.

Louisiana and Oklahoma adopted anti-Islam legislation that sought to prohibit Muslims from practicing their faith. The real purpose of these bills, often termed “anti-Sharia” or “anti-foreign law” bills by their supporters, was to use fear to marginalize American Muslims in public discourse and public policy making processes. David Yerushalmi, author of the template language for most of these anti-sharia state-level bills, stated, “If this thing passed in every state without friction, it would not have served its purpose… The purpose was heuristic — to get people asking this question, “What is Sharia?”

Yerushalmi, one of the thought leaders behind the anti-sharia movement has expressed animosity toward Muslims, blacks and women. In a 2006 essay, he wrote, “There is a reason the founding fathers did not give women or black slaves the right to vote… Why is that? Were they so flawed in their political reckonings that they manhandled the most important aspect of a free society – the vote?”

Yerushalmi’s animus towards marginalized groups is not unique amongst anti-Muslim activists. There is a body of evidence demonstrating the ideological crossover between anti-Muslim sentiment and other forms of hate. Prominent anti-Muslim activists have had direct connections to leading fascist and racist figures, and have made statements in direct support of them. These individual connections infect organizational connections and warp public discourse.

ACT! For America (ACT!), the country’s largest anti-Islam movement, supports anti-immigrant positions, such as the constitutionally suspect “Birthright Citizenship Act of 2013.” The act, if passed, would prevent so-called “anchor babies,” children born in the US, from gaining citizenship. Articles and statements on the ACT! National web site make the (unsubstantiated) claim that the Latino-based gang MS-13 and Al-Qaeda are

* “Anchor Babies” is a derogatory term used to describe children of undocumented immigrant parents born inside American sovereign territory. Irrespective of the parents’ status, the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution grants automatic citizenship to children born inside the United States, although it does not confer any such legal privileges to the parents. Nonetheless, those who claim to be concerned about “anchor babies” incorrectly believe that undocumented immigrant women who come to the United States and give birth make it easier for themselves or other family members to enter the country.
working together to infiltrate the U.S.-Mexico border. ACT! voices general opposition to immigration reform by connecting the entire issue to one of terrorism.

A 2012 study on hate speech and talk radio produced by researchers at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) found that talk radio shows that engage in anti-immigrant rhetoric also engage in anti-Muslim rhetoric. Through a content analysis of on-air statements and website materials, the UCLA study examined hosts’ and guests’ ideological views on frequently discussed topics—including immigration and terrorism. Its findings revealed that “the hosts promoted an insular discourse that focused on, for example, anti-immigration, anti-Islam, and pro-Tea Party positions, and that this discourse found repetition and amplification through social media.”

The Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) initiated its latest research project, Islamophobia: A Threat to All, to offer well-researched data on the intersection of various types of bigotry and marginalization.

Manufacturing Bigotry, one of the reports of the project, identifies coordinated legislative efforts that marginalize segments of the population, usually by emphasizing and encouraging popular prejudices. The report analyzes state-level bills and laws on a number of key public policy issues, from 2011 to 2013. One of the key findings is that many of the legislators who supported anti-Islam legislation also supported anti-immigrant and Voter ID bills, suppressing participation from racial and economic minorities.

This report, Strength through Diversity, highlights the methods and approaches of groups seeking to give citizens greater, not fewer rights. In the process, these groups are promoting pluralism and community empowerment. There are four case studies that offer an opportunity to reflect on best practices and lessons learned.

** It is important to point out that being opposed to certain immigration reform policies does not necessarily make a person anti-immigrant per se. There are important public policy issues attached to the debate that are not necessarily motivated by bigoted or hateful sentiments. For instance, see: Massimo Calabresi, “Is Racism Fueling the Immigration Debate?” Time, May 17, 2006, accessed January 4, 2014, http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1195250,00.html.
Our Intended Audience
– American Muslim Advocates and Activists

As with other publications in *Islamophobia: A Threat to All*, the primary audience is local and state-level American Muslim activists and advocates. The report provides findings, insights and actionable suggestions, based on four case studies. The emphasis is on basic structural observations. This approach allows those new to the world of coalitions, American Muslim organizations, and advocacy/activism/policy engagement to plan for their future, and allows those with more experience to re-engage with some of their premises.

According to a 2011 Brookings Institution report, *Enhancing Impact in the Public Square*, lack of capacity in a hostile political climate prevents American Muslim organizations from developing the skills and resources necessary to increase effectiveness. The Brookings report concluded:

> Forced to continually respond to external requests and crises, most [American Muslim organizations] have not been able to obtain a broader understanding of how their work relates to the broader civil society landscape, and identify potential partners they could work with to achieve common goals.\(^{17}\)

Local and state-level American Muslim activists and advocates are most aware of the need to engage in broader civil society. One of the interviewees for this report, a staff member at a national advocacy and civil rights organization who trains local chapters, observed:

> [O]ne of our first responsibilities is taking up cases and after a chapter has enough resources they can hire someone in government affairs that can translate incoming cases into policy solutions., so you are not only identifying individual cases, but also identifying institutional issues that need to be corrected or reformed.\(^{18}\)

In constructing the report’s research design, its investigative methodology, and its recommendations, the goal was to provide the insights based on the feedback from American Muslim community leaders.
Parameters

To establish the research parameters, it is important to clarify what are, and what are not the purposes of this particular report. It is not meant to debate the merits or drawbacks of the positions these coalitions have taken. Furthermore, it is not intended to provide directly applicable insights into successful federal-level legislative advocacy. The reason why we caution against direct applicability from local/state to federal has to do with differences in sizes. Local and state coalition advocacy operations are much smaller in scale and more operationally simple compared to federal-level advocacy, where there are many more actors for and against an issue, making operations more complex. This in turn can affect the insights and conclusions that can be drawn in each case.

The focus of this report is to provide the reader with insights into what elements help advocacy coalitions achieve success in local and state-level coalition advocacy. The emphasis is on what has happened, not what could have happened. Readers are encouraged to turn the examples into case studies and discuss decision points as part of their own reflection.

There are two reasons for the focus on local and state-level advocacy. The first reason is based on America’s demographic shifts. By 2050, America’s Muslims are a group that may make political gains due to the rise of a "majority-minority" population. The anxiety around this population change is manifest most clearly at the state level.

The second reason is American federalism. States, and sometimes local cities and towns, pass laws that serve as models for U.S. Congressional members to later adopt and pass at a national level. As the late Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis said, states often serve as “laboratories for democracy.”

Current academic and applied research literature examining “success” and “effectiveness” in coalitions is sparse. This report is a crucial contribution to the growing body of knowledge on this topic.
Methodology

With the commissioning of this report, the author, with an established working group, developed an initial list of seven cases, based on discussions and interviews with ISPU stakeholders with extensive experience in local and state level advocacy.

The selection of the final four cases was based on several factors, listed below:

- **American Muslim involvement.** Three of the four case studies highlight examples of American Muslim organizations engaged in a broader coalition. One case study (case study #2) examines successful coalition advocacy that does not involve an American Muslim organization.

- **Direct policy impact on American Muslims.** Three of the four case studies involve coalitions addressing policies and legislation targeting or disproportionately impacting American Muslims. One of the cases (case study #2) does not involve an issue disproportionately impacting Muslims.

- **Diversity of geographical location.** Two of the four case studies are on the East Coast; one on the West Coast; and one in the South.

- **State vs. Local-level advocacy.** One case study focuses on local level advocacy in a major city. The other three focused on state-level advocacy.

- **Diversity of legislative goals.** Two of the four case studies seek to pass sweeping legislative reforms. Another case study focuses on passing a statewide legislative resolution re-affirming America's commitment to religious liberty. The fourth case study highlights efforts to block legislation.

- **Expressed priorities of advocacy groups.** According to a May 2014 report by the Open Society Institute that surveyed 36 Muslim Arab and South Asian (MASA) organizations, the top three policy priorities of those surveyed found were: 1) excess law enforcement surveillance (55 percent), 2) immigration issues (12 percent), and Islamophobia (10 percent). These priorities also shaped the selection of case studies.

In addition to gathering secondary sources of information, the report uses primary data gathered in the form of semi-structured interviews with stakeholders around the country, as well as advocates directly involved in the case studies. Furthermore the author provides an independent analysis of financial and electoral data taken from in-house documents provided by interviewees and from reputable information clearinghouses, including the National Institute on Money in State Politics. Using these multiple methods and sources corroborates the reliability of sources and empirically grounds the research.

Limitations

Before concluding this section, it is critical to briefly acknowledge the limitations of this research. Given the small, but in-depth sample size, this report’s findings are not generalizable. Furthermore, due to time and resource limitations, the case studies do not include examples of “failed” or “unsuccessful” coalitions as a point of comparison against which to further isolate and identify factors that create “effective” and “successful” coalitions.

