

MAY 2013

STUDY

THE BAY AREA MUSLIM STUDY: *ESTABLISHING IDENTITY AND COMMUNITY*


Commissioned by the One Nation Bay Area Project

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One Nation Bay Area



The One Nation Bay Area project is a collaborative funded by Silicon Valley Community Foundation, The San Francisco Foundation, Marin Community Foundation and Asian American/Pacific Islanders in Philanthropy (AAPIP) in partnership with the One Nation Foundation. Over the past two years the One Nation Bay Area project: distributed almost \$500,000 to support American Muslims and non-Muslims partnering on community issues to enhance civic engagement in the Bay Area Muslim community; supported convenings to strengthen relationships between American Muslim and non-Muslim community partners and generate knowledge to inform philanthropy; and commissioned the *Bay Area Muslim Study—Establishing Identity and Community*, a benchmark study to inform philanthropy, public agencies, and the private sector.

The Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) is an independent nonprofit think tank committed to education, research, and analysis of U.S. domestic and foreign policies issues, with an emphasis on topics related to the American Muslim community. For more information and to view our other reports, please visit www.ispu.org.

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STUDY



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A CALL TO ACTION: A Letter from the Funders

The San Francisco Bay Area is one of the most diverse regions in the United States. More than 30% of its population is foreign-born, and close to two-thirds of its residents under the age of 18 are the children of immigrants.

Nearly 250,000 Muslims—one of the highest concentrations of Muslims in the country—live, study, volunteer, work and contribute to the economies and communities of the Bay Area.

With a history of supporting and funding the American Muslim community, Silicon Valley Community Foundation, The San Francisco Foundation, the Marin Community Foundation and Asian Americans/Pacific Islanders in Philanthropy (AAPIP) partnered with the One Nation Foundation to create the One Nation Bay Area project in 2010. The One Nation Bay Area project complements the community foundations' and AAPIP's social justice and interfaith understanding, civic engagement and immigrant integration grantmaking portfolios.

The One Nation Bay Area project commissioned the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding to help us—and the Muslim community members themselves—better understand who is in the community, what languages they speak, what their educational attainment levels are, what their immigration status is, what the levels of employment are, what civic engagement means to them, and to honor their resilience in the face of continued misperceptions about the American Muslim community.

This benchmark study provides historical, religious, and cultural context for a community that is often misunderstood and misrepresented – in our schools and communities. For the first time, this report gathers quantitative and qualitative research about the needs of the Bay Area Muslim community and suggests recommendations for philanthropy, public agencies, and the private sector.

We invite you to join us in responding to this study's call to partner with American Muslims in the Bay Area in order to leverage their strength and resilience, and to address the complex challenges of a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, socioeconomically diverse community of enormous potential.



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The San Francisco Bay Area (hereinafter “Bay Area” and “area”) has one of the largest Muslim populations in the United States: nearly 250,000 Muslims live in the six counties surrounding the city of San Francisco. It is home to a large number of immigrants who sought economic and educational opportunities, as well as refugees and their American-born children who fled strife, violence, and economic hardship. Many work in Silicon Valley, but survey results show the existence of clear regional socioeconomic disparities. This region is also attractive to immigrants because its diverse and inclusive atmosphere allows religious and cultural diversity to flourish. It also hosts a significant African American Muslim community and a growing number of converts.

Over the past thirty years, the Bay Area in general, and the Muslim population in particular, has experienced significant growth brought on by the region’s economic transformation and the emergence of an information technology industry that required a massive infusion of educated and skilled labor. This growth has resulted in the proliferation of mosques as well as community institutions.

In 2009, the One Nation Foundation announced an initiative to partner with community foundations in cities across the United States to support increased understanding between American Muslims and non-Muslims in their local communities. This foundation and its Bay Area project partners (Silicon Valley Community Foundation, the Marin Community Foundation, the San Francisco Foundation and Asian American/Pacific Islanders in Philanthropy) commissioned the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) to conduct original research and provide demographic information and analysis about this specific community. In particular, there was a desire to identify its needs and assess the challenges it faces. Even though Muslims are an integral part of the area, their relatively small size often means that they are not included within the region’s more general needs assessments.

Benchmark Nature of the Study

This benchmark study, the first of its kind on the Bay Area’s Muslim community, serves many purposes including providing groundbreaking data on its demographics, sense of identity, economic wellbeing, political and civic engagement, and the challenges that it faces. The resulting data is useful for academics and practitioners wishing to pursue further research, as well as for the community and its leaders, philanthropists and foundations, policymakers, and the general public. As a source of information, it will serve as an important tool for advocacy

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and media purposes, given that data about the community has often been misrepresented. Finally, the report will add to and complement the growing body of empirical data on local Muslim communities and the national portrait.

Methodology & Limitations

The report offers a robust picture of the Bay Area Muslim community by drawing on data from both qualitative and quantitative research, as well as the principal investigators' deep knowledge and understanding of the community. This project utilized a mixed-methods research design with quantitative indicators coming from an in-person survey and qualitative data elicited from in-depth interviews and focus groups. Survey data was collected throughout the area with a total of 1,108 Muslim respondents aged fifteen to eighty-five. In addition to the quantitative survey, five focus group discussions with sixty-two participants aged sixteen to seventy-five were conducted, along with fifteen in-depth one-on-one interviews.

The analysis is broken into the following categories: 1) views on Muslim identity and religiosity, 2) views on civic and political engagement, and 3) needs and challenges facing the community and its institutions.

Before moving forward, it is also important to identify the limitations to the research. First, obtaining a representative sample of Bay Area Muslims is very difficult, time consuming, expensive, and therefore not feasible. Another issue was the high non-response rates for some questions posed. This included surveys that were partially completed or questions that were left blank. The length of the survey – over 100 questions – likely contributed to a low response rate. The final limiting challenge was the lack of detailed data on the community's subgroups and the subsequent difficulty in analyzing their major differences.

We anticipated these kinds of challenges in advance and employed a number of survey techniques, as well as including research assistants who were both culturally sensitive and known to the communities where they were gathering data. A fuller discussion of the research limitations and the countermeasures to mitigate them is in the body of the report.

Key Findings

Overall Racial/Ethnic and Residential Demographics

We estimate the Bay Area Muslim population to be approximately 250,000. The community, therefore, constitutes 3.5 percent of the area's total population and is one of the highest concentrations of Muslims in the country. The community is made up of a diverse mix of racial and ethnic groups who maintain their own cultures: South Asians (30%), Arabs (23%), Afghans

(17%), African Americans (9%), Asian/Pacific Islanders (7%), Whites (6%), and Iranians (2%). Based on the survey findings, the majority of Muslims live in the following counties:

**Alameda (37%),
Santa Clara (27%), and
Contra Costa (12%).**

A much smaller percent lives in San Mateo (6%), San Francisco (3%), and Marin counties (1%). The heart of San Francisco (the Tenderloin district) has a heavy concentration of Yemeni, Iraqi, Moroccan, Algerian, Indonesian, and Malaysian Muslims, most of whom are working class and small business owners. South Asian and Arab Muslims tend to cluster in the South Bay, Afghans are dominant in the East Bay, and African/African American Muslims mostly reside in Oakland. Overall, the bulk of the community lives along the “880 and 101 corridor,” the primary thoroughways to Silicon Valley and the East Bay.

Educational Attainment Levels

Many Muslim immigrants arrived already highly educated; others attended colleges and universities after their arrival. The survey indicated that 74 percent of respondents have completed at least some college or more. Nearly 25 percent have completed graduate school, and 5 percent have earned a Ph.D. In comparison to the 2010 U.S. Census data examining other minority groups, the Muslim population is doing as well or better with regard to educational attainment.

Among immigrant Muslims, 67 percent spoke at least three languages. Over 71 percent of all respondents spoke a language in addition to English. This high percentage of bilingualism may be due to the fact that India and Pakistan have been primary targets for recruitment to the high tech industry and English is the language of instruction in these countries.

Levels of Income

The Median household income is \$70,686, lower than the average for the general Bay Area region (\$77,879). This is significantly higher, however, than the national median household income for the general public (\$50,054 in 2011). However, the cost of living in the Bay Area is significantly higher than the national average.

Significant income disparities are evident across geographic, occupational, and racial/ethnic lines. About 11 percent of Muslim households make below \$20,000, almost 23 percent make below \$40,000, and 34 percent make below \$60,000. San Francisco had the highest percent of Muslims at the lower income level: 39 percent indicated they had less than \$40,000 in household income. This was followed by Alameda County, where one-third indicated they had less than \$40,000 in household income. Those whose household incomes had less than \$40,000 are distributed among Marin (27%), San Mateo (18%), Contra Costa (17%), and Santa Clara (10%) counties.

South Asian Muslims had the highest income levels, with nearly half (49%) of them having a household income above \$100,000. In comparison, those groups with the lowest proportion of household incomes above \$100,000 were Hispanic Muslims (15%), Afghans (10%), and African American Muslims (10%). These latter communities, as well as large numbers of South Asians, Iraqis, and Yemenis, are primarily employed in blue-collar professions, such as custodial staff and taxi cab drivers. An analysis of the qualitative data, presented in greater detail below, will illuminate the findings further.

Religious Practice and Identity

On the whole, the majority of participants state that religion is important in their daily lives. A majority reported that they prayed five times a day, considered himself or herself religious, and identified themselves as Sunni Muslim. Based on the survey, more than half of the respondents identified as Muslims first (54%), felt that the Muslim experience has affected their life greatly, and felt that they have a fair or great amount in common with other Muslims (84%). Most of the respondents (68%) reported attending a mosque at least once a week. The survey indicates that just over 11 percent of the respondents were converts to Islam.

After 9/11, Muslims were put in the national spotlight and many utilized the opportunity to educate and inform the public about their community and religion. According to the focus group discussions and interviews, the increasing amount of Islamophobia has added to a sense of urgency. Some Muslims did not identify as such prior to 9/11. But as Muslims were increasingly portrayed in negative terms and Islam came under attack, they became more assertive in practicing and identifying with Islam and other Muslims. The data validates this. Nearly three out of four respondents felt that what happens to other Muslims has a “fair amount” or a “great” effect on their lives.

The vast majority of Muslims believe in giving to charity, including the obligatory annual alms (zakat). Over 71 percent of participants felt that giving zakat was somewhat or very important. Of those who responded, a plurality (18%) of Muslim households gave at least \$100 and \$100-\$500 (16%), followed by those who gave \$1,000-\$5,000 (15%). Those who reported contributions between \$1,000 and \$5,000 per year were in line with the average charitable donations of Americans and the other ethnic groups more specifically.

Civically and Politically Engaged

The majority of participants were civically engaged. When asked if they had volunteered recently, 62 percent said they had volunteered in the past year by donating time to local charities and nonprofit organizations, being involved in their local mosque, or in similar activities. Some were involved in more indirect ways, such as helping extended family members by babysitting or driving children to soccer practice, providing meals for a sick relative or sending money back to their country of origin. Many of them, regardless of their type of civic engagement, can be seen

as “promoting the quality of life” in their communities (Muslim and non-Muslim) and felt part of the “larger social fabric” while personalizing community-wide problems.

The survey suggested that Muslims who attend the mosque once a week or more were the most likely to have volunteered in the past year (72%). Muslims who rarely or never attend the mosque were the least likely to volunteer (25%).

Respondents were informed about politics, and there was strong agreement that American Muslims must be actively involved and politically engaged. Muslims in the study increasingly vote and are engaged in addressing local and national social problems, as well as protesting U.S. domestic and foreign policies since 9/11.

Challenges

The Muslim community faces many internal and external challenges. While these challenges were strongly conveyed in the focus groups and interviews, they are not unique to the Bay Area; rather, they are representative of the various challenges being experienced by Muslims nationwide.

The external challenges include:

The Challenge of Islamophobia. Participants identified Islamophobia, defined as the rising tide of discrimination directed against Muslims, especially school-aged children, as a major challenge. A full 60 percent of respondents said they knew someone who had been discriminated against; 40 percent said that they had experienced personal discrimination. About half reported knowing a victim of a hate crime, and 23 percent indicated that they had been victims of a hate crime.

Conflict in Muslim-Majority Countries. American involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and other areas has placed local Muslim community members at the forefront of the ensuing discussions and debates. They are asked to respond on a regular basis to issues and events that are beyond their immediate control and circle of influence. In addition, as the United States begins to withdraw from Afghanistan and possibly other Muslim-majority areas, we expect a continued wave of immigrants. This external challenge, which was described as “ever present,” must be understood and planned for by humanitarian organizations and the community.

Media Portrayals of American Muslims. A strong theme in the research was that the community sees itself as the target of various media outlets, with everyone developing their own particular negative representation of Islam and Muslims. Respondents expressed frustration that the intermittent inclusion of a positive representation is often lost. This was held to have a profound impact upon the community’s – especially its young people’s – self-image and well-being.

Muslims as “Double Minorities.” Many Muslims face a double minority status due to their racial/ethnic and religious backgrounds. Many respondents described the community as not yet socially connected to the broader Bay Area society. In other words, its members are living within very narrowly constructed immigrant or community enclaves. Many participants described facing exclusion from the social, religious, and political space in that they were not actively sought out, even though they had experienced some inclusion in ceremonial events or were consulted about foreign policy considerations. We recommend further research to explore and understand the specific needs and challenges of those who face other "multiple minority" identities such as lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered (LGBT) Muslims, Muslims with disabilities, etc.

The internal challenges include:

Lack of Broad Vision and Planning. Respondents pointed to a lack of an integrated long-term plan for the community, even though the number of successful groups, organizations, and centers is constantly increasing. Leaders admitted that strategic and resource planning is needed in all areas, as the existing community-wide framework has been reactive, due to a negative operating environment, rather than proactive and strategic. The interviews showed that even in areas of common concern (e.g., Islamophobia), organizations have neither developed a strategic unified response nor located the necessary resources to address this serious problem. In part, the problem arises from the community’s relative youth, wide diversity, and its members’ cultural and knowledge gap of how to operate institutions in the United States.

Leadership Concerns and Limited Resources. Participants indicated a major overlooked challenge: limited professional staff and the high reliance on volunteers present in Muslim institutional settings. They also cited the constant depletion of resources due to relief efforts for crises in the Muslim world and remittances sent abroad. Bay Area Muslim institutions, which are heavily dependent on regular donations from community members, have few alternative or diverse sources of financial resources. Leaders claimed that this forces the organizations to focus more on short-term planning and feel pressured to concentrate on raising the needed annual operating funds.

Regional Socioeconomic Disparities. While the Muslim community nationally and in the Bay Area is often described as generally middle to upper class and well-educated, survey results show the existence of clear regional socioeconomic disparities. For example, outside of Silicon Valley, income levels for immigrants and converts alike trail considerably behind those of their South Bay counterparts. Indeed, participants remarked that this economic disparity has brought about a certain level of tension among various segments of the community and a feeling that the more affluent Silicon Valley and immigrant business owners in the inner city are immune to the needs, concerns, and real pain felt by those struggling at the lower end of the economic ladder. A final complexity to this dynamic, according to respondents, is that women in families facing economic challenges run the risk of getting caught up in an endless race to make ends meet – sometimes without a supportive spouse, community, or religious institution.

Challenges Related to Bay Area Muslim Women. Participants in several focus groups pointed to distinct challenges faced by a number of Muslim women. For example, the mosque's basic architecture and layout often provides only a small interior space for women, including those with children. The lack of physical space and programs tailored for women, families, and children, not to mention their minority status, were reported as negatively impacting their sense of belonging, self-worth, and leadership potential. The lack of women in leadership roles or on institutional boards, which is both a result of, and an exacerbation of, these internal challenges, was the subject of several focus group discussions. The presence of female role models can contribute to change within the broader community. For example, respondents cited measured progress and positive examples within several Muslim and non-Muslim organizations that have made Muslim women's voices and Muslims' voices in general, part of their organizational framework.

Lack of Engagement with Non-Muslims. Even though Muslims have been in this country since its founding, they have had only limited strategic engagement with non-Muslim communities. The respondents stated that this self-imposed isolation was the norm and that meaningful relations outside of this socially constructed box are the exception. Yet this research also indicates that some level of civil society-led community cohesion and partnerships have emerged due to the crises affecting American Muslims. At the same time, some respondents asserted that various Muslim community-oriented groups and organizations had developed an isolationist attitude before 9/11, and even more so after 9/11, which made the possibility of coalition building and relations a non-issue for them. On a more structural level, this research strongly suggests that Muslim community organizations lack the necessary skills, institutional knowledge, and resources to develop long-term and meaningful relations with non-Muslims.

Cultural and Religious Obstacles. The evidence from this study suggests the ethnic and cultural norms for many Bay Area Muslims take precedence over those required by Islamic tenets (e.g., basic social guidelines for upholding universal brotherhood and sisterhood irrespective of particular creed, color, or language). These combined cultural, ethnic, and sectarian divisions have perpetuated a widespread lack of intra-Muslim community communication, coordination, and cooperation. Taken as a whole, it seems the Bay Area community has been unable to harness its diverse sets of talents into a functional unity; rather, more time is spent on the particular sub-group and only a limited effort is being made to form intra-Muslim community relations.

Lack of Professional Development and Training. More often than not, each immigrant group uses the organizing methods learned in, or imported from, back home, all of which were developed within a specific cultural, political, and social setting. Once deployed in the United States, they have limited viability and are non-transferable to the next generation. According to the focus group interviews and other follow-up research, basic skills pertaining to office management, record keeping, employee development, and operating manuals are a novelty

for many institutions. Considerable resources would be required to change this dynamic. Even institutions that have developed a certain level of knowledge have not transferred this knowledge to their broader memberships or shared it with other groups and organizations. We found little to no evidence of training for non-profit staff. Furthermore there was very limited mention by the participants, of basic activities such as regular retreats for setting institutional agendas and establishing strategic goals and objectives.

Strengths

The preceding discussion on weaknesses must not overshadow an equally important acknowledgement and assessment of the Bay Area community's strengths.

The Un-harnessed Potential of Islamic Norms and Values

Community building and community cohesion. A deeply held faith resonates across all layers of the community, as reflected by the 92 percent of respondents who expressed some level of religiosity. At the individual level, faith has served as a place of comfort for community members and helps many of them deal with the difficulties they face at the present time; however, it also calls upon them to act and be agents of positive action in the world. Family structures, which include a very low divorce rate, are another identified strength. This evidence suggests that families foster a generally cooperative spirit, a fact that may hold un-harnessed potential for community-building efforts. The high level of volunteerism and spirit of giving are directly connected to faith and family, as reflected in the survey results.

Activism and resilience. Despite the challenges faced by immigrant and minority communities, and more recently the post 9/11 context, these Muslim communities were able to grow and in many cases thrive. The subtext here is another important, if somewhat less-acknowledged, strength- resilience. Looking at the data as a whole, Muslims' resilient community-building efforts largely appear to be the product of a strong faith-based tradition of building institutions and a society that has – and continues to – contribute positively to bringing about a better world. This faith-based civic ethic is perhaps best reflected in a narrated saying of the Prophet Mohammed, whose guidance and life is a model for Muslims: "If the end of time comes upon you while you are planting a seed, continue planting it."

Additional Strengths to be Recognized and Researched Further

Women. No discussion of community strengths can be complete without recognizing that Muslim women have built a critical number of Muslim institutions. The existence of their efforts proves their ability to overcome both internal as well as external cultural, religious, and gender barriers.

Diversity. As the survey shows, a solid segment of community members are highly educated, have cosmopolitan attitudes and behaviors, and have a certain linguistic prowess (66% speak

between two and five languages). As noted above, this emerging community has made strides in terms of partnering with other faith and minority communities and in terms of civic and political engagement. These should be built upon and celebrated. Finally, the Muslim youth and university students play a key role and are often on the front lines of representing their Islamic identity with dignity, innovation, and in collaboration with other student groups and communities.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are based on the primary source data conducted during the course of this study's research, surveys, and focus groups. They are directed to community leaders and institutions, philanthropic and charitable foundations, and academic and policymaking circles.¹

For Muslim Community Leaders and Institutions

Strengthen the community's institutional infrastructure. Most organizations rely heavily on volunteers. The respondents emphasized that Muslim leaders should prioritize investing in people and organizational capacity rather than land, buildings and property. The emphasis on physically building mosques and schools should be balanced with efforts to staff and manage these and other institutions serving the community. This includes hiring skilled professional managers and staff to oversee proper management, administration and financial oversight.

Empower women institutionally. Community leaders should prioritize supporting woman-run organizations and expanding women's access to, and inclusion in, their institutions. Women should have an equal footing as partners in the ongoing process of community building and their involvement will increase the diversity of ideas and solutions to address community challenges.

Share existing knowledge and resources. This research paints a picture of a Bay Area community that is diverse but also divided and resource-depleted. Developing an intra-Muslim dialogue and relations across diverse segments in the community is needed to leverage the existing diversity for proactive and impactful projects. The leadership and trail-blazing work of the African American Muslim community should be analyzed. Members' linguistic abilities should be used in international business, disaster relief, translation services for immigrant and refugee communities, and in other areas. In this context, there should also be a heavy emphasis on developing partnerships with other populations facing similar immigration challenges.

Develop the skills and capacities for increased civic engagement and consistent external community engagement. Institutions should continue to support political participation, such as voter education drives, and "Get Out The Vote" efforts. Therefore such efforts should be expanded and supported in a concerted fashion. This should also include media training for community-based organizations that emphasizes effective messaging, outreach to allies, and developing strategies to counter the media's negative portrayal of Muslims.

Reach out to disenfranchised/disenchanted Muslims. The focus groups and interviews revealed that an unknown number of Muslims have opted to stay away from the mosque or community center. Many Muslims in this category are highly religious and spiritual, pray and fast during Ramadan, and yet feel ignored by the broader Muslim community. In some cases, this may require developing non-judgmental and less formal spaces focused on specific needs, such as including youth and addressing their concerns.

For Foundations and Philanthropists

Commit to long-term investment in empowering the community. Projects directed at institution building and supporting new or continuing staff positions should be given the highest priority.

Facilitate opportunities for coalition building and collaboration with non-Muslim civic organizations. Funding should be directed toward specific programs and projects that have detailed and measurable outcomes over the period of the grant or funding cycle. In this regard, the work of One Nation Bay Area and its funding partners is a major step in the right direction.

Support education and training programs on how to manage not-for-profit organizations, with special emphasis on successful models. Non-Muslim partners can be very instrumental in providing appropriate educational and training materials that can serve as templates for the community.

Train Muslim women seeking leadership positions in the non-profit sector. Provide leadership development for executive directors and board chairpersons, especially for those who are women. This would be analogous to how certain underserved/disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups receive empowerment training based on their particular needs and capacities. Grant applications should seek information from funded groups about their male-female ratios concerning leadership and decision-making positions. Best-practice guidelines should be developed along with funding cycle workshops. Partnering with current female Muslim leaders in developing this area is highly recommended.

Support social and legal services for American Muslims. Such services include, but are not limited to, refugee counseling, immigration and naturalization services for documented and undocumented Muslims, job and language training, literacy services for adults, anti-domestic abuse services, and civic literacy programs.

Pay special attention to immigration issues. These can be divided into three large areas: 1) undocumented Muslims, 2) documented but facing delays due to normal immigration processes, and 3) documented and facing delays due to security-related issues. Foundation resources should direct funding toward each of these areas and provide grants to groups and organizations that can provide needed services to refugees, undocumented, and legal permanent residents facing challenges associated with attaining legal status and citizenship.

Study Islamophobia in the context of other forms of bigotry and racism. Unlike other forms of bigotry, anti-Muslim prejudice and hate currently have more mainstream acceptance than anti-Black or anti-gay attitudes. This mainstreaming of anti-Muslim bias has arguably seeped into society's cultural, political, and legal power structures. Foundations and grantees should support efforts by community organizations and allies seeking to create and sustain a counternarrative. Also, grants should be made to encourage academic institutions to sustain engagement with the study, documentation, and examination of Islamophobia. Finally, grants should focus on informing the public, law enforcement, and other civic institutions about Islam and Muslim cultural practices in order to reduce discrimination, improve services, and bring about long-term changes in how they respond to Muslims' needs.

Facilitate Intra-Muslim dialogue. Funding should target organizations that want to pursue dialogue by working on joint projects that can lead to long-lasting relations. This recommendation mirrors the one provided to community leaders above.

Leverage high level of religiosity among community. Foundations should take advantage of the strong faith within the community and provide opportunities to leverage the deeply held faith across all layers of the community.

For Educators and Academics

Foster research and work focused on Muslim communities. Research priorities should include understanding Muslims as part of American society and not through the narrow lens of regional studies, eastern religions, and/or newly emerging security studies. We encourage educators and academics to look at them through the lenses of American studies, ethnic studies, sociology, political science, journalism, and similar disciplines. Educators should avoid or abandon the "othering" conception and one that views Muslims through a security lens.

Deepen understanding of Islam and Muslims among educators. This is especially important at the primary and secondary school levels where there are concerns over bullying. Teachers should be aware of any bullying directed toward Muslim children and be ready to deal with it both properly and effectively. Local school boards should partner with Muslim institutions that specialize in education and anti-bullying strategies. Educators should attempt to provide accurate information to their students about Islam and Muslims including the often biased literature in schools.

Connect with communities outside the classroom. Many college and university professors engage in "Community Engaged Scholarship" which focuses on research in underrepresented and vulnerable communities. Direct exposure to these communities can also serve to move academic institutions' research agendas beyond the above-mentioned narrow areas of focus. Partnerships should focus on providing access to the relevant training and resources in order to remedy those areas in which the community is highly underrepresented. It is part of each college/university's mission to address and bridge this gap and help communities facing discrimination and racism.

For Policymakers

Facilitate platforms to generate ideas. Policymakers should hold workshops and sessions to exchange views, support emerging research, and seek expert opinions on a host of issues confronting the Muslim community and its partner organizations. Partnering with existing academic programs at local universities as well as community-oriented think-tanks can accomplish this goal.

Challenge anti-Muslim narratives. Policy makers, civic and elected officials should challenge anti-Muslim narratives and leverage their leadership in the community to stand with the Muslim community as allies in ensuring the rights of Muslims. Elected officials should enhance their understanding and engagement with the Muslim community to better serve the needs of the community they represent. This engagement is likely to affirm the community’s sense of belonging, foster greater civic engagement and ultimately counter—by deed—the process of “otherization.” This does not imply agreement with or supporting Islam; however it is an affirmation of community and shared values as Americans.

INTRODUCTION

The San Francisco Bay Area (hereinafter “Bay Area” and “area”) boasts one of the largest population of Muslims in the country. It is home to a large number of immigrants who sought economic and educational opportunities, as well as refugees who fled strife, violence, and economic hardship, and their American-born children. This region attracts immigrants because its inclusive atmosphere fosters religious and cultural diversity to flourish. Furthermore, the Bay Area is home to a growing number of converts and a significant African American Muslim community, whose presence is a living repository of Islam’s unique indigenous history in this country.

On any given Friday at the Muslim Community Association (Santa Clara), Masjid Dar Al-Salam (San Francisco) or the San Ramon Mosque (Contra Costa), one can find an ethnic gathering the likes of which is found only in Makkah, Saudi Arabia during the *hajj* (annual pilgrimage).² The Bay Area community’s vibrant institutional base consists of over eighty mosques, a small number of full-time schools, and a host of non-profit cultural and civic organizations. It has also played a significant role in shaping regional and national organizations, as well as being a key source of funds for national initiatives and institutions.

In 2009, the One Nation Foundation announced an initiative to partner with community foundations in cities across the United States to support increased understanding between American Muslims and non-Muslims in their local communities. This foundation and its Bay Area project partners (Silicon Valley Community Foundation, the Marin Community Foundation, the San Francisco Foundation and the Asian American/Pacific Islanders in Philanthropy) commissioned the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) to conduct original research and provide demographic information and analysis about this specific community. In particular, there was a desire to identify its needs and assess the challenges it faces. Even though Muslims are an integral part of the area, their relatively small size often means that they are not included within the region’s more general needs assessments.

This report serves many purposes. It is a resource for the community and its leaders, foundations and philanthropists, policymakers, and scholars. As a source of information about this particular community, it will serve as an important tool for advocacy and media purposes because facts about the Muslim community have often been misrepresented. The report will also be a groundbreaking benchmark of data for academics and practitioners wishing to pursue further research. Finally, the report will add to and complement the growing body of empirical data on local Muslim communities and the national portrait.

The Bay Area community’s vibrant institutional base consists of over eighty mosques, a small number of full-time schools, and a host of non-profit cultural and civic organizations.

The data provided below draws upon five focus groups and interviews of community leaders conducted during the spring, summer, and fall of 2012, as well as a quantitative survey consisting of 1,108 respondents conducted in the fall of 2012. In addition, the findings are compared with existing quantitative and qualitative sources within various segments of the Muslim community, as well as data from several other sources, including surveys conducted by the Muslims in the American Public Square (MAPS) project in 2001 and 2004, and the Pew Research Center's national surveys on the American Muslim community in 2007 and 2011.

Benchmark Nature of the Report

One of the Muslim community's ongoing challenges is the lack of specific and actionable research on the national and community levels. In addition to the importance this has for potential donors seeking to support and build community capacity, in-depth data will help community organizations, local policymakers, and national organizations to better understand, represent, and meet the community's needs. The report, the first of its kind on Muslims in the Bay Area, adds to a growing body of research on specific Muslim community trends and demographics and will help inform national debates.

In addition to a handful of dissertations, one of the few reports to touch on issues related to Muslim communities is *Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim and South Asian Communities in the San Francisco Bay Area: An Introduction for Grantmakers*,³ which provided a broad overview of several Bay Area ethnic communities in an effort to help funders respond to the post-9/11 backlash against these specific communities. However, the report had limited quantitative data and focused more on ethnic groups than on the Muslim community.

While several national studies of American Muslims have included individuals from the Bay Area, the numbers were exceptionally small. The most important major national study, conducted by the Pew Research Center, was released in May 2007 and updated in 2011. The 2007 study was the first comprehensive survey to describe this population's attitudes, experiences, and demographics. However, it included only sixty-eight Bay Area Muslims out of a national sample of 1,051 individuals. In 2001 and 2004, Zogby International conducted in-depth surveys for MAPS. The data were derived from interviews with a nationally representative sample of 501 Arab American respondents aged 18 or older.

Such surveys face several limitations. Due to the small percentage of Muslims within the larger American population, estimated at 0.5-0.7 percent,⁴ American Muslims have never been surveyed via probability methods on the national level. In the absence of nationally representative samples of American Muslims selected by random techniques, many pioneering studies have drawn on purposive samples based on convenience of access, mosque membership lists, Muslim organizations, or particular local communities – techniques that severely impair the samples' representative quality.

Perhaps more fundamentally, beyond sampling techniques, is the way certain religious, ethnic, and racial groups are categorized and counted – or not counted at all. For instance, while the U.S. Census represents one of the most methodologically sound and in-depth inquiries into the country’s demographics, religion is not among the categories listed. Another example is the categorization of Arab Americans and Persian Americans as White/Caucasian in the Census, as opposed to their respective nationalities or the more generic “Middle Eastern.” In fact the Arab American Institute, a national civil rights and advocacy organization, spearheaded a community-awareness campaign during the 2010 Census called, “Check it Right, You Ain’t White!”⁵

Perhaps the existing research’s greatest weakness is the limited data gathered on the community’s subgroups and the subsequent inability to analyze the differences among them. Another weakness is that most recent surveys have focused on the views of American Muslims instead of presenting a comprehensive picture of them.