However the methodology, including careful selection of cases, as well as sources of data yielded findings with important insights for practitioners. The research design and key findings are also potentially transferable for researchers seeking to further explore coalition advocacy effectiveness in other contexts.
There are five key terms central to this report: coalition, advocacy, lobbying, Islamophobia and success.

**Coalition.** “A group of organizations whose members commit to an agreed-on purpose and shared decision making to influence an external institution or target, while each member organization maintains its own autonomy.”

**Advocacy.** “A broad group of activities that encompass pleading for or against causes, as well as supporting or recommending positions.”

**Lobbying.** “An attempt to influence specific legislation, including legislation that has already been introduced in a legislative body, and specific legislative proposals that an organization, or group of organizations (such as a coalition) may oppose or support. It is important to note that lobbying is a specific type of advocacy technique. While lobbying can be part of an advocacy strategy, advocacy does not necessarily include lobbying.”

**Islamophobia.** “An exaggerated fear, hatred, and hostility toward Islam and Muslims that is perpetuated by negative stereotypes resulting in bias, discrimination, and the marginalization and exclusion of Muslims from America’s social, political, and civic life.” In this report Islamophobia is used interchangeably with anti-Muslim hate, anti-Muslim sentiment and anti-Muslim animus.

**Success.** The definition of success used in this report is more fluid than the other terms defined thus far. In the context of this report, success is not limited to achieving certain legislative goals, like passing a law or a resolution. As our cases will show, “success” often includes an organization or a broader community establishing and cementing relationships with new allies or having their issue(s) supported by a broader set of organizations and communities.
Based on the priorities identified by ISPU’s working group, the results of informal discussions and formal interviews with stakeholders, and a review of prior studies, this report establishes the following five points of background in each study:

1. Reasons for forming a coalition.

2. Capacities of the coalition as a whole and of individual organizational members.
   i. Membership and diversity of that membership.
   ii. Role of funding in achieving goals.
   iii. Cohesiveness of the coalition.
      1. The unity of purpose.
      2. The unity of action.

3. The division of leadership and labor.


5. What each coalition considered to be a success.
What Role Does Funding Play in Coalitions?

Local and state-level American Muslim organizations, and their Arab and South Asian ethnic counterparts, tend to have modestly sized staff and budgets. A May 2014 survey of 36 Muslim, Arab, and South Asian (MASA) advocacy organizations found that 18 of the groups studied had only one to five individuals as staff members. In the same study, a similar number of respondent organizations, 17, said they had an annual budget of less than $500,000. These findings raise questions of how funding and resourcing levels may or may not affect an organization’s ability to advocate effectively.

Although one of the report’s interviewees, an experienced advocate, expressed the view that “funding has little to do with the success of” coalitions and movements, particularly those involved in social justice causes, a 2011 report found the importance of funding to be “highly dependent on context.” The cases in this report demonstrate this context-driven variation.
Overview of the Issue

“Stop and Frisk”, officially called, “Stop, Question and Frisk” (SQF) is a crime control tactic of the New York City Police Department (NYPD) that allows officers to temporarily detain, question, and potentially search pedestrians if an officer has reasonable suspicion that the pedestrian in question has “committed, is committing, or is about to commit a felony or a Penal Law misdemeanor.”\(^3\) Data compiled and analyzed by government and non-government organizations found that a disproportionate and overwhelming majority of these stops were of Black and Latino people.\(^3\) Additional analysis found that Blacks and Latinos were also substantially more likely than Whites to be frisked and to have physical force used against them.\(^3\) In addition to concerns over civil rights and civil liberties, data also suggests the program is ineffective in the short-term\(^3\) and in the long-term, possibly counterproductive to controlling crime.\(^3\)

On August 23, 2011, the Associated Press (AP) published the first\(^3\) in its series of investigative reports on secret widespread NYPD surveillance efforts. Rather than conducting targeted, evidence-led investigations of specific individuals suspected of criminal activity, the AP’s research found “police subjected entire neighborhoods to surveillance and scrutiny, often because of the ethnicity of the residents, not because of any accusations of crimes. Hundreds of mosques and Muslim student groups were investigated and dozens were infiltrated.”\(^3\)

Initially, groups challenged each of these NYPD tactics as separate issues. A unified advocacy effort emerged to address the department’s “Stop and Frisk” and domestic intelligence operations, sometimes referred to as “NYPD Surveillance.” This effort resulted in the partial passage of the 2013 Community Safety Act.\(^3\)

Identifying Common Goals and Working on Multiple Issues

Public awareness of concerns about SQF rose after a particularly violent and tragic incident. A New York Times story argued that “the battle over police stops in New York has many origins, but most see its beginnings in the killing of Amadou Diallo by a team of specialized police officers, who shot the man as he stood in the vestibule of his Bronx apartment building in 1999.”\(^4\) Diallo, an unarmed African Muslim immigrant vendor, was shot 41 times by four police officers at the scene.\(^4\)
Despite the community outrage generated by this incident and others, an organized coalition for police reform did not coalesce until almost 12 years later. Communities United for Police Reform (CPR), the main coalition working for the reform of NYPD policies and practices, began to take shape in June 2011.

After the AP published the first in its series of investigative reports on secret and widespread NYPD surveillance efforts, other reports found the NYPD targeting more than New York City Muslims. The NYPD spied on New York City’s progressive organizations. The police also left the confines of New York City and established clandestine units throughout the United States.

There are clear overlaps in victimized communities in the abuses of SQF and NYPD spying: SQF gained notoriety for the shooting of an unarmed Muslim man, and the NYPD spied on political organization fighting for citizen rights. Despite these connections, there was not a cohesive strategy to address both issues simultaneously.

CPR, which is focused on structural change of the NYPD, created a space for organizations that were significantly involved in both SQF and mass surveillance issues to come together. Linda Sarsour, Executive Director of the Arab American Association of New York (AAANY) explains:

> Now the question is when did these two worlds converge… the anti-stop and frisk movement and the NYPD surveillance? And I think it goes back to when there were some organizations in the Muslim community, for example DRUM, Desis Rising Up and Moving, who were already working with some of these groups like Malcolm X Grassroots Movement…

> [...] And what we did was we learned more about the coalition called Communities United For Police Reform (CPR). We did a lot of solidarity events around police accountability; we then started including some of the organizations around MACLC [Muslim American Civil Liberties Coalition] including DRUM and the Arab American Association of New York. We asked to be official members of CPR.

Bridge-building efforts included solidarity events that brought together Muslim and non-Muslim groups. These were important for building and strengthening alliances. Before the coalition formed, each reform agenda had its own legislative champions in the New York City Council (“City Council”). As ties were built between grassroots groups, they used the momentum to build connections with City Council lawmakers as well. As a result, reform efforts became increasingly coordinated. Sarsour explains:

> So we ended up having a meeting with the folks that were from the advocacy groups and the community organizations that were working off of the Community Safety Act but does not include [at the time] the Inspector General bill. And we’re able to basically come to an agreement that we wanted to add the Inspector General bill to the Community Safety Act. So the Community Safety Act added the IG [bill], which now made the Community Safety Act four pieces of legislation. And from there it was kind of the start of something new.

Establishing relationships of trust was important to prevent issues around competing interests. CPR’s Executive Director Joo-Hyun Kang stated, “When there were revisions on parts of the bills, we went back to organizations that are based in directly affected communities to make sure they were okay with them, that it still met their needs.”
A Broad Coalition of more than 63 Organizations

According to CPR’s website, there are at least 63 organizations actively participating in the coalition in one of two official capacities: members of the campaign and organizational supporters. This list (Appendix A) exhibits groups with different faith traditions, policy interests, socio-economic communities, races, ethnicities, gender orientations, and other markers of community. There are organizations dedicated to representing the views of Jews, Christians, Muslims, Latinos, African-Americans, immigrants, civil libertarians, supporters of drug de-criminalization, homeless advocates, and numerous other concerns.

A Formal Leadership and Well-Established Division of Labor

CPR has a well-established division of labor. According to CPR’s website, its organizational members are divided into two categories: members of the campaign and organizational supporters. Both categories “support the goals of CPR’s campaign, endorse the Community Safety Act, and participate in various activities of the campaign.” Members of the campaign have the added responsibility of “implement[ing] the main work areas of the campaign.”

Of CPR’s 24 members, nine, or just over one-third serve on the coalition’s Steering Committee. There are also a set of structures, which deal with different facets of the coalition’s campaign activities. According to Linda Sarsour, these structures include coordinating committees, as well as:

...policy working groups where... most of what we brought to the table was around the IG [bill] and our strategy around that. Grassroots action, we obviously are seen as one of those organizations that can help mobilize Muslims and Arabs, which is a community that the CPR people were never able to mobilize even on stop and frisk. They were just never able... they didn’t have this connection to the community that we have a connection to. So our role has been to ensure that Arabs and Muslims are part of—VISIBLE part of—the large mobilization, press conferences, and even identifying young Muslims to testify, for example, at New York City council hearings or speak at press conferences. (Emphasis added)

Strong Capacity with Wide Resource Disparities

CPR members have varying capacity and capability levels, in areas such as technical expertise and funding.