Finally, the lack of continuity between surveys makes it hard to assess how participants’ opinions have changed during the last decade. Even in instances when the questions asked cover the same subjects asked about by earlier surveys, differences in wording or available answers makes such assessments difficult and often impossible. This report attempts to remedy some of these shortcomings by using a mixed research method and moving beyond the mosque to conduct the survey. The goal of this study is to offer a robust picture of the Bay Area’s Muslim community by drawing on data from both qualitative and quantitative research, as well as the principal investigators’ (PI) deep knowledge and understanding of the community. The report’s analysis is broken into the following categories: 1) views on Muslim identity and religiosity, 2) views on civic and political engagement, and 3) needs and challenges facing the community and its institutions.

Methodology

This project utilized a mixed-methods research design, with quantitative indicators coming from the in-person survey and qualitative data elicited from in-depth interviews and focus groups.

Survey data was collected from a total of 1,108 Muslim respondents aged fifteen to eighty-five through in-person paper questionnaires during the Eid al-Adha (Feast of the Sacrifice) prayers in October 2012.⁶ We attempted to reduce the selection bias by moving beyond the mosque to obtain a more diverse sample during the Eid al-Adha gathering, which is often attended by “cultural Muslims” interested in cultural activities rather than the holiday’s religious connotations. In addition, we conducted the survey at several local community cultural events and social gatherings in an effort to capture a greater number of less practicing/less observant and disengaged Muslims (i.e., those who self-identify as “cultural,” “secular,” or simply “non-religious”). This was supplemented with a focus group that specifically targeted “disengaged and disenfranchised”⁷ Muslims. A team of trained research assistants administered the questionnaires by inviting random individuals to complete the paper questionnaire, which was available in English, Farsi, Pashto, and Arabic. The questionnaire included information about the survey’s purpose, the confidentiality of their responses, the principal investigators’ background, and the final report’s publication.

A team of ten data entry assistants completed data processing in December 2012. The paper questionnaires were entered into a spreadsheet which was then rechecked and coded in a statistical software package entitled “R.”⁸

In addition to the quantitative survey, we conducted five focus group discussions with sixty-two participants aged sixteen to seventy-five, as well as fifteen in-depth one-on-one interviews. Focus group participants were recruited across the Bay Area and selected from various community segments in a way designed to reflect its diversity. Trained recruiters emailed invitations, posted flyers at local universities and colleges, attended community and cultural events, and stood outside ethnic markets and cafes. Each potential participant was initially asked a few questions about their background and if he/she was interested in participating in a Muslim focus group. If they agreed and met the diversity requirements, the research team contacted them later by telephone, email, or an official letter of invitation to a specified focus group location.

The first focus group held in the South Bay comprised a mixed group of sixteen Muslim community leaders, namely, heads of major Muslim civic organizations, activists, and imams. We conducted four additional focus groups with forty-six participants in different parts of the region, one of which was devoted exclusively to non-practicing Muslims (N=9), defined as individuals who are disconnected from and disenchanted with the broader Muslim community. All sessions were comprised of both men (N=25) and women (N=37). Participants represented an ethnically diverse cross-section along the lines of race, ethnicity, immigrant and native-born, and levels of religiosity as well as Sunni (N=48), Shi’a (N=6), Ahmadiyya (N=1), and Sufi (N=3) Muslims. The focus groups included 21 South Asians, 14 Arabs, 5 African Americans, 5 Whites, 3 Afghans, 3 Iranians, 2 Asian/Pacific Islanders, and 1 Hispanic participant.

Three general themes guided the ensuing discussions:

- Muslim identity and community in the Bay Area,
- The civic and political engagement of Bay Area Muslims, and
- The needs and challenges facing the Bay Area Muslim community and what Muslims are doing about them.

The discussions were audio recorded and later transcribed for analysis. Based on the questions tailored to the moderator’s guidelines, an index was developed and used to code the transcripts for content analysis.⁹

We conducted approximately fifteen formal and informal interviews with community leaders, organizational heads, and imams who were selected because of their particular knowledge or expertise in a specific area. These interviews were held between February and October 2012.

A major flaw in past research on Muslims in the United States has been the tendency to recruit subjects through such “visible” or high-profile institutions as mosques or faith-based community organizations. A serious weakness here is the under-representation of less-religious or “secular” individuals who, as some studies suggest, probably reflect a very sizeable portion of the overall American Muslim population today. Taking this into account, we took the following steps in constructing and implementing this study’s research design:

- Reviewed previous academic studies,
- Searched online databases of cultural, ethnic, educational, or commercial entity listings (e.g., online mosque and business listings- included in Appendix C), and
- Recruited nonreligious participants, including members of ethnic, civic, and cultural, as well as progressive/secular, organizations.

Participants in the quantitative survey as well as in the qualitative research (including focus groups) included individuals who self-identify as Muslim. We attempted to balance additional demographic characteristics that might influence patterns of immigration, settlement, acculturation, level of religious identification, and community involvement based on diverse sampling to ensure a representative cross-sampling of Muslims across the area. These may include:

- Age
- Class
- Occupation
- Ethnicity
- Gender
- Race
- Place of Birth (i.e., American-born versus foreign-born)
- Level of Religiosity (ranging from practicing or observant to “cultural” or non-practicing)
- Leadership, including religious and secular activists
- Minority Groups (e.g., Twelver Shi’a, Isma’ili, Sufi)

Recruitment employed multiple strategies that were found to be useful in previous studies. One strategy was “snowball” recruitment, whereby a researcher begins with a list of contacts who have either participated in previous studies or are personal friends or colleagues. The researcher then solicits each contact to provide names of other contacts who are then asked to suggest more contacts, and so on. Other methods included leafleting and posting flyers at businesses, mosques, and neighborhood associations in Muslim neighborhoods. As an incentive, potential focus group participants were offered a \$50 honorarium.

(A more detailed presentation of the methodology, including survey questions, focus group questions and demographics questionnaire is located in Appendix B.)

Research Limitations

As the preceding section suggests, we consciously employed a mixed-method research design to overcome the many weaknesses inherent in community-based research. However, this approach cannot overcome all limitations. Obtaining an absolutely representative sample of Bay Area Muslims is very difficult, time consuming, expensive, and therefore not feasible. We attempted to reduce the sample's selection bias by moving beyond the mosque and obtaining a more diverse sample of participants during the Eid al-Adha gathering rather than relying on Muslim participants during the Friday prayers. In addition, we conducted the survey at several local community cultural events and social gatherings, which helped capture greater numbers of less-practicing/less-observant Muslims (i.e., those who self-identify as “cultural,” “secular,” or simply “non-religious”). This was supplemented with a focus group that specifically targeted disengaged and disenfranchised Muslims.

Another weakness was the high non-response rates for some of the questions posed. This included surveys that were partially completed or questions that were left blank. We suspect that a number of respondents did not complete the entire survey because it contained over 100 questions. In other cases, they felt uncomfortable with some of the questions and were concerned that “a few of the questions were too sensitive.” They also worried that the data might be used against them despite assurances and procedures for confidentiality. This was especially true among Afghan and Yemeni Muslims, who restricted efforts to conduct the survey out of suspicion that the results would be used to harm the community.

In anticipation of this potential problem, we recruited research assistants who were recognized members of and had worked with the community to assist with the data gathering. Nevertheless, some participants refused to answer any questions related to their income levels, charitable donations, sending funds to family members abroad, and political views. We believe that this fear can partially be explained within the broader context of Islamophobia and the post-9/11 environment, both of which have made Muslims targets of hate crimes and indiscriminate government surveillance, not to mention concerns over FBI “mapping” of Muslim religious and ethnic communities.

The final limiting challenge was the lack of detailed data on the community's subgroups and the subsequent difficulty in analyzing their major differences. This report has attempted to provide some breakdown along subgroup lines, but this was only possible on several key issues. We did account for Shi'a-run centers in the Bay Area, and efforts to administer the survey were made in those centers; however, the response rate was not as high as we expected (this study estimated a Shi'a population of 3.8%, while other studies have listed it as high as 10%¹⁰). This issue leads us to call for more focused research to address this gap. In addition, some segments of the Iranian community do not identify strongly with the Muslim community and have achieved a level of assimilation in the broader society. Therefore this group was somewhat difficult to reach and may have impacted the overall numbers of the survey participants.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF BAY AREA MUSLIMS

In the past thirty years, the Bay Area generally and the Muslim population more specifically have experienced meteoric growth due to the region's economic transformation and the emergence of the information technology (IT) industry, which required a massive infusion of educated and skilled labor. The Muslim population grew primarily by immigration as well as refugee settlement programs in the aftermath of major wars and civil conflicts in Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, and Bosnia, to name just a few. In addition, a sizable convert community has also emerged throughout the region. Since the 1960s, the Bay Area has been a major destination for Muslim immigrants due to the presence of such high quality and internationally recognized academic institutions as the University of California, Berkeley (UC Berkeley) and Stanford, its economic dynamism, its tolerance and over-all acceptance of diversity, and, just as important, the climate and geography that has made California the top destination for many people.


Bay Area Centers and Institutional Development

During the last thirty years, the Bay Area's Muslim population experienced a phenomenal rate of increase as well as a subsequent proliferation of mosques and community institutions. In 1965, immigrant Muslims founded the San Francisco Islamic Center at Crescent Street (in the outer Mission district) and Masjid Annur in Sacramento. Members of the indigenous Nation of Islam (NOI), founded and led by Elijah Muhammad, had already established the area's first Islamic centers and schools. (An "Islamic center" generally indicates something more than a mosque and a vision for a community center; however at present both "mosque" and "center" are often used interchangeably.) In a number of Bay Area cities, these Islamic centers and schools became orthodox ("Sunni") Islamic institutions under the leadership of Elijah's successor: Warith Deen Muhammad. Immigrant communities were either oblivious to or ignored the NOI's presence because its members were considered to be outside the bounds of Islam. Nevertheless, the Muslim community was very small and confined in two or three cities; Oakland and San Francisco served as a major hub.

At present, the Bay Area hosts some eighty-four mosques and religious centers representing possibly every group and sect within the Islamic fold. Mosques can be found in almost every Bay Area city and county. Santa Clara and Alameda counties have the highest numbers, followed by Contra Costa, San Francisco, and Marin counties (figure 1).

During the last thirty years, the Bay Area's Muslim population experienced a phenomenal rate of increase as well as a subsequent proliferation of mosques and community institutions.

Figure 1: Map of Bay Area Highlighting Muslim Schools, Mosques, and Organizations



Pre-1980

In the early 1970s, the Bay Area contained only a few pockets of Muslims: African American converts and a small number of immigrants from Yemen, Palestine, Pakistan, India, Iran, and Syria. Mostly former followers (and their offspring) of the NOI, large numbers of African American Muslims entered Sunni Islam in 1975-76 when Elijah's successor ordered his followers embrace "orthodox" (Sunni) Islam.

The first full-fledged Bay Area mosque built by immigrant Muslims, the Islamic Center of San Francisco at Crescent Street, was designed to be a central location that would serve all members of this dispersed community. The Crescent Street mosque, opened in 1965 by a mixed group of Indians, Pakistanis, and a few Arabs, attracted congregants from all over the area and served as a focal point for Muslim immigrants. It continues to do so today. Prior to its establishment, the only other mosque in northern California was Sacramento's Masjid Annur, ninety-six miles away from San Francisco. Despite the distance, many Muslims would make the journey twice a year for the Eid prayers.

Between the 1960s and 1980, only two additional mosques became operational: Oakland's Masjid Warithdeen, located at 47th Avenue, in 1976, and the Clara Muhammad School. Oakland is home to one of the Bay Area's oldest African American Muslim communities and pioneered Islamic education in an American setting. At the time, many immigrants were unaware of these developments and did not take the emerging African American Muslim community seriously.

Imam Mehdi Khurasani set up another Islamic center in Marin County in 1975, after he arrived from Iran in 1974 and found no place for worship for the small Persian community. The center, which has hosted various dignitaries over the years, is nestled in the redwood forest of Fairfax (Marin County). Over the years, however, so many community members moved to the South Bay Area that it has become difficult to sustain regular prayers. The primary cause for this population shift, according to Imam Khurasani, was the employment and economic opportunities offered in San Francisco and Silicon Valley. This development mirrored a broader shift toward the South Bay by other communities, one that has been going on for the past twenty years. The center, now known as the Redwood Mosque, has little substantive connection with the broader Shi'a community, even though Imam Khurasani maintains strong personal ties with the area's entire Shi'a community. Having suspended the holding of regular religious services, it now serves as a retreat center and site for interfaith events. At present, according to the imam, Iranian community members from Marin participate and attend functions organized at the Islamic Cultural Center of Northern California, Oakland, which functions as a focal point for the Persian-speaking Shi'a community in Alameda, Contra Costa, and Marin counties.

The Bay Area's Iranian community attained critical mass immediately after the 1979 Revolution. Early on, the community was located in San Francisco, Concord, Walnut Creek, Marin, and Berkeley; after a while, however, members began migrating to San Jose, Santa Clara, Sacramento, and Los Angeles. More research is needed to provide a clear picture about the Iranian community, as very little concrete data currently exists.

The presence and contribution of the area's Sufi groups also requires further study. During the focus groups and interviews, a number of participants pointed out Sufism's importance in their own life and practice. The presence of these groups goes back to at least the 1960s; they still retain a vibrant presence throughout the region. Marin County's International Association of

Sufism (IAS), a very prominent Sufi group, is housed in a small office in Novato but promotes itself as one of the “premier gatherings” for hundreds of artists, poets, and Sufi scholars.¹¹ It also brings together dozens of religious leaders from many faith traditions and cultures to celebrate and explore their common humanity. There is also a Sufi community in Fairfax. These groups’ impact on and contribution to the region need further research, and their success and continuity can provide some guidance as to possible projects to fund.

1980-1990

The next decade saw the emergence of several centers. The South Bay Islamic Association (SBIA) was incorporated in 1980. The following year, its founding group acquired the American Legion Building located in downtown San Jose and turned it into their headquarters and central mosque. At roughly the same time, a group of families purchased a church in Santa Clara and renovated it so that it could serve as a mosque: the Muslim Community Association (MCA). Both SBIA and the MCA have come to play major roles in developing the infrastructure of the South Bay’s Muslim community.

San Francisco’s Masjid Al-Jame, known locally as the Fiji Center, opened its doors in 1985 in the southern part of the city. In 1986, students at University of San Francisco (USF) managed to establish a prayer hall in a campus church; it soon became a major attraction for the local community. At that time, USF attracted a large Muslim student body from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states due to some government contracts with the university (the University of the Pacific in Stockton now fills this role). The student leadership and organizers were mainly Palestinians, some of whom were students at San Francisco State University and City College of San Francisco.

In the North and East Bay, the Berkeley Masjid began to take shape around 1982 in a rented building on Claremont Avenue. At the same time, a group in Richmond began meeting in a house, which they called Masjid al-Islam, for prayers. One and possibly two more mosques were opened around the same time: the Abu Bakr Mosque and the Masjid al-Islam in Oakland. The exact date is disputed, however, for some community members say this occurred during the early 1990s. In addition, in late 1987 the Darulislam Mosque opened in Concord on Detroit Avenue and attracted Arabs, Afghans, and Indo-Pakistanis to the area. A total of eight centers were founded during this period, raising to ten the total number of Bay Area mosques.

According to this study’s data collection and analysis, the 1980s was also the start of a critical shift in the settlement patterns of the Bay Area Muslim population. Figure 1 and 2 shows its five counties and the concentration of Muslim populations and businesses. Before the 1980s, the region was narrowly constituted to include all of the cities and municipalities immediately facing the Bay, as well as several inland localities that had had a functionally dependent relationship with the hub: San Francisco.


For immigrant Muslims, San Francisco served not only as an entry point but also as the economic, social, political, religious, and cultural hub for their communities. The search for jobs and housing often did not extend beyond city borders, and the East or South Bay were considered places of exile from the center because no one wanted to move away from the hub.

In the late 1970s and the 1980s, the community formed a firm link with San Francisco, as the Crescent Street Center constituted the only viable mosque and housed a full-time imam who attended to the community's needs. In addition, a fully functioning weekend school that offered a vibrant Qur'anic study program also opened its doors.

The community organized conferences and family events, as well as summer picnics and park days, in close proximity to San Francisco. During the mid-1980s, the local Palestinian Muslim community of San Francisco organized an annual Al-Quds Day that attracted Muslims from all over Northern and parts of Southern California. The community's fundraising activities were centered near the Crescent Street Center, and at almost every event the imam spoke or urged attendees to donate. The amounts raised were modest, compared to what would come a few years later, but nonetheless critical for initial community development. In addition, the Crescent Center was its public face to the larger American society because many media representatives visited the mosque to do stories on the annual Ramadan or Eid celebrations.

For the past thirty years, the Bay Area has experienced massive demographic and economic shifts, all of which have impacted the local Muslims. During the 1980s and toward the end of the decade, a slow shift began to take hold, one that was influenced by the emergence of two dominant and large Sunni institutions: SBIA and MCA in the San Jose/Santa Clara area. Although in the 1970s Shi'a religious activities were almost nonexistent in the Bay Area, by the mid-1980s and early 1992 Ahmed Mirza and Ali Hussain had managed to establish a vibrant South Bay community. In June 1986 a house in San Jose was purchased and gradually transformed into the Hussaini Center. Like SBIA and MCA, the Shi'a Muslim Association of the Bay Area has played a role in the community's growth.

Figure 2: Map of Muslim Families Based on Surname



In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the skyrocketing demand for highly skilled technical employees, coupled with the rather low rate of available personnel domestically, influenced a change in immigration policy in favor of H1B visas.¹² As a result, the quota for such visa holders was increased several times to accommodate high-tech corporate interests. In large part, the Indian community was the largest beneficiary due to New Delhi's swift action upon realizing just how important this sector was to the American economy. The door that was opened to the Indian community also resulted in large numbers of Indian Muslims arriving in the Bay Area, followed by another stream of H1B immigrants from Pakistan. The South Bay (the San Jose and Santa Clara area) has a high concentration of Indo-Pakistani Muslim immigrants. In addition, there has been a steady stream of H1B immigrants from Egypt, Turkey, and Arab lands. This initial Muslim mix contributed to the transformation and eventual supplanting of San Francisco as the community's hub. Most major events and resources have shifted southward.

An understudied outcome of this southward shift is the existing income gap between Silicon

Valley and, in particular, Alameda and Contra Costa counties, where Muslims' income levels trail that of the South Bay. In addition, Muslim communities outside Silicon Valley tend to consist of blue-collar workers, taxi drivers, small storeowners, and flea market vendors. For instance, Yemenis are highly visible in San Francisco's janitorial work force – they constitute one-third of all union members, and Muslim taxi drivers are a very common sight around the airport and BART stations. This income disparity is coupled with an education gap and exacerbated in cases where immigration was due to war or conflict in the country of origin. In addition, large numbers of refugees live outside Silicon Valley and often subsist on the margins of the economy. While some do find steady employment, the majority continues to occupy the lower echelons of the job market. Unfortunately, those who are undocumented live in perpetual fear and often face economic exploitation.

1990-2012

The following twenty-two years witnessed a fivefold expansion as well as a marked qualitative change in the type of institution, size, and resources committed. Once again beginning in the South Bay, the Muslim Community Association (MCA) rapidly outgrew its Catherine Street location. By mounting a local and national fundraising campaign through the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), as well as securing a host of personal and institutional loans, it purchased the former Hewlett Packard office building on 3003 Scott Street in Santa Clara for \$3.5 million. As a result, MCA soon enjoyed a leadership position across the Bay Area because it could now accommodate thousands of people.

SBIA opened a prayer hall in Southeast San Jose's Evergreen district. In 1997, it helped establish another facility in San Jose: the South Valley Islamic Center. The group uses two additional facilities for Friday prayers, and expansion efforts are underway.

The Fremont and Hayward areas, new suburbs for Silicon Valley, also experienced rapid community growth and the expansion of centers. In Hayward, three mosques were built and opened during 1993-99 primarily to serve the local Afghan community. Three centers opened in Fremont, one of them a multi-million and multi-phase project – the Islamic Society of East Bay (ISEB) at Peace Terrace (completed in 1995). In addition, in 1997 Hamza Yusuf's Zaytuna Institute purchased land and two buildings in Hayward and thereby became one more aspect of community development in the area. Initially established to provide community-based, pluralistic religious education from a classical Islamic perspective, in 2004 it launched a pilot non-accredited seminary program. In 2009, it adopted a new name: Zaytuna College.¹³ Currently a full-time undergraduate institution of higher education specializing in Arabic and Islamic studies, it is seeking formal college accreditation.¹⁴

More recently, two new sites have opened: Al-Medina Educational Center and the Ta'leef Collective. A number of Shi'a centers in Fremont serve Isma'ili Muslims, and a group composed mainly of converts has opened the Fatimiyya Islamic Center (FIC).

The Ahmadiyya community's presence in the United States dates back to the 1920s and 1930s;

however, it put down roots in the Bay Area only in the 1960s. Ahmadiyyas were involved in setting up San Francisco's first mosque in 1965, and in due time they established three more centers to meet their needs: one in Oakland (for Alameda county), Milpitas (covering Santa Clara), and Bay Point (for Contra Costa county).

Like those in other parts of the country, the first Ismailis arrived in the Bay Area during the late 1960s, mainly from Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda. Most were students at UC Berkeley enrolled in mathematics, business, engineering, and similar fields. The Ismailis had originally settled in East Africa during the early nineteenth century as a result of the Indian Ocean trade and colonial relationships. As with other Asians in that region, they traced their ancestry back to the western Indian state of Gujarat and to the port-city of Mumbai.

Communal life centered on the *jamatkhana* (house of congregation), which was used for prayer, reflection, as well as educational, cultural, and other functions. Ismailis also attend mosques for congregational Muslim services. While the initial informal prayer gatherings took place in individual houses, members eventually rented a suitable space in Berkeley. As the pioneers graduated, many moved toward Oakland; the *jamatkhana* followed them in 1974, only to be relocated around 1981 to Oakland Hills to address community needs.

In the early 1980s, the Bay Area Ismaili community began to settle in pre-boom Silicon Valley and engage in the grocery business. To serve the community dispersed between the East and South Bay/Peninsula, in 1982 a *jamatkhana* opened in Fremont and remained the center of Bay Area Ismaili life there for a decade. As with Ismailis elsewhere in the country, the majority hailed from India via East Africa. During the 1990s, a new wave of immigrants primarily from Pakistan, Central Asia, and Iran arrived and settled in Sunnyvale and Mountain View; smaller numbers of them settled in San Jose. To respond to these new settlement patterns, in 1992 the *jamatkhana* moved to Sunnyvale. As immigrants continued to arrive, a third *jamatkhana* opened in Alameda County in 1998, and a fourth in Sacramento in 2007.

With the boom in Silicon Valley, Ismailis from other parts of North America migrated there and eventually formed four major nodes of communal life: Milipitas-Santa Clara, Alameda, Sacramento, and Marin. The largest segment lives in the Santa Clara area, while the second largest lives in the Sacramento area. Today Bay Area Ismailis, just like those in other American cities, are well-educated, civically engaged, first- and second-generation Americans, and recent arrivals who are mainly professionals, businesspeople, and students.

Moving to the west and north of Santa Clara, three additional mosques opened in a short period of time. The Islamic Society of San Francisco rented a third-floor space downtown and opened its doors in October 1991. Masjid al-Tawheed purchased a property on Sutter Street in 1994, and the San Francisco Muslim Community Center welcomed worshippers in 1996. In 2003, Masjid al-Noor was added to the mix in San Francisco after the Islamic Society of San Francisco's congregation split in two. Also the San Francisco Muslim Community Center, under the leadership of Abu Qadeer

al-Amin, recently opened its doors in the Outer Mission Neighborhood of San Francisco after moving from the Divisadero Street location it had operated since the mid-1980s. To the north of San Francisco and across the Golden Gate Bridge, the Islamic Center of Mill Valley opened in 1991 and from the beginning served as a focal point for a small immigrant Gujarati Indian community. Further north, in Novato, a small group of mostly South Asian and Arab Muslims started praying in a garage and soon after established the Islamic Center of North Marin (ICNM) in 2007. The relatively small and humble mosque includes a couple of converted offices nestled in the middle of a business park. The mosque has a warm and welcoming environment with prayers held daily and the capacity for approximately 75 congregants.

Coming directly across the San Rafael Bridge into the East Bay and Oakland, additional mosques began opening. In early 1991, the Oakland Islamic Center began offering services at a rented warehouse located at the corner of 31st and Telegraph; later on, its members managed to purchase and renovate it. The East Bay Area's first Shi'a institution, the Islamic Culture Center of Northern California, was incorporated in 1995 with a major purchase of a historical landmark church at Madison in downtown Oakland. Another mainly Yemeni mosque opened in 1996 at 12th Street and Market to serve business owners in the area, while a predominantly African American group rented space on Park Blvd originally to hold Friday prayers; they later transformed it into a mosque. Another mosque was opened around 57th Street in Oakland and completed in the late 1990s. Masjid al-Iman, which operated at the MLK Street location, moved to a larger building, and Imam Zaid and volunteers used it for the Lighthouse Mosque, which recently purchased a larger building across the street. An examination of Oakland reveals that eight mosques serve the community in this rather small city. Also, if we add the two additional mosques in Alameda, one which came online in 1992 and another one that was founded in early 1996, the mosque picture in this period becomes clear.

As a result of the more than twenty years of civil war in their homeland, a steady stream of Somali refugees and immigrants have made their way first to the United States and then to the Bay Area. Their major population clusters are located in Oakland, Alameda, Hayward, San Jose, and Santa Clara. Based on the information obtained from interviews, focus groups, and other primary research, data suggests that Bay Area Somalis are highly underserved, understudied, and face scrutiny from the Department of Homeland Security.

Starting in the early 1990s, a small LGBT Arab and Muslim grouping began to take shape in and around San Francisco. Over the past ten years, a more visible community in San Francisco has emerged due in part to the city's attraction and its reputation for tolerance, as well as changes to immigration laws that provide asylum for LGBT Muslims from across the world. We expect this expansion to continue and a number of focus group participants made reference to this segment of the community. Although this study's survey did not ask about sexual orientation, we feel that more research and data on this community is needed.

Prior to the 1990s expansion we counted a total of eight or possibly ten mosques; however,

during and after the high-tech explosion we found forty-eight completed centers and more on the drawing boards. After 9/11 some of these projects were slowed down due to fear combined with the economic downturn. But now that we are a few years removed from the tragic events and the economic picture is improving, another set of mosques is emerging, the latest of which is Walnut Creek (2011). At present, the Bay Area boasts some eighty-four mosques and religious centers representing possibly every group and sect within the Islamic fold. Mosques can be found in almost every city and county in the Bay Area. Santa Clara and Alameda counties have the highest numbers and are followed by Contra Costa, San Francisco, and Marin counties. In addition, every college and university in the region has a vibrant Muslim Student Association (MSA) that holds regular Friday prayer services. The area has one of the largest concentrations of Muslims in the country, after Detroit, Washington (DC), New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Houston.

Civic and Cultural Institutions Outside the Mosque

The Bay Area's vibrant cluster of Muslim civic and cultural institutions covers a full spectrum of activities ranging from such national groups as the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the Islamic Network Group (ING), Muslim Advocates, the American Muslim Alliance, the Muslim American Society, the Muslim American Voice, the Islamic Scholarship Fund (ISF), the Illume Media Inc., the Aswat Ensemble, Muslims without Borders, and the Islamic Circle of North America. Several of these advocacy and civic engagement organizations were established in the 1990s or after September 11, 2001. Several are based on ethnic or cultural origin, some work closely with religious centers and groups, and others maintain a distinct secular character. Across all five Bay Area counties we found civic organizations working with every ethnic and national group in the region, from Somali, Sudanese, and Eritrean associations to Indonesian, Pakistani, Tajik, Iranian, Bosnian, Malaysian, Turkish, Albanian, and Libyan associations. The ethnically based and non-mosque centered associations organize annual cultural festivals, art and language classes, workshops, film and lecture events, and mobilize relief efforts. These culturally focused organizations play an important role in helping their members navigate their relationship with the broader society while affirming their Muslim identity through cultural expressions.

One of the oldest ethnically based organizations in the area is San Francisco's Arab Cultural Center (ACC). Since its inception in the early 1960s, the center has managed to reflect a unified voice for Arab-Americans in the city. At one point, the city's Arab-American institutional framework counted some fifty-plus groups, with the largest being connected to segments of the local Palestinian community. In addition to Palestinian-based organizations, the ACC is connected to Jordanian, Egyptian, Yemeni, Lebanese, Moroccan, Iraqi, and Syrian organizations. Since 9/11, the ACC has taken on projects designed to provide social services as well as more engaged advocacy on the community's behalf. The San Francisco city leadership has recognized this role and supplied funding for vital programs. A more recent development in San Francisco is the emergence of the Arab Resource and Community Center. Located in the heart of the Mission district, it focuses on youth and progressive civic engagement. The center provides a meeting space for activists,

regular programming, and a constant presence within the city's politically Left circles. A successful highlight for the Bay Area's Arab community is the annual Arab Film Festival, which has become a major cultural institution recognized by the region's art and cultural communities. An attempt to hold a Muslim film festival a few years back modeled on the Arab Film Festival, however, fizzled due to a lack of resources and organizational infrastructure.

The East Bay has a cluster of organizations that both speak for the community on various critical issues and serves as a point of contact for media and political leadership: the Afghan Coalition, Afghans for Peace, the Afghan Cultural Association, the Afghan Elderly Association, and the Afghan Cultural Society. These institutions have been instrumental in organizing rallies and protests as well as community-wide responses to international and local events. Community members have been appointed to various commissions and boards in Fremont, Hayward, and Newark and have had considerable success in addressing the community's emerging needs, particularly those of the youth. The large Afghan presence has contributed to institutional growth; however, limited resources and knowledge have impacted the quality and rate of development within the institutions.

Over the past twenty years, segments within the Muslim community have developed institutions beyond the mosque. Groups like American Muslims Intent on Learning and Activism (AMILA), which started in 1992, were pioneers in this regard and focused on education and activism. The events of 9/11 and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq engendered a renewed urgency to organize and respond to both the rising tides of racism and discrimination from the larger society, now generally referred to as Islamophobia in academic and international organizations, and to counter the community's silence and fear. But the end result was not the creation of new organizations; rather, a decentralized network emerged among individuals across racial, ethnic, sectarian, and class spectrum to respond and to participate in the protests, rallies, and mobilizations held in reaction to these massive events. The same dynamic occurred during the post-2008 economic crisis, when individual Bay Area Muslims responded without any coordination. But as the Occupy Movement¹⁵ began to emerge, Muslims began to consolidate their voices within the movement. In Occupy Oakland, a Muslim group emerged and hosted weekly Friday prayers that were open to all. This event was used to articulate a transnational perspective to the events that were unfolding locally. Groups like Social Justice Halaqa, the Bay Area Muslim Community Organizing Network, the Bay Area Solidarity Summer, and Poetry in the Park were all connected to the critical developments emerging out of Occupy Oakland and Occupy San Francisco movements.