An organizer for the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU), a CPR steering committee member discussed technical expertise, stating, “In CPR, we’re working with diverse groups, some who have never worked on legislative matters. That pushes us to have deep conversations and to challenge each other to think about what’s best for the entire group.”
According to a 2012 profile of CPR by the New York Times, the Open Society Foundation (OSF) gave approximately $2.2 million in seed money to establish the umbrella organization. However, there were significant fiscal and resource disparities amongst CPR members. These disparities impacted individual organizations’ ability to contribute consistently to CPR.

**Funding Impacts Participation**

There were only two CPR coalition supporters who represented large Muslim constituencies: Desis Rising Up and Moving (DRUM) and Arab-American Association of New York. Funding constraints limited how these organizations participated in coalition activities.

Fiscal sponsors of CPR, recognizing the challenges of member, allocated funds toward addressing resource disparities. One major fiscal sponsors, North Star Fund, reported, “Last year, we provided a $100,000 challenge grant for grassroots groups who are leading the effort but are systematically under-resourced by philanthropy.”

**Multiple Tactics and Strategies**

CPR was established by “roughly 40 different groups of researchers, lawyers, and community activists.” As a result, CPR used a range of advocacy tactics and strategies.

The Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), a CPR Member, filed a 2008 lawsuit, *Floyd v. City of New York*, which went to trial in March 2013. During the trial, CPR Members and Organizational Supporters used community-based organizing and public awareness/media advocacy tactics to publicize the trial. One tactic was the visible “pack the courthouse” demonstrations. Organizers coupled this tactic with rallies and press conferences outside the courthouse, where the legal proceedings were taking place.

During the *Floyd v. City of New York* trial, different organizations within CPR, including the Muslim American Civil Liberties Coalition (MACLC) managed events on different days. Sarsour notes:

> The Floyd trial was a class action lawsuit against the New York Police Department on Stop and Frisk that when finally brought to court, was a month long trial. And the Muslim community really showed up. And when I mean showed up, I’m talking about overflow room. Being in the courtroom to support the plaintiffs in that lawsuit who were predominantly young men of color allowed our coalition partners to be able to say “these days when the Muslim community is packing the courthouse, they got our back—we don’t have to organize.”

In August 2013, federal district judge Shira Scheindlin ruled that SQF was unconstitutional and ordered an independent monitor to oversee a reform process. Shortly after Scheindlin’s ruling, an appeals court blocked it.

In addition to a legal strategy, CPR organizations were also engaged in legislative approaches, including lobbying legislators and policy-makers to pass the four Community Safety Act bills. Two of the bills, the End Discriminatory Profiling Act and the NYPD Oversight Act (also known as the “Inspector General bill”) passed by an overwhelming majority. Council members overrode Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s veto action with super-majorities on August 22, 2013.

* Describing when supporters of a plaintiff or defendant attend their trial in such large numbers that the courtroom fills to capacity.
In response, Mayor Bloomberg and the New York Chapter of the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association filed their own lawsuits against the anti-racial profiling law, but not against the Inspector General bill. CPR organizations filed amicus curiae briefs in support of the anti-racial profiling law.

The election of Bill de Blasio in 2013 as New York City’s new mayor shifted CPR’s focus to ensuring new reform policies were effectively implemented. CPR released a position paper entitled, Safety and Civil Rights for all New Yorkers: Fulfilling Pledges on Policing & Community Safety for the Mayor’s First 100 Days. Among the top eight pledges the position paper highlights, two address American Muslim issues: to “Ensure Effective Implementation of the End to Discriminatory Profiling and the NYPD Oversight Acts” and to “End Illegal Surveillance of Muslim Communities and Political Activities.”

An important advocacy strategy that CPR used was to reframe the debate around the efficacy of SQF through data. By researching and analyzing the data, CPR demonstrated that SQF did not result in benefits the NYPD claimed. Paul J. Browne, the NYPD’s chief spokesperson, conceded in an interview with the New York Times that the numbers served to reframe the debate. Mr. Browne stated that, “by using the data that we’re required to produce, the advocates managed to reframe the debate over the stop-and-frisk policy as a numbers-oriented calculation of how often the police interactions resulted in arrests or summonses.”

CPR, in partnership with the John Jay College of Criminal Justice’s Center on Race, Crime, and Justice, established an information portal of independent research on SQF, called stopandfriskinfo.org. The purpose of the website is to “serve as a resource for all those concerned about discriminatory policing and alternatives to maintaining public safety” and contains relevant information including, “a library of research papers, divided into the themes of the impact of, legality of, effectiveness of, and alternatives to - stop and frisk and related policing practices.”

Research also played an important role in shaping the debate surrounding spying on NYC’s Muslim communities. The New York Times’ editorial board has published at least three separate pieces criticizing the NYPD’s surveillance policy of local Muslim communities, each time citing a lack of evidence demonstrating the program’s effectiveness.

Diverse Communities, United Around a Common Goal of Reform

CPR is a highly cohesive coalition with a strong sense of unity of purpose and action. The mission is well defined, and centers on reforming NYPD policies and practices. Based on her experience, Sarsour notes that, “this coalition is specific to accountability and transparency of the New York Police Department, in whatever way that means. We don’t work on immigration or other issues; [CPR works] within the only focus that they have.”

CPR demonstrated unity of action, even with the diverse interests of its 60-plus members and supporters. This unity of action is illustrated in its position statements and its specific legislative advocacy.
The purpose of the coalition, according to the CPR website, is to push for “the New York City Council to pass legislation ending discriminatory ‘stop and frisk’ practices and related discriminatory policing, ensuring respect of New Yorkers’ rights, and far more vigorous oversight of the NYPD.”

This position is translated into specific policy recommendations. CPR’s website states the coalition supports the four City Council bills included in the Community Safety Act package, along with supporting resources. After the election of a new NYC mayor, CPR published Safety and Civil Rights for all New Yorkers: Fulfilling Pledges on Policing & Community Safety for the Mayor’s First 100 Days. Ending mass surveillance of NYC Muslim communities was among the list of 8 major policing reforms mentioned in the paper.

This clarity of purpose resulted in coordinated activity amongst participating organizations. Two days after the Floyd trial began the Arab American Association of New York and Jews for Racial and Economic Justice organized a “pack the court” event during the day and an “evening Seder-in-the-Streets against stop and frisk in Foley Square [in Lower Manhattan].” One week later, on March 27, 2013, the Muslim American Civil Liberties Coalition (MACLC), along with Desis Rising Up and Moving (DRUM) and the New York chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) organized a press conference outside the courthouse. At least 34 groups and organizations participated in 26 different events over 15 days. Events included “pack the court”, religious services, and street art performances.

**Legislative and Policy Changes Achieved**

The first accomplishment is passage of favored legislation. Defining legislative success as full passage of all four Community Safety Act (CSA) bills, the evidence indicates that substantial progress has been made despite significant resistance from competing interests, including vocal opposition from the NYPD, police unions, and then-mayor Michael Bloomberg’s administration. Forms of opposition have included numerous press statements, an unsuccessful veto attempt, and a last-minute lawsuit filed against the passed legislation. In late January 2014, the new de Blasio administration announced that it would end its legal challenge to the Floyd v. New York decision, accept the federal court-appointed monitor to oversee reform implementation, and work to end SQF abuses altogether. Nonetheless this type of success remains partially complete. The other two CSA bills have not yet been voted on.

The second type of success is policy implementation, including legal challenges to SQF and NYPD mass surveillance of Muslim communities. Questions and concerns remain over the willingness and ability of de Blasio and the new NYPD Police Commissioner, William Bratton to fully implement the kinds of legal and policy reforms sought by CPR and others. These concerns include fully ending the NYPD’s mass gathering of information without individualized suspicion of criminal activity. Media outlets have reported that Chief Bratton has disbanded the specific unit conducting unchecked surveillance on Muslim communities. Community advocates contend that, while a positive first step, broader questions remain unanswered about whether or not general warrantless surveillance practices that have been directed at Muslims and others remain in places under other programs that may not have been disclosed. As of the publication of this report, it appears that controversies and concerns surrounding surveillance of NYC Muslim communities remains an ongoing issue.
Beyond Legislation: “Organization, Mobilization, and Inclusion” of Muslims

The organization, mobilization, and inclusion of American Muslims in effective coalition advocacy work is a marker of a strategic success. Linda Sarsour points out that years of working together on related interests has expanded the inclusiveness of CPR. She states that, “You probably couldn’t maintain [standing] and couldn’t be a member of CPR if you said, for example, ‘look, I’m here to work on stop and frisk, and I don’t agree, I think that the NYPD should be spying on Muslims.’”