Another set of organizations developed to address a specific need. Habibe Husain, citing "Serving God through Serving His Creation" as an organizing principle, established the Rahima Foundation (Arabic: "mercy and compassion") in Santa Clara. Through her and her family's efforts, this foundation became the focal point for all needy Bay Area Muslims and a trusted agency for collecting and distributing the annual zakat. The North American Islamic Shelter for the Abused, which opened its doors in October 2002 in Palo Alto, addressed domestic violence and marital

problems in the community and the wider Bay Area. NISA (Arabic: “women”) applies an Islamic approach to these problems while simultaneously working to create a more harmonious family situation for its clients, who come from a wide array of beliefs and cultures. In 1979 Manzoor Ghori, at that time the MSA’s regional representative, along with other members founded the Bay Area-based Indian Muslim Relief and Charities (IMRC) to protect and support India’s Muslims. American Muslims for Jerusalem, founded in the Bay Area in early 1996, undertook a similar effort on behalf of the Palestinians; this was followed by the establishment of American Muslims for Palestine. In 2002, the Ta’leef Collective opened its doors in Fremont to offer outreach services by creating a space in which those interested in Islam receive accurate information, to assist converts, and to serve disenfranchised and marginalized Muslim young adults living in the West. This latter effort is conducted through programs and classes that help integrate this group into the larger Muslim community. Another more recent addition, San Jose’s Muslim Nurses Association founded in 2008, asserts that the nursing profession is the “highest calling to be a healer, a person who cares for the sick and dying, and to give back to the community is more important than waiting for the community to give to you.”¹⁶

The community’s artistic and cultural productions has become more visible over the past ten years as the community expanded and its talent became more diverse. The Arab Film Festival has been the longest and most sustainable effort in this area. Now, however, we increasingly find artists, musicians, painters, playwrights, poets, and film and documentary producers emerging in the Bay Area, some of whom have acquired national and international audiences. The contribution of the Aswat Ensemble before and after 9/11 is very important, for founder Nabila Mango uses it as a vehicle to assert an explicit link between cultural production as a tool for self-definition, empowerment, and civic engagement. In fact, a constant performance schedule across the area calls for such a fusion. The Bay Area is the home of Muslim playwright Wajahat Ali, whose UC Berkeley class project, entitled “Domestic Crusaders,” eventually had a successful run on Broadway. Khalil Bendib, an Algerian-born cartoonist living in Berkeley, uses the Internet to publish his work in independent and alternative media outlets. He also cohosts a weekly one-hour program, “Voices of the Middle East,” on KPFA (94.1). During the 2008 presidential campaign, Bendib unofficially announced his candidacy and used sarcasm as a tool to speak out on issues important to Muslims. This followed his successful *Mission Accomplished: Wicked Cartoons by America’s Most Wanted Political Cartoonist* (Interlink Books: 2007). Bendib’s work currently appears regularly in more than 1,700 small and mid-sized national and international newspapers.

The impact and contributions of Michael Wolfe and the Unity Production Foundation include elevating and setting elite standards for Muslim media productions not only for the Bay Area, but worldwide. A similar contribution is found in Javed Ali’s *Illume*, a magazine that brings together writers, graphic artists, and photographers and has managed to create a sustained Muslim media presence in the region and give a voice to the voiceless. A number of notable authors, including Khaled Hosseini (*The Kite Runner* and *A Thousand Splendid Suns*), Mir Tamim Ansary (*West of Kabul, East of New York: An Afghan American Story* and *The Widow’s Husband*), Sumbul Ali-

Karamali (*The Muslim Next Door*), and Naheed Hasnat (*Shooting Kabul*) have added the important element of storytelling to improve non-Muslims' understanding of Muslim communities. More research and work on the impact and contribution of cultural producers within the community may provide a wealth of information and a more accurate understanding of how Muslims use various media to define themselves.

One challenge arising from this rich diversity of organizations is competition and a lack of focus on basic community needs. Several focus group respondents stressed that the community's leadership is often preoccupied with internal rivalries, contention, and opposition of different groups. They felt that leaders waste valuable time and energy on community politics, rather than community needs. In addition, these respondents felt leaders are not paying sufficient attention to more pressing problems, such as pockets of poverty and the lack of support for certain segments of the Bay Area community.



DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

There are no official statistics for the Bay Area's Muslim population, and very little demographic data on the community. The U.S. Census does not ask about religious affiliation, which makes it difficult to determine the community's exact size. Estimates have been derived by analyzing census data on the basis of immigration patterns from Muslim-majority countries¹⁷ and by examining patterns of American Muslim institutionalization (e.g., the number of mosques and congregation size).¹⁸ Finally, some estimates have been based on deriving population figures from national studies. National estimates of Muslims in the country range from 2 to 10 million.¹⁹ The Pew Research Center, which has conducted the most scientifically sound study, estimated that there were 2.75 million Muslim in the United States in 2011.

The authors of this report estimate the Bay Area's Muslim population at approximately 250,000 individuals. The community, which constitutes one of the nation's highest concentrations, comprises approximately 3.5 percent of the total Bay Area population.²⁰ This population figure relies on several methods. This includes an effort to derive relevant statistics from the Pew Research Center's 2011 national study of American Muslims. In addition, we conducted an extensive area-wide search of Muslim surnames and identified over 50,000 families. This number is most likely an underestimate, for it does not include Muslims with non-Muslim surnames or converts who have kept their original names. It should be noted, however, that the Muslim population continues to grow at a faster pace than other religious communities (primarily due to immigration and conversion). Some scholars go so far as to suggest that Muslims could eventually become the area's second largest religious minority.²¹

The Bay Area Muslim community, which constitutes one of the nation's highest concentrations, comprises approximately 3.5 percent of the total Bay Area population.

Basic Demographic Information

The demographic information presented below, including all graphs and tables, is derived from the responses to the survey conducted specifically for this report. Based on these findings, Muslims have settled throughout the Bay Area. The majority live in Alameda (37%), Santa Clara (27%), and Contra Costa (12%) counties, a far smaller percent appears to live in San Mateo (6%), San Francisco (3%), and Marin counties (1%). There seems to be a heavy concentration of Yemeni, Iraqi, Moroccan, Algerian, Indonesian, and Malaysian Muslims living in the heart of San Francisco: the Tenderloin district. Most of them are working class and small business owners. The bulk of the community lives along the Highway 880 and 101 corridors, the primary thoroughway to Silicon Valley and the East Bay corridor. South Asian and Arab Muslims have tended to cluster in the South Bay, Afghans in the East Bay, and African American Muslims in Oakland.

The survey respondents had a slightly higher male-to-female ratio (46% to 42%); 12 percent did not respond to the question about gender (table 1). Our survey also indicated a relatively young population, with the majority of Muslims (68%) being under the age of forty-five. In fact, even as the early generation of Muslim immigrants settled down and started families, the community's average age has continually declined. In comparison to the Bay Area's general population, which has a median age of 39.4 (according to data from the U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey),²² the Bay Area's Muslim population median age is 35.0, and thus higher than that of other minority groups.²³ For Hispanics the national median age is 27.6, for African Americans 30.9, and for Asians 33.2.²⁴

Table 1: Basic Demographic Data of Bay Area Muslims (N=1,108)

		%
Gender	Male	46
	Female	42
	No response	12
Age	Under 18	10
	18 – 24	17
	25 – 34	20
	35 – 44	21
	45 – 54	15
	55 – 64	10
	65 – 74	3
	75+	1
	No response	3
Children	Yes	56
	No	38
	No response	7
Number of Children	1	7
	2	14
	3	14
	4	5
	5+	6
	No response	54
Primary Language Spoken	English only	22
	Native language	12
	Native language better than English	9
	English better than native language	18
	Mix of both	29
	Other	3
	No response	8
Number of Languages Spoken	1	5
	2	33
	3	24
	4	7
	5+	3
	No response	28
Marital Status	Married	57
	Single/Never married	32
	Separated	<1
	Divorced	5
	Widowed	2
	Domestic partner/Civil union	<1
	No response	3
Spouse from the Same Background	Yes	50
	No	12
	No response	37

More than half of the sample (57%) indicated that they were married; approximately 5 percent of those surveyed were currently divorced. This was relatively low, compared to the percentage of all Americans (21%) who are currently divorced.²⁵ Slightly less than 1 percent were separated. The lower percentage of currently divorced Muslims may be due to such factors as the relatively high number of single and unmarried Muslims (32%). This data on divorce raises many interesting questions and warrants further research.


The data in this report is similar to the data in the Pew report, which revealed that 1 percent of Bay Area Muslims were divorced and that 3 percent were divorced in California as a whole. Just over half of all married respondents had spouses from the same ethnic background. Muslims in this survey are marrying across ethnic and racial lines and are therefore more representative of the new diverse America. Most Bay Area Muslim families in the survey have children; of those who responded 14 percent had two children and another 14 percent had three children.²⁶ In comparison to the national average of 2.06 children,²⁷ this study's data suggests that the average-sized Bay Area Muslim family is larger than its mainstream American counterpart. Because the Muslim community is made up of mostly ethnic and racial minorities, it makes sense to compare them to other ethnic and minority communities rather than to religious communities like Christians and Jews, who for the most part are white. For other minority groups, the figures are as follows: Hispanics have 2.4 children, African Americans have 2.0 children, and Asians have 1.7 children.²⁸ Out of the ethnic groups, Hispanics appear to be more in line with Muslim families as regards the number of children.

Race and Ethnicity

This study's survey results suggest that this community is one of the country's most diverse in terms of ethnicity, linguistic background, education, and economic wellbeing (figure 3). A number of groups constitute the majority of the population, while maintaining their own cultures:

- South Asian (30%),
- Arabs (23%),²⁹
- Afghans (17%),
- African-Americans (9%),
- Asian/Pacific Islanders (7%),
- White (6 %), and
- Iranians (2%).

Figure 3: Race and Ethnicity



Although more than one-third of the participants were born in the United States, Muslims have emigrated from nearly fifty countries and now live throughout the Bay Area. The most frequently cited countries of origin are Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Egypt, and Yemen.

Table 2 is a comprehensive, but not exhaustive, list of countries of origin. This is but a sampling of the full breadth and diversity of the local community.

Table 2: Country of Origin for Bay Area Muslims (N=1,108)

Country of Birth	%
USA	34
Pakistan	14
Afghanistan	11
India	10
Egypt	3
Yemen	2
Iran	2
Palestine	2
Jordan	2
Syria	1
Morocco	<1
UK	<1
Saudi Arabia	<1
Canada	<1
Algeria	<1
Bangladesh	<1
Turkey	<1
Kuwait	<1
Iraq	<1
Lebanon	<1
Philippines	<1
Tunisia	<1
France	<1
South Africa	<1
China	<1
Djibouti	<1
Ethiopia	<1
Fiji	<1
Indonesia	<1
Kenya	<1
Sudan	<1
UAE	<1
Vietnam	<1
Australia	<1
Eritrea	<1
Israel	<1
Thailand	<1
Venezuela	<1
Burma	<1
Denmark	<1
Ghana	<1
Kazakhstan	<1
Libya	<1
Malaysia	<1
Russia	<1
Singapore	<1
Somalia	<1
Sri Lanka	<1
Taiwan	<1
No response	6

Among immigrant Muslims in this sample, 67 percent spoke more than two languages. Over 71 percent of respondents spoke a language in addition to English. This high percentage of bilingualism may be due to the fact that India and Pakistan have been primary targets for recruitment to the high tech industry and English is the language of instruction in these countries.

Immigrant Muslims cited educational, economic, and employment opportunities as their primary motivations for emigrating (over 29%). Nearly 8 percent emigrated because of wars and civil conflicts or persecution in their home country.³⁰ Based on interviews and focus group discussions, many Afghans, Palestinians, Bosnians, and Somalis left for these very reasons. They had stopped at or spent time at another country before coming to the United States for economic, educational or family reasons (table 3).

Table 3: Immigration Status and Reason for Emigrating (N=1,108)

		%
Citizen	Yes	49
	No	14
	No response	37
Immigration Status	Green Card (Permanent)	8
	Employment Visa	2
	Student Visa	2
	Political Refugee/Asylum	1
	Green Card (Temporary)	1
	Undocumented	<1
	Filing for papers	<1
	Other	1
Reason for Immigration	Educational opportunities	17
	Conflict/Persecution in home country	8
	Family reasons	7
	Economic opportunities	6
	Employment opportunity	6
	Marriage	5
	Other reason	2
	Combination	14
	No response	37

Similar to Latinos and new immigrants, Muslims in this sample are on the path to citizenship; around 50 percent of them are already citizens.³¹ This is consistent with the 2007 Pew report, which suggests that two-thirds of the current Muslim population has immigrated since the 1980s. The large percentage (37%) of survey participants who did not respond to this question may suggest that immigration status is a sensitive topic or that the community might contain an undocumented segment that lives on the margins of civil society.


Education

Earlier studies of Muslim immigrants suggest that those who arrived in the country were already highly educated, while others enrolled in various colleges and universities after their arrival. This survey indicated 74 percent of respondents had completed between at least some college and graduate school. Nearly 30 percent have earned a B.A., nearly 25 percent completed graduate school, and 5 percent had earned a Ph.D. (figure 4). These numbers are higher than those for the general Bay Area population,³² of which slightly more than 41 percent aged twenty-five or older have a B.A. (25.2%) or higher (16.3%). This also appears to be higher than the general public at the national level: high school education (31%), some college (19%), an associate degree (9%), a B.A. (19%), an M.A. (7 %), professional degree (1%), and a Ph.D. (1%). But this high level of attainment, as discussed below, is not consistent across ethnic and geographic lines.

A glimpse of the MCA's leadership indicates the presence of fifty to sixty Ph.D. holders and hundreds of M.A. holders on its membership roster. Almost 90 percent of the congregation has some level of college degree in addition to technical training certificates. Across town at SBIA, the level of educational attainment likewise is rather high: about thirty people have a Ph.D., 100 have an M.A., and a majority of people has a B.A. The Shi'a Muslim Association of the Bay Area likewise reported that the overwhelming majority of the congregation consists of highly educated professionals.


Interviews with leaders from other South Bay mosques paint a picture of congregations that mostly consist of professionals employed in the high-tech industry and possessing university degrees. Their educational background is partly a result of H1B visas, which were designed to acquire highly qualified workers to fill the massive need across much of the Silicon Valley.

Figure 4: Highest Level of Education Completed



In comparison to other minority groups, Muslims are doing fairly well in regards to educational attainment. According to this survey, nearly 30 percent of Bay Area Muslims had a college degree. This is equivalent to Asians (29%) among the general public nationally and significantly higher than Hispanics (9%) and African Americans (12%).³³ Within the survey, South Asian Muslims had at least a college degree (78%), as compared to Iranians (72%), Hispanics (69%), Whites (66%), Arabs (62%), Asian/Pacific Islanders (59%), African Americans (50%), and Afghans (40%). The survey also suggested that 35 percent of Iranians in the sample have a Ph.D. The high percentage of Hispanics and Native Americans with graduate degrees, as indicated in Figure 4a below is likely a result of the small sample size.

Figure 4a: Ethnicity and Education



In comparing the Muslim community in the northern portion of the East Bay, including Oakland and parts of San Francisco, we begin to see a difference in the community’s educational background. Taking San Francisco first, we find a high concentration of predominately blue-collar Yemeni, Iraqi, Tunisian, and Moroccan Muslims. The populations of both cities mainly consist of blue-collar workers; however, this observation should not be taken as an absolute because a quick look at the educational composition of key congregations highlights important exceptions. For instance, the survey data indicate that both the Islamic Society of San Francisco and the Oakland Islamic Center attract a large share of professionals from the downtown areas as well as business owners, even though they do not reside in the area.

The Yemeni population is divided into two major segments: one is involved in the inner city liquor business, while the other is heavily vested in the janitorial services sector (one-third of the local union membership is Yemeni). It seems that the Yemeni and Palestinian liquor storeowners in San Francisco and Oakland tend to have a high school education or less. In some establishments we find two generations, sometimes three, involved in the business. All of the Yemeni participants did


not know anyone from within their community who was a college graduate, even though almost half of them were second-generation Americans. The picture is different with Palestinians. Those who work in the grocery business tend to send their children to a university, after which many of them move into a professional field and obtain employment after graduation.³⁴

When parents were asked whether they send their children to public or private schools, 41 percent of respondents said that they send their children to public schools; only 6 percent said private schools. Despite their desire to give their children an Islamic education, only 3 percent sent them to a full-time Islamic school. This is not surprising, for most Bay Area Islamic schools lack adequate resources and many have volunteer (as opposed to properly certified) instructors. Another limiting factor is the lack of Islamic schools in the Bay Area.³⁵ Granada Islamic School, MCA's full-time school, is one of the most successful due to its central location, proximity to a large community, and available resources. Yet the challenge for many of the area's Islamic schools, and the community more generally, is how to develop a sustainable resource base that can support a full-time Islamic school system.³⁶

Socioeconomic Status

Based on this survey, median household income stood at \$70,686, which was lower than the average of the area's general public (\$77,879).³⁷ It was, however, significantly higher than the median household income for the general public nationally: \$50,054 in 2011.³⁸ But these figures should not be considered as absolutes, given the high non-response (21%) rate. As a result, they must be viewed with a degree of caution.

Figure 5: Combined Household Income (N=1,108)



Of those who responded to the survey, 56 percent were employed either full or part time (table 4). Twelve percent indicated that they were unemployed, which could include those who did not desire or seek employment. Six percent of survey participants were underemployed or looking for employment. In comparison with the general Bay Area, as of October 2012 the regional unemployment rate stood at 7.7 percent.³⁹ The participants fare even better when compared to national unemployment statistics of January 2013: Asians (6.4%), African Americans (13%), Hispanics (8%), and the general public (8%).⁴⁰

However, if we combine the rates of those who are unemployed, underemployed, and looking for employment, a different economic picture emerges, one that suggests that some help might be needed for those below the radar. The gap exists between professionals in the South Bay or business owners and less wealthy groups, including new immigrants who are struggling to find employment and possibly are facing discrimination due to limited language skills, immigration status, or their “Muslim-looking” appearance. This issue of unemployment needs to be studied further.

Table 4: Financial Situation (N=1,108)

		%
Financial Situation	Excellent condition	11
	Good condition	35
	Fair condition	33
	Poor condition	8
	Don't know/Rather not answer	5
	No response	9
Employment Status	Full-time	41
	Part-time	15
	Not employed	12
	Full- or Part-time student	8
	Stay-at-home parent	6
	Looking for employment	4
	Retired	3
	Under-employed	2
	No response	10
Industry Working In	Tech	18
	Education	10
	Medical	9
	Service	7
	Retail	6
	Government	2
	Construction	1
	Other	17
	No response	30
Self Employed	Yes	16
	No	65
	No response	19
Receive Government Benefits	No Assistance	64
	Medical Assistance	6
	Food Stamps	3
	Government Assistance	2
	Housing Assistance	2
	Combination	6
	No response	18
Combined Household Income	Less than \$20,000	12
	\$20,000 to \$39,999	11
	\$40,000 to \$59,999	11
	\$60,000 to \$79,999	9
	\$80,000 to \$99,999	8
	\$100,000 to \$149,999	15
	\$150,000 – \$199,999	7
	\$200,000 – \$249,999	7
	More than \$250,000	<1
	No response	21
Own or Rent	Own	36
	Rent	46
	Neither	10
	No response	8

Nearly half the survey respondents (46%) indicated that their financial situation was good or excellent. According to the same Pew survey referenced earlier, 46 percent of the general population felt the same way, as did 45 percent in California. Within this survey, the financial situation based on county was good or excellent for a large number of participants.

However a solid plurality of respondents (46%) rent rather than own a home. Pew research⁴¹ found that 74 percent of Bay Area Muslims were not homeowners, somewhat higher than this research. Among the general population this figure was 66 percent; among the general California population it was 70 percent. Reasons for the findings and their differences require further research.





Figure 5a: Financial Situation by County

In Marin, those who indicated that their financial situation was excellent or good was the highest (64%), followed by Santa Clara (56%), San Mateo (50%), and Contra Costa (49%). Alameda (41%) and San Francisco (37%) counties had the lowest percent of respondents indicating they felt their financial situation was good or excellent. For both counties, the reverse was true: 22 percent of Muslims in San Francisco and 11 percent of Muslims in Alameda indicated their financial situation was poor. This was higher than the figures for San Mateo (6%), Santa Clara (5%), Contra Costa (2%), and Marin (0%) (figure 5a).

Figure 5b: County and Household Income




While we celebrate the economic success of some Muslims, it is important to note the challenges facing lower-income Muslims. About 11 percent of Muslim households in this sample make less than \$20,000. Almost 23 percent make less than \$40,000, and 34 percent make less than \$60,000 (figure 5). San Francisco had the highest percent of Muslims who had less than \$40,000 household income (39%). This was followed by Alameda County, where one-third of the participants indicated they had less than \$40,000 household income. Other counties reported the following figures: Marin (27%), San Mateo (18%), Contra Costa (17%), and Santa Clara (10%) (figure 5b).

As earlier figures from the survey suggest, while regional Muslims show a fairly strong household economic performance, there are significant financial inequalities along geographic residence and educational inequalities along racial/ethnic lines. As the proceeding figures will show, economic inequalities also emerge roughly along racial/ethnic lines.

South Asian Muslim respondents had the highest income levels, with nearly half (49%) having a household income above \$100,000. The figures for other ethnic and racial groups are as follows: Iranians (38%), Asian/Pacific Islander (36%), Arab Muslims (26%), Whites (23%), Hispanic Muslims (15%), Afghans (10%), and African American Muslims (10%). Many of the educated Muslim immigrants who arrived with their families have comfortable salaries, some even in the six-figure range.⁴²

Figure 5c: Ethnicity and Household Income



A qualitative look at some communities, based on in-depth interviews and focus groups conducted, further illuminates the above-mentioned data. Three mosques in San Francisco are heavily frequented by blue-collar Muslims, most of whom are immigrants who arrived with limited education and language skills. Some of these who arrived due to civil wars in their homelands might have university degrees but often lack the necessary language skills or are older, both of which make it difficult to find employment. Likewise, Oakland’s two African American mosques are mostly attended by blue-collar workers whose educational background tends to lag behind their Muslim counterparts in the South Bay.

The picture in Richmond, Concord, and Hayward is almost the same as in San Francisco and Oakland. In interviews with Afghans attending mosques in Concord and Hayward, the researchers found that most are blue-collar employees working in the taxi, gas station, and flea market sectors; in hospitality service businesses; and as street vendors. Further research needs to be done to delve deeper into immigration patterns and English-language acquisition, as well as to determine what (if any) worker training programs are needed.

The situation for Iraqi immigrants arriving in 1998 is possibly the most difficult, for they moved into the inner city of San Francisco and Oakland, lack language skills, and are middle-aged – all of which make it hard to fit into the country’s mainstream society and economy. A social services case officer who was interviewed in San Francisco reported high rates of depression and social isolation among the Tenderloin’s Iraqi immigrant population. She attributes this to difficulties associated with dislocation and the absence of a social support network. At this time, there is little research available to assess whether this pattern will continue or grow as a result of the ongoing war in Iraq.

Some anecdotal evidence suggests that there are notable exceptions and encouraging signs of advancement. In Oakland, the primary Islamic centers are the Islamic Culture Center of Northern California (ICCNC), the area’s main Shi’a center, and Oakland Islamic Center at 31st and Telegraph. The ICCNC is mainly frequented by East Bay Iranians who settled in the area after the 1979 Islamic revolution. They are mainly highly educated and boast a large number of Ph.D. and other university degrees holders, in addition to a large number of business owners and those involved in real estate. A few blocks away we find the Oakland Islamic Center, which serves a mixed congregation. A group of engineers from the nearby California Department of Transportation’s (Cal-Trans) central offices attends the Friday prayers held at the center.

Meanwhile, younger congregation members in Richmond, Concord, and Hayward were either attending a two- or four-year college or were recent university graduates working as professionals. Younger respondents were working toward degrees in engineering and computer science, while older respondents held blue-collar jobs. In addition to the local Afghan communities, we found Iraqi, Syrian, Pakistani, and Palestinian professionals who were university graduates.

These disparities affect a person’s perceptions and sense of community cohesion. The researchers’ discussions with individuals from the inner city and among the African American Muslim community highlighted their sense of abandonment by the immigrant community, which for many stems from the established racist attitudes to which Muslims are not immune. This is not meant to imply that only the African American community is being critical; on the contrary, some of the immigrants with lower household income also felt abandonment by the community’s wealthier segment.

From interviews with community leaders in Marin, the researchers noticed the following split. The Muslim population clustered around the Islamic Center of Mill Valley is predominantly blue collar, its older members have limited education, and only a limited number of its youth are pursuing higher education. On the other hand, the remaining segments of the Iranian community represent an educated cluster that contains many business owners and professionals. The survey sample from Marin was too small to draw up a complete picture. The researchers’ overall conclusion, based on interviews and interaction, is that over the past thirty years the community shrank while other areas in the Bay Area were becoming focal points for activities due to the macro-economic factors affecting the region as a whole. However, as this report is a pilot study, further research is needed.

Community Health and Government Assistance

Almost 80 percent of respondents reported having health insurance coverage (table 5). Seventy-three percent denied using alcohol in their lifetime (20 percent saying they had at least one drink and 8 percent giving “no response”). Seventy-nine percent of the respondents reported not using drugs in their lifetime (13 percent reporting drug use and 8 percent with “no response”). In comparison, data from the Centers for Disease Control reports that nearly 60 percent of the general Bay Area population had at least one alcoholic drink within the past month⁴³ and 13 percent engaging in some sort of drug use within the past month.⁴⁴ However the researchers cautiously note that comparisons to the general Bay Area population are difficult given different years in which data was collected, different survey methodologies employed, and different questions asked. Nonetheless a casual reading of the data does suggest Bay Area Muslims’ consumption of alcohol and other drugs is consistent or lower than that of their regional non-Muslim neighbors and peers. Given the prohibition against using alcohol and drugs in Islam, this would be expected. Regardless, further research is needed.

Table 5: Health (N=1,108)

		%
Health Insurance	Yes	78
	No	14
	No response	8
Type of Insurance	Kaiser	29
	Private insurance	14
	Insured through employer	19
	County health department	6
	Community clinic	3
	Emergency room	<1
	Don't seek health services	2
	No response	27
Consumed Alcohol (lifetime)	Yes	20
	No	73
	No response	8
Used Drugs (lifetime)	Yes	13
	No	79
	No response	8

While most participants did not receive any type of government assistance, approximately 18 percent of the community did (e.g., medical assistance and food stamps). Afghanis were the most likely to report such assistance. Based on the survey, 27 percent of Muslims in Alameda county reported receiving some type of government assistance. Another 27 percent of Muslims in Marin County reported receiving food stamps.⁴⁵ For other counties receiving some type of government

assistance, the figures are as follows: San Francisco (17%), San Mateo (13%), Contra Costa (12%), and Santa Clara (9%) (figure 5d). In comparison, data from the U.S. Bureau's 2011 American Community Survey found approximately 5.3 percent of all Bay Area households surveyed said they received food stamps.⁴⁶ The same survey also found 11.9 percent of all Bay Area residents claimed to have no health insurance,⁴⁷ lower than the 14% in the survey who reported no coverage. Like the analysis of drug and alcohol use, comparisons are difficult to do because of the different methods and types of data being gathered by various groups.

Figure 5d: Government Benefits by County





Figure 5e: Immigration Status and Health Insurance




This study found that those participants who were American citizens were more likely to have health insurance (85%) than those who were not (72%). Furthermore, the survey found that more than half (56%) of all immigrant Muslims who held green cards had health insurance. This was significantly lower for those with an employment visa (20%) or a student visa (10%).

IDENTITY

Bay Area Muslims, like those around the country, have very diverse identities. As in any religious community, the strength of one's self-identification and level of religious observance varies from person to person as regards age, generation, gender, class, circumstances of immigration, and the presence of local institutions. The strength of religious identity is generally associated with the frequency of mosque attendance and, more broadly, involvement in the local community's activities.

Respondents were asked several questions about their identity, which was then explored further during focus group discussions. In general, they tended to vary in how strongly they identified by religion, ethnicity, and profession, among other affiliations. Most of them identified as Muslim first (figure 6).

Figure 6: How do Muslims Identify Themselves? (N=1,108)



The strength of religious identity is generally associated with the frequency of mosque attendance and, more broadly, involvement in the local community's activities.

Religious Identity

Identifying as Muslim was important for many focus group participants, and nearly eight out of ten participants in this quantitative survey felt that religion was important to them (table 6). Some of them recognized other types of identity, but considered their Islamic identity to be the most important one.

Table 6: Relevance of Religion and Level of Practice (N=1,108)

		%
Religious Importance	Very important	78
	Somewhat important	13
	Not too important	2
	Not at all important	<1
	Rather not answer	<1
	No response	7
Giving Charity (Zakat)	Very important	65
	Somewhat important	6
	Neutral	4
	Not too important	4
	Not at all important	11
	No response	10
Fasting	Very important	67
	Somewhat important	3
	Neutral	3
	Not too important	3
	Not at all important	14
	No response	11
Mecca Pilgrimage	Very important	59
	Somewhat important	8
	Neutral	5
	Not too important	5
	Not at all important	12
	No response	11
Quran Reading & Listening	Very important	45
	Somewhat important	15
	Neutral	13
	Not too important	8
	Not at all important	8
	No response	11
Eating Halal	Very important	45
	Somewhat important	10
	Neutral	13
	Not too important	7
	Not at all important	14
	No response	12
Headscarf	Very important	31
	Somewhat important	14
	Neutral	21
	Not too important	8
	Not at all important	13
	No response	13
Growing a Beard	Very important	19
	Somewhat important	13
	Neutral	24
	Not too important	11
	Not at all important	19
	No response	14

A majority of respondents reported that they prayed five times a day (figure 7), considered themselves religious, and identified themselves with the Hanafi school of thought (table 7). This final characteristic refers to a type of Islamic jurisprudence. More than half of the respondents identified as Muslims first (54%), felt that the Muslim experience has affected their life greatly, and felt that they have a fair or great amount in common with other Muslims (84%).