The legislative success of CPR impacts how Muslim communities view the democratic process, and how they could seek to achieve other goals in collaboration with a diverse group of other communities. Sarsour explains:

> It was a monumental moment, when you look back on New York City and all the work we’ve done here. Most often it has been done in isolation. There have been some of us who understand the importance of coalition work, but in general our community never really understood it. And I think the police work has brought our community to a place where it now makes sense why we can’t win this on our own and why coalition building is the way to address all issues. (Emphasis added)

American Muslim investment in CPR resulted in a reform of NYPD’s spying policies. Sarsour emphatically pointed out that, “if it wasn’t for their (CPR’s) visible support and solidarity, I don’t think that the surveillance program or our campaign to end NYPD unwarranted surveillance would have gotten to the place that it got to.”
Case Study # 2 - Maryland DREAM Act

Overview of the Issue

Maryland’s DREAM Act (SB167/HB470) allows students living without legal documentation in America to be eligible to receive in-county tuition rates at Maryland community colleges, and in-state rates at public four-year colleges and universities. The Maryland State General Assembly passed it in 2011, and there were no American Muslim organizations involved in the coalition that got the legislation passed. This case study has two distinct periods: legislative advocacy and the referendum challenge.

Origins of the DREAM Act

DREAM stands for “Development, Relief, and Education of Alien Minors.” It was originally proposed as a piece of federal legislation. It was meant to provide an earned pathway to citizenship for undocumented children, brought into the US illegally by their parents. State-level versions of the DREAM Act focus on granting tuition-cost relief to students seeking to attend public colleges/universities.

During the legislative advocacy period, CASA de Maryland (CASA) coalition members lobbied elected officials and advocated amongst public and civil society allies. The bill passed both chambers of the General Assembly and Governor Martin O’Malley signed it into law in 2011. In July of that same year, opponents of the law gathered enough signatures to place it under a statewide veto referendum for 2012.

In the referendum challenge period, a coalition called Educating Maryland Kids (EMK) formed specifically to secure the legislative victory by “taking it directly to the ballot box.” The disposition of the Maryland DREAM Act’s was put to a popular vote. Despite initial polling indicating strong opposition, the law was affirmed by a large margin: 58.9 to 41.1 percent.

The case study below will analyze both periods of coalition work: legislative advocacy and the referendum challenge/"the ballot initiative". For the purposes of comparison, key parts of each period will alternate in the following descriptions.
Creating Coalitions

Prior Relationships and Identifying Key Constituents Bring the Coalition Together (Legislative Phase)

Two factors catalyzed the formation of the legislative advocacy coalition.

The first factor was the pre-existing relationships that CASA de Maryland, the primary organization behind the legislative campaign, had with other organizations. According to Kim Propeack, Political and Communications Director at CASA de Maryland, these relationships were “already existing over years of past practice together and partnerships that we were easily able to get onboard.”

The second factor was that CASA conducted extensive outreach to other organizations that represented a diverse set of interests. These groups included representatives of Maryland’s public and private colleges and universities. All three University of Maryland presidents, the Maryland Association of Community Colleges, as well as the heads of individual private colleges, all gave statements of support in favor of the Maryland DREAM Act. Propeack particularly emphasized the importance of the colleges’ support, noting, “if you don’t have them onboard then they’re killing your bill.”

Professional Media Campaigners are Hired to Win the Ballot (Referendum Phase)

The ballot initiative coalition, called Educating Maryland Kids (EMK) developed around a “pay-to-play”-type model that is used for winning ballot questions across the country. In this structure, the groups contributing the largest amount of funds to the campaign effort are the lead organizations. These contributions allowed EMK to hire professional full-time staffers, with expertise in media campaigns and winning ballot initiatives, to run the coalition’s daily operations.

Membership and Leadership

A large, diverse coalition (Legislative Phase)

Legislative advocacy coalition members included faith-based, ethnic-based, immigrant rights, organized labor, business, and education advocacy groups. CASA de Maryland’s newsletter lists at least 28 civil society, and local- and state-level government entities that supported the effort to pass the Maryland DREAM Act (Appendix B).

Big Spenders Steer the Strategic Direction (Referendum Phase)

Under this “pay-to-play” structure, the lead organizations are the groups contributing the largest amount of funds to the campaign effort. In order to be elected to EMK’s steering committee, an organization was required to contribute a minimum of a $100,000.
As a result of these structures, decision-making was centralized. Although various individuals, private companies, faith-based organizations, and political campaigns made donations, the top eight donors, the steering committee members, constituted more than 75 percent of EMK’s total budget. Six of these eight organizations were organized labor groups, and their financial contributions were more than 70 percent of EMK’s budget. The other two organizations were a private corporation (Domino Foods), and the Emerson Collective, “an organization that supports social entrepreneurs and organizations working in the areas of education and immigration reform, social justice and conservation.”

Resource allocation

Established Lobbies and Time Invested were the Key Factors (Legislative Phase)

Coalition funding ensured that certain organizations had the full-time staff dedicated to grassroots mobilizing and direct lawmaker lobbying. Established organizations like CASA de Maryland, Maryland Industrial Areas Foundation (a multi-faith advocacy group), SEIU, and the Maryland Catholic Conference already had “a hand-to-hand lobby system in place there in Annapolis. They were working votes and they brought district leadership to lobby meetings, so they were effective at putting political pressure on.” Ultimately the biggest “expense” borne by coalition members was that “it cost [them] time but at that point it was not like financial donations were that important.”

Funding Pays for Visibility and Enforces Structure (Referendum Phase)

Funding for EMK, served three central purposes: 1) paying for full-time staff; 2) buying television and radio ads; and 3) establishing discipline and direction for the coalition. Since groups could only participate in the EMK’s steering committee if they contributed at least $100,000, there was an inherent structure. Propeack explains, “You’re playing to win, right? You know you need to enforce some structure with pretty high payments.”

Leadership

A Lead Organization with Strategic Support (Legislative Phase)

CASA de Maryland was the de facto lead organization. There was no formal umbrella structure identified by public sources, or from ISPU’s interviews with individuals familiar with or involved in the effort to pass the 2011 Maryland DREAM Act. The coalition was a semi-fluid group of independent organizations that regularly coordinated and communicated with one another. The division of labor among the organizations was based on each organization’s strength. Propeack describes how these various efforts worked out in practice:

The way we managed that from our perspective we primarily saw ourselves as staffing the campaign. So anything that had to get done, we felt we were responsible for. And then there were other people…

So the other groups who did a lot of lobbying on this were SEIU… the Maryland Industrial Areas Foundation… And certainly the colleges did a lot of work on this and let’s say the community colleges in particular.
So I would really count those guys as primarily driving it and we would have daily discussions and updates with a consortium of people and the Maryland Catholic caucus… about what one legislator said and we were vote counting constantly and figuring out what the legislator had a relationship with which group and walking the halls…

So it was really a combination of the different kinds of names [of], actors driving it forward, but I would feel [we had] responsibility and have daily check-ins with [people] about progress.\textsuperscript{114}

**Professional Staff (Referendum Phase)**

The referendum challenge or ballot initiative campaign was very different. The division of labor and decision-making structure was based on the financial investments made by various contributing organizations. These investments in turn paid for professional staffers skilled in running day-to-day operations of public media campaigns for the purposes of winning referendums: “We hired a professional team—that was the first thing. We had a campaign manager, we had pollsters, we had a comms [communications] person”,\textsuperscript{115} in addition to hiring a full-time professional social media strategist.\textsuperscript{116}

**Managing Internal Relations**

**Trust and Deference (Legislative Phase)**

Coalition organizations had more say in coalition activities, compared to EMK’s formalized rules, and there was no formal structure. The absence of a structure did not affect the coalition’s unity of effort. Internal trust among all of the coalition members—built from years of working with each other—and deference to each group’s strengths appeared to mitigate any challenges from the lack of formality.

Conflicts did occasionally arise within the coalition. Propeack broadly recounted that, “There was also a lot of negotiation, there were conflicts we had with some institutions about the language we were using and there were political problems. There were negotiations with leadership in the Chambers and the governor’s office so those were some actions that had to be taken.”\textsuperscript{117} The passage of the legislation indicates that these issues were resolved.

Not all groups were engaged consistently, but they were used strategically:

…if you look at a group like Morgan State University… [Maryland’s] flagship HCBU8, the head of Morgan State has a very close relationship with the committee jurisdiction in the Senate so we reached out to the president to get involved in that conversation…

\* Historically Black Colleges and Universities. These are institutions of higher education that were established with the intention of serving the America’s black communities. After passage of the 1965 Higher Education Act HBCUs became a legal status that such institutions could potentially qualify for in order to receive direct federal education funds.
Frederick County Teachers Association - Frederick County is like the most anti-immigrant jurisdiction in the state, but their teachers union is just awesome and they’ve dealt with a lot of the anti-immigrant school issues really, really wonderfully. So we had them reach out to the target Senator from that jurisdiction to get his commitment. So kind of like there’s a group of us, for the first set of groups that really drove things... but then we would get into things that into where we knew of the other entities was going to be really effective.\textsuperscript{118} (Emphasis added)

Highly Cohesive (Referendum Phase)

The need for a large investment indicates that EMK’s member organizations were different than the members of the legislative coalition. It also suggests asymmetries in political experience and technical sophistication between the biggest donors and the various civil society groups that spearheaded the legislative advocacy period. Propeack pointed out that DREAM supporters had “a very, very difficult time raising money out of the immigrant community and there was a sense that [this was] not a lack of interest as so much as there was not a history of investing in these types of campaigns.”\textsuperscript{119} The coalition’s connections with the Governor’s office were as crucial to helping staff familiarize itself with immigrant communities that were central to supporting the initial passage of the bill.

Strategies and Tactics

Visits to Elected Officials (Legislative Advocacy)

In Annapolis, groups organized legislative lobby days where hundreds of constituents from across the state visited their statewide elected officials. According to Propeack, coalition members made visits to legislators “across both chambers, over 200 lobbying visits.”\textsuperscript{120} She recalled that during the meetings coalition members helped supporting legislators, “draft the legislative language [and] recruit sponsors. We try to buffer reputations early on by bringing on a bunch of co-sponsors to walk the halls to bring on a bunch of [other] co-sponsors.”\textsuperscript{121}

In the home districts of elected officials, groups organized town halls. Coalition members also implemented a door-to-door program in the districts of four swing legislators, to encourage voters to call their legislator’s offices in support of the DREAM Act.

Media Strategy and Poll-Tested Public Messaging (Referendum Phase)

Initially, supporters of the new law filed legal challenges to remove the Maryland DREAM Act from being on a ballot referendum.\textsuperscript{122} They argued that Maryland state law prohibits appropriation-related items from being challenged on a ballot.\textsuperscript{123} Ultimately Maryland’s Supreme Court disagreed and ruled in June 2012 that the ballot initiative could proceed.\textsuperscript{124}

Educating Maryland’s Kids launched less than a week after the ruling.\textsuperscript{125} Its efforts centered on media outreach, public opinion polling research, and message testing. Based on the polling conducting by EMK, messages were based around “education”, as opposed to “immigration”. The education message framing resonated with Marylanders and drew out large numbers of supporters, even in counties that were considered hostile to the DREAM Act.\textsuperscript{126}
Success in Maryland: Laws, Building a Reputation, and Forging New Alliances

The legislative success was passage of the DREAM Act and securing that victory at the ballot the following year. These successes created significant political momentum for other legislative actions. The year after the ballot victory lawmakers reinstated and expanded a program that would allow undocumented immigrants to apply for driving privileges. Propeack explains:

_We created so much political power by winning that referendum that it completely altered the landscape of what legislators are willing to do on any topic on immigration._ And that’s why the following year we won driver’s license access in 90 days. We originally thought it was going to be a two-year campaign and we won in the first year._  

Strengthening African-American—Latino community relationships was another success of the coalition. CASA de Maryland’s _Winning The Maryland DREAM Act_, declared that “Building permanent African American-Latino alliances was a key accomplishment of the campaign” and was facilitated by CASA giving “dozens of presentations at African American churches and community organizations, educating thousands.”

Bridge Building Crucial to Securing MD DREAM Act Victory

Outreach to groups beyond primary beneficiaries was a key component of the legislative coalition’s work.

According to U.S. Census figures, Maryland’s African-American population is higher (30 percent) than the national average (13 percent). In comparison, Latinos are 8.7 percent of Maryland’s population, but almost 17 percent nationwide.

The Maryland DREAM Act referendum passed, with almost 59 percent in favor of the law. These numbers suggest the importance of the African-American vote in the referendum.

Nine counties, out of a total of 24, with the highest voter turnout constitute approximately 82 percent of the votes cast statewide. The voting outcomes in these nine counties reveal only three counties voted against the Maryland DREAM Act. The other six counties had African-American populations of 18 percent or higher. In Baltimore City, Baltimore County, and Prince George’s County (three of Maryland’s four most populous counties) it would have been _statistically impossible_ to achieve victory without winning the African-American vote. This data underscores the significant “return on investment” DREAM Act supporters received by building bridges across communities.

* These were counties that had a voter turnout of 85,000 or more.
Overview of the Issue

The Washington State resolution “represents the clearest example of victory” in terms of American Muslim coalition advocacy working to influence the state legislative process. In addition to preventing the passage of House Bill 1392, which targeted Muslims’ right to practice their personal religious jurisprudence, fiqh (often confused with shari’a), legislators passed a Senate counter-resolution called “Faith in Our State.”

Case Study # 3 - The “Faith in Our State” Resolution

Sharia: An Expert’s View

There is a general confusion among the US public about what sharia is. This is because anti-Muslim activists engage in alarmist rhetoric and have little to no formal education or expertise in Islamic legal theories. The confusion arises from a conflation of the terms sharia and fiqh.

Dr. Asifa Quraishi-Landes, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin, with a focus on Islamic law, explains that:

*Islamic jurisprudence is built on the idea that every human effort to articulate sharia (divine law) in specific legal rules is a human, and therefore unavoidably fallible, process. This process is called ijtihad, and the rules it produces are called fiqh (understanding). Fiqh rules can be criticized without questioning God’s infallibility, because they are merely the result of fallible human efforts to understand and elaborate sharia. In short, whereas sharia is perfect and is not in need of reform, fiqh rules are always fallible and therefore can be wrong.*
Muslims Lead on Religious Liberty

In 2013, several Washington state legislators proposed a pair of anti-Sharia bills (HB1392/SB 6118). These bills were only supported for a few days. The incident motivated Council on American-Islamic Relations’ Washington State chapter (CAIR-WA) to work on passing a symbolic counter-resolution re-affirming Washington state’s, and America’s, commitment to religious freedom. The resolution was titled “Faith in Our State.” CAIR-WA reached out to a group of faith-based, immigrant rights, and civil liberties groups with whom it had existing, trusted relationships.139

Participating organizations included the Washington State chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Faith Action Network (FAN)10, OneAmerica, the Sikh Coalition, and the Jewish Greater Federation of Seattle.140

A Time-Intensive Goal

The organizations that came together formed a very loose informal coalition that assisted CAIR-WA on an ad-hoc basis, particularly in areas where CAIR-WA lacked technical capacity, such as having full-time lobbyists in the state capitol. Arsalan Bukhari, Executive Director of CAIR-WA explains:141

…our efforts became more relaxed, in the beginning we thought ‘gosh, we’re going to have to… pull out the stops on this one, to move forward’ but then it seemed pretty easy to get it done and so it was never a formal coalition. It was just organizations that we thought would support and have the means especially with lobbyists on the ground in Olympia.

Assistance from other organizations’ lobbyists was crucial. These lobbyists gave feedback on the language of CAIR-WA’s proposed resolution, and informally passed on information about the legislators’ offices from which they should expect opposition.142

Funding constraints were not a factor. Through trusted working relationships with other coalition members, CAIR-WA was able to leverage their allies’ lobbying network. Bukhari reflected, “we had time donated … by staff members giving advice on talk[ing] to lawmakers.”143

Allies co-signed letters supporting the resolution, and encouraging others to do the same. The Faith Action Network encouraged its members to participate in CAIR-WA’s 2013 Muslim Lobby Day to support the resolution144 and included “Faith in Our State” as part of its overall set of legislative priorities for 2013.145

CAIR-WA’s largest direct expense was the human resources put into the effort. CAIR-WA has only two full-time staff, in addition to the Executive Director.146 This effort required fully leveraging of “volunteer and intern resources and so [there were] a number of people who emailed and called lawmakers and emailed and called constituents to have them meet with lawmakers.”147

* An interfaith organization composed of representatives of Jewish, Christian, Unitarian Universalist, Muslim, Buddhist, Sikh, Baha’i, and Native American faith traditions. See: http://www.fanwa.org/.
An Ad-Hoc Coalition

This coalition was informal. Communication was on an “as needed” basis. As a result, unity of action was intermittent, and was generally limited to CAIR-WA’s requests for civil society allies to sign and send letters to support the resolution. The unity of purpose was well defined. All efforts focused on getting the resolution passed in both legislative chambers. When it became clear that the resolution would not pass in the House due to technical issues over specific language, CAIR-WA focused its efforts on successfully ensuring the resolution’s passage in the Senate.