Table 7: Sectarian and Religious School Affiliation

		%
Religious Identity	Sunni	75
	Shi'a	4
	Sufi	2
	Ismaeli	<1
	Just Muslim	14
	Other tradition	<1
	Don't know/Rather not say	1
	No response	3
Religious School	Hanafi	37
	Shafi'i	9
	Salafi	9
	Maliki	3
	Jaafari	2
	Hanbali	<1
	Blend	8
	No particular school	18
	Don't know	12
	No response	9

Some felt that not only was it important to identify oneself as a Muslim, but to share this identity with others and be known as a Muslim (table 6). One participant shared his passion for being identified as a Muslim by stating that, *"I feel like that it is important for me to establish my identity as a Muslim. It is constantly in my mind. Wherever I go, whatever I do. I need to let people know that I am a Muslim. And I don't want to blend into the brown crowd."*

After 9/11, Muslims were put in the national spotlight and many utilized the opportunity to educate and inform the public about their community and religion. According to the researchers' interviews and focus groups, the perception of increasing Islamophobia has only added to the urgency. Some Muslims did not initially identify as Muslim before 9/11. But as Muslims and Islam were subjected to more and more negative portrayals, they became more willing to practice and identify with Islam and other Muslims. The survey data validated this response. Nearly three out of four respondents felt that what happens to other Muslims has a "fair amount" or a "great deal" of effect on their lives.

This is a significant finding, for it counters the prevailing narrative that 9/11 caused Muslims to “hide” or not want to be seen as Muslim. Many of the focus group participants indicated that they became more interested in expressing their Muslim identity after 9/11. It is important to highlight this while also recognizing the impact of Islamophobia, since this shows that the community is not hiding as a group and has responded in both large and small ways to the attacks directed against them.

One participant described this as follows, *“I feel that I’m more into the religion, that’s what I care about. It’s not the environment or the place, the actual place. It doesn’t matter whether I’m here or in Lebanon or in China. That doesn’t matter to me....It’s creating that Muslim environment and creating and growing as a Muslim. That’s what I care about because in the end, to me, that’s all that matters.”*

As another participant pointed out, *“After 9/11 I became more Muslim I would say. Certain times it was in my interest to represent myself as a Muslim. I started growing my beard about two, two and a half years ago because I wanted to be more visibly Muslim.”*

An older participant responded with a long list of events that had happened to her as an African American woman in the United States, *“So I’m skipping over the gender issues. I’m skipping over the racism issue because I’ve lived through all those issues also, but I think presently the identity of a Muslim works for me.”*

The progression toward an Islamic identity was a pretty constant theme among those who responded that Islam was their chief identity. For converts, this identity rollercoaster can be quite dramatic. One participant stated, *“When I first became Muslim I was a niqabi . . . Why am I wearing niqab, is it the right thing? So I think I kind of stumbled, got caught up in eating halal and wearing niqab, wearing hijab, it just became very complex for me, but I do identify very strongly with being Muslim because I credit it for saving my life.”* She converted after a traumatic event; however, as evidenced by her statement, she experimented with what it means to be a Muslim. For some, these fluctuations are possibly due to the people and influences they encounter at mosques or social gatherings.

The survey indicates that just over 11 percent of the respondents were converts. Interestingly, when inquiring about when they converted, the survey found that the 1990s and post-9/11 were the highest periods for conversions among those who responded. Also, reasons for conversion tended to point to self-motivation (i.e., reading) more than through friendship and contacts with Muslims.


For many, if not most, the sectarian distinction between Shi’as and Sunnis is of little importance as regards self-identification. This data suggests it is safe to say that most Muslims, at least in the Bay Area, consider the mainstream media’s attention to this distinction to be overblown; however,

some religious leaders tacitly acknowledge that sectarian tensions in the Middle East are potentially divisive. In the Dearborn (MI) community, for instance, home to the country's largest Arab Shi'a population, sectarian identity is reflected by mosque affiliation or by volunteering with specific community-based organizations. In comparison, Iranian Shi'as in Los Angeles have no mosque infrastructure to speak of, and for many in the community simply being "Muslim" carries more significance than being "Shi'a." It can be said, then, that the specificity of ethnicity or country of origin overrides sectarian identity when it comes to everyday relations among Bay Area Muslims.

The mosque is valued as a place of worship and communal gathering. Attendance by adults is stable, but is less so for young adults. The interviews and focus groups show that some mosques provide space for civic education, news, and information about civic and political issues in the broader community; engage in voter registration and educational activities; and serve as a key entry point for interfaith dialogue. According to the focus group participants, most mosques accommodate women and provide space for worship, education, and children's activities – all of which make them appealing to families. But several focus group participants also remarked that mosques continue to provide inadequate space for women. This was especially the case for those who participated in the disenfranchised Muslims' focus group. In fact, they cited this as a major reason why they feel disconnected from the community.

Most of the respondents (68%) reported attending a mosque at least once a week (figure 7). This was significantly higher than Christians, of whom, according to a Gallup poll, only 35 percent attended a place of worship at least once a week in 2010. Muslim attendance at their places of worship is also higher than most church-going ethnic groups (e.g., Hispanics and African Americans) participating in the same poll.⁴⁸ According to the same survey, 55 percent of African Americans attended church at least once a week, while 49 percent of Hispanics and 31 percent of Asians did so.


Figure 7: Mosque Attendance (N=1,108)



Today, mosques compete with media and popular youth culture. As a result, one might say that many mosques do not “speak the language” of their younger members. Critics more generally want better services for children, better-organized educational and recreational programs, and youth ministries that are just as developed as their Christian counterparts.⁴⁹ Mosques with private full-time schools are especially important as spaces for integrating children from different ethnic communities, something that did not occur when new immigrants encountered African American Muslims.


On the whole, the majority of focus group participants felt that religion is important in their daily lives. For some, religiosity means the strict observance of prayers, mosque attendance, and participating in other major forms of Islamic worship. All of these are considered to be outward expressions of what it means to be a “real” Muslim. Some even argue that religious practice (including wearing Islamic clothing) is more important in the United States than ever before, for it demonstrates that Muslims are just as much a part of the American public square as any other faith community. Most of the respondents felt that it was at least somewhat important to adjust one’s cultural practices to blend into the larger society (figure 8).

Figure 8: Is it Important for Muslims to Change to Blend into Larger Society? (N=1,108)



Degrees of religiosity can vary according to generation and patterns of immigration (figure 9). For instance, Iranians who came soon after the revolution tend to be more secular. At the same time, many Iranians agree that Muslims in the United States today are generally more observant than many people in Muslim-majority countries.

Figure 9: Level of Religiosity (N=1,108)



Freedom of religion is also seen as large factor that influences Muslim religiosity, especially in the current climate of Islamophobia. For some, according to data derived from interviews, religiosity is personal and detached from any particular orthodox tradition. For example, prayer might be limited to attending the Friday or holiday services, or simply doing one's best to live in accordance to the spirit of Islamic values. Observant Muslims, on the other hand, see their secular coreligionists as giving in to a kind of "Burger King religion," where religiosity is whatever you say it is. Attitudes like this caused some young adults in the focus groups, who were born and raised in America, to become conflicted and ambivalent about their religious identity and practice. On the one hand, strict religious observance makes it hard for them to fit into mainstream society and culture; they worry that other Americans will treat them as "unapproachable." At the same time, they feel alienated from their own faith communities by those who are quick to criticize them for not being religious enough or for bending their religious practices to accommodate a "modern" American lifestyle.

Hijab (Headscarf)

While data presented thus far suggests that the post-9/11 backlash has motivated some to be more open about their religious beliefs and behaviors, this study's findings suggest that peoples' attitudes toward the hijab are more varied. Just under one-third (31%) of respondents (regardless of gender) indicated that it was "very important" to wear the headscarf; 14 percent stated that it was "important," and 21 percent were either neutral or considered it of little or no importance (figure 10).


For many Muslim women, the hijab represents a central part of their religious identity. While it is worn for religious reasons (i.e., to preserve one's modesty), it can also be worn as a symbol of Islamic identity. In post-9/11 America, it has become a test of religious conviction for some and a political statement for others. MSAs across the Bay Area and nation-wide organized "hijab wearing day" events, during which women from diverse backgrounds wore headscarves to express their solidarity with Muslim women. On one such day at Berkeley, over 500 women participated and the MSA provided the hijabs and explained how to wear them. Similar programs were carried out across Bay Area campuses.

Other women reacted differently. Some stopped wearing it after 9/11 out of fear that they might be attacked. After 9/11, veiled women were often targets.⁵⁰ Many also removed it to hide their religious identity. Surprisingly, some began wearing it as a means of personal empowerment. Some Muslim women have also been challenging stereotypes about the hijab and have gained some reassurance with it.⁵¹

Many female focus group participants expressed varying experiences while wearing the hijab. For some, it had little bearing on their identity as a Muslim woman. For instance, one participant stated, *"You can't tell that from my body, but I'm as Muslim as you are, even if I consciously*

choose not to wear hijab.” This type of comment characterized many of the responses to this issue. Some Muslim women do not feel that it is important to their Muslim identity. The focus group participants’ main concern was identity and the hijab, even though some did not feel it was an important part of their identity.

Figure 10: Is it Important to Wear the Hijab (Headscarf)? (N=1,108)



One woman remarked, “I think it’s interesting what the previous two people (not wearing hijab) said because no one looks at them and says are you or are you not, but with me when you wear a hijab it’s very obvious that that’s what you are. It’s actually interesting how many times I actually do get asked what religion are you? It’s funny because you would think that wouldn’t happen, but it still does.” Her comments were directed toward other focus group women who did not wear it and some of the comments they had made when asked about their religious identity.

While the hijab is loaded with meaning, some men have to contend with identifying as a Muslim by growing a beard or wearing a *kufi* (a skull cap) or a *thobe* (a long gown). Although such clothing is not religiously mandated, many men choose to wear it in order to identify themselves as Muslim. Many converts wear such attire to identify with their new religion. One participant said, “When I first became Muslim you know you get some brothers who are like Oh brother you should put on a thobe, you should grow out your beard... But then after studying, you know what I’m saying it’s almost been four years, so after really studying, I’m like okay, as being a Muslim I don’t need to identify myself by the way I dress.” Much like the woman mentioned earlier who wore the *niqab*, he initially experimented with different forms of specifically Muslim clothing but later on concluded that this was not a critical aspect of Islam.

Racial and Ethnic Identity

Besides religion, most focus group participants identified with their race or ethnicity. At times these were intertwined with their religion; however, usually one or the other took precedence. This section considers those who gave race and ethnicity precedence over religion or other identifiers.

African American Muslims, who make up around 9 percent of the Bay Area's Muslim population in the survey, are located in large numbers in the cities of Oakland, Alameda, Richmond, San Francisco, and Pittsburg, each of which hosts one or more centers organized and led by African American imams. The largest concentration is in Oakland, which has four such institutions.

The area's Afghan community, which constitutes 17 percent of the overall Muslim community in the survey, is one of the largest outside of Afghanistan. Most originally came here to escape the violence in their homeland from 1979 to 1996, when various communist and religious factions fought each other. Its members live in Hayward, Fremont, Union City, Newark, Concord, and Walnut Creek, but are increasingly moving into the far corner of the East Bay: Antioch, Brentwood, and Livermore as well as all the way south into San Jose. In the three-block strip of Fremont Blvd., one can readily see the impact of their immigration and settlement via restaurants and stores featuring signs written in both English and Dari. This development is similar to other immigrants groups who put their imprint on various American cities, such as China Town, Japan Town, and Little Saigon.

According to the survey, the South Asian community, mostly Indians and Pakistanis, (commonly referred to as "Indo-Pakistanis") constitute the largest segment of the Bay Area's Muslim population: 30 percent. Collectively this community has established almost half of the region's mosques. The community's hub is located in the South Bay cities of San Jose, Santa Clara, Fremont, Palo Alto, and Redwood City. Over the past fifteen years, increasing numbers have moved into San Ramon and Pleasanton. In contrast to the Yemeni community, many Indo-Pakistanis arrived in the wake of the 1965 federal immigration reforms to pursue higher education at such universities as Berkeley and Stanford in medicine, engineering, and similar fields.

In addition, class and education differences are reflected in the community members' lifestyles and religious practice. The community's more professional and affluent segment is dispersed across the Bay Area. There is also a small but vibrant community of about 500 individuals (100 families) at Mill Valley in Marin County. This particular community is unique in that most of its adherents emigrated from Rander village, near the Gujarati city of Surat and settled in South Marin to establish the Islamic Center of Mill Valley. Nearly half of those who attend the mosque hail from the same Gujarati village. This very insular community follows a strict Deobandi⁵² school of Islam that prioritizes one's faith and internal spiritual purification, rather than engaging with the world. In Novato, the Islamic Center of North Marin (ICNM) includes Muslim immigrants from various Indian and Pakistani cities, as well as a small number of Arabs.

Arabs constitute 23 percent of the area's Muslim community in the survey. When it comes to Islamic centers, most Arabs can be found in the various inner city mosques of San Francisco and Oakland. A sizable number can also be found in the South Bay and particularly at the Muslim Community Association in Santa Clara, where some of the initial founders were also Arabs. In addition, Arab worshippers are present in every mosque across the area and often assume leadership responsibilities despite their limited numbers. A large segment of Iraqis and North African Arabs have moved to the Bay Area during the last ten years and are heavily concentrated in the San Francisco's Tenderloin district and in the San Jose area.

Yemeni immigrants, who constitute just over 2 percent of the area's Muslims in the survey, tend to reside and work in close proximity to one another as well as maintain generational involvement in the same occupations. When it comes to immigration and settlement in the Bay Area, this particular community might be one of the oldest, for its members made their way first to the Central Valley as farm workers and then began migrating to the inner city.

Over time, these workers moved into Northern California's inner cities and the Bay Area, where they settled mainly in Oakland and San Francisco; a limited number later went on to Richmond and Pittsburg. The Yemeni communities in both San Francisco and Oakland, who are concentrated in possibly the toughest neighborhoods, for the most part are engaged in grocery and liquor store businesses, a point that often causes tension with the local African American communities.⁵³

Based on the observations of this report's authors, both of whom have lived and interacted with Bay Area communities for decades, and interviews for this study, local African American communities view the prevalence of liquor stores in their neighborhoods as feeding into and benefiting from their misery. Also, these liquor stores tend to become centers for drugs, prostitution, and other criminal activities. African American Muslim leaders see the selling of liquor by Arab Muslims as a double betrayal, as violating Islamic teachings of Islam and as their concern for fellow Muslims who happen to be African American. This is a main – and frequently brought up – point made by African American Muslim community leaders. At one point it culminated in a march led by Imam Zaid Shakir and others in West Oakland's streets.

Not all of the area's Yemeni immigrants arrived via the Central Valley; in fact, additional interviews point to large groups coming to the Bay Area beginning in the early 1990s and continuing to the present, but less so after 9/11 and the increasingly stringent visa requirements applied to Yemenis and the inhabitants of other Muslim-majority countries.

Their heavy concentration in the inner city resulted in the emergence of Islamic centers in the heart of San Francisco and Oakland to meet their needs. To date, there are three in Oakland, three in San Francisco, one in the northern city of Richmond, and one more (a recent addition) in the East Bay city of Pittsburg. In addition to the prayer services, each center provides some level of educational program. One of them, San Francisco's Masjid al-Tawheed, runs a full-time school. Almost one-third of the San Francisco Janitors Union's membership is Yemeni. (In recognition of

the assertiveness and importance of this large block of workers, the San Francisco union hall on Golden Gate Ave was named for Naji Diafallah,⁵⁵ a Yemeni Muslim farm worker who was killed in 1973 fighting on behalf of labor rights.)

Other segments of the Arab community include Palestinians, Syrians, Iraqi, and Egyptians, as well as a more recent large influx of Moroccans, Tunisians, and Algerians. The Palestinians have the longest continuous presence, dating from the early 1950s, and receive continual infusions due to their immigration that began in 1948 and has never stopped.

One smaller but important group is the Iranians (2% of the area's community, according to this survey data) who arrived after the 1979 revolution. Prior to this event the area attracted a number of Iranian students, some of whom were active in the Berkeley community and organized many anti-shah protests. Due to the type of immigrants arriving after 1979, highly secular and relatively well-off, they understandably did not emphasize their Islamic identity and displayed a rather anti-Islamic attitude. However, more recent arrivals tend to maintain a Shi'a Islamic identity and are more at ease with expressing this publicly.

This community has established three large centers: one in downtown Oakland and two in San Jose. It is distinguished by its very wide distribution across the Bay Area. We found a high level of business ownership, real estate holdings, and professional employment in all fields, among them engineering, medicine, the computer industry, and banking. There are additional Shi'a-run mosques and centers in the Bay Area: one frequented mainly by newly arriving Iraqi Shi'as in Mountain View, one in Dublin that serves Arabic-speaking Shi'as, one organized by a group of African American Shi'a converts located in Hayward, and yet another small office space in Berkeley set up to serve students. In addition, at least two fully functioning centers serve the Isma'ili Shi'a community, and one serves Bohra Isma'ili members.

Finally, there are smaller groups across the area representing various ethnicities and nationalities. Oakland hosts small Somali, Eritrean, Ethiopian, Ghanaian, and Nigerian groups who work in the area. They attend the local mosque and hold weekly meetings and study circles. Across the Bay in San Francisco live small groups from Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, China, Bosnia, and Albania, who likewise attend mosques on a regular basis. In the South and East Bay, one can find small Turkish, Bangladeshi, and Fijian mosques.

No single mosque can be identified for White or Latino converts; however, Berkeley's Zaytuna College (the former Zaytuna Institute) is a major attraction for this particular convert community. More importantly the Ta'leef Collective, which began as Zaytuna Institute's outreach program in 2002, was reestablished in 2005 as an independent organization. Now led by a young charismatic leader named Usama Canon, it is a welcoming space that tries to acclimatize converts of all stripes by helping them to realize a "sustainable conversion" to and practice of Islam, as well as a healthy, gradual integration into the greater Muslim community. The collective also strives to

reengage the growing number of disenfranchised and often marginalized Muslim young adults. In addition to the above, Marin County, Berkeley, and the South Bay contain several Sufi centers that attract significant numbers of White converts.

Muslims from conflict-torn areas also focused on ethnicity as an identifier. Afghans focused much of their attention on Afghan politics and their relationship with their “homeland,” while Palestinian participants took pride in their identity as Palestinians. One focus group participant declared, *“For me, when somebody asks me, “where are you from, what are you?” I always say Palestinian because coming from a contentious area and coming from a place where you have this pride, you almost feel like you have to say it to educate them. But in the past 10 years now, then I say well I’m Muslim too, so that they know...But I think for me the cultural thing is more in response to how society views Palestinians. It’s almost like I have to put it out there.”* Other Palestinian participants saw their Muslim identities as an opportunity to help break the stigma surrounding their people.

For others, race or ethnic identity was far more complex and at times difficult to express. Some Iranian participants struggled with their identities. One participant responded, *“One thing that has been consistent throughout my life that has not been full of questions, has been the aspect of faith in our family. So that’s been the one consistent factor and then the rest has been kind of like swaying of what we identify ourselves with. And I would identify myself Persian rather than Iranian if someone asks me. And I used to identify myself as a Muslim or an Iranian Muslim.”* Afghans, Pakistanis, Iranians, and Palestinians seemed to have the strongest identification with their ethnicity. Those who identified less with race or ethnicity remarked that such identities inhibit Muslim unity. This finding might also suggest that greater religious identification can mitigate racial/ethnic intra-community tensions.

This participant preferred the ethnic identifier “Persian” as opposed to “Iranian.” Another participant explained this by saying that the questions usually asked after self-identifying as Iranian are difficult for them to answer because this often becomes a political issue. They are mostly uncomfortable with the follow-up questions regarding Iran’s president, nuclear program, relations with other countries, and so on. Since the Iranian community in the United States happens to be largely opposed to the current regime in Iran, this could also be a political statement as well. Those who preferred to identify as “Persian” suggested that this term did not carry such a negative connotation, given the history of American-Iranian relations over the past forty years.

The focus group’s Afghan participants included ethnic Pushtuns, Tajiks, and Hazaras. The Pashtuns are a large tribal group that predominantly resides in an area straddling the Afghan and Pakistani border. During the Afghan civil war before 9/11 and the American invasion, race and religion were large factors in the conflict with the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance was composed mostly of Tajiks and Uzbeks, whereas the Taliban were mainly Pashtuns. The relation between “Afghan” and “Muslim” is nearly an expectation, as one participant added, but parents and other family members often place special emphasis on their Pashtun identity. As one participant pointed out, *“I wouldn’t say that I’m Muslim American. They would expect me to say Pashtun Afghan in addition to that.”*

Pashtuns are also a minority group in Pakistan, where they are often referred to as Pathans. Minority groups in most countries consider their ethnic composition to be particularly important. For example, the Kurds in Turkey and the Berbers of North Africa are distinct ethnic groups who share the same faith as the predominant group (Turks and Arabs, respectively) but are conscious of and concerned with maintaining their unique identity. Participants who identified as Pashtun stressed their identity as Pashtuns over their religious or national identity. The participant continued, *“I guess Pashtuns are nationalistic, but not as much as Pakistani Pashtuns are. They are [a] little overboard.”*

Profession as Identity

One’s job and career are essential components of identity. As immigrant Muslims continue to integrate into the broader mosaic of American society, they are likely to identify with their job or career. Several focus group participants cited their jobs as an important aspect of their identity. Participants spoke about being social workers, lawyers, business owners, and members of a variety of other professions.

Among those who cited their career as their identity were those who were more likely to be disconnected from the community. In the absence of a strong Islamic or racial identifier, it would be natural for the stronger American currents of secular identity to take precedence. On the other hand, one hijab-wearing participant also noted that she identifies very strongly with her profession. Other participants were not as focused on their job identity, but cited it as an important factor of their overall identity.

One participant who was quite articulate on this matter stated that her identity is contextual, dependent on the environment, for *“I live in this very work centric place I guess I often identify myself by what I do.... You know it would start with the identification of how I came to be at that particular place. How do you know the host? Well, I work with him or her. I am friends with his or her spouse. Because we work together. A lot of my connections are through my work and through my school... I identify by that sort of narrow scope and that's probably because that's what I spent most of my time doing.”*

MUSLIM CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

Civic engagement is defined as “working to make a difference in the civic life of our community and developing the combination of knowledge, skills, values and motivation to make that difference. It means promoting the quality of life in a community, through both political and non-political processes”.⁵⁶ The study relied on this definition to assess civic engagement levels among the Bay Area’s Muslims.

Most of the participants felt that they were civically engaged. Participants highlighted their volunteerism in the community, including some whose full-time jobs were oriented toward civic and community work. Others gave charity and/or raised funds for community activities, whether a blood drive or walking for breast cancer. Some were involved in more indirect ways: helping extended family by babysitting or driving the children to soccer practice, providing meals for a sick relative, or sending money to those still living in their lands of birth. Many participants, regardless of their type of civic engagement, can be seen as “promoting the quality of life” in their communities (Muslim and non-Muslim) and felt themselves to be part of the “larger social fabric” while personalizing community-wide problems.

Participants highlighted their volunteerism in the community, including some whose full-time jobs were oriented toward civic and community work.


Table 8: Volunteer Activities (N=1,108)

		%
Volunteering in the Last Year	Yes	62
	No	29
	No response	9
Type Volunteer in the Last Year	Parent-Teacher Association (PTA)	10
	City Council meetings	3
	Student Council meetings	3
	Boy Scouts or Girl Scouts meeting	3
	School board meetings	2
	Honor Society meeting	2
	Chamber of Commerce	1
	Fraternity or Sorority meeting	1
	English Learner Advisory Committee	1
	School Site Council	1
	Other	14
	Combination	1
	No response	58
Organization Volunteer in the Last Year	Religious organizations	17
	Community service organizations	8
	Youth organizations	5
	Social organizations	5
	Political organizations	1
	Combination	31
	No response	34
Number of Times Volunteered	Only once	16
	2-3 times	20
	4-5 times	15
	6-7 times	4
	8-10 times	3
	10 times+	5
	No response	37
Walk for Charity	Yes, within the last 12 months	14
	Yes, but not within the last 12 months	16
	No, never	48
	No response	22
Raise Money for Charitable Cause	Yes, within the last 12 months	31
	Yes, but not within the last 12 months	23
	No, never	26
	No response	20

Respondents to the survey, as summarized in the table above, indicated that a significant plurality of Muslims report volunteering at least two to five times a month (35%); another 15 percent report volunteering at least once a month. A combined 12 percent reported volunteering six or more times per month. The rest chose “no answer,” which suggests that they either did not want to answer the question or did not volunteer.

When asked if they had volunteered recently, 62 percent of respondents said that they had done so in the past year. African American Muslims were the most likely to have volunteered, with 80 percent saying they had done so during the last twelve months. This survey recorded the following percentages for the other communities: Hispanics (77%), Whites (73%), Iranians (71%), South Asians (68%), Arabs (58%), Asian/Pacific Islanders (58%), and Afghans (48%). While social bias may exist (reporting higher rates of volunteerism because it is more acceptable to do so) these rates are still significantly high. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 27 percent of the general US population volunteered in 2011, less than half of the rates reported by Bay Area Muslims. When compared to other ethnic groups, it is apparent that other ethnic groups volunteer less than the general population and far less than the Bay Area Muslim population. During 2011, 14.9 percent of the Hispanic population, 20.3 percent of the African American population, and 20 percent of the Asian population volunteered.⁵⁷

Figure 11: Volunteer Levels Among Various Ethnicities



The study's focus groups revealed some interesting information as regards the participants' conceptions and level of civic engagement. They were most engaged in civic affairs at the local level: volunteering, charity works, community projects, and interfaith activities. Some participants equated civic engagement with political participation and involvement with certain national issues (e.g., gay rights or foreign policy).

The African American Muslims are one of the area's most civically engaged communities, and many of their leaders and members are involved in projects designed to improve the area's quality of life. In Oakland and San Francisco, they are involved in initiatives to improve education and raise awareness of air and environmental pollution, crime, gangs, and bullying prevention programs – all of which are multi-faith and diverse. In Oakland, community members developed a youth outreach program with after-school activities in an attempt to prevent violence. This effort is connected to college-preparation programs that organize visits to local universities and promote participation in summer campus programs. The city's African American-led mosques played an important role and provided space, staff, and support to these community-based efforts. For example, they participated in rallies and marches against violence and met with city leaders to bring about change.

A similar approach is documented among San Francisco's African American Muslims, who have sought to deal with the core issues impacting their community and joining with non-Muslims to forge coalitions designed to bring about effective change. Their leaders have organized prison educational outreach programs and prisoner support projects, and participate in anti-death penalty efforts. Furthermore, this particular community has always been well-represented in voter registration programs, political campaigns, running for office, and seeking appointments across all levels of government. This is due to its members' long history of civil rights work and their general acceptance as part of the "American fabric."

Many participants voiced their concern that cultural barriers often made it harder for some Muslims to become civically engaged. As one participant pointed out, *"I wish my community would be more civically engaged, we live in a society where if you don't speak up no one hears your voice...So coming back over here, the community the reason why it's so insular is because the mindset of the immigrant when he comes to this country, especially my family, Yemenis, was that they're here to work, make money, go back."* Another made a similar point: *"But in terms of civic engagement. I think I get frustrated because I come from a South Asian community that economically and financial stable they don't see a need to go outside that little bubble. Because our parents have this mentality that we came for economic opportunity that's why we are here so we will stay within our South Asian community...So it's hard to get to motivate people from that community and that come from that mentality to also be engage with that society. I think also after September 11th ...that's when I think community was more active and there's definitely a push for to kind of build the youth to kind of build a community within themselves and have a community and talk amongst themselves whereas no one talked about being Muslim until after that time."*


Another reason for detachment from civic or political engagement is indifference to issues seen as outside the immediate self-interests of one's isolated community. This phenomenon was evident among such ethnic groups as the Yemeni Muslims in San Francisco and the Afghan Muslims in the East Bay, both of whom exhibited far lower levels of engagement with the broader Muslim community and American society more generally. For example, during pro-immigration-rights rallies held nationwide, few of them joined in solidarity with Latinos, even though they also face

immigration problems. It might be the case that the Afghans and some Yemenis saw this as unrelated to their key concerns, perhaps among them the United States government’s global campaign to “counter violent extremism” and Islamophobia. Muslims in other parts of the country or in the Bay Area, however, reacted differently. San Francisco’s Palestinians, who have a history of political activism, participated in large numbers, had a contingent in the march, and were very well represented on the program committee thanks to their organizing experience.

Despite some of the difficulties facing Muslim organizations, evidence suggests that they are increasingly becoming savvier in their advocacy efforts. For instance, various immigrant groups have started to adopt a hallmark of the area’s African American Muslim community—building coalitions with non-Muslim organizations. Not only has cross-cultural activity and interfaith dialogue helped counteract Islamophobia and foster religious tolerance, but it has also led Muslim groups to build bridges and join alliances with non-Muslims. These joint efforts are often focused on social justice issues and humanitarian relief.

As effective as coalitions may be, however, many admit that greater involvement is held back by the lack of well-organized, broad-based Muslim organizations. At times, Muslims in the United States seem to be unable to overcome internal divisions rooted in their specific cultural, ethnic, and class identities. Despite these obstacles, many would agree that continued interfaith work at the local level is one of the best ways to mobilize communities and develop trust and solidarity with non-Muslim organizations.

Figure 11a: Mosque Attendance and Volunteering



Much of the discussion in the national media has suggested that increasing levels of religiosity lead to isolation and disengagement. This study's survey, however, suggests that the relationship between mosque attendance and volunteerism is more complicated. Those of the respondents who attend the mosque once a week or more were the most likely to have volunteered in the past year (72%). In contrast, those who rarely or never attend the mosque were the least likely to volunteer (25%). Other scholars have found similar results.⁵⁸

There were a number of questions related to civic engagement and organizational involvement that the responders did not answer. As noted above, there are several possible reasons for this, ranging from concerns over discrimination and surveillance to discomfort with the questionnaire's length. Another possible explanation, specific to this section, might be that many Muslims are volunteering in ways outside of the traditional and formal organizational structures to which we are accustomed. Thus this study's questions might not be totally suitable. If this is the case, further research is required to assess more clearly where they volunteer.

Certain national issues have attracted and mobilized many people, such as the Occupy Wall Street movement, gay rights (marriage equality), education, and taxation. Foreign policy issues also arose in this discussion, in particular the plight of the Palestinian people. One participant was part of the Palestinian Youth Movement. Based on the responses, the level of activism in promoting these issues was weak.

One of the major findings from the focus groups was that despite the desire to be active within the community, their level of consistency with a particular type of engagement is low. A number of participants described getting involved and then stopping before moving onto another activity. This may be a result of frustration with the task or a consequence of working with Muslim organizations that do not have full-time staff and thus rely heavily on volunteers who can only devote a limited amount of time.

Some participants were concerned about the specific needs of new immigrants, the homeless, women and children, and other vulnerable populations. One participant focused on another group: students with speech and language problems. She stated, "*I do a lot of leadership advocacy and leadership work in terms of like policy, like being part of the panels, the National Student Speech Language Hearing Association, that makes all of the policies for the students and like the policy making and strategic planning for everything that happens nationally with our field and with everything that happens for the students and resources available to students. So I do a lot of things in the leadership.*" The desire to actively engage in policy formulation was rare among the focus group participants. They were more likely to be involved in needs based activities and providing services rather than policy related activism.