Lawmaker Lobbying

The effort to pass “Faith in Our State” focused on direct lawmaker lobbying. CAIR-WA’s specific activities centered on its annual Muslim Lobby Day, an event where hundreds of Washington State Muslims visit the state’s capitol in Olympia. In preparation for its 2013 Lobby Day, CAIR-WA staff and members met with lawmakers in their own districts one to two months prior to the legislative session in order to gauge the level of support among lawmakers to the proposed resolution. This effort helped staff and constituents “know ahead of time where they stand and what [their] chances are… [they] were emailing and calling and [on] April 19th [it] passed.” CAIR-WA also leveraged the lobbying resources of its allies in this effort.

Success: Passing the “Faith in Our State” Resolution

The “Faith in Our State” initiative was successful for three reasons. First, the resolution passed successfully. CAIR-WA staff hoped to have the resolution approved by both legislative chambers, however they were only able to have it approved in the Senate. CAIR-WA’s Executive Director expressed his desire to have the resolution approved in the House chamber during the 2014 legislative year.

Second, the resolution is symbolically and tactically significant at a national level. Symbolically, it was the first resolution of its kind to be passed in the country since the rise of anti-Sharia/anti-Islam initiatives in 2009. Tactically, this resolution forced anti-Muslim activists to “expend energy defeating [an] initiative rather than [Muslims] expending energy defeating theirs.”

Third, the lobbying process created unlikely political allies. The resolution passed in a Republican-controlled Senate chamber, which seems counter-intuitive as Republican lawmakers proposed the overwhelming majority of anti-Sharia bills in state legislatures across the country from 2011-2012. This case study illustrates that challenges can be overcome with the right kind of engagement. According to Bukhari, finding common ground based on shared moral values was crucial to gaining the necessary legislative support to pass the resolution:

...in this case it was a lot of the religious leaders, Republican Party members supported this. Yeah, if you look at the list of support, I think the sponsors of the bill, maybe three-quarters of them are Republican Party members and who... care about fiscal issues they are [also] very religious people, at least, according to what they profess. So that’s a notable item that other people need to really take note of—that there are a lot of opportunities to engage with people based on shared values. And we really saw that again in this resolution at least. (Emphasis added)
Overview of the Issue

This case study focuses on combating two high-profile pieces of anti-Muslim policy in Tennessee. One is an anti-sharia bill proposed in 2011. The other involves efforts in 2014 to change the portrayal of Islam in public school textbooks and curricula.

In November 2010, 70 percent of Oklahoma voters approved a referendum banning sharia. Four months later, Tennessee state Senator Bill Ketron (R) and state Representative Judd Matheny introduced Senate Bill 1028 and House Bill 1353. Claiming that sharia “continues to plague the United States generally and Tennessee in particular,” the bills proposed that adherence to the “legal-political-military” doctrine of sharia would be a felony punishable by 15 years in jail. One critic labeled the pair of proposed laws as a “radical response to a non-existent threat.” Opposition to the bills swiftly emerged. A diverse coalition of American Muslims, civil liberties organizations, interfaith groups, immigrant rights leagues, and other concerned parties gathered to challenge the bill. The language of the bill was amended to remove any references to Islam, sharia, or foreign law. It was transformed into an anti-terrorism law.

In the 2013-2014 Tennessee legislative session a group of lawmakers proposed several bills that would significantly revise textbook curricula and education standards throughout the state. The “textbook” coalition included various minority communities. They raised concerns about language in the bills that suggested a desire to change how issues such as slavery and the Civil Rights Era were discussed in classrooms. Tennessee Muslims became involved in this fight, as the discussion was framed around the idea that textbooks contained “pro-Islamic” and “anti-Christian” biases.

Working with Many Groups, Including the Tea Party

Tennessee Muslims joined with local Tea Party groups to oppose the anti-sharia bills. Tea Party groups joined the coalition because they believed that the bills constituted an infringement upon the individual liberties of all Tennesseans and could be used to target groups critical of government policies.

The textbook coalition included groups representing African-American, immigrant, and LGBTQ communities. This diverse coalition came together because of shared concerns that the proposed changes would minimize contributions of racial, ethnic, gender, and religious minorities. In addition, the proposed change would distort facts and discussions concerning civil rights, slavery, and the global history of Islam.
Coalition member Rev. Dr. Dan Rosemergy, minister of the Greater Nashville Unitarian Universalist Congregation and chair of the Interfaith Alliance of Middle Tennessee, saw the anti-sharia bills as a threat to the common good of Tennessee’s diverse religious communities:

*I’m pleased to stand with my colleagues and friends—of many faiths and organizations— to oppose House Bill 1353 (Senate Bill 1028). It’s simply an unnecessary piece of legislation. We all live and abide by the secular laws of the land, and no religious or faith law or practice changes that or exempts any believer from those secular laws.*

### Managing Limited Resources

The coalition had organizations with notable differences in their capacities. The Tennessee affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union had seven full-time staff and budget of over $700,000. The American Center for Outreach, a Tennessee Muslim advocacy organization formed in 2011, has only one staffer listed on its website and a reported budget of less than $50,000.

Funding levels have not hindered Tennessee Muslim groups from engaging in coalition work. Remziya Suleyman, Director of Policy Outreach and Administration at the American Center for Outreach, says, “Sometimes funding limited us in how much we can do, but it has never been a determining factor in terms of when we find a priority issue and the need to partner up with diverse groups…” In other coalitions, participation helped lessen financial challenges on an organization because multiple groups bundled their resources.

### Division of Labor Among Tennessee Muslim Advocacy Groups

Until 2011, the *de facto* lead organization for Tennessee Muslims was the Tennessee Immigrant and Refugee Rights Coalition (TIRRC). TIRRC staffers that were Muslim eventually left the organization to start up Muslim-specific groups such as the American Center for Outreach (ACO) and the American Muslim Advisory Council (AMAC).

There was an organic division of labor amongst the three main statewide Tennessee Muslim organizations: ACO, AMAC, and the Muslim Youth Network of Tennessee (MYNT). The separation of activities is important as it speaks to the increasing maturation of American Muslim organizations. According to a 2011 Brookings Institute study on American Muslim advocacy organizations:

*The relative newness and diversity of organizations, coupled with the lack of clear structures challenge both the ability of Muslim communities to coordinate their activities and the ability of external audiences to understand the communities and their interlocutors.*

While all three organizations broadly share the mission of community empowerment and development through increased political and civic engagement, each organization pursues this mission differently and caters to different segments of Tennessee Muslim communities.

ACO is the lead statewide advocacy and lobbying organization, while AMAC functions as an intermediary body between communities and local, state and federal government agencies. AMAC also functions as a trusted clearinghouse for information on Islam and Muslims. The broad purpose of MYNT is to enable positive youth development and create a support network for the next generation of Tennessee Muslims. MYNT’s role vis-à-vis ACO and AMAC, is to encourage civic and political participation among Muslim youth.
Tennessee Muslim organizations place a strong emphasis on participation in the coalitions’ operations. Failing to participate in a coalition’s operations can have negative consequences. For example, Suleyman pointed to a recent controversy over an inflammatory ad labeling an anti-abortion ballot initiative as the “Tennessee Taliban amendment” and depicting the Tennessee legislature as a turbaned man stepping on a woman. The progressive organization responsible for launching the ad, Tennesseans for the Preservation of Privacy, did not seek prior consultation from other pro-choice, progressive, and Muslim allies. Unfortunately, Suleyman noted that broad coalition processes could sometimes be “bureaucratic”. In the case of the “Taliban” ad controversy, she noted that “…because of the bureaucracy it just took a really long time to send a perfect message that all groups were ok with…and so the pushback from the interfaith perspective was delayed…”

**Strong Personal Relationships**

Reflecting on her experience with large coalitions, Suleyman noted:

> I think this shows how even broad coalitions can be effective. Not only when you work on a diverse issue, sometimes around immigrant, refugees, resettlement, but also when you have a bill directly targeting one group specifically that makes it very difficult to mobilize and if you don’t have the relationships and trust beforehand those groups are not going to come out to support those issues.

There were pressures placed upon individual members that undermined cohesiveness. For instance, certain high profile interfaith coalition members who fought against the anti-sharia bills received resistance from their congregations. According to Suleyman, both a Catholic priest and a Rabbi were allegedly reprimanded by their respective congregations. The priest received a harsh administrative punishment from his diocese, while the Rabbi was let go from his temple.

Tea Party groups fighting the anti-sharia bills also faced opposition from other Tea Party members and organizations. Will Coley, a Muslim convert who facilitated the East Tennessee Tea Party opposition to the sharia bills, was the subject of political attacks from anti-Muslim pundits and fellow Tea Party members that espoused anti-Muslim views.

Because Will Coley was an active and well-known local libertarian for several years, the coalition to defeat the anti-sharia bills received support from East Tennessee Tea Party groups. Coley received a national Liberty Inspiration award for “work promoting the compatibility of Islam and classical liberalism or ‘limited government’.”