Lastly, many participants voiced concern over the erosion of Muslim citizens' constitutionally protected rights. As cited above, surveillance, public protest, and Islamophobia have brought many constitutional issues to the fore. In essence, Muslims need to be aware of these issues and protect their community. One focus group participant remarked, *"I write a lot of letters to politicians. I've become much more nationally aware of like the NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act) and the erosion of first amendment rights that has happened in the United States which is aimed at the Muslim community."* Many national Muslim organizations focus on these issues (e.g., the Muslim Legal Defense Fund), and the number of cases resulting from what was thought to be constitutionally protected rights has alarmed and mobilized many Muslims.

Types of Civic Engagement

Volunteering

The focus group participants volunteered in areas ranging from fundraising for charities to donating their time in soup kitchens and homeless shelters to social services, abused women and children, and health clinics. Most saw volunteering in civic activities as an alternative to political activism and felt that it was far more positive work. One participant remarked, *"I do a lot of service work and educational work through Sufi Women's Organization and International Association of Sufism. We work in the jail and we do other humanitarian projects. And as a profession I work with mentally ill and incarcerated and homeless people and what I've found is that I can either do that work and try to bring balance to society on an individual level working with people, one on one or in groups or I can be involved with politics."* The interesting point here is that she felt an urge to be involved in some way and actively chose to volunteer in humanitarian projects to "bring balance to society."

Table 9: Frequency of Volunteer Activities, by Type of Organization (N=1,108)

	Yes, I volunteer once a month or more %	Yes, I volunteered within the last 12 months %	No, not within the last 12 months %	No response %
Religious organization	10	38	28	24
Environmental organization	6	10	49	35
Civic or community organization involved in health or social services	10	21	37	33
Youth, children or education organization	11	27	30	31
Any other volunteer group	28	10	1	61

Some participants noted how volunteering made them feel good. They felt like they were giving back to a community of which they were a part. It should also be noted that they did not consider Muslim and non-Muslim communities to be separate entities. When they referred to “the community,” they referred to the larger community of both groups. One participant said, *“I was a part of a AmeriCorps position at the ACC, the Arab Cultural Community Center, and I went out to high schools, three days a week, three different high schools in San Francisco and I was also helping immigrants with social services, like MediCal, low income housing and...it does feel good to give back to the community, to help out.”*

Many focus group participant volunteers concentrated on serving those in need, whether it was a community garden, donating items to the homeless or low income communities, participating in a food bank, or becoming involved with blood drives. Some of these functions occurred through the mosque, while others involved organizations in which the individual was already involved but were not necessarily Muslim.

Interestingly, one participant fosters kittens, visits the elderly in the hospital, and takes part in volunteer drives for various causes because this person felt such involvement is a way to show others that Muslims are a part of the community. This indicates that beyond any altruistic motive, there is also a motive to inform others about Islam and Muslims in the United States. The respondent stated, *“And on purpose I did the phone calls at KQED because I just wanted to have a Muslim just come for that three seconds on camera, not to be recognized but just having that shot because I also feel like we just need to be out there as regular people.”*

Muslims are volunteering their time, but the survey indicates that many are not committing a significant amount of time to volunteering or active engagement with the community. Volunteering means taking time away from work and family obligations. As one participant lamented, *“Number one is time, you see people at that Friday khutba (sermon) and sometimes you have only fifteen minutes and you don’t see them again. When you need them for a project they disappear, whether it is da’wah (missionizing), whether it is to build a masjid or a school or a group, you will find only one or two who are dedicated out of 100 or 200 people.”* Another participant added, *“I live in Marin County too we’ve got a very large community from about the same village, about 500 in our community. And the problem in our community is there’s no volunteering they don’t want to spend money they don’t want to spend time. Everyone does their own thing...”*


It should be noted that the Mill Valley mosque represents only part of the Marin county’s diverse Muslim community. Others, including the South Asian Muslims in Northern Marin, the Shi’a Muslim immigrants from Iran, and the Sufi Muslims in Fairfax are far more likely to be engaged and volunteering in the community. In an interview with one of the Sufi leaders, she informed us that they believe very strongly in engaging with the community. In fact, she stressed that Muslims should be engaged with everyone regardless of their religious affiliation. During the interview, she noted that *“the services we provide, includes advocating for women’s rights, working in the prisons, art therapy, literacy projects, we are focused on interfaith work.”*

Philanthropic Interest

The vast majority of Muslims believe in giving charity, including the obligatory annual zakat. Over 71 percent of those surveyed felt that giving zakat was somewhat or very important. Generally, most Americans feel that giving charity is important, as the data on annual charitable giving among the general American public clearly shows. In 2011, such charitable donations totaled \$298.42 billion for the country. This total was down compared to previous years due to the Great Recession.⁵⁹ According to the Giving Institute (formerly the American Association of Fundraising Counsel), individuals gave \$217.79 billion of that total.⁶⁰ In household terms, the annual donation in 2011 was \$2,213 per household.⁶¹ Across ethnic lines, in 2005, Hispanic households were reported to have donated \$1,195 and African American households were reported to have donated \$1,363 in the same year.⁶² As for this study's Muslim respondents, a plurality (18%) of households donated "at least \$100" and "\$100-\$500" (16%), followed by those who donated "\$1,000-\$5,000" (15%). Those who donated between \$1,000-\$5,000 per year were in line with the average giving of Americans and the other ethnic groups more specifically. These results are reported in figure 12.

Many who attended the focus groups said that they also contributed to charities in line with the general American populace. Most of the participants contributed money to local causes. The focus group participants were not sure if the contentiousness surrounding charitable donations sent abroad had an impact on the amount donated. According to their analyses, however, there was very little effort to coordinate philanthropic giving. Thus all indications are that Muslims contribute to worthy causes but, like many, have not yet mastered the art of strategic philanthropy.

Figure 12: Annual Donations to Charity (N=1,108)



Several focus group participants gave charity but did not specify its destination. One participant stated that he donated to “things that we support,” without explaining what those things were. A few participants made their intentions perfectly clear. For instance, one participant explained, “I take kickboxing at this one place, and they had this thing that you could like buy the backpack and school supplies for inner city kids or something. So I did that. I think that’s like the smallest side of it. And there’s people that like spend their lives working for social justice and that’s like the other end of the spectrum I think.” In this case, the participant did not intentionally go out to contribute money, but saw a charity stand or a brochure and contributed spontaneously.

Many focus group attendees mentioned that their level of civic engagement was passive at best, such as contributing money or attending events. There were responses like “I’ll kind of passively like donate or like show up at an event” or “I’m mostly passively engaged. Like I want to help in certain causes so I kind of through financial support.”

When asked during the focus groups if they donated to Muslim organizations, nearly everyone raised their hands. Similarly, when asked how many give to non-Muslim nonprofit organizations, the majority once again raised their hands. When asked if they donated to political campaigns, very few raised their hands. Yet the vast majority gave money to international charities or organizations. Furthermore, survey findings indicate that about one-third of respondents (34%) support their extended families financially.⁶³

Table 10: Raising Money for a Charitable Cause (N=1,108)

	Yes, within last 12 months %	Yes, but not within last 12 months %	No, never %	No response %
Have you personally walked, run, or bicycled for a charitable cause?	14	16	48	22
Have you ever raised money for a charitable cause?	31	23	26	20

More than half (53%) of those surveyed answered that they had raised money for a charitable cause. Nearly one-third had done so during the past year. Some participants hinted at being afraid to mention this publicly, and some only made cash donations to avoid leaving any paper trail. These are very real fears, since accusations of terrorism support have often centered around charitable giving.

Community Projects

The focus group discussions revealed that few participants were involved in community projects that required a substantial amount of time and effort. These projects are separated from general volunteering and donations due to the amount of work and management required.

One participant, a convert, explained his involvement in crime prevention and community betterment projects. He had experienced prejudice as an Asian minority in Stockton. As the Muslims did not treat him in the same way, he gradually converted. He explained his experience in the following terms, *“because I was being bullied so much, I kind of didn’t have that many friends you know. But it was the Muslims who really kind of showed me that they didn’t have prejudice in them and I would participate with them in what they were doing because I was interested. And at the time, I did it to be cool. But just praying with them and fasting with them really gave me the, you could say, the spiritual experience to the point where I decided to convert one time when I was 15 because of how well I was being treated by Muslims.”* Prejudice isolates communities and discourages their members from becoming involved with the larger community. For this participant Islam probably prevented this introversion and he described how it encouraged his active involvement in community-wide projects. Out of all of the focus group participants, he went into great detail about his involvement with different projects, among them something called “Stockton 2020,” which focused on building and promoting libraries. He explained, *“For me, I’m more civically involved locally than nationally or state wide. What I’ve been involved in you know, in most civic activities called Stockton 2020. And the campaign was Library Changes Lives.”*

Several participants voiced strong support for being engaged. As one participant made clear, Muslims *“can no longer live in their cultural bubbles. And so I think that’s why I connect with people that are willing to spread it [the notion of civic engagement]. Many different ways. Whether it’s feeding people or going into the prisons. Or going to the streets.”* We found it particularly interesting to see a response from the isolated community in Marin, which rarely engages in civic activities. One of its members shared the following, *“I feel like one of the most important things to do is deconstruct the us versus them notion that is so laid out in every single context, seeing us as better or seeing us as different or seeing us as more superior in value ...especially growing up in Marin my entire life... a lot of the people in the community consider themselves as the “other” in relation to like a very homogenous white wealthy population of Marin County. So I think the first thing to do is create a dialogue and deconstruct this notion that we’re targeted, we’re victimized or even that we’re just different.”*

Others felt Muslims need to move outside their comfort zone and engage with non-Muslims. *“So I think we need to be, and not just necessarily work within the framework of organizations for Muslims. Some people, I think that’s the first start, because that’s what’s gonna get people out of their comfort zones...just be involved in your local neighborhood activities. You know lots of people just don’t know Muslims they don’t know Muslims because Muslims aren’t at school board meetings, not civically engaged... I think you just need to start building relationships outside our communities.”*

Jobs Related to Community Assistance

Many focus group participants had positions in some sort of organization that was focused on helping the community. These are highlighted below.

Some focused on helping their ethnic communities. For instance, one participant concentrated on helping the Arab community through her work-related services. She explained, *“I work part time as medical intern in a clinic in downtown San Francisco for the Arabic community. I try to help them outside also because there are a lot of patients that are Arabic there. I also work at an Asian women shelter. There are very few Arabs there. I advocate for many patients and many women to help them in different medical fields and push them to be advocates for Arab culture. Sometimes I go to the court to interpret, sometimes to the general hospital. That’s the way I try to engage with people.”*⁶⁴

Other participants provided more general non-ethnic focused services. One person answered, *“As far as civil engagement, there is an agency that a Muslim sister is a director of and it’s called Legal Services for Prisoners with Children. And I have a past work history before starting my own business as a social worker. So my passion is helping kids not go into the foster care system.”*

Some participants worked with city agencies committed to children and families and also advocated support for programs that encourage strong family and youth activities. One participant who was very active in promoting social, family, and cultural issues related, *“I sit on the board of the Arab Film Festival here in San Francisco area. I was former city commissioner, I was a funding board member for a city agency department of children and their families. I was also and still am part of Colmen Advocates which is a family and youth advocacy organization.”*

Beyond their jobs, these individuals were also volunteering their time to issues that are important to them, such as welfare and youth guidance in juvenile delinquent centers. Their non-job-related activism indicates that it is more than a job for them; they are engaged in bettering their community.

Some also felt that the Muslim community is not doing enough to support Muslims’ individual problems. They described that Muslims are also drug addicts, prostitutes, and participate in other illicit activities. Although these issues may be considered personal, some participants felt that the community has not adequately addressed them. One participant stated, *“I think like a big challenge at least especially for the immigrant Muslim community and I think the convert community as well is like an issue with like shame. I think people feel like ashamed for getting help with their problems. So I think a lot of things are swept under the rug and things are under reported and things like that. And I feel like it’s a huge challenge of how to fix that.”* Another participant similarly stated, *“When you are poor and you don’t have money and you are trying to survive and you can make more as a prostitute than at McDonalds and you have children to feed and you are the only Muslim in your family and you have a line of prostitutes or people who have sugar daddies ...It’s not because you don’t know your deen. It’s because there’s not a community*

that supports you. There's not a community that's saying oh sister we see your child has holey shoes. Let us make sure you buy your child some shoes. We see your child is growing out of her pants, but everybody walks by and shakes their head."

Interfaith

Several Muslim groups in the Bay Area have joined interfaith efforts in an attempt to bridge the divide between Muslims, Christians, and other faith groups. Some of the participants were also part of this effort and considered it a form of local civic engagement in which the primary purpose is to create community bonds among disparate religious groups.

One participant explained, *"I do work with the Interfaith Council of Contra Costa County, and a lot of the programs that they bring out, like we do a blood drive every year."* In this example, the organization not only dialogues with other religious communities, but also encourages collaboration among religious communities at a level that proves their tolerance and respect for each other, and that they want to work together to improve their community.

Another participant who is a Palestinian American business owner and registered Republican related, *"I do mix with the interfaith (community) especially the Jewish-Muslim dialogue in Marin. I traveled the other year to meet the head rabbi of Israel. I go inside and I show them there's nothing that we hide."*


Political Participation

Many within the focus groups implied that they trust the nation's political system but place more confidence in local political institutions and processes. At the same time, however, many feel powerless to have any real impact on major national policy debates. Several participants voiced concern about politicians in Washington and other prominent national leaders that continue to voice suspicion about American Muslims and their institutions. The most prominent of these were the hearings on the radicalization of American Muslims initiated by Rep. Peter King (R- NY) and Chair of the House Homeland Security Committee. These types of efforts by government officials caused some American Muslims to doubt whether they had any real political voice. On the other hand, there is strong agreement that American Muslims must continue to be actively involved and politically engaged. They increasingly vote, address local and national social problems, and some protest the government's domestic and foreign policies related to the United States government's global campaign to "counter violent extremism."

The focus groups suggested that although trust in the political system is evident, there is a good deal of mistrust in electoral politics and politicians. Most feel that the little respect shown to the community by local politicians and elected officials is due more to political expediency than to any genuine interest. The African American Muslims' distrust stems from generations of disenfranchisement. For them, the racialization of Muslim immigrants and the abuse of civil rights following 9/11 are nothing new.


Most agree that Islam is compatible with political participation (figure 13). For a few Muslims, finding the right balance between one’s allegiance to Islam and one’s participation in the broader American society is a challenge. Some religious Muslims have difficulty reconciling their support for a candidate who favors policies that they feel violate Islamic values (e.g., marriage equality). A small minority of American Muslims, particularly those who embrace the conservative Salafi school of thought, regard any political engagement as un-Islamic. For instance, in Marin County some Muslims who adhere to the similarly conservative Deobandi movement have adopted a very similar apolitical stance... As one participant pointed out, some “*Muslims who do not engage in voting despite being American because they feel the US to be a ‘kuffar’ country.*” Other participants from this community felt that Muslims should remain apolitical in order to “*focus on purifying the hearts of Muslims and making them better Muslims.*” Similarly, while interviewing a Muslim leader in Marin, we were told that, “*we tend not to be involved in civic engagement or political activities.*” It should be noted this group represents a small minority among Muslims in Marin County and certainly a minority among Muslims across the Bay Area. It is clear from both the surveys and the focus groups that Muslims are interested in politics and actively engaged in political participation.

Figure 13: Percent Who Agree Islam is Compatible with Political Participation (N=1,108)



Many view the news as an outlet for participation in the political system. Figure 14 shows that a majority of the respondents follow the news at least somewhat closely. The Internet is increasingly taking over other traditional mediums of information, such as television and newspapers, as the main source of news for a near-majority of Americans,⁶⁵ and American Muslims reflect this trend (figure 14).


Figure 14: Percent Who Follow the News (N=1,108)



It is also reported that Bay Area Muslims predominantly rely on local or American, as opposed to foreign news sources (figure 15). The data suggest that many respondents (42%) follow foreign news, such as the BBC and Al Jazeera as their primary news source.

Following the news can lead to political activism. A number of focus group participants reported becoming politically active and wanting to participate in politics after watching the news, reading the newspaper or following the elections. Some voted in local and national elections, while others led protests in local and national movements. Others went so far as to run for office, whereas others hosted candidate forums. All such forms of political participation are covered in this section (table 11).

Figure 15: Primary Source of Information (News) (1,108)



Some respondents are directly involved in political parties, and a solid plurality belongs to the Democratic Party (table 11). This is not unusual, given the fact that most minorities in the United States, historically speaking, have voted Democratic at least since the 1960s.⁶⁶ Prominent Republicans have also made public Islamophobic comments, including Tea Party members and individuals such as former representative Allen West (R-FL).

Additionally, Pew research in the Bay Area revealed that 58 percent of Muslims polled felt that the Republican Party was unfriendly toward Muslims. In general, the Muslim community in this survey sample did not place much confidence in the Republican Party.

Table 11: Political Participation (N=1,108)

		%
Register to Vote	Yes, I am registered	57
	No, I did not register	17
	I am not interested	4
	Not eligible	7
	I am planning to register	3
	No response	13
Voted in Presidential Election	Yes	47
	No	31
	Not a citizen	9
	Can not remember	1
	No response	13
Plan to vote for in 2012 Presidential Election	President Barack Obama	68
	Mitt Romney	2
	Other	13
	No response	17
Political Party	Democrat	46
	Independent	14
	Republican	3
	No preference	12
	Other	3
	Don't know/Rather not answer	9
	No response	13
Political Views	Very conservative	2
	Conservative	12
	Moderate	37
	Liberal	15
	Very liberal	5
	Don't know/Refused	14
	No response	15
Volunteer for Political Org. or Candidate	Yes, within the last 12 months	8
	Yes, but not within the last 12 months	9
	No, never	68
	No response	15
Convince People to Vote for Candidate	Yes, always	10
	Usually	17
	No	59
	No response	14
Wore a Button	Yes, always	4
	Usually	7
	No	75
	No response	14
US Maintain Troops Afghanistan	Yes	7
	No	63
	Don't know	16
	No response	14
Smaller or Larger Government	Smaller	17
	Larger	41
	Don't know	26
	No response	16

Whether respondents were politically active or not, most reported moderate political views, with more respondents identifying as liberal-leaning rather than conservative-leaning. Certain self-identified conservative politicians, activists, and organizations have isolated some religious minorities despite having similar values. As a result, American Muslims have been pushed toward politically liberal-leaning views. Many Muslims hold similar views on gay rights, abortion, and fiscal limits as conservative Republicans, yet vote Democratic and lean in the liberal direction⁶⁷ (table 11).

In addition, survey findings indicate that some support larger government (41%), whereas others favor smaller government (17%). This could be a result of their affiliation with the Democratic Party (i.e., following party lines).

Fifty-seven percent of the survey respondents were registered to vote, which is quite low compared to the general California population of 76.5 percent⁶⁸ (table 11).⁶⁹ This is partially a reflection of citizenship status. When we asked the same question in the focus groups, the vast majority of participants were registered to vote and interested in politics, indicating that their political participation levels were higher than those of the survey respondents or that the social pressure of being in a focus group of their peers may have impacted their responses. However, their involvement in more active forms of political engagement (e.g., voter education, candidate forums, and protests) was weaker. Some participants have been part of voter education projects to teach Muslims their civic duties and make them informed voters. One leader in the leaders' focus group stated, *"We have a similar grant that I wrote to the League of Women Voters to go to the masajid (mosques) and get them to do voter education, voter registration, and be part of the speakers bureau."* These are important efforts to potentially increase the numbers of Muslim voters.

Very few people who spoke about voting as a form of civic engagement actually voted. Some participants responded, *"Does my vote really matter when it comes to the president?"* or *"So why I don't vote. The reason is that I don't agree with the United States international foreign policy."* These reasons are mostly in line with those of the general population. Many Americans do not vote because they feel that their vote does not matter or they protest the vote because of the candidates or the lack of differentiation on things like foreign policy. Muslims appear to be no different, although for minorities their level of participation is lower than some other groups. One participant lamented, *"So we are very weak in voting. We have a hard time. It's very hard for people to get involved in politics. Especially when it comes to donating money or supporting candidates we are almost not there."*

Some participants affiliated with cultural and ethnic organizations arranged candidate forums. Most politicians do not have contact with the community, either intentionally or non-intentionally. These forums allow politicians to engage with Muslims and listen to their concerns. One participant involved with these forums noted, *"INCSA70 is actually taking a project of organizing candidates forums and we are still defining where. I mean what are you going to be and where. This year we got a grant from One Nation to do that. To do candidate forums."*

When asked who they planned to vote for in the 2012 election, most reported being likely to vote for Barack Obama (68%), followed by “other” (13%) and Mitt Romney (2%). Almost 47 percent of the respondents voted in the 2008 presidential election, which was lower than the general population’s rate (60%) (table 11). It was also a little lower than the Hispanic rate (49.9%) and about the same as the Asian rate (47%). African Americans had the highest turnout in both 2008 and 2012. In 2008, 65.2 percent of African American registered voters voted for Obama.⁷¹ Based on these statistics, Muslim rates are below the national average and those of other larger ethnic groups.

The most active level of political participation among participants, besides running for office, was in protests (table 12). One participant shared, “*There was a recent event we did in Jumah (Friday Congregational Prayer) in front of city hall, it was in regards to an ordinance we wanted to pass ... and it was the first time like my masjid ... prayed Jumah in front of City Hall.*” The protest was a local issue over zoning regulations, always used by local governments to hinder mosque construction and prevent Islamic gatherings.

There are very few elected Muslim politicians at the national level with the exception of Congressman Keith Ellison (D-MN) and André Carson (D-IN). Yet more recently, there has been an effort among Muslims to run for office and hold political positions in local government. In the last decade, the Bay Area has witnessed an increase in the number of Muslims running for local office in councils or commissions. Among them are Omar Ahmad, the late mayor of San Carlos (d. 2011), who is believed to have been the second Muslim mayor of an American city. Also, Natalie Bayton (aka Naimah Salaam) was elected and served on the Oakland City Council for the West Oakland Districts. Dr. Muhammed Nadeem ran twice for Santa Clara City Council, and eighteen-year-old Aziz Akbari ran for mayor of Fremont. Others include an Arab American in San Francisco who ran for city council and almost won. A number of community members serve on key commissions in city hall. One focus group participant was a former member of a local commission. She cited this as an example of her level of engagement, “*I served ten years as commissioner for the city, I sat twice in this coalition. I voted for housing. You have to engage beyond your Islamic activities and we don’t do that.*” Across the Bay Area’s universities, many Muslim students serve on student councils and student government, which points to positive development among the youth.

The area’s rich academic infrastructure includes two globally leading institutions, the University of California (Berkeley) and Stanford University, as well as other solid academic institutions that attract Muslims from all over the world. As a result, every campus has a Muslim Student Association (MSA) chapter. The MSAs at Berkeley and Stanford date back to the early 1960s, when immigration reform resulted in the arrival of a sizable number of Muslim students who, in due time, helped build the early institutional infrastructure. For example, San Francisco’s Jones Mosque was initially set up by students from the University of San Francisco and San Francisco State University, and the Berkeley Mosque was founded by MSA students and graduates of UC Berkeley. This pattern was repeated throughout the Bay Area. Evidence points to early activism among both Muslim and Arab students influenced by President Jamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt and his pan-Arab nationalism, as well as the international Non-Aligned Movement. Such events

encouraged students to participate in the Free Speech Movement and anti-Vietnam war and civil rights protests. In fact, the longest student strike on an American campus occurred at San Francisco State University. Records of statements of support and participation in campus activities have been unearthed, and more work is needed to develop a full picture of that particular period.

Today, MSAs throughout the Bay Area are active on every campus and regularly organize the “Islam Awareness Week,” the “Fast-A-Thon” during Ramadan, and the “Peace Not Prejudice” campaign. The latter event is a more positive and strategic response to the “Islamofascism Week” activities promoted by David Horowitz and others.⁷² Furthermore, MSAs around the region are civically engaged. For example, a Berkeley student serves on the Peace and Justice Commission in the City of Berkeley, while other members volunteer in local homeless shelters and offer after-school tutorial services to the area’s underserved communities. In the academic year 2006-07 Roshia Jones and Hira Khan, both Muslim women, were elected president and vice president, respectively, of UC Berkeley’s American Civil Liberties Union campus chapter. They led the organization and served as role models for everyone on campus. During the same time period, the *Daily Cal*’s editor-in-chief was Adeel Iqbal, a Muslim student and member of MSA. At present, one can find Muslims serving on every student government council in Bay Area universities and colleges. This continues a long tradition started in the late 1980s, when Abdel Malik Ali became president of San Francisco State University (1986) and was followed in that position by Abdullah Ahmed (1988) and Dr. Hatem Bazian (1989 and 1990), the only person to be elected for two consecutive terms in the university’s history. In 1991, Shahed Amanullah was elected UC Berkeley student Executive Vice President. We find Muslim students at Cal State East Bay, San Jose State University, Stanford, and every community college in the region being elected to similar posts. MSA students have participated in every Bay Area movement for the past thirty years, a record of contribution that deserves to be researched sometime in the future.

Muslims are far more engaged in civic than political activities, even though we have seen a steady rise in political engagement in recent years.⁷³ They are primarily focused on improving the local community and are thus less involved in state or national politics.

Table 12: Political Involvement (N=1,108)

	Yes, within last 12 months %	Yes, but not within last 12 months %	No, never %	No response %
Have you volunteered for a political organization or candidate running for office?	8	9	68	15
Have you given money to a candidate, political party or organization supporting candidates?	12	8	66	14
Have you ever contacted or visited a public official to express your opinion?	13	14	59	14
Have you ever contacted a newspaper, radio, television or magazine to express your opinion on issue?	11	15	61	14
Have you ever taken part in a protest, march or demonstration?	19	27	41	14
Have you ever signed a petition about a social or political issue?	32	21	32	15
Do you voice opinion about politics via email, Twitter or Facebook	28	10	48	15
Have you ever refused to buy something because you disagreed with the social or political values of the company?	37	16	33	14
Have you worked as a canvasser – going door to door for a political candidate or social group?	4	7	75	14
Have you served as an appointed or elected public official?	2	3	81	14

If one compares the Bay Area community with other parts of the country, we see similar patterns. Nationwide, the country's Muslim communities are starting to become more engaged. For example, the Florida-based Emerge USA has actively worked to get Muslims involved in all levels of government. Its recent poll of the state's Muslims found that 85 percent of Florida's more than 100,000 registered Muslim voters planned to vote in the 2012 national and local elections. They also overwhelmingly supported the Democratic Party after some Republicans, among them Representative Allen West, indulged in Islamophobic rhetoric. Emerge USA invigorated the

community in his district to vote overwhelmingly for his Democratic rival Patrick Murphy. Murphy won by a narrow margin, a margin that would not have existed if the Muslim community (5,000 voters in the district alone) had not voted.⁷⁴

The number of mosques across the country has increased by 74 percent since 2000.⁷⁵ These ethnically diverse institutions are led by officials who advocate for positive civic engagement.⁷⁶ Despite this evidence, however, on the national level only 51 percent of Muslims aged eighteen to twenty-nine are registered to vote. This is the lowest rate among all religious groups for this age group.⁷⁷ Writing in *Islamic Horizons*, a nationally-distributed American Muslim magazine, Marwa Abed, a Palestinian American, lamented that “*from the passing of the National Defense Authorization Act to the NYPD surveillance and the Irvine 11, to the overall sense of Islamophobia, Muslim Americans must reclaim their voice and demand that they be accepted as equal partners in their society.*”⁷⁸

Youth involvement is a positive sign, for it means that the Muslim community in this country is beginning to demand the same rights as all other communities. Of course those who promote the Islamophobic discourse are well aware of this and thus try even harder to demonize the Muslims and Islam. Umm Sumaya’s study of Muslim youth found that they are becoming more engaged not only in their individual communities, but also in other mainstream activities.⁷⁹

This might indicate passive levels of political engagement, as opposed to full engagement with others in the community. It also indicates very limited contact with non-Muslim individuals and institutions working to influence the vote. Additionally, those who were not actively supporting candidates inferred that their level of political involvement ended with voting. This could also be strategic, since the Muslim community is the “black sheep” of electoral politics and thus does not want to hurt the candidates that its members support. In fact, most Muslims do not wear candidate-supporting buttons. However, data from the survey respondents suggests other reasons for this: a fear of publicly expressing their political views or possible unawareness of the meaning and importance of this particular cultural norm as a form of political speech. It may also be a sign of the times, as more Americans express their political views through such online social media outlets as Facebook and Twitter, as did a number of this study’s Bay Area Muslims.

The Muslim community has opposed most foreign military interventions, and the survey results demonstrate this fact in relation to Afghanistan. Almost two-thirds (63%) of respondents felt that the United States should not maintain troops in Afghanistan, compared to 7 percent who thought it should. These findings were consistent with Pew’s data on Muslims and foreign policy.

CHALLENGES

The Muslim community is facing many internal and external challenges, none of which are unique to the Bay Area. In fact, they are representative of the challenges Muslims are facing nation-wide. In addition, many of the challenges Muslims face are also similar to those faced by other minority religious and ethnic/racial groups. For the Muslim community however, these challenges are compounded by the relatively recent immigration of many in the community and the fact that Muslims and Islam face a generally high degree of suspicion in the US.

Many of these challenges stem from a lack of strong community-based organizations with a large number of in-house talented leaders and internal capacity. Focus group participants stressed that community leaders focus more on rivalries than community needs. This results in a lack of strategic planning and collaboration, as well as their inability to deal effectively with the challenges facing their communities. The external challenges are strongly associated with the post-9/11 environment and the United States government's global campaign to "counter violent extremism." The PATRIOT Act and other laws have opened the door for targeting by government agencies, public anti-Muslim statements by prominent national leaders, and negative media coverage. In the long run, Muslims will have to confront and embrace their own struggle for inclusion in the vast American ethnic and religious mosaic. This will involve, to one degree or another, working with other Muslims and non-Muslims. To get to that stage, the community must tackle its internal challenges, the most important of which is the growing regional disparity. The shift southward in the Bay Area has had positive outcomes for some, but it has also created a wealth gap that has the potential to evolve into pernicious class differentiations.

The research points to a number of other challenges, some of which are universally shared due to the tough regional economic dynamics, fast-paced life style, and high cost of living. The most impacted are those who belong to the shrinking middle class, the poor in general, and first-generation immigrants in particular. As stated earlier, the community is rather young, with the bulk of its members only arrived or converted in the past twenty or thirty years. Furthermore, the lack of data makes it almost impossible to trace specific developments in terms of generations or over specific and regularized periods. This report, therefore, is a crucial building block in data development and, more importantly, a contribution to a better understanding of the community's future needs.

Somewhat similar to present-day Catholics, with immigration from Latin America and Asia, the American Muslim community faces the challenge of forming a cohesive community from a diverse population while maintaining and celebrating each subgroup's cultural specificity. Indeed, Muslims share a common faith, a singular unifying holy book, and a uniform set of

For the Muslim community however, these challenges are compounded by the relatively recent immigration of many in the community and the fact that Muslims and Islam face a generally high degree of suspicion in the US.

rituals; nevertheless culture, nationality, and ethnicity contribute significantly to their particular religious modes of expression.

According to the focus group discussions, some see the challenge as being centered on forming an American Muslim identity. Others consider preserving and celebrating what they already have, while others navigate between the available choices. In mosques across the area, Friday prayers are an international affair with some locations having some seventy or eighty different nationalities in attendance. Respondents described diversity as a major and multi-faceted challenge that, at its worst, leads to fragmentation and a loss of unity. At its best, it can serve as a source of empowerment and imagining different possibilities.

More importantly, respondents felt that any idea of a singular Muslim community should be dropped and replaced with a more nuanced heterogeneous and diverse understanding; however, this should not lead us to conclude that this heterogeneous picture lacks a central ethos directed at the desire to achieve a united community. In fact, the survey responses and focus groups point to this deeply held desire to arrive at unity in order to foster sharing and understanding among all Muslims.

This common call for unity is challenged by diversity and the differing needs of the constitutive elements. For example, Afghans have specific needs that other communities do not, given their different reasons for immigrating and settling in the Bay Area. But even within that singular group, women, men, and children face multi-faceted challenges. In a similar way, recent Iraqi, Somali, and Palestinian refugees in the area cannot be compared to their countrymen and women who arrived years ago and under different circumstances. Furthermore, African American and Latino converts face a whole set of issues emerging from a long history of racism, discrimination, and neglect; these do not suddenly disappear after their conversion. The needs of these two communities are understudied and are often subsumed under the larger categories of Islam and Muslims. Accounting for racism and undoing its effect are major challenges toward which the Muslim leadership should start directing some resources.

A sizable number of focus group respondents discussed that many organizations stress maintaining the status quo instead of working to bring about a healthy community. Among the pressing issues identified in this research are coming to grips with poverty and the lack of support services, engaging more effectively with the youth, and building Islamic centers that are more than just prayer halls and schools. The leadership in most centers was described as a closed circle that is not in the habit of addressing the members' various issues. Young respondents maintained that the older leaders ignore their concerns and often keep them at a distance from planning activities that are relevant to their needs or connected to their experiences. More than one respondent mentioned that this lack of focus becomes more pronounced and is reflected in the weekly sermons, which often fail to inspire or provide needed direction to the community at large.

External Challenges

The Challenge of Islamophobia

The post-9/11 period has witnessed intense campaigns directed at Muslim leaders locally, regionally, and nationally, many of whom have been pursued legally for one reason or another. In addition, throughout the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) case the government listed other Muslim organizations as “unindicted co-conspirators” and thereby tarnishing their image and creating a cloud of suspicion over both the organizations and their leaders.⁸⁰ These legal attacks provided ample firepower for those engaged in demonizing Muslims and Islam, thus causing several of the leaders interviewed to feel besieged.

The survey and focus groups identified Islamophobia, the rising tide of discrimination aimed at Muslims (especially schoolchildren), and negative media depictions as major challenges. Islamophobia, a term developed in the British context in early 1991, has morphed into a global term utilized by the United Nations, the European Union, and similar institutions. In fact, there is now an academic program, the Islamophobia Research and Documentation Project, and a bi-annual *Islamophobia Studies Journal* published by UC Berkeley. The term is imperfect, but it does point to the ongoing phenomena of “othering” Muslims and its consequences in various areas of society. Islamophobia is composed of many elements, such as racially motivated violence and crime directed at Muslims or those perceived to be Muslim (e.g., Sikhs). According to this research, the problem impacts the community’s view of itself, relations between its various segments, and shapes and influences relations with society at large. Racism seeks to disrupt one’s human potential, and Islamophobia seeks to disrupt the community and its ability to pursue its goals and priorities. Community leaders stated that the resources diverted to deal with Islamophobia undercuts their ability to pursue such pressing needs as building a school, a recreation center, or establishing a local radio station.

Table 13: Discrimination Faced by Bay Area Muslims (N=1,108)


		%
Muslim Discrimination Problem	Yes, very much	42
	Yes, somewhat	35
	Not really	10
	No response	14
Hate Crime Victim	Yes	23
	No	64
	No response	14
Personally Discriminated	Yes	40
	No	45
	No response	15
Known a Hate Crime Victim	Yes	50
	No	36
	No response	13
Known Someone Discriminated Against	Yes	59
	No	26
	No response	14

Most respondents felt that discrimination was at least somewhat of a problem; 60 percent said they knew someone who had been discriminated against, while 40 percent said that they had been personally discriminated against (table 13). About half reported knowing someone who was a hate crime victim, and 23 percent of Muslims indicated that they themselves were victims of a hate crime. But these results should be interpreted with caution, as they might be related to a broad interpretation of hate crimes. More research is needed in this area.

Furthermore, the high level of reported discrimination is significant and worthy of further exploration and research, especially on the type of discrimination. Some of the participants said that they are not offended by discriminatory statements and now accept them as the post-9/11 norm.

The survey results and focus groups point to the preponderance of negative incidents related to security services and FBI intrusion into community affairs. Yemenis, Afghanis, Pakistanis, and Palestinians in particular report considerable intrusion into their daily affairs by security agencies, such as frequent FBI visits, various types of delays, and secondary searches in the airport (figure 16). Although the FBI and local police services have reached out to the community, released documents reveal that some of these efforts are designed to acquire mapping data and to spy on communities. Not surprisingly, many Muslims have developed a higher level of mistrust.

Figure 16: Security in Airports Targeting Muslims (N=1,108)



Certainly, other communities have faced racism and discrimination. But this initial assessment points to the need to better understand the problem and its impact on people. The psychological impact of discrimination and racism run deep and are multi-layered: feelings of isolation, fear, and the lack of support from the community and the larger society.⁸¹ Fear and isolation make people accept the unacceptable and begin to consider racism a norm to be tolerated. As a result, they internalize the basic assumption of their supposedly “inherent” inferiority and thus no longer live or aspire to reach their potential. Thus, community leaders should be documenting the effects and proposing appropriate remedies. Respondents stated that efforts must be directed at internal education for Muslims and then working with civil rights and civil society organizations to challenge racist figures and attitudes. They felt that Muslim organizations and institutions should be in the forefront and that all civil society and faith-based organizations should be enlisted to help usher in a new era based on justice, equality, and a racism-free discourse.

Conflict in Muslim-Majority Countries

The ongoing United States government campaign to “counter violent extremism” and direct American involvement in Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, as well as in other areas, places the local Muslim community at the forefront of discussions and debates based upon these conflicts. Local community members remarked that they feel regularly called upon to deal with issues and events beyond their immediate control and circle of influence. Such efforts shift resources from badly needed local projects to crises abroad and also help create the impression that the

community is a foreign entity that is not really a part of this country. The interview and focus group participants remarked that such ideas cause institutions and some in the interfaith community to engage the community for their own narrow and at times self-serving interest (e.g., foreign policy).

In addition, the flow of Muslim immigrants can be dated and linked to major conflicts in Muslim-majority countries and the subsequent uprooting and mass flight of people across borders, even to the United States. The latest recent refugees, namely, those coming from Bosnia, Somalia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, and Syria, place considerable stress on the community and its limited resources. As the United States begins to withdraw from Afghanistan and possibly other Muslim-majority areas, we expect the arrival and relocations of even more refugees and/or immigrants. This external challenge was described as ever-present and must be understood and planned for by humanitarian organizations and the community alike.

Muslims as “Double Minorities”

Many Muslims face a double minority status – both racial and religious – that affects the ability to develop social, religious, and political relations with non-Muslims. Furthermore, the fact that many Muslims are recent arrivals means that they have not had sufficient time to develop these critical relations. Many responders described the community as not yet socially connected to the broader Bay Area society and as living within very narrowly constructed immigrant or community enclaves. While this is normal on the one hand, treating it as a place of distinct difference might lead to exclusion. In his critical *How does it Feel to be a Problem?: Being Young and Arab in America*, Moustafa Bayoumi uses W.E.B. Du Bois’ probing question in his classic *The Souls of Black Folk* to bring to our collective consciousness the struggles, tribulations, and also victories of Arab Americans in New York. But more importantly, the fact that Muslims have to ask themselves this question illustrates the problematizing of the Arab as a person in our society. In a similar way, the “Muslim person” has become a very complex “problem.” As respondents described how they felt about the treatment they have received, it became clear that they often felt the “best” way to deal with the Muslim community was to keep it at a distance, to not engage with other Muslims, or (for some) not to appear in a photograph with other Muslims. As such, many Muslims described facing exclusion from the social, religious, and political space, despite a limited degree of inclusion in ceremonial events or foreign policy issues.

Internal Challenges

Lack of Broad Vision and Planning

The leadership focus group and participants in other sessions pointed to a lack of an integrated long-term plan, even though the number of successful groups, organizations, and centers is constantly increasing. The leaders said that strategic and resource planning is needed in all areas, as the existing community-wide framework has been reactive rather than proactive and strategic. As of the writing of this report, the community has no agreed-upon long-term plan, and nothing

on the immediate horizon points to the development of one. The Northern California Islamic Council's (NCIC) efforts point to some positive initiatives in this regard. Many leaders described institutions operating in survival mode and preoccupied with just remaining alive, which naturally prevents any consideration of even potential region-wide and cross-organizational initiatives in these spheres. Furthermore, respondents described the existing ethnic and national modes of organizing that do not stress strategic planning since the existing communication and relationship network are able to meet their own specific needs. The interviewees claimed that even in areas of common concern (e.g., Islamophobia), the organizations have developed neither a strategic unified response nor provided the needed resources to address them. In part, the problem arises from the community's relative youth, wide diversity, and its members' cultural and knowledge gap of how to operate institutions in the United States.

Leadership Concerns and Limited Resources

Participants presented another major overlooked challenge: limited staff and high reliance on volunteers in Muslim institutional settings, most of which are generally quite new and just beginning to develop. Limited human and financial resources heavily burden the community's current institutional landscape. The aggregate institutional landscape is heavily dependent on untrained volunteers who cannot function effectively in a highly developed civil society. For example, during the survey process the researchers set out to call all the local mosques in order to prepare them for the survey distribution during Eid events; the actual number of those who answered the phone or called back was three out of sixty. This is not due to their lack of concern, because further research revealed that these institutions are run by volunteers who have separate full-time jobs and thus take care of the mosque or center mostly during Friday prayers and weekends. In addition, several of the institutions serve only one immigrant group, which means that information about how to contact and get things moving is subject to informal patterns and culturally specific modes of communication. Depending on the subgroup, the best way to communicate might be at the local grocery store, taxi drivers' waiting areas, or immediately before Friday prayers. This problem does not exist in convert-run and -led organizations. Perhaps this very positive reality can be utilized to create intra-community partnerships designed to train and develop institutional mechanisms.

Another institution-related issue is the constant depletion of resources via relief efforts directed toward the large number of crises in the Muslim world. Not only has the dollar value of relief increased, but so has the staggering numbers of people in need. Participants mentioned that financial relief efforts have been set up– and remain ongoing – for Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Syria, Kashmir, Mauritania, Bangladesh, and quite a few other Muslim lands.

If the common immigrant practice of sending regular monthly support to family members back home is added to this, which of course increases during conflicts and war, this further lessens the financial resources available for community building and institutional development in the United States.

Bay Area Muslim institutions are heavily dependent on regular donations from community members and have few (if any) alternative or diverse sources. Leaders maintain that this leads organizations to focus more on short-term planning and the pressure to raise the needed annual operating funds. At present, most local community institutions have no financial reserves or an established endowment to help them cover their operating expenses. Based on discussions and interviews with the leaders of several community organizations, it can be said with some confidence that some organizations would have to close down if their annual fundraising drives do not raise enough money. Thus, the resulting lay-offs would be immediate for the one or two people who are actually being paid.⁸²

Many Muslim institutions were described as heavily dependent on a small number of volunteers, activists, and workers, while the vast majority of members are neither engaged nor have enough free time to participate at any level. The Bay Area has a high cost of living, which means that Muslims as a group face as many difficulties as any other first-generation immigrants in the Bay Area. In fact, some adults who work full time have to take another part-time job just to make ends meet. This lack of engagement is also due to conditions faced by all new immigrants, and it will take a few generations before a different set of conditions will emerge that will make it easier for them to become more engaged and able to commit the needed resources for community development. Some respondents saw the challenge in the following terms: How can we make those who are financially hard-pressed perceive the community and its institutions as part of the solution, and how can we convince them of the value of contributing their time to support these institutions as a building block for long-term change? In order for this to happen, however, the community leadership must become far more responsive to grassroots challenges, as described above.

Regional Socioeconomic Disparities

While the Muslim community nationally and in the Bay Area is often described as generally middle to upper class and well-educated, the survey results provide strong evidence of a regional socioeconomic disparity. For example, San Francisco, Alameda, and Contra Costa counties register a very high percentage of household incomes below \$40,000, whereas Santa Clara and Marin have the highest income levels. According to the research, outside of Silicon Valley the income levels for immigrants and converts alike trail considerably behind those of their counterparts in South Bay. The causes for this disparity in San Francisco, Alameda, and Contra Costa counties is largely a result of the fact that these areas host many immigrant Muslims who arrived in the region as war refugees. Afghans constitute the single largest national group in Contra Costa and Alameda counties, and are followed by newly settled Iraqi, Palestinian, and Somali refugees in the area. In fact, the newly arriving Iraqi and Palestinian refugees relocated to the Bay Area's inner cities and often in public housing. Their new situation results in immediate challenges, for these war refugees are older, married, and have limited formal education and limited or no support structure.

Another facet of this economic disparity is specific to converts, particularly African Americans and Latinos, who bring along legacies of racism, discrimination, and exclusion as well as a sizable number who converted in prison. Such individuals described being shunned by family members, and their pre-conversion religious, social, and economic networks were often not responsive or supportive. Thus, they can face lower economic prospects than their immigrant counterparts.

Participants remarked that one outcome of this economic disparity has been the appearance of a certain level of tension between various segments of the community and a feeling that the more affluent Silicon Valley and immigrant business owners in the inner city are immune to the needs, concerns, and real pain felt by those struggling at the lower end of the economic ladder. Some resentment also revolves around the high proportion of Muslim small business owners operating liquor stores in the inner city who have constant contact with and are, at times, openly hostile toward local African American community members and leaders. These leaders are, of course, fully aware of the Qur'an's prohibition of all alcoholic beverages and the readiness of some practicing immigrant Muslims to sell them in heavily suffering neighborhoods inhabited by members of both communities. When asked why they do so, immigrant storeowners in Oakland, Richmond, and San Francisco stated that their first job in the country was often in such a store operated by someone from their ethnic or national group. No language or technical skills were needed to start such a business, and the customers did not care who is selling them or even understand their particular needs. All that mattered was selling the product and collecting the money, for doing so engendered immediate financial resources for immigrants attempting to reconstitute themselves.

These tensions indicate that focused engagement is needed to address these types of profound economic disparities. Respondents asserted that the community has no programs to address such issues head-on and devise solutions that actually work. In this regard, some respondents cautioned that women in families facing economic challenges run the risk of ending up in an endless race for making ends meet – sometimes without a supportive spouse, community, or religious institution. Focused research on women in this predicament is very much needed but with caveat that the research is focused on addressing the problem as one emerging out of economic conditions and not “Orientalist”⁸³ notions of “a women’s place” in Islam.

Challenges Facing Bay Area Muslim Women

Participants in several focus groups pointed to distinct internal and external challenges faced by Muslim women from all ethnic and racial backgrounds. This was particularly evident when we spoke to disenfranchised and disconnected Muslims. A mosque's basic architecture and layout often provides only a small interior space for women. For those with children, these areas are not accommodating and place a heavy emphasis on women to discipline the children during services. In some respect this points to a deeper cultural issue: Mosques in many Muslim-majority countries are male-only spaces and women are culturally and (in some places) specifically told not to attend services at the mosque. While this might serve the cultural needs of a Muslim-majority society or country due to the mosque's narrow role and the presence of other avenues

to address various needs, it does not – and cannot – work in this country, where Muslims are a minority. In the United States the mosque is more than just a prayer space; rather, it is a site for a collective community affirmation of belonging to a collective tradition, an educational site, a job networking site, and a host of other functions.⁸⁴

The lack of physical space and programs for women, families, and children is compounded by their minority status. Such a reality was reported to impact their sense of belonging, self-worth, and leadership potential within the community. The lack of women in leadership roles and on institutional boards, which is both a result of and exacerbates these challenges, was the focus of several focus group discussions.

External discrimination was the norm for many female focus group participants. For some of them, their threshold for anger has diminished, which points to an increased acceptance of racism as part of daily life. In addition, a number of participants pointed out that they are not spoken to or face condescending comments laced with Orientalist references to oppression or the forceful imposition of the hijab by men. Furthermore, Muslim women of all backgrounds described being considered as representative of all Muslims and of being asked to explain the action of any Muslim both locally and worldwide. A few commented that they felt tokenized by groups and organizations that included them because they wanted to address Muslim women's issues; however, they usually sought to speak on the women's behalf and thus creating yet another layer of exclusion in the guise of inclusion.

The presence of female role models can help change the broader community. Measured progress and positive examples cited by respondents include the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the Islamic Network Group (ING), Muslim Advocates, the Rahima Foundation, the Give Light Foundation, the North American Islamic Shelter for the Abused (NISA), and the American Muslim Voice – in all of them, women's leadership and civic engagement is the norm. Other well-established organizations and institutions highlighted in this research have made it a point to engage Muslim women on equal footing and place them in leadership positions and provide appropriate resources. In particular the Asian Law Caucus, the H.H. Prince Aga Khan Shi'a Imami Councils for USA, the National Lawyers Guild, and the One Nation Foundation were mentioned as leaders in this regard and have made the inclusion of female Muslim voices and Muslim voices in general part of their organizational framework.

Lack of Engagement with Non-Muslims

Even though Muslims have been in this country since its founding, they have had only limited strategic engagement with non-Muslim communities. Muslims from different ethnic, national, and racial groups tend to stick to members of their own sub-group. According to our respondents, this self-imposed separation is largely the norm and meaningful relations outside of this socially constructed box were an exception and often found only among a few individuals. Once we understand the above-mentioned facts, we can begin to comprehend the compounded challenge related to engaging with non-Muslims.

After 9/11, newly emerging institutional partnerships focused on addressing this latest crisis and the avalanche of attacks directed at Muslims and those who “looked” Muslim. Important and critical relations were formed with several organizations that transcended racial, ethnic, and religious lines. These include, but are not limited to, the Japanese American Citizens League, the Asian Law Caucus, Catholic Charities, the First Presbyterian Church, the Jewish Voice for Peace, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund, the One Nation Foundation, Silicon Valley Community Foundation, and many others.

These groups formed relations with community leaders and showed their solidarity by defending their rights on both local and national levels. The research indicates that some level of civil society-led community cohesion and partnerships have emerged out of these various Muslim-related crises. Yet acknowledging this silver lining must be tempered, for such relationships can only remain effective if the community’s leadership and grassroots relations are somehow transformed into structural and long-term relations that can help deliver policy changes on the local and national levels.

For its part, Muslim communities and civil society organizations appear to lack a general strategic direction and structured plan for engagement with non-Muslim communities of faith and others in the broader American society. However, the participants said that some relationships were only on the surface and that they need to be deepened to ensure continuing cooperation.

Some respondents stated that various Muslim community-oriented groups and organizations that were isolationist in nature before 9/11 became even more so after 9/11. They were, therefore, not concerned at all with building coalitions and relationships.⁸⁵ In addition, as the community’s level of fear increased, due to unchecked government surveillance and negative media attention, the result was what civil liberties advocates would refer to as a “chilling effect” on constitutionally protected activities: community members were opting to avoid or be extra-cautious about participating in public events, celebrations, and similar activities. These chilling effects extend into the Muslim communities’ budding political activities, thereby creating a degree of distance between the targeted group and segments of the society at large that could help them deal with the effects of discrimination.⁸⁶ In short, Muslims must find a way to address this phenomenon head-on in an attempt to develop appropriate and realistic remedies.

On a more structural level, the research strongly suggests that the community lacks the skills, institutional knowledge, and resources needed to develop long-term and meaningful relations with non-Muslims. Being a community with thin institutional capacities makes such engagement an even more daunting task, especially when it is coupled with a lack of language skills for some and a general lack of cultural awareness among potential non-Muslim allies.

Cultural and Religious Obstacles

As mentioned above, the Bay Area Muslim community is very diverse and has many ethnic, nationality, and sectarian-based institutions. Such a situation emphasizes differences instead of similarities. This evidence suggests the ethnic and cultural norms for many area Muslims takes precedence over those required by core Islamic tenets (e.g., upholding universal brotherhood and sisterhood irrespective of particular creed, color, or language). These combined cultural, ethnic, and sectarian divisions have perpetuated a lack of internal communication, coordination, and cooperation. Taken as a whole, it seems this community has been unable to transform its diverse talents into a functional unity; however, this evidence suggests more time is spent on the particular group instead of forming intra-community relations.

Data from the focus groups and interviews indicates attitudes of mistrust and a lack of cooperation exists among all community. This is, in fact, a major challenge facing all American Muslims. Although the roots lie in history, it continues to be impacted by a 24/7-news cycle that usually highlights existing divisions. While the survey results demonstrate that people identify themselves as Muslim first, this attitude has not yet led to any broad-based engagement outside the confines of each group. Therefore, this envisaged unity remains only an aspiration.

Lack of Professional Development and Training

Community organizing and activism presupposes a knowledge base of how to develop institutions over time. The focus groups and interviews indicate that the lack of ongoing education and training focused on best practices and successful models for organizing is a major challenge for a majority of Muslim institutions and communities. More often than not, the existing organizing methods were brought over from the home country, which were developed within specific cultural, political, and social settings. Once deployed in the United States, however, they have only a limited viability and are non-transferable to the next generation.

This issue seems to be particularly acute in Muslim non-profit institutions. According to the focus group interviews and follow-up research,⁸⁷ basic skills pertaining to office management, record keeping, employee development, and operating manuals are a novelty for many institutions. It would require a considerable amount of resources to change this picture. Even with those institutions that have attained a certain level of knowledge, this knowledge was not transferred to its broader membership or shared with other groups and organizations. The researchers found little to no evidence of training non-profit/not-for-profit staff. To the very limited extent that the participants identified this, such basic activities as regular retreats held to set agendas and establishing goals and objectives were noticeably absent.

STRENGTHS

The preceding discussion on challenges, however, must not overshadow an equally important acknowledgement and assessment of the Bay Area community's strengths.

Community Building and Cohesion

A deeply held faith resonates across all layers of the community, as reflected in the fact that fully 92 percent of respondents expressed some degree of religiosity. An ethos of universal brother/sisterhood, as reflected in widely acknowledged Islamic teachings, potentially serves as a foundation for internal community bridge building.

While the connection between religiosity and mosque attendance is often conflated, our evidence suggests a community that holds tight to its faith and uses it to navigate the challenges they face. At the level of the individual, his/her faith has served as a place of comfort for community members and helps many of them deal with present realities and calls them to act and be agents of positive action in the world. Family structures, which include a very low divorce rate, are another identified strength. The evidence suggests that the generally cooperative spirit fostered by families may hold un-harnessed potential for community building. Further study and research is needed to highlight this critical success.

Activism and Resilience

The high level of volunteerism and spirit of giving are directly connected to faith and family, as reflected in the survey results. Despite the challenges faced by immigrant and minority communities, and more recently the post 9/11 context, these Muslim communities were able to grow and in many cases thrive. The subtext of this observation is another important, if somewhat less-acknowledged, strength—namely the resilience of the community.

Looking at the data as a whole, Muslims' resilient community-building efforts largely appear to be the product of a strong faith-based tradition of building institutions and a society that has – and continues to – contribute positively to bringing about a better world. This faith-based civic ethic is perhaps best reflected in a narrated saying of the Prophet Mohammed, whose guidance and life is a model for Muslims: "If the end of time comes upon you while you are planting a seed, continue planting it."⁸⁸

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Women

No discussion of community strengths can be complete without recognizing that Muslim women built a critical number of Muslim institutions. The existence of their efforts provides indisputable evidence of their ability to overcome existing internal and external cultural, religious, and gender barriers.

Diversity

Racial, ethnic, and cultural diversity within the community is a major underutilized strength. The survey shows that a solid segment of the community is highly educated and provides strong evidence of cosmopolitan attitudes and behaviors as well as linguistic prowess (66% speak between two to five languages). The data very strongly suggests that when coupled with talent, education, and strategically deployed resources, the Bay Area Muslims' diversity can make for a profound contribution to the region. As noted above, as an emerging community Muslims have made strides in terms of partnerships with other faith and minority communities, and in terms of civic and political engagement. These should be celebrated and built upon. Finally, the community's youth and university students play a key role and are often on the front lines representing their Islamic identity with dignity and innovation, as well as in collaboration with other student groups and communities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations, based on the primary source data collected during the research, surveys, and focus groups, are directed to community leaders and institutions, philanthropic and charitable foundations, academic and policymaking circles.⁸⁹

For Muslim Community Leaders and Institutions

Strengthen the community's institutional infrastructure. Most organizations rely heavily on volunteers. The respondents emphasized that Muslim leaders should prioritize investing in people and organizational capacity rather than land, buildings and property. The emphasis on physically building mosques and schools should be balanced with efforts to staff and manage these and other institutions serving the community. This includes hiring skilled professional managers and staff to oversee proper management, administration and financial oversight.

Empower women. Interviews, focus groups, and survey data all indicated the need for greater female participation and leadership. Women should have an equal footing as partners in the ongoing process of community building and their involvement will increase the diversity of ideas and solutions to address community challenges. *Empowering women empowers the community.*

Share existing knowledge and resources. The research paints a picture of a Bay Area community that is diverse but also divided and resource-depleted. Developing an intra-Muslim dialogue and relations across diverse segments in the community is needed to leverage the existing diversity for proactive and impactful projects. The leadership and trail-blazing work of the African American Muslim community should be analyzed. Existing organizations like the Northern California Islamic Council, Zaytuna College, the Muslim American Society, the Shia Association of Bay Area (SABA), the Islamic Network Group (ING), as well as the Islamic Culture Center of Northern California (ICCNC), along with other academic projects in the region, can work to develop it jointly. Community members' linguistic diversity and abilities should be tapped and used in international business, disaster relief, translation services to work with immigrants and refugees, and similar fields. Spanish should be heavily emphasized so that Muslims can partner with other populations facing similar immigration challenges.

Develop the necessary skills and capacities for increased civic engagement and consistent engagement with non-Muslims. Institutions should continue to support political participation (e.g., voter education drives and Get Out The Vote efforts). These kinds of initiatives, which were largely spearheaded by Dr. Agha Saeed and the American Muslim Alliance, have slowed due to his deteriorating health. Reshma Inamdar, of the League of

Empower women. Interviews, focus groups, and survey data all indicated the need for greater female participation and leadership.

Women Voters, tried to continue this effort, however it remains limited. Therefore such efforts should be expanded and supported in a concerted fashion. They should build on existing interfaith relations to exchange know-how and successful organizational methods that, in the long-run, will lead to a deepened sense of interfaith cooperation and partnership for the common good. One area that requires special attention is media training for community-based organizations that emphasizes effective messaging, outreach to allies, and developing strategies to counter the media's negative portrayal of Muslims.

Reach out to disenfranchised/disenchanted Muslims. The focus groups and interviews revealed that an unknown number of Muslims have opted to avoid mosques and/or community centers because, in their opinion, these institutions and their leaders do not address their specific needs and concerns. To correct this situation, the leadership should begin an open dialogue with all community members and take specific steps to close this gap. Many Muslims in this category are highly religious and spiritual, pray and fast during Ramadan, and yet feel ignored. Programs like “Let’s Talk” or the “Imam at Your Home” can help open communications with this group. Moreover, creating a non-judgmental, less formal space focused on specific needs (e.g., including youth and addressing their problems) would also be helpful.

For Foundations and Philanthropists

Commit to long-term investment that will empower the community. Projects directed at institution building and supporting new or continuing staff positions should be given the highest priority. Another helpful action would be working with communities to develop sustainable funding models and long-term endowments. Finally, helping Muslim institutions leverage high net-worth individuals in the area can also be useful. Some of these Muslims are hesitant to invest in community projects due to perceptions of non-professionalism or of having no direct connection with the grassroots. Foundations can play a key role in cultivating them for project-specific opportunities that will have a long-term impact.

Facilitate opportunities for coalition building and collaboration with non-Muslim civic organizations. Funding should be directed toward specific programs and projects that have detailed and measurable outcomes over the period of the grant or funding cycle. Resources have traditionally been used for very narrowly tailored programs that were far more public relations focused and also sought to address issues that were either non-critical for the community or motivated by certain foreign policy interests. Coalition building, civic engagement, and interfaith must be prioritized and should be motivated by social justice concerns. In this regard, the work of One Nation Bay Area and its funding partners is a major step in the right direction.

Support education and training for managing not-for-profit organizations, with emphasis on successful models. In this regard, Non-Muslim partners can be very instrumental in providing appropriate educational and training materials that can serve as templates for the community. Furthermore, grants and resources can be utilized to foster a culture of education and training

as well as to incentivize personal development as a condition for future funding. The Catholic Charities' work and partnership with the Muslim community is a positive development. In fact, it might be persuaded to consider supporting Muslim institutions by offering three-month funded internships designed to train Muslims in a specific aspect of not-for-profit work that will strengthen the community's organizational backbone. A similar type of program could consist of a director-level Muslim shadowing a professional for a certain amount of time to acquire a better and more accurate picture of what is possible and what can be easily done.

Train Muslim women seeking leadership positions in the non-profit sector. Provide leadership development for executive directors and board chairpersons, especially for those who are women. Breaking cultural and religious barriers is a very important and sensitive matter, and thus enlightened leadership and appropriate funding is required. This would be analogous to how certain underserved/disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups receive empowerment training based on their particular needs and capacities. Grant applications should seek information from funded groups about their male-female ratios concerning leadership and decision-making positions. Best-practice guidelines should be developed along with funding cycle workshops. Leveraging existing female Muslim leaders to partner in developing this area is highly recommended.

Support social and legal services for American Muslims. Obtaining funds and grants from non-profit and public agencies (e.g., county-level Health and Human Services agencies) is vital, considering the number of refugees from war zones and the number of poverty-stricken American Muslims who need both psychosocial and social welfare support. In other cases, support is needed for those youth facing bullying and discrimination while trying to negotiate tensions within their family and community environments. Such services include, but are not limited to, refugee counseling, immigration and naturalization services for documented and undocumented Muslims, job and language training, literacy services for adults, anti-domestic abuse services, and civic literacy programs.

Pay special attention to immigration issues. These can be divided into three large areas: 1) undocumented Muslims, 2) documented but facing delays due to normal immigration processes, and 3) documented and facing delays due to security-related issues. Foundations should direct their funding toward each area and provide grants to groups and organizations that can provide the needed services.