There were also conflicts within the coalition amongst liberal groups. Tennesseans for Preservation of Privacy put out a controversial ad that used bigoted motifs of Muslims. Tennessee Muslims, as well as pro-choice and progressive allies, denounced the ad as racist and inflammatory.

Suleyman believes that these coalitions did not fray largely because of one factor: personal relationships.
The rabbi and Catholic priest were willing to face severe professional repercussions because of their strong personal relationships. In response to the “Tennessee Taliban” ad, Suleyman received messages of support from progressive partners who were appalled by the offensive nature of the ad. One pro-choice group, the Middle and East Tennessee chapter of Planned Parenthood, quickly went on record to publicly condemn the ad as “disturbing and offensive.”

Community Presence
Coalition members deployed policy and issue research, such as short backgrounder and legislative guides, for their constituents and other interested parties. According to Suleyman effective “community presence and mobilization” were also extremely important. Effective community presence, in her view, can be achieved in one of two ways. The first tactic is to be visible, such as attending rallies, or meeting with elected officials. Physical presence allows others to “see[], individualize, and put[] human faces to the issue.” The second tactic is media engagement. Suleyman notes that strategic communications and effective messaging are important, but that consistency is key. She points out:

>Strategic communication and advocacy work when you have a presence that’s constant... when there’s an issue that pops up and people expect you to be there or that you are the lead person in breaking that story. And then you are able to get hundreds of folks to retweet, repost, and you make kind of the cyber noise needed to show your presence… via the internet and electronically.

Success: Legislative, Political Awareness, and Institution Building
This study case exhibits success in three areas.

The first success was changing the language of the anti-shariah bills to remove references to Islam and Muslims, and instead index “material support” for terrorism. There was a similar result for the bills about textbooks. Two out of the four bill packages died in the committee-hearing phase. Language negatively impacting the portrayal of minority communities, including Muslims, was removed from the other two bills before their final passage.

The second success was the increasing political mobilization of Tennessee Muslims. After Neo-Nazis firebombed the Islamic Center of Columbia in 2008, Tennessee Muslims started becoming politically active. This process was accelerated during the controversy surrounding the Murfreesboro mosque in 2010 and the debate about the 2011 anti-sharia bills. Many Tennessee Muslim leaders and activists joined forces with interfaith leaders, civil liberties organizations, and immigrant rights advocates for the first time. There were also connections with Tea Party activists, school educators, and LGBTQ advocates. Suleyman explains:

>You had faith leaders coming, you had the Muslim community, you had the liberal LGBT communities coming out because parts of the bill would have tackled…the kind of messaging was that the textbooks are not only too “Muslim friendly” but that they are too “LGBT friendly” as well. And so getting them, getting diverse actors around… at the table with us represents a real success...

The third success was the creation of new institutions. Tennessee Muslim communities began setting up institutions such as ACO, AMAC, and MYNT. These groups, and others, raised the civic consciousness of Tennessee Muslims and mobilized the eligible voters among them, transforming these communities into a political force that has to be engaged.
The following are the six findings that are common over our four case studies.

**Coalitions are important to securing success.** There is a need for organizations from different backgrounds to work together to achieve a particular goal.

In the case of New York City police reform, visible Muslim involvement in the SQF reform effort led to political momentum to change the NYPD’s mass surveillance of Muslim communities. Constituents may be concerned about one specific issue, but achieving the goal in that issue often requires organizations to work on related issues. No concern exists in a vacuum.

**Funding does not always determine success.** While funding is necessary and important, all of our cases showed that despite facing resource challenges, organizations can still contribute to larger changes. Pooling resources and establishing divisions of labor within a coalition based on each organization’s capacities and capabilities can efficiently distribute resources and skill sets.

For example, in New York City, despite facing significant resource constraints, Muslims established a visible and an impactful involvement in the broader SQF-reform coalition.

**Unity of purpose is central to coalition effectiveness.** A coalition with a common vision and set of goals can establish a strategic and operational vision. This investment reduces friction in processes and personnel as the coalition grows.

In Maryland and Washington, one or two organizations may be considered the lead on a specific issue, but other groups provided strategic resources, including interpersonal connections or operational capabilities that other organizations may not have.

**Relationships and trust matter.** Coalitions may start with formal membership requirements based on principles and procedures, but over time a level of trust develops. New organizations may formally enter these established coalitions, and must cultivate trust through engagement. Relationship building can happen through mutual interests or shared values.

Personal relationships are key elements in coalitions, as private conversations can help manage disagreements, maintain a cohesive vision, manage external criticism, create support networks, and build trust.
The New York case study demonstrates a situation where distinct concerns came together under a broader structure to more efficiently affect change. The relationships were reciprocal, and relationships were solidified through mutual exchange.

The case studies from Washington and Tennessee exhibit coalitions largely formed on shared values.

These personal relationships also mediated conflict. In New York and Maryland, coalition members navigated internal tensions. The Tennessee coalition contended with both internal and external pressures that could have fractured the group.

**There is no single model of “success”**. In each case study, success is determined by the nature of the goal, the types of resources available, and the scope of the advocacy. Success is determined by context, and strategy is not solely predictive of success. What is clear is that each coalition needs a multi-vector approach that may include media outreach, get out the vote actions, protests/rallies, issue/policy research, and professional lobbying.

**“Success” involves long-term impact**. Legislative and policy changes are important, and are significant short-term measures of success. For experienced advocates, the mobilization and creation of infrastructure, particularly in communities that are new to civic and political engagement, are important measures of long-term success. Coalition partners build strong political reputations and establish themselves as communities that must be constructively engaged. The case studies from New York City, Maryland, and Tennessee most clearly display this notion of success.
Conclusion and Recommendations

This report offers an analysis of strategies of successful coalitions. The four case studies reflect different legislative/policy goals, interest groups, coalition structures, geographic regions, and organizational capacities.

The following recommendations are based on the findings of the report:

**To American Muslim Advocates**

- **American Muslims need to work in coalitions to secure shared interests.** Muslim communities and organizations lack the numbers, skills, and influence to operate independently for high-impact goals. When deciding to join a coalition, prospective organizations should examine how their highest priority issue areas may overlap with the interests of others. ISPU has developed a set of tools (http://www.ispu.org/islamophobia) that demonstrates how anti-Muslim bigotry, such as anti-sharia laws, overlap with legislative attacks directed against other communities. It is important to share this data with potential partner communities and organizations, in order to start conversations around strategy.

- **Focus on shared goals and interests.** A simple period of self-reflection should help determine if an organization should join a coalition. Determine if organizational and coalition visions align; clearly state the goals and objectives of the coalition; reiterate the areas of shared interest to create a collaborative environment. The case studies demonstrate that the most effective coalitions were made of a variety of groups that were able to demonstrate ethical integrity and commit capacity to meaningful engagement.

- **Commit to what can be delivered.** Organizations should know what unique contributions they can provide to a coalition. Limited presence and participation, with sincerity and based on practical limits, is valuable. One of the advantages a coalition provides is the distribution of resources to complement each organization’s strength. There are also creative and low-cost means of contributing to coalitions. In New York City, Muslims were instrumental in organizing street demonstrations and “pack the courthouse” events. In Maryland and Washington, coalition partners facilitated meetings with key officials and offered lobbying advice.
• **Build and maintain strong relationships with coalition partners.** This helps enhance working relationships, and demonstrates shared interest and commitment. Personal relationships mitigate potential internal and external pressures that undermine the partnership. The engagement with the needs of others means that other communities and organizations are more likely to come to your organization and your community’s assistance on other issues.

**To Potential Foundations and Other Funders**

• **Play the role of the convener.** Funding organizations can call meetings to discuss strategy, shared experiences, lessons learned, and to catalyze coalitions. Not only can they bring together diverse American Muslim groups, but also non-Muslim groups that operate in similar spaces.

• **Educate around resource allocation.** While direct funding is always welcome, there also needs to be more open discussion and education around resource sourcing and allocation. A resource is more than just money; it includes human capital and infrastructure. Information on anticipating needs, budgeting for growth, and management are necessary parts of any organization’s growth. Providing some of that material ensures a more efficient use of funding.
Appendix A – List of Organizations Actively Involved in the Communities United for Police Reform (CPR) Coalition

Below is a list of organizations involved in CPR. Original text is in italics below. For the original source, visit: http://changethenypd.org/campaign/intro-members.