Study Islamophobia in the context of other forms of bigotry and racism. One of the end goals should be the development of effective tools to counter and change the current toxic atmosphere facing American Muslims. Unlike other forms of bigotry, anti-Muslim prejudice and hate currently enjoys more mainstream acceptance than anti-Black or anti-gay attitudes. This mainstreaming of anti-Muslim bias has arguably seeped into society's cultural, political, and legal power structures – all of which pre-judge Muslims as a threat based on guilt by association. Historical examples (e.g., the Chinese Exclusion Act [1882] and United States Executive Order 9066 [interning Japanese and Japanese Americans during WWII]) may serve as stark but useful historical bridges between past and contemporary forms of institutionalized prejudice that harm everyone. Foundations and

grantees should support community and individual efforts to join with those who also want to create and sustain a counternarrative. Grants should be given to academic institutions to support sustained engagement with the study, documentation, and examination of Islamophobia. Finally, grants should be focused on informing the public, law enforcement, and other civic institutions about Islam and Muslim cultural practices in order to reduce discrimination, improve services, and bring about long-term changes in how these institutions respond to the community's needs.

Facilitate Intra-Muslim dialogue. Funding should target organizations that want to pursue dialogue by working on joint projects that can lead to long-lasting relations. This recommendation mirrors the one provided to community leaders above.

Leverage high level of religiosity among community. Foundations should take advantage of the strong faith within the community and provide opportunities to leverage the deeply held faith across all layers of the community.

For Educators and Academics

Foster research and work focused on Muslim communities. Research priorities should include understanding Muslims as part of mainstream American society and not through the narrow lens of regional studies, Eastern religions, and/or newly emerging security studies. We encourage educators and academics to also look at Muslims through the lenses of American studies, ethnic studies, sociology, political science, journalism, and other disciplines. The general direction should be away from the “othering” conception and security threat examination of “good” and “bad” Muslims. A positive development is the newly established Arab and Muslim Ethnicities and Diaspora Studies program at San Francisco State University, housed in the School of Ethnic Studies. This program examines the history and contributions of Arabs and Muslims in the United States. Finally, existing academic programs focusing on Islam and Muslims should develop local academic networks that meet on a regular basis and cooperate on regional and possibly national research initiatives.

Deepen understanding of Islam and Muslims among educators. This is especially important at the primary and secondary levels where there are concerns over bullying. Teachers should be aware of bullying directed at Muslim schoolchildren and be ready to deal with it properly and effectively. Local school boards should partner with Muslim institutions specialized in education and anti-bullying strategies. Educators should attempt to provide accurate information to their students about Islam and Muslims including the often biased literature in schools

Engage communities outside the classroom. Many college and university professors engage in “Community Engaged Scholarship” which focuses on research in underrepresented and vulnerable communities. All partnerships should focus on providing access to training and resources to those areas in which the community is highly underrepresented. University-level grants should

be directed at media, journalism, oral history, cultural production and film programs; adult literacy programs; English language programs for immigrants; and other areas that can help uplift the community. It is part of each college/university's mission to address and bridge this gap and help communities facing discrimination and racism.

For Policymakers

Facilitate platforms to generate ideas for developing and choosing policies informed by expert opinion. Policymakers should hold workshops and sessions to exchange views, support emerging research, and seek expert opinions on a host of issues confronting the Muslim community and its partner organizations. Partnering with existing academic programs at local universities as well as community-oriented think-tanks can accomplish this goal.

Challenge anti-Muslim narratives. Policy makers, civic and elected officials should challenge anti-Muslim narratives and leverage their leadership in the community to stand with the Muslim community as allies in ensuring the rights of Muslims. Elected officials should enhance their understanding and engagement with the Muslim community to better serve the needs of the community they represent. This engagement is likely to affirm the community's sense of belonging, foster greater civic engagement and ultimately counter in deeds the process of "otherization." This does not imply agreement with or supporting Islam; however it is an affirmation of community and shared values as Americans.

Future Research and Closing the Gap

The Bay Area, not to mention the entire national Muslim community, is an understudied segment within the larger American society due to its small size. The community's high level of nationwide diffusion makes it an even greater challenge for scholars. This report has only scratched the surface and provided a ground-breaking general picture of the Bay Area's Muslim community. Thus its results have increased the questions and avenues for further research.

The survey for this project had 105 questions, which was a shortened form of the original list. The researchers wanted to learn and examine every aspect of a previously non-studied and non-surveyed community. Quite naturally, the limitations of time and resources dictated the scope of what could be done. The researchers hope that others will build upon their efforts.

In this regard, future research projects should:

1. Focus on socioeconomic disparities as well as the needs and services available to these communities.
2. Conduct more focused research on Muslim women, their role in the community, and the challenges they face.

3. Focus on youth in order to identify their needs, challenges, and how they deal with bullying and identity issues at school and in society in general.
4. Study youth educational programs and interfaith work.
5. Assess the kind of education that youth in the Bay Area receive at the mosque and in Islamic schools.
6. Determine the number of disengaged youth, why they avoid the community's institutions, and how this can be remedied.
7. Study newer immigrants who live in the inner city, the challenges they face, and possible solutions.
8. Conduct more in-depth research on civic engagement and the link between religious practice and civic engagement.
9. Conduct healthcare-related research, which is badly needed, with a particular focus on Muslim refugees with PTSD-related problems.
10. Research the role of Muslim artists and their contributions to and impact on constructing an American Muslim identity under duress.
11. Research the Bay Area's growing Muslim LGBT community.
12. Study the MSAs' role in the area and their continued involvement.
13. Assess Silicon Valley success stories and its contribution to the region's economic progress and its impact (or lack thereof) within the community.
14. Determine the rate and experience of mixed marriages and how diversity impacts established social patterns for both immigrants and converts.
15. Further work and research on Islamophobia in general and the role of the arts in the community and in opposing Islamophobia.
16. Establish additional monolingual focus groups (e.g., Arabic, Pashto, and Farsi).
17. Study the American-born children of Muslim immigrants along with these immigrants' different streams of migration.
18. Understand the increased mainstreaming of Salafi Islam that, some argue, marginalizes women.
19. Research the unique challenges of the Somali and larger African diaspora communities, as well as war refugees settled in inner cities, and identify what resources should be developed to address these challenges.
20. Study the Muslim non-profit sector's institutions and charitable organizations, the roles they play, and how to maximize the resources available to the community.

APPENDIX A

Terms

da'wah: missionizing or proselytizing.

Deen: Arabic for “faith.”

Deobandi: This is a religious movement, centered primarily in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh, consisting of Muslims committed to a literal and austere interpretation of the Qur'an. It is based upon the Hanafi jurisprudential school of Sunni Islam.

Eid al-Adha: Also known as the Feast of the Sacrifice, it is one of the two major Islamic festivals. This festival marks the end of the pilgrimage and commemorates Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his first-born son Ishmael to God.

Hanbali school: One of Sunni Islam's four jurisprudential schools. Named after its intellectual founder Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855), it is the strictest and most conservative Sunni school of thought. It is also considered to be the main legal influence upon the Salafis, a fundamentalist movement that claims to be guided only by the Qur'an and the transmitted sayings of the Prophet.

Ja'afari school: The legal school of thought representing Shi'i Islam. It is named after Imam Ja'far ibn Muhammad al-Sadiq (d. 765), a highly revered figure for most Shi'as and a descendant of the Prophet.

Hajj: The annual pilgrimage to Makka and one of Islam's five pillars.

Hanafi school: One of Sunni Islam's four jurisprudential schools. It is named after its intellectual founder Imam Abu Hanifa (al-Nu'man ibn Thabit) (d. 765).

hijab: A veil or scarf that covers a Muslim woman's hair.

Jamatkhana: An Urdu word denoting a gathering space. Its primary purpose is to facilitate the Ismaili Shi'a Muslims' religious and ritual life.

masjid: Arabic for “mosque.”

kafir (pl. kuffar): Arabic for those who are not Muslims, Jews, Christians, or Zoroastrians. However, some Muslims apply it to all non-Muslims. In some contexts it can be either a descriptive or a

pejorative term.

khutba: The sermon delivered during the congregational Friday prayer.

kufi: A small brimless skull cap worn by men.

Maliki school: One of Sunni Islam's four jurisprudential schools. It is named after its intellectual founder Imam Malik ibn Anas al-Asbahi (d. 795).

niqab: A facial covering that conceals everything but the woman's eyes.

thobe: The traditional long ankle-length gown worn by Arab men.

Salafism: A broader puritanical theological and legal movement, as opposed to a Sunni legal school per se, this trend draws much of its intellectual inspiration from the Hanbali school.

Shafi'i school: One of Sunni Islam's four jurisprudential schools. It is named after its intellectual founder Imam Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi'i (d. 820).

APPENDIX B

Quantitative Survey Questionnaire, Focus Group Questionnaire, and Focus Group Demographic Background Form

Dear Participant,

You are invited to participate in a study of Muslims in the Bay Area. The study wants to learn about your views on religion, politics and community engagement. The survey will focus on your experiences, attitudes and opinions about civic life and identity as a Muslim in America. The survey is the first study of its kind to provide an in-depth picture of Muslims in the Bay Area and to help address the needs and challenges facing the community.

TIME TO COMPLETE SURVEY: The survey will take approximately 15 minutes to complete.

PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY: Your response to the questions will be kept completely confidential. To guarantee this, neither your name nor any personal information that could identify you will appear in the written transcripts or in any published materials.

HOW THE RESULTS WILL BE USED: The results of the survey will contribute to a study of Muslims in the Bay Area. The authors will produce a report to be published by the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) and available to the public.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION

About ISPU

ISPU is an independent, nonpartisan think tank and research organization committed to conducting objective, empirical research and offering expert policy analysis on some of the most pressing issues facing the United States. In addition, ISPU has assembled leading scholars across multiple disciplines and built a solid reputation as a trusted source for information about American Muslims and Muslim communities around the world. For more information call ISPU at (202) 481-8215 or visit our website at www.ispu.org

SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND

What is your gender? Male Female

Are you currently a U.S. citizen? Yes No

Where do you live? City: _____

County: _____

Q. What is your age?

- Under 18
- 18-24
- 25-34
- 35-44
- 45-54
- 55-64
- 65-74
- 75+

Q. Please indicate your race/ethnicity.

[Please check only one]

- Black/African-American (non-Hispanic)
- South Asian
- Arab
- Iranian/Persian
- Afghan
- Hispanic/Latino
- Native American
- Asian/Pacific Islander
- White (non-Hispanic)
- Other (Please specify): _____

Q. What Muslim subgroup do you most identify with?

- Sunni
- Shi'a
- Sufi
- Ismaeli
- Just Muslim
- Other tradition (Please specify): _____
- Don't know/Rather not answer

Q. To what extent do you consider yourself religious?

- Very religious
- Religious
- Somewhat religious
- Not very religious
- Not at all religious

Q. How frequently do you attend the mosque?

- I attend all five prayers
- I attend every day
- I only attend Friday prayers
- I only attend the Eid prayers
- I rarely attend
- I never go

Q. How often do you pray?

- I pray all 5 daily prayers
- I pray at least 3 of the daily prayers
- I pray one of the daily prayers
- I do not pray

Q. How do you approach your religion?

- I follow Hanafi school of law
- I follow Maliki school of law
- I follow Shafi'i school of law
- I follow the Hanbali school of law
- I consider myself a Salafi
- I consider myself a Jaafari
- I follow a blend of the schools
- I don't follow any particular school
- Don't know

Q. To what extent do you identify and feel affiliated with other Muslims?

- All the time
- Most of the time
- Sometimes
- Rarely
- Never

Q. What is your native language?

Q. What primary language do you speak?

- English Only
- Native language, listed above
- Native language better than English
- English better than native language
- Mix of Both
- Other (Please specify): _____

How many languages do you speak?

Q. What is your primary source of information?

- Internet
- Television
- Radio

- Newspaper
- Friends
- Other

Do you rely on a foreign source for your information?

- Yes
- No

Q. What is your current marital status?

- Married
- Separated
- Divorced
- Widowed
- Domestic Partner/Civil Union
- Never been married

Is your spouse from the same ethnic/national/racial/religious background?

- Yes
- No

-If no, from where? _____

Q. Do you have any children?

- Yes
- No

If yes, how many children do you have?

Q. Including your spouse and children, who else do you live with? [Check all that apply]

- Mother-in-law
- Father-in-law
- Brother-in-law
- Sister-in-law
- Mother
- Father
- Sister
- Brother
- Grandparent
- Relatives
- Friends
- Other

Q. In what country were you born?

Q. If not born in the U.S., in what year did you come to the U.S.? _____

Q. Do you provide financial assistance to your family where you were born?

- Yes
- No

Q. If not born in the U.S., what would you say is the MAIN reason you came to the United States?

- Educational opportunities
- Economic opportunities
- Employment opportunity
- Conflict or persecution in your home country
- Marriage
- Family reasons
- Other reason? *(Please specify):*

Q. If born outside the U.S., are you currently a citizen of the United States?

- Yes
- No

Q. If not a citizen of the U.S., what is your immigration status?

- Green card (temporary)
- Green Card (permanent)
- Employment Visa
- Student Visa
- Undocumented
- Political refugee/asylee
- Filing for papers
- Other *((Please specify):*

SECTION B: IDENTITY

Q. Do you refer to yourself as:

- American Muslim
- Muslim American

Q. Do you consider yourself:

- American first
- Muslim first
- Both equally
- Your ethnicity first *(i.e. Afghan, Egyptian, Pakistani, Iranian)*
- American, Muslim and your ethnicity

Q. Are you a convert to Islam?

- Yes
- No

If yes, when did you embrace Islam?

- before 1960s
- 1970s
- 1980s
- 1990s
- Post 9/11
- within the last year

Before conversion, what religious affiliation did you have?

- Protestant
- Catholic
- Jewish
- Hindu
- Buddhist
- Atheist
- Agnostic
- Other

If you converted what was the motivation

- Visited a mosque
- A friend
- Reading about Islam through books, internet
- Marriage
- Before conversion were you a practicing person?
- Attended a house of worship once a week

Q. Do you think what happens to Muslims in this country will affect what happens in your life?

- A great deal
- A fair amount
- Only a little
- Nothing

Q. How much do you think you have in common with other Muslims living in the United States?

- A great deal
- A fair amount
- Only a little
- Nothing

Q. How important is it for Muslims to change so that they blend into the larger society?

- Very important
- Somewhat important
- Not too important
- Not at all important

Q. To what extent do you think that the current Muslim leadership represents you or your vision of Islam?

- Yes, very much
- Yes, somewhat
- Only a little
- Not at all

SECTION C: EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION BACKGROUND

Q. What is the highest level of education you completed?

- Less than High School
- High School graduate
- Some College/Technical School
- College graduate
- Graduate school
- Ph.D.

Q. Where did you attend school?

- In the U.S.
- Abroad
- Both 03

Q. What type of school did your kids attend?

- Public school
- Private school
- Islamic school
- Home school

Q. How would you rate your own personal financial situation?

- Excellent condition
- Good condition
- Fair condition
- Poor condition
- Don't know/Rather not answer

Q. Are you currently employed full-time, part-time or not employed?

- Full-time
- Part-time
- Under-employed
- Not employed
- Looking for employment
- Retired
- Full or Part Time Student
- Stay-at-home parent

Q. What industry are you currently working in?

- Tech
- Medical
- Education
- Government

- Retail
- Service
- Construction
- Other

Q. Are you self-employed?

- Yes
- No

If self-employed what type of business do you do? _____

How long have you been self-employed?

How many people do you employ?

Q. Does your family receive the following benefits from the government? [Check all that apply]

- Government Assistance
- Food Stamps
- Housing Assistance
- Medical Assistance
- No Assistance

Q. What is your total combined household income?

- Less than \$20,000
- \$20,000 to \$39,999
- \$40,000 to \$59,999
- \$60,000 to \$79,999
- \$80,000 to \$99,999
- \$100,000 to \$149,999
- \$150,000–\$199,999
- \$200,001–\$249,999
- More than \$250,000

Q. Do you currently own or rent your home?

- Own
- Rent
- Neither

Q. Do you have health insurance?

- Yes
- No

If yes, where do you get your health needs?

- Kaiser
- Private Insurance
- Insured through employer
- Emergency Room
- Community Clinic
- County Health Department

- Don't seek health services

Q. Have you ever consumed alcohol?

- Yes
- No

Q. Have you ever used drugs?

- Yes
- No

SECTION D: RELIGIOUS AND CIVIC ACTIVITIES

Q. How important is religion in your life?

- Very important
- Somewhat important
- Not too important
- Not at all important
- Rather not answer

Q. Please circle how important each of the following religious activities are to you. (1 indicating very important and 5 indicating not at all important)

- 1 - Very important
- 2 - Somewhat important
- 3 - Neutral
- 4 - Not too important
- 5 - Not at all important

a. Giving charity, or zakat

1 2 3 4 5

b. Fasting during Ramadan

1 2 3 4 5

c. Undertaking a pilgrimage to Mecca

1 2 3 4 5

d. Reading or listening to Quran daily

1 2 3 4 5

e. Do you only eat halal (zabiha) meat?

1 2 3 4 5

f. Do you feel Muslim women should wear the head scarf?

1 2 3 4 5

g. Do you think men should grow a beard?

1 2 3 4 5

SECTION E: CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND VOLUNTEERISM

Q. During the last 12 months, have you done any volunteer activities?

- Yes
- No

Q. In the past 12 months which of the following did you participate in? [Check as many as apply]

- Parent-Teacher Association (PTA)
- English Learner Advisory Committee (ELAC)
- School Site Council
- School board meetings
- Chamber of Commerce
- City Council meetings
- Student Council meetings
- Honor Society meeting
- Fraternity or Sorority meeting
- Boy Scouts or Girl Scouts meeting

Q. In the past 12 months which of the following volunteer work have you participated in? [Check as many as apply]

- Raise funds for a family that needed help
- Helped drive kids in the neighborhood to school
- Take care of a relative's kids after school
- Cook meals when a friend is sick

Q. In the last 12 months, what type of organizations did you volunteer with? [Check as many as apply]

- Religious organizations
- Youth organizations
- Social organizations
- Community service organizations
- Political organizations

Q. How many hours did you spend volunteering per month? _____

Q. If the answer is yes, how many times per month?

- Only once
- 2-3 times
- 4-5 times
- 6-7 times
- 8-10 times
- 10 times+

Q. What type of activities do you perform for the main organization? [Check as many as apply]

- Administrative support
- Helping the poor
- Blood drive
- Organizing a lecture
- Tutoring
- Fundraising
- Serving food
- Medical services
- Educational training
- Health promotion
- Counseling
- Other _____

Please indicate whether you have volunteered with any of the following types of organizations or groups:

A. Religious organization

- Yes, I have volunteered within the last 12 months
- Yes, I volunteer once a month or more
- Not within the last 12 months

B. Environmental organization

- Yes, I have volunteered within the last 12 months
- Yes, I volunteer once a month or more
- Not within the last 12 months

C. Civic or community organization involved in health or social services

- Yes, I have volunteered within the last 12 months
- Yes, I volunteer once a month or more
- Not within the last 12 months

D. An organization for youth, children, or education

- Yes, I have volunteered within the last 12 months
- Yes, I volunteer once a month or more
- Not within the last 12 months

E. Any other group: (please specify):

- _____
- Yes, I have volunteered within the last 12 months
 - Yes, I volunteer once a month or more
 - Not within the last 12 months

Q. Do you belong to any of the following types of groups or associations? [Check as many as apply]

- labor unions
- professional associations
- political group
- social group
- sports team
- youth group

Q. Do you donate money to any of the following types of groups or associations? [Check as many as apply]

- labor unions
- political group
- social group
- sports team
- youth group
- professional associations
- homeowners association

Q. Have you personally walked, run, or bicycled for a charitable cause? This is separate from sponsoring or giving money to this type of event.

- Yes, within the last 12 months
- Yes, but not within the last 12 months
- No, never

Q. How much money do you donate to charity on an annual basis?

- at least \$100
- \$100–\$500
- \$500–\$1000
- \$1000–\$5000
- \$5000–\$10,000
- \$10,000–\$25,000
- More than \$25,000

Q. Aside from donating money, have you ever done anything else to help raise money for a charitable cause?

- Yes, within the last 12 months
- Yes, but not within the last 12 months
- No, never

SECTION F: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Q. In general, how closely would you say you follow news about politics and current events?

- Very closely
- Somewhat closely
- Not too closely
- Not at all

Q. Are you registered to vote?

- Yes, I am registered
- No, I did not register
- I am planning to register
- I am not interested
- Other (Please specify) _____

Q. Did you vote in the previous presidential election?

- Yes
- No
- Can't remember
- Not a citizen

Q. In the 2012 Presidential election, even if you do not plan to vote, which candidate do you support?

- President Barak Obama
- Mitt Romney
- Other

Q. With which political party do you consider yourself aligned?

- Republican
- Democrat
- Independent
- No preference
- Other _____
- Don't know/Rather not answer

Q. In general, which of the following best describes your political views?

- Very conservative
- Conservative
- Moderate
- Liberal
- Very liberal
- Don't know/Refused

Q. What policy issues are you most concerned about? [Please number them from 1 being most important to 9 being least important]

- ___ Economy
- ___ Foreign Policy
- ___ Education
- ___ Environment
- ___ Health Care
- ___ Civil Liberties
- ___ Islamophobia
- ___ Immigration
- ___ Other (Please specify) _____

Q. Have you volunteered for a political organization or candidate running for office?

- Yes, within the last 12 months
- Yes, but not within the last 12 months
- No, never

Q. When there is an election taking place, do you try to convince people to vote for or against one of the parties or candidates, or not?

- Yes, always
- Usually
- No

Q. Do you wear a campaign button, put a sticker on your car, or place a sign in front of your house?

- Yes, always
- Usually
- No

Q. Have you given money to a candidate, political party, or organization that supported candidates?

- Yes, within the last 12 months
- Yes, but not within the last 12 months
- No, never

Q. Have you ever contacted or visited a public official – at any level of government – to express your opinion?

- Yes, within the last 12 months
- Yes, but not within the last 12 months
- No, never

Q. Have you ever contacted a newspaper, radio, television or magazine to express your opinion on an issue?

- Yes, within the last 12 months
- Yes, but not within the last 12 months
- No, never

Q. Have you ever taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration?

- Yes, within the last 12 months
- Yes, but not within the last 12 months
- No, never

Q. Have you ever signed a petition about a social or political issue?

- Yes, within the last 12 months
- Yes, but not within the last 12 months
- No, never

Q. Do voice opinions about politics via email, Twitter or Facebook

- Yes, within the last 12 months
- Yes, but not within the last 12 months
- No, never

Q. Have you ever refused to buy something from a certain company because you disagreed with the social or political values of the company that produced it?

- Yes, within the last 12 months
- Yes, but not within the last 12 months
- No, never

Q. Have you worked as a canvasser – going door to door for a political or social group or candidate?

- Yes, within the last 12 months
- Yes, but not within the last 12 months
- No, never

Q. Have you served as an appointed or elected public official?

- Yes, within the last 12 months
- Yes, but not within the last 12 months
- No, never

Q. Should the United States maintain troops in Afghanistan?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know

Q. Do you think the new security measures at U.S. airports are targeted at Muslims or to all Americans equally?

- Targeted at Muslims
- All Americans equally

Q. As a Muslim living in the U.S., do you think Islamic teachings are compatible with participation in the American political system?

- Yes, very much
- Yes, somewhat
- Only a little
- Not at all

Q. Generally speaking, when it comes to government programs, do you favor a smaller government with fewer services, or larger government with many services?

- Smaller
- Larger
- Don't know

Q. Do you think discrimination against Muslims is much of a problem in today's society?

- Yes, very much
- Yes, somewhat
- Not really

Q. Have you ever been a victim of a hate crime?

- Yes
 No

Q. Have you ever been discriminated against based on your religious identity as a Muslim?

- Yes
 No

Q. Have you ever known a Muslim who has been a victim of a hate crime?

- Yes
 No

Q. Have you ever known someone who was discriminated against based on their religious identity as a Muslim?

- Yes
 No

Q. What do you think is the single biggest challenge facing the Muslim community in the United States?

THANK YOU!

Focus Group Questions

Name of Volunteer: _____

Location of Survey: _____

Background:

1. How do you identify yourself?
2. In general, what do you say are some of the greatest challenges facing the American Muslim community?
3. What are the specific challenges facing your particular segment of the Muslim community?

Muslim Identity:

1. Do you attend Mosque? Why or why not? How often?
2. Some reports indicate that American mosques and American Muslims are being monitored. How does this make you feel? Are you nervous about this? Do you trust the system? Do you think you can be falsely accused of supporting terrorists?
3. If you are a convert, how have things changed before and after embracing Islam? Have any of these perceptions been altered since 9-11?
4. Since 9-11, unfavorable attitudes of Islam in mainstream society have increased. Have you experienced any backlash yourself? Why do you think this is so?
5. Do you think Muslims have not done enough to “exonerate” their images? OR What – if anything – should Muslims be doing to change the public’s impression of them and of Islam more generally?

6. As I mentioned, we are going to be conducting a larger survey of American Muslims later this year. Do you have any advice for us in what to say to prospective Muslim survey respondents to make them feel at ease and willing to cooperate with the survey? We think that people answer our question about religious affiliation honestly, but some people worry that Muslims may sometimes be afraid to do so... what do you think?

Local Community:

1. Living in [City X], would you say the Muslim population is well-respected here? Why?
2. Do you think Muslims in this city have it better-off than Muslims elsewhere? Why or why not?
3. How would you describe the relationship of the Muslim community with local political leaders? What about other religious groups: Christians? Jews?
4. In your view, what are the most pressing social needs or problems facing Muslims in (CITY), and how are they being addressed?
5. What about Muslim community centers and advocacy groups: Do you have confidence in them?
6. What about your local mosque? Public schools?
7. [QUESTIONS OR ISSUES RAISED BY PARTICIPANTS]

Are there any specific questions or issues that you feel we've overlooked in our discussion

Civic and Political Engagement:

1. Are you civically engaged [Please Define] with the community? How?
2. Are you civically engaged outside the Muslim community? How?
3. What are your views of American politics and should Muslims be involved?
4. Are you politically engaged [Please Define]? How?
5. Are Muslims successful in their political engagement? Do Muslims have influence in politics?
6. How effective have Muslims in the Bay Area been in mobilizing and getting involved politically?
7. What policy issues are you most concerned about?

8. Do you have confidence in existing political institutions? How about the president, Congress, the courts – and how about local political people and institutions — specifically: Mayor, city hall, police?
9. How do you get your news? Do you rely on any sources other than the U.S. mainstream media? Some of these sources might include news/entertainment from local, national, online, or foreign-based Muslim media, e.g., Al-Jazeera.

PROBE:

1. Do local political leaders care about you?
2. gaining support for an initiative or sustaining it by working with legislators and officials at different government levels;
3. influencing public opinion on particular issues by contacting the media;
4. coalition building with other groups to build political support;
5. Running Muslim candidates.
6. Trust or confidence in elected officials; political system; government, etc.

Time permitting, these probing questions can be asked:

Group Consciousness Questions:

1. People think of themselves in different ways. In general, do you think of yourself as an American, South Asian, Arab, African American or [ETHNIC GROUP] American?
2. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, and Independent, or of another political affiliation?
3. How would you describe your views on most matters having to do with politics? Do you generally think of yourself as liberal, middle-of-the-road, or conservative?
4. How interested are you in politics and what's going on in government in general?
5. The political parties and candidate organizations, as well as other political groups, try to contact as many people as they can to get them to vote for particular candidates. During the past four years, have you received any letter, e-mail, or telephone call from a political party or candidate organization or other political group about a political campaign?

6. In the past four years, did someone you know try to request you to vote, or to contribute money to a political cause, or to engage in some other type of political activity?
7. If you have an opportunity to decide on two candidates for political office, one of whom is Muslim, would you be more likely to vote for the Muslim candidate if the two are equally qualified?
8. What does it mean to you to be an American?
9. Do you perceive any differences between Muslims from Muslim majority countries and Muslims born in the United States?
10. Do you want people to know that you are Muslim, or would you prefer that they did not know?
11. Muslims often complain about the lack of unity and cohesion within the Muslim community. Do you think there is a lack of unity? Do you believe this lack of unity has hurt Muslims?

Health and Well-being:

1. How would you describe your overall well being these days? Are you satisfied with your life personally? Are you satisfied professionally? Are you more stressed and anxious than before 9-11?
2. What about stress from work? Is that related to 9-11?

Bay Area Focus Group Basic Demographic Information

Gender: _____

What is your age?: _____

Are you married?: _____

How many children do you have?: _____

Where is your place of birth?:

If not born in the U.S., in what year did you come to the United States?:

Are you a U.S. citizen?: _____

Where do you live? City: _____

How long have you lived in the Bay Area?:

Please indicate your race/ethnicity.

- African-American (non-Hispanic)
- South Asian
- Afghan
- Arab
- Hispanic/Latino
- Native American
- Asian/Pacific Islander
- White (non-Hispanic)
- Other (Please specify): _____

Are you a convert to Islam? _____

What Muslim subgroup do you most identify with?

- Sunni
- Shi'a
- Ismaeli
- Sufi
- Zaydi
- Don't know/Rather not answer
- Other tradition (Please specify)

To what extent do you consider yourself religious?

- Very religious

- Religious
- Somewhat religious
- Not very religious
- Not at all religious

How frequently do you attend the mosque?

- I never attend
- I only attend Eid
- I have never been to the mosque
- I attend every day
- I attend all five prayers

How often do you pray?

- I pray all 5 daily prayers
- I pray at least 3 of the daily prayers
- I pray one of the daily prayers
- I do not pray

What is your native language? _____

What is the highest educational level that you have completed?

- No education
- H.S. diploma
- Some college
- College diploma
- Graduate Degree
- Ph.D.

What industry are you currently working in?

- Tech
- Medical
- Education
- Government
- Retail
- Service
- Construction
- Other

Please estimate your total annual family income:

- Below \$12,000
- \$12,000 – 20,000
- \$20,000 – 50,000
- \$50,000 – 75,000
- \$75,000–\$100,000
- \$100,000–\$150,000
- \$150,000–\$200,000
- \$200,000–\$250,000
- More than \$250,000



APPENDIX C

The below table documents the Bay Area's Muslim-owned, operated, or serving institutions and businesses.