**Members of the campaign** (organizations that agree to CPR’s core principles of working together, support the goals of CPR’s campaign, and participate actively in working groups that develop and implement the main work areas of the campaign):

- Audre Lorde Project
- Bronx Defenders*
- Center for Popular Democracy
- Center for Constitutional Rights*
- Center on Race, Crime & Justice of John Jay College of Criminal Justice*
- Color of Change
- CAAAV Organizing Asian Communities
- Drug Policy Alliance
- FIERCE
- Justice Committee*
- LatinoJustice PRLDEF
- Legal Aid Society
- Make the Road NY*
- Malcolm X Grassroots Movement*
- Marijuana Arrests Research Project
- NAACP-Legal Defense and Education Fund
- New York City Anti-Violence Project
- New York Civil Liberties Union*
- NY Communities for Change
- Peoples’ Justice for Community Control and Police Accountability
- Picture the Homeless*
- Streetwise & Safe*
- VOCAL-NY
- Youth Ministries for Peace and Justice
Organizational Supporters (organizations that support the goals of CPR’s campaign, endorse the Community Safety Act, and participate in various activities of the campaign).

- 5 Borough Defenders
- Arab American Association of New York
- Asian American Legal Defense & Education Fund
- Association of Legal Aid Attorneys/UAW Local 2325
- Astraea Lesbian Foundation for Justice
- Bill of Rights Defense Committee
- Black Women’s Blueprint
- Brotherhood/Sister Sol
- Campaign to Stop the False Arrests
- Center for NuLeadership on Urban Solutions
- Chhaya CDC
- Council on American Islamic Relations - New York
- Child Welfare Organizing Project
- Creating Law Enforcement Accountability & Responsibility
- Criminal Justice Clinic at Pace Law School
- Desis Rising Up & Moving
- Families Against Stop & Frisk
- Families for Freedom
- Gay Men of African Descent
- The Game Changers Project
- Immigrant Defense Project
- Jews Against Islamophobia
- Jews for Racial & Economic Justice
- Latino Commission on AIDS
- Manhattan Young Democrats
- New York Harm Reduction Educators (NYHRE)
- Northern Manhattan Coalition for Immigrant Rights
- Persist Health Project
- PROS Network
- Public Science Project
- Queers for Economic Justice
- Restaurant Opportunities Center of New York
- Sistas & Brothas United/ Northwest Bronx Community & Clergy Coalition
- Sylvia Rivera Law Project
- Tribeca for Change
- Trinity Lutheran Church
- T’ruah: the Rabbinic Call for Human Rights
- Turning Point for Women and Families
- Youth Represent

*denotes organizations currently serving on CPR’s steering committee
Appendix B – List of Organizations Involved in the Legislative Passage of the Maryland DREAM Act

Below is a list of organizations taken from a CASA de Maryland document, “Annapolis Victory Report 2011.” Organizational affiliations are marked in italics below.

- Maryland Industrial Areas Foundation Affiliates (IAF):
  - Action in Montgomery (AIM),
  - Baltimoreans United in Leadership Development (BUILD), and
  - People Acting Together in Howard (PATH)
- Maryland Catholic Conference
- Maryland Association of Community Colleges
- Maryland State Board of Education, Montgomery College
- Prince George’s Community College
- Prince George’s Public Schools
- University System of Maryland
- Morgan State University
- Action Langley Park
- Bienvenidos a Delmarva Initiative
- Center for Hispanic Development “Rayo de Luz” of the Eastern Shore
- Committee for Montgomery
- Frederick County Teachers Association
- Greater Baltimore Urban League
- Korean American Association of the State of Maryland
- Jewish Community Relations Council
- Maryland Hispanic Chamber of Commerce
- Maryland Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages
- Maryland Vietnamese Mutual Association
- Montgomery County Coalition of Parent Teacher Associations
- Montgomery County Education Association
- NAACP of Maryland
- Organizing for America
- Partnership for Renewal in Southern and Central Maryland (PRISCM)
- South Asian Americans Leading Together (SAALT)
- U.S. Hispanic Youth Entrepreneur Education
Endnotes


3 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=CaSE&court=uS&v ol=285&page=262. noting, “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”


For instance, see: Josh Lefkowitz, “The Crime-Terror Nexus.” New York State Office of Homeland Security, March 13, 2006, accessed December 25, 2013, http://info.publicintelligence.net/NY-CrimeTerrorNexus.pdf, 8, noting, “However, despite an array of media reports speculating on Al Qaeda’s links with MS-13, Chris Swerker, Assistant Director of the FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division, testified before Congress in April 2005 that ‘there is no credible, independent reporting to support or otherwise corroborate these reports.’ He added, ‘current analysis also supports the assessment that it is unlikely that MS-13 and Al Qaeda would form an overt partnership for both security and ideological reasons.” Also see: “Mara Salvatruchas.” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, No Date, accessed December 25, 2013, http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=4486, noting, “Rumors have persisted of contact between MS members and an al-Qaeda associate... However, it must be mentioned that these rumors have not been substantiated, and that some U.S. security officials explicitly deny them.”


New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932). http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?navby=CaSE&court=uS&v ol=285&page=262. noting, “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”


Taken from: Mizrahi and Rosenthal, “Complexities of Coalition Building”


Ibid.


Ibid., P. 29.

Telephone Interview with Jennifer Deng-Pickett, former Director of the DC Language Access Coalition, 12/20/13.

Raynor et. al, “What Makes an Effective Coalition?”, 29
Four Cases of Local and State Level Coalition Success


Goodman, “As Critics United.”


Goodman, “As Critics United.”


Sarsour interview.


“Ibid.”

“Prohibiting Bias-Based Policing (Introduction #1080); “Investigating, reviewing, studying, and auditing of and making recommendations”


Ibid., 7.

Goodman, “As Critics United”.


“Ibid.”


“Safety and Civil Rights for all New Yorkers: Fulfiling Pledges on Policing & Community Safety”

Ibid.

“Landmark Class-Action Lawsuit Finds NYPD”

“Muslims United Against Stop and Frisk: Pack the Courthouse for Floyd Trial”; “Muslims United Against Stop and Frisk.” Perry, “Stop and Frisk Trial: Day 6.”

Author’s analysis of information taken from: “Landmark Class-Action Lawsuit Finds NYPD”.


Endnotes


Ibid. 

Ibid.

Telephone interview with Kimberley Propeack, Political and Communications Director for CASA de Maryland. December 20, 2013.


Tilsley, “Dream Act Passes in Maryland.” Also see: “Question 04: Public Institutions”

Telephone interview with Kimberley Propeack, Political and Communications Director for CASA de Maryland. December 20, 2013.


Propeack interview.

Ibid.


Propeack interview.

Author’s analysis of data taken analyzed from: “Educating Maryland Kids.”

Author’s analysis of data taken analyzed from: “Educating Maryland Kids.”

“Board of Directors—Laurene Powell Jobs.” One of America’s largest organized labor groups.


Tilsley, “Dream Act Passes in Maryland.” Also see: “Question 04: Public Institutions”

Service Employees International Union. One of America’s largest organized labor groups.

Propeack interview.

Ibid.


Propeack interview.

Author’s analysis of data taken analyzed from: “Educating Maryland Kids.”

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Service Employees International Union. One of America’s largest organized labor groups.

Propeack interview.

Ibid.


Propeack interview.

Author’s analysis of data taken analyzed from: “Educating Maryland Kids.”

Author’s analysis of data taken analyzed from: “Educating Maryland Kids.”


Service Employees International Union. One of America’s largest organized labor groups.
Ibid., Noting, “So I think this was focused around not making this a CASA campaign. So we got four real professionals, in addition to a social media person.” (Emphasis added.) Also see: “Educating Maryland Kids.” “Local Politechs Strategies,” No date, accessed January 24, 2014, http://www.localpolitechs.com/clients/educating-maryland-kids/.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Propeack interview. Noting, “We were winning, even with Republican voters in Prince Georges and Montgomery County. We really needed to pump out the votes in this area. We won in a lot of counties that people consider anti-immigrant.”


Propeack interview.

Winning The Maryland DREAM Act.” CASA de Maryland, No date, 2. On file with author.

Ibid., 2

“State and County QuickFacts—Maryland”


“WA State Senate Passes Religious Freedom Resolution.”


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Bukhari interview.

Ibid.


It should be noted that Muslim community members still found the final version of the bills overly broad and still problematic. However in practical terms, those provisions are not likely to have any additional negative repercussions on Muslims simply because they mirror federal laws prohibiting the same thing.


About ISPU

ISPU is an independent, nonpartisan think tank and research organization committed to conducting objective, empirical research and offering expert policy analysis on some of the most pressing issues facing the United States. These issues include U.S. foreign policy, national security, the economy, and public health. In addition, ISPU has assembled leading experts across multiple disciplines and built a solid reputation as a trusted source for information about American Muslims and Muslim communities around the world.

ISPU scholars provide insight into the major debates taking place across the country. They offer context-specific analysis and recommendations to journalists, policymakers, and the general public through reports, policy briefs, articles, op-eds and books. ISPU disseminates its publications through a variety of channels and holds regular congressional briefings, policy events and academic conferences.

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