Name of Organization	Organization Type	Demographic Served/ Type of Food	ONBA Grant Recipient (Y or N)	City	Website	Email Address
Voice of Witness	Community Organization	Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim and South Asian communities; adults and young adults ages 13-18	Y	San Francisco	www.voiceofwitness.com/	letters@voiceofwitness.com
Oakland Community Organizations	Community Organization	Faith Based Communities	Y	Oakland	http://www.oaklandcommunity.org/	lafitteolu@oaklandcommunity.org
Zawaya	Community Organization	Arab American Communities	Y	San Francisco	http://zawaya.org/site/	info@zawaya.org
Afghan Coalition	Community Organization	Afghani American Communities	Y	Fremont	http://www.afghancoalition.org/	Info@afghancoalition.org
United Religions Initiative	Community Organization	Faith Based Communities	Y	San Francisco	http://www.uri.org/	office@uri.org
Congregations Organizing for Renewal	Community Organization	Faith Based Communities	Y	Hayward	http://www.corcommunity.org/	info@corcommunity.org
Arab Resource and Organizing Center	Community Organization	Arab American Communities	Y	San Francisco	http://www.araborganizing.org/	info@araborganizing.org
Arab Culture and Community Center	Community Organization	Arab American Communities	Y	San Francisco	http://www.arabculturalcenter.org/	info@arabculturalcenter.org
Clergy and Laity United for Economic Justice	Community Organization	Faith Based Communities	Y	Los Angeles	http://www.clueca.org/index.htm	info@clueca.org
Abraham's Vision	Community Organization	Faith Based Communities	Y	Redwood City	http://www.abrahamsvision.org/	N/A
San Francisco Organizing Project	Community Organization	Faith Based Communities	Y	San Francisco	http://www.sfop.org/	N/A
Islamic Networks Group	Community Organization	American Muslim Communities	Y	San Jose	http://www.ing.org/	mail@ing.org
Golden Thread Productions	Community Organization	Middle Eastern American Communities	Y	San Francisco	http://www.goldenthread.org/	information@goldenthread.org
San Francisco Interfaith Council	Community Organization	Faith Based Communities	Y	San Francisco	http://www.sfinterfaithcouncil.org/index.html	mgpappas.sfic@gmail.com
Interfaith Council of Contra Costa Community	Community Organization	Faith Based Communities	Y	Walnut Creek	http://interfaithccc.org/	N/A
Buena Vista Community Institute/Buena Vista United Methodist	Community Organization	Faith Based Communities	Y	Alameda	http://bvumc.wordpress.com/	N/A
Zaytuna College	Educational Institution	Muslim University Students	N	Berkeley	http://zaytunacollege.org/	http://www.zaytunacollege.org/contact/
Averroes Institute	Educational Institution	Muslim High School Students	N	Fremont	http://www.averroesinstitute.com/cgi-bin/averroes.cgi	info@averroesinstitute.com

NOTE: Cells that contain information that was not readily available have a designation of N/A information and may be found with more in-depth research

Name of Organization	Organization Type	Demographic Served / Type of Food	ONBA Grant Recipient (Y or N)	City	Website	Email Address
Northstar School	Educational Institution	Muslim Students Grades Kindergarten to 8th Grade	N	Union City	http://northstarschool.org/	info@northstarschool.org
Granada Islamic School	Educational Institution	Muslim Students Grades Pre-Kindergarten to 8th Grade	N	Santa Clara	http://granadaschool.org/	
Mounir Islamic School	Educational Institution	Islamic School Serving the SFBA and Sacramento Areas	N	Cupertino	N/A	mounirkad@yahoo.com
San Francisco Islamic School	Educational Institution	Islamic Elementary School, Sunday School, After School Program, and Adult Education School	N	San Francisco	http://www.sfishamicchool.org/sfis/	info@sfishamicchool.org
Peace Terrace Academy	Educational Institution	Muslim Students Grades Pre-Kindergarten to 8th Grade	N	Fremont	www.peaceterrace.org	
Bay Area Arabic School	Educational Institution	Islamic Weekend School Program	N	Concord	www.bayareaarabicschool.org	admin@bayareaarabicschool.org
Middle East Food Market	Grocery Store/Market	N/A	N	Fremont	http://www.mefoodmarket.com/	customerservice@mefoodmarket.com
Ali's Halal Meat & Grocery	Grocery Store/Market	N/A	N	Hayward	N/A	N/A
Madina Halal Foods	Grocery Store/Market	N/A	N	Fremont	N/A	N/A
Mandavi Bazaar	Grocery Store/Market	N/A	N	Union City	N/A	N/A
Hafiz Food Mart	Grocery Store/Market	N/A	N	Hayward		
El Ranchito	Grocery Store/Market	N/A	N	Hayward		
Damavand Market	Grocery Store/Market	N/A	N	Fremont		
Gifto Store	Grocery Store/Market	N/A	N	Hayward		
Khyber Halal Market	Grocery Store/Market	N/A	N	Fremont		
California Halal Market & Grill	Grocery Store/Market	N/A	N	Hayward		
Afghan Food Mart	Grocery Store/Market	N/A	N	Fremont		
Herat Market	Grocery Store/Market	N/A	N	Newark		
Costco	Grocery Store/Market	N/A	N	San Leandro	http://www.costco.com/	
Afghan Market	Grocery Store/Market	N/A	N	Hayward		
Ariana Sweets	Grocery Store/Market	N/A	N	Fremont	http://www.arianasweets.com/home_page.htm	arianasweets@gmail.com
P.O.D. Market	Grocery Store/Market	N/A	N	Hayward	http://www.campusdish.com/en-US/CSW/CSUEastBay/Locations/POD.htm	

Name of Organization	Organization Type	Demographic Served/ Type of Food	ONBA Grant Recipient (Y or N)	City	Website	Email Address
Shama's Halal Market	Grocery Store/ Market	N/A	N	Hayward		
Mera Khana Fresh Meat & Grocery	Grocery Store/ Market	N/A	N	Concord	http://www.merakhana.com/	info@merakhana.com
Pamir Food Mart	Grocery Store/ Market	N/A	N	Fremont		
Yekta Market	Grocery Store/ Market	N/A	N	Fremont		
Maiwand Market	Grocery Store/ Market	N/A	N	Fremont		
Faisal Market	Grocery Store/ Market	N/A	N	Fremont		
New York Pizza	Halal Restaurants	American	N	Newark	N/A	N/A
Indian Harvest Restaurant	Halal Restaurants	Indian	N	Fremont	N/A	N/A
Mumbai Chowk	Halal Restaurants	Indian	N	Newark	http://www.mumbaichowk.com/	mail@mumbaichowk.com
Café√© Rumi	Halal Restaurants	Afghan	N	Castro Valley	http://www.cafe-rumi.com/	info@cafe-rumi.com
Darda Seafood	Halal Restaurants	Chinese	N	Fremont	http://www.dardaseafood.com/	N/A
Daawat	Halal Restaurants	South Asian	N	Union City	N/A	N/A
Tandoori-N-Curry	Halal Restaurants	Pakistani	N	Fremont	http://tandooriandcurry.com/HOME.html	tandooriandcurry@gmail.com
Texas Chicken	Halal Restaurants	American	N	Fremont	N/A	N/A
Bismillah Restaurant	Halal Restaurants	Pakistani	N	Fremont	N/A	N/A
California Gyro & Pizza	Halal Restaurants	Mediterranean	N	Hayward	N/A	N/A
Mirchi Café/©	Halal Restaurants	Fusion	N	Fremont	http://www.mirchicafe.com/	N/A
Ohlone Deli	Halal Restaurants	American	N	Fremont	N/A	N/A
Mr. Kebab	Halal Restaurants	Mediterranean	N	Union City	http://www.mrkebab.net/	fresh@mrkebab.net
Gyro Express	Halal Restaurants	Mediterranean	N	Fremont	N/A	N/A
Kabul Express Kabob	Halal Restaurants	Afghan	N	Newark	N/A	N/A
Pakwan	Halal Restaurants	Pakistani	N	Hayward	http://www.pakwanrestaurant.com/index.html	N/A
Mughal	Halal Restaurants	Pakistani	N	Hayward	http://www.gomughalrestaurant.com/1.html	email-info@gomughalrestaurant.com
New York Pasta & Pizza	Halal Restaurants	American	N	Union City	N/A	N/A
Falafel Corner	Halal Restaurants	North American	N	Fremont	N/A	N/A
De Afghanan Kabob House	Halal Restaurants	Afghan	N	Fremont	N/A	N/A
Caravan	Halal Restaurants	Afghan	N	Hayward	N/A	N/A
Pakwan	Halal Restaurants	Pakistani	N	Fremont	http://www.pakwanrestaurant.com/index.html	N/A
Galaxy Coffee	Halal Restaurants	Coffeehouse	N	Newark	N/A	N/A
Century House & Gardens	Halal Restaurants	Afghan	N	Fremont	N/A	N/A
Sala Thai (II)	Halal Restaurants	Thai	N	Fremont	http://www.salathai-restaurant.com/	N/A
Fish & Chips Chicken Stop	Halal Restaurants	American	N	San Leandro		N/A

Name of Organization	Organization Type	Demographic Served / Type of Food	ONBA Grant Recipient (Y or N)	City	Website	Email Address
Maiwand Kabob House	Halal Restaurants	Afghan	N	Fremont		N/A
Yogurtastic	Halal Restaurants	American	N	Fremont	http://yogurtastic.com/	N/A
Curry King	Halal Restaurants	Indian	N	Union City		N/A
Saffron Grill Kabob House	Halal Restaurants	Afghan	N	Newark		N/A
Mediterranean Gyro & Kabob Wraps	Halal Restaurants	Mediterranean	N	Newark		N/A
The Sweet Art of Cake	Halal Restaurants	Bakery	N	Hayward	http://www.thesweetartofcake.com/The_Sweet_Art_of_Cake/Welcome.html	thesweetartofcake@gmail.com
Shalimar (IV)	Halal Restaurants	South Asian	N	Fremont	http://www.shalimarsf.com/	shalimarcatering@att.net
CaféV© Gyro	Halal Restaurants	Mediterranean	N	Newark		N/A
Muskaan	Halal Restaurants	Indian	N	Union City		N/A
Basant	Halal Restaurants	Pakistani	N	Newark	http://www.basantcuisine.com/	info@basantcuisine.com
Syphon CaféV©	Halal Restaurants	Italian	N	Hayward		N/A
Dosa Bawarchi	Halal Restaurants	Indian	N	Milpitas	http://www.dosabawarchi.us/	info@dosabawarchi.us
Kinara Restaurant & Lounge	Halal Restaurants	Indian	N	Milpitas	http://www.kinaralounge.com/index	N/A
Malay Asian Express	Halal Restaurants	Malay	N	Fremont	http://www.malayasianexpress.com/	N/A
Garden of Eden	Halal Restaurants	Yemeni	N	San Leandro		N/A
Amma's	Halal Restaurants	Indian	N	Newark	http://www.amma.us/	N/A
Shalimar (III)	Halal Restaurants	South Asian	N	Fremont		N/A
Salang Pass	Halal Restaurants	Afghan	N	Fremont		N/A
Mission Paradise	Halal Restaurants	South Asian	N	Hayward	http://paradiseballrooms.com/	info@paradiseballroom.com
Chutney	Halal Restaurants	Pakistani	N	Fremont	http://www.chutneyfremont.com/	N/A
Biryani Bowl	Halal Restaurants	Indian	N	Fremont	http://www.biryaniibowl.com/	N/A
Gaters Kabob Hut	Halal Restaurants	Mediterranean	N	Fremont	http://www.gaterskabobhot.com/	N/A
Mehran	Halal Restaurants	South Asian	N	Newark	http://www.mehrancatering.com/	N/A
A Thai Express	Halal Restaurants	Thai	N	Newark		N/A
Taco Bravo	Halal Restaurants	Mexican	N	Fremont		N/A
Afghan Village	Halal Restaurants	Afghan	N	Newark		N/A
Lovely Sweets & Cuisine	Halal Restaurants	Indian	N	Union City		N/A
Falafel, Etc.	Halal Restaurants	Middle Eastern	N	Fremont		N/A
Balkh Bakery & Deli	Halal Restaurants	Afghan	N	Fremont		N/A
Masala Grill	Halal Restaurants	South Asian	N	Fremont	http://www.masalagrill.com/	N/A
Oasis Grill	Halal Restaurants	Mediterranean	N	Hayward	http://www.sfoasisgrill.com/	info@sfoasisgrill.com
H. Salt Fish & Chips	Halal Restaurants	American	N	Fremont		N/A
Spicy Hut	Halal Restaurants	South Indian	N	Newark	http://www.spicehut.us/	spicehut@gmail.com
Kabob Bistro	Halal Restaurants	Afghan	N	Fremont		N/A
Kabab Korner	Halal Restaurants	South Asian	N	Hayward		N/A
Chaat CaféV©	Halal Restaurants	North Indian	N	Fremont	http://www.chaatcafes.com/	SUGGESTIONS@CHAATCAFES.COM

Name of Organization	Organization Type	Demographic Served/ Type of Food	ONBA Grant Recipient (Y or N)	City	Website	Email Address
Chandni	Halal Restaurants	South Asian	N	Newark	http://gochandni.com/Home/	info@gochandni.com
Mezza's Pizza & Grill	Halal Restaurants	Mediterranean	N	Fremont	http://www.mezzaspizzaandgrill.com/	N/A
Kabul Afghan Restaurant	Halal Restaurants	Afghan	N	Hayward		N/A
Muslim Community Association	Islamic Center	Multicultural	N	Santa Clara	http://www.mcabayarea.org/	Form via website: http://www.mcabayarea.org/about-us/contact-us
Muslim Community Center of East Bay	Islamic Center	Predominantly South Asian	N	Pleasanton	http://www.mcceastbay.org/	info@mcceastbay.org
Oakland Islamic Center	Islamic Center	Predominantly Arab	N	Oakland	N/A	N/A
San Ramon Valley Islamic Center	Islamic Center	Multicultural	N	San Ramon	http://www.srvic.org/	info@srvic.org
South Valley Islamic Center	Islamic Center	Multicultural	N	San Martin	http://www.svic.org/about.php	info@svic.org
Blossom Valley Muslim Community Center	Islamic Center	Multicultural	N	San Jose	http://bvmcc.org/	N/A
Islamic Society of San Francisco	Islamic Center	Multicultural	N	San Francisco	http://islamsf.com/prayer.php	issf@att.net
Taqwa Islamic Center	Islamic Center	Predominantly South Asian	N	Fremont	http://www.taqwaislamiccenter.org/	info@taqwaislamiccenter.org
Walnut Creek Islamic Center	Islamic Center	Multicultural	N	Walnut Creek	http://www.darulislam.org/	N/A
Berkeley Masjid	Masjid	Multicultural; mostly students	N	Berkeley	www.berkeleymasjid.org	Form via website: www.berkeleymasjid.org
Al-Hilal Center	Masjid	Predominantly South Asian	N	Milpitas	www.alhilaal.org/wp/sample-page/	info@alhilaal.org
Islamic Center of Alameda	Masjid	Multicultural	N	Alameda	http://icabayarea.org/	Form via website: http://icabayarea.org/index.php/contacts
Islamic Center of Berkeley	Masjid	Multicultural; mostly students	N	Berkeley	N/A	N/A
Islamic Center of Livermore	Masjid	Multicultural	N	Livermore	http://www.iclivermore.org/index.html	icl@iclivermore.org
Islamic Cultural Center of Northern California	Masjid	Predominantly Persian	N	Oakland	http://www.iccnc.org/articlePage.php?About-Us-86	info@iccnc.org
Islamic Society of East Bay	Masjid	Predominantly South Asian	N	Fremont	http://www.iseb.org/	N/A
Jamaatus Saalam	Masjid	African American	N	Oakland	N/A	N/A
Lighthouse Mosque	Masjid	Multicultural	N	Oakland	http://www.lighthousemosque.org/aboutus.htm	thelighthousemosque@gmail.com
MASJID ABUBAKR	Masjid	Predominantly Arab	N	Oakland	N/A	N/A
Masjid Al-Iman	Masjid	Multicultural	N	Oakland	N/A	N/A
Masjid Al-Salam	Masjid	Predominantly Arab	N	Oakland	N/A	N/A
Abu Bakr as-Siddiq Mosque	Masjid	Predominantly Afghani	N	Hayward	N/A	N/A
Masjid Al-Islam	Masjid	African American	N	Oakland	N/A	N/A
MASJIDUL WARITHEEN	Masjid	African American	N	Oakland	http://masjidulwaritheen.org/	Form via website http://masjidulwaritheen.org/contact.html
Masjid An-Noor	Masjid	Multicultural	N	Richmond	N/A	N/A
Islamic Center of Fremont	Masjid	Predominantly South Asian	N	Fremont	http://www.icfbayarea.org/	N/A
Afghan Islamic Center	Masjid	Afghani	N	Concord	N/A	N/A

Name of Organization	Organization Type	Demographic Served/ Type of Food	ONBA Grant Recipient (Y or N)	City	Website	Email Address
Ibrahim Khalilullah Islamic Center	Masjid	Multicultural	N	Fremont	http://ikicenter.org/	info@IKICenter.org
Islamic Society of West Contra Costa County	Masjid	Predominantly South Asian	N	Richmond	N/A	N/A
Masjid Quba	Masjid	Multicultural	N	Alameda	N/A	N/A
Masjid Al- Noor	Masjid	N/A		Santa Clara	http://www.mcabayarea.org/locations	N/A
Bay Area Cultural Connections	Masjid/ Cultural Center	Turkish		Sunnyvale	http://baycc.org/baycc-english/contact-us/	contact@baycc.org
Bay Area Cultural Connections- Second location	Masjid/ Cultural Center	Turkish		Albany	http://baycc.org/baycc-english/contact-us/	contact@baycc.org
Islamic Center of East Bay	Masjid	N/A		Antioch	http://antiochmasjid.org/	
Yaseen Foundation	Masjid/ Community Center	N/A		Belmont	http://www.yaseen.org/index.php/contact-us	yaseen@yaseen.org
Taleef Collective	Nonprofit Organization	N/A		Freemont	http://www.taleefcollective.org/?page_id=124	info@Taleefcollective.org
Islamic Association of Immigrants	Masjid	Afghan		Hayward	N/A	N/A
Islamic Center of Mill Valley	Masjid	African American		Mill Valley	N/A	N/A
Peninsula Muslim Association	Masjid/ Rug Store	N/A		Mountain View	http://peninsulamuslimassociation.com/	N?A
Al-Medina Education Center	Masjid/School	N/A		Newark	http://www.mec1.org/about_us.php	reach@mec1.org
North Marin Islamic Center	Masjid	N/A		Novato	N/A	N/A
Masjid Tasbeeh	Masjid	Multicultural		Oakland	N/A	N/A
Jamil Islamic Center	Masjid	Sufi		Palo Alto	N/A	N/A
Islamic Center of Stanford University	Masjid	Nondemonitonal		Stanford	N/A	N/A
Al-Madinah Academy	Masjid	N/A		San Bruno	N/A	N/A
Bayview Islamic Unity Center	Islamic Center	Sufi		San Francisco	N/A	N/A
Al-Tawhid Mosque	Masjid	Salafi- Yemeni		San Francisco	N/A	N/A

ENDNOTES

1 The only exceptions to this are recommendations directed at the academic community. Based largely on both authors' combined decades of formal education and community experience, they reflect the needs gleaned from many conversations with broader communities and their leaders, as well as involvement in building academic programs in Berkeley, San Francisco State University, San Jose State University, Stanford, Saint Mary's College, University of San Francisco, Santa Clara University, Diablo Valley College, and Zaytuna College.

2 A glossary of terms is available at the end of the report.

3 Sarita Ahuja, Pronita Gupta and Daranee Petsod, *Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim and South Asian Communities in the San Francisco Bay Area: An Introduction for Grantmakers*, Report (November 2004)

4 *Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream*. (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2007); *Muslim Americans: No Signs of Growth in Alienation or Support for Extremism* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2011).

5 John Blake, "Arab- and Persian-American Campaign 'Check it Right' on census." *CNN*, April 1, 2010. http://articles.cnn.com/2010-04-01/us/census.check.it.right.campaign_1_arab-american-leaders-census-form-persian?s=PM:US. Last accessed March 26, 2013.

6 In order to provide comparative analysis, several of the questions for the quantitative survey were pulled from previous studies including the ISPU report "A Window Into American Muslim Physicians: Civic Engagement and Community Participation" by Wahiba Abu-Ras, Lance Laird, and Farid Senzai. See Appendix B for further details.

7 We define "disengaged and disenfranchised" Muslims as those individuals, who self-identify as Muslims, yet are not connected/affiliated with any Muslim organization and did not attend participate in any mosque-based prayers. This disconnection with Muslim faith-based institutions and religious centers is due to what they have identified as intra-community cultural, political, social, gender and religious barriers.

8 For more information on "R", see: <http://www.r-project.org/>. Last accessed March 26, 2013.

9 For further information, see Appendix B.

10 For instance, see: *Muslim Americans: No Signs of Growth*.

11 See: <http://ias.org/>. *International Association of Sufism*, 2013.

12 The H1B is a non-immigrant visa. Designed for specialty occupations, it allows employers to temporarily employ foreign workers.

13 "Our History," *Zaytuna College* (2013). http://www.zaytunacollege.org/about/our_history/. Last accessed March 26, 2013.

14 "Why Zaytuna College?" *Zaytuna College*, (2013). <http://www.zaytunacollege.org/about/>. Last accessed March 26, 2013.

15 The Occupy Movement is an international protest movement that opposes socioeconomic inequality and seeks to make socioeconomic policies more just and evenly distributed, as opposed to being highly concentrated among a small minority of individuals and large business entities. "Background & Timeline." *#Occupytogether*, (2013). <http://www.occupytogether.org/aboutoccupy/#background>. Last accessed March 26, 2013.

16 For more information on the Muslim Nurses Association, see: <http://muslimnursesassociation.blogspot.com/search?updated-max=2008-04-17T14:41:00-07:00&max-results=7&start=14&by-date=false>. Last accessed March 26, 2013.

17 Ghayur, Arif. 1984. "Demographic Evolution of Pakistanis in America: A Case Study of a Muslim Subgroup," *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 1: 113; Stone, Carol L. 1991. "Estimate of Muslims in America" in Yvonne Y. Haddad (ed.), *The Muslims of America* New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 25-36.

18 Bagby, Ihsan, Paul M. Perl and Bryan T. Froehle. 2001. "The Mosque in America: A National Portrait." Washington DC, Council on American Islamic Relations.

19 For a concise analysis, see Husain, Asad and Imran Husain. 1996. "A Brief History and Demographics of Muslims in the United States," in *Muslims in America: Opportunities and Challenges*, Husain, A., J. Woods, and J. Akhter. Chicago: International Strategy and Policy Institute, 19-43 and Carol L. Stone, "Estimate of Muslims in America," in Yvonne Y. Haddad (ed.). 1991. *The Muslims of America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 25-36.

20 According to the 2010 U.S. Census, the Bay Area population stood at 6,117,033 in five major counties of Alameda, Santa Clara, Contra Costa, San Francisco, San Mateo, and Marin.

21 John Ayers. 2007 "Changing Sides: 9/11 and the American Muslim Voter," *Review of Religious Research* 49, no. 2.

- 22 "San Francisco Bay Area," Bay Area Census, accessed April 9, 2013, <http://www.bayareacensus.ca.gov/bayarea.htm>.
- 23 Lindsay M. Howden and Julie A. Meyer, "Age and Sex Composition." *U.S. Census Bureau*, 2011. <http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf>. Last accessed March 26, 2013.
- 24 Dennis Cauchon and Paul Overburg, "Census Data Show Minorities Now a Majority of U.S. Births." *USA Today*, 2012. <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-05-17/minority-births-census/55029100/1>. Last accessed March 26, 2013.
- 25 This national rate is based on data taken from U.S. Census Bureau and the Pew Research Center. Nationally, 9 percent of men and 12 percent of women indicated that they were currently divorced. See: Ross Toro, "Marriage and Divorce Statistics Nationwide (Infographic)." *LiveScience.com*, September 28, 2011. <http://www.livescience.com/16185-marriage-divorce-statistics-infographic.html>. Last accessed March 26, 2013.
- 26 A total of 54 percent of our survey respondents did not answer this question. Therefore, one should take this statistic with some caution.
- 27 Taken from: "Total Fertility Rate (Children Born Per Woman) 2012." *U.S. Global Health Policy*, 2012. <http://www.globalhealthfacts.org/data/topic/map.aspx?ind=87>. Last accessed March 26, 2013.
- 28 Taken from: "National Center for Health Statistics." *Centers for Disease Control and Prevention*, 2013. <http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/>. Last accessed March 26, 2013.
- 29 This includes Egyptians, Yemeni, Iraqi, and Palestinians.
- 30 It should be noted that 37 percent of respondents did not answer this question. Therefore, this response needs to be taken with some caution.
- 31 Once again, 37% of respondents did not answer this question. Therefore, this response needs to be taken with some caution.
- 32 Based on data from the American Community Survey, conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. See: "San Francisco Bay Area." *California Bay Area Census*, 2010. <http://www.bayareacensus.ca.gov/bayarea.htm>. Last accessed March 26, 2013.
- 33 "Educational Attainment in the United States: 2011 — Detailed Tables." *U.S. Census Bureau*, (2012). <http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps/2011/tables.html>. Last accessed March 26, 2013.
- 34 There are many reasons that may explain the differences within each community and profession. However, data from primary investigator Bazian's interviews with local Yemeni leaders points to a process of sending their children to Yemen at a young age and then bringing them back around the high school years to maintain a first-generation immigrant experience and cultural identity. Additional factors revealed in the interviews point to financial successes in business that dampen any motivation to attain higher education as well as the lack of highly educated role models, both of which limit their aspirations. A small number of Yemeni youth and few leaders have tried to deal with this issue, but have met with only limited success. This area needs further study, surveying, and support to determine how best to help Yemeni youth value education without disrupting the community's inner working.
- 35 There are approximately 300 full time Islamic schools across the country, and less than five in the Bay Area. For further details on Islamic schools in the United States, see Karen Keyworth, "Islamic Schools of the United States: Data-based Profiles," *ISPU Report* (Canton: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2011).
- 36 For further details on Islamic schools in the United States, see Yvonne Haddad, Farid Senzai and Jane Smith, *Educating the Muslims of America* (Oxford University Press, 2009).
- 37 2010 U.S. Census Bureau.
- 38 2010 U.S. Census Bureau.
- 39 "Metropolitan Area Employment and Unemployment – October 2012." *Bureau of Labor Statistics*, November 28, 2012. http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/metro_11282012.htm. Last accessed March 26, 2013.
- 40 It should be noted that these figures reflect an overall improved national economic climate compared to prior months. See "Table A-2. Employment Status of the Civilian Population by Race, Sex, and Age." *U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics*, 2013. <http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empst.t02.htm>. Last accessed March 26, 2013. It should be noted that American Muslims include Asian, Arab, Hispanic, African American, and many other ethnic and racial groups.
- 41 Data on file with the authors.

42 2010 U.S. Census Bureau.

43 43 “Summary Health Statistics for U.S. Adults: National Health Interview Survey, 2011,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, accessed April 9, 2013, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_10/sr10_256.pdf.

44 Ibid.

45 At first this may seem surprising, given our earlier data suggesting that Marin county Muslims have a higher than average income compared to other Bay Area Muslims. At the same time, however, we note there are concentrations of blue-collar Muslims in Marin, which may partially explain our food stamp finding. But given our limited data on Marin county’s Muslims, it is difficult to draw any conclusions at this time. Further research is needed.

46 46 “San Francisco Bay Area,” Bay Area Census, accessed April 9, 2013, <http://www.bayareacensus.ca.gov/bayarea.htm>.

47 Ibid.

48 Frank Newport, “Americans’ Church Attendance Inches Up in 2010.” *Gallup*, June 25, 2010. <http://www.gallup.com/poll/141044/americans-church-attendance-inches-2010.aspx>. Last accessed March 26, 2013.

49 Yvonne Haddad, Farid Senzai and Jane Smith, *Educating the Muslims of America* (Oxford University Press, 2009).

50 Sahar Aziz, “The Muslim ‘Veil’ Post-9/11: Rethinking Women’s Rights and Leadership.” *Institute for Social Policy and Understanding*, November 2012, [http://www.ispu.org/pdfs/ISPU_Brief_AzizTerrMuslimVeil_1126_\(1\).pdf](http://www.ispu.org/pdfs/ISPU_Brief_AzizTerrMuslimVeil_1126_(1).pdf).

51 Ashraf Zahedi, “Muslim American Women in the Post-11 September Era.” *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 2, P. 183-203.

52 The Deobandi tradition is centered primarily in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh. It brought together Muslims committed to a literal and austere interpretation of Islam.

53 Based on the observations of the primary investigators, both of whom have lived and interacted with Bay Area communities for decades, local African American communities view the prevalence of liquor stores in their neighborhoods as feeding into and benefiting from their misery as a major problem. Many of them view this as an issue about which the city does not care. Also, these liquor stores tend to become centers for drug, prostitution, other criminal activities. African American Muslim leaders see the selling of liquor by Arab Muslims as a double betrayal, as violating Islamic teachings of Islam and as their concern for fellow Muslims who happen to be African American. This is a main – and frequently brought up – point made by African American Muslim community leaders. At one point it culminated in a march led by Imam Zaid Shakir and others in West Oakland’s streets.

55 See: “UFW Martyr: Nagi Daifullah.” In “UFW Martyrs.” *United Farm Workers of America*, (No date). <http://www.ufw.org/pdf/Martyrs.pdf>. Last accessed March 26, 2013.

56 Thomas Ehrlich, *Civic Responsibility and Higher Education*. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2000), P. VI.

57 “Volunteering in the United States, 2011.” *Bureau of Labor Statistics*, February 22, 2012. <http://www.bls.gov/news.release/volun.nr0.htm>. Last accessed March 26, 2013.

58 Jamal, Amaney, “The Political Participation and Engagement of Muslim Americans: Mosque Involvement and Group Consciousness.” *American Politics Research*, Vol. 33 No. 4, (July 2005), P. 521-544; Matt Barreto and Karam Dana, “Mosques as American Institutions.” *Religions*, Vol. 2, (2011), P. 504-524.

59 M. Nichols “U.S. charitable giving approaches \$300 billion in 2011”. *Reuters*. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/19/us-usa-charity-idUSBRE85I05T20120619>. Last Accessed: June 19, 2012

60 See: *The Giving Institute*. 2013. <http://www.aafrc.org/>. Last accessed March 26, 2013.

61 “Charitable Giving Statistics.” *National Philanthropic Trust*, 2012. <http://www.nptrust.org/philanthropic-resources/charitable-giving-statistics>. Last accessed March 26, 2013.

62 Richard Steinberg and Mark Wilhelm, “Religious and Secular Giving, by Race and Ethnicity.” In *Exploring Black Philanthropy: New Directions for Philanthropic Fundraising*. Eds. Patrick Rooney and Lois Sherman (Center on Philanthropy: Indianapolis, IN, 2005), 57-66.

63 It should be noted that a large number of respondents did not answer this question, and therefore the response needs to be taken with a degree of caution.

64 This statement was heavily edited due to poor English.

65 “More Americans Get Their News from the Internet.” *U.S. News and World Report*, January 11, 2011. <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2011/01/11/more-americans-get-their-news-from-the-internet>

66 For instance, see Robert C. Smith, *Conservatism and Racism, and Why in America are they the Same* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2010).

67 Farid Senzai, “Engaging American Muslims: Political Trends and Attitudes,” *ISPU Report* (Washington DC: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2012).

68 “Historical Close-of-Registration Statistics for Presidential Elections.” *Office of the California Secretary of State*, October 22, 2012. <http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/15day-general-12/hist-reg-stats1.pdf>. Last accessed March 26, 2013.

69 It should be noted that this was based on all respondents to the survey, and therefore included Muslims who were not eligible to vote.

70 We were unable to verify this organization’s name.

71 “Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections: 1828-2008.” *The American Presidency Project*, 2013. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/turnout.php>. Last accessed March 26, 2013; Mark Hugo Lopez and Paul Taylor, “Dissecting the 2008 Electorate: Most Diverse in U.S. History.” *Pew Research Hispanic Center*, April 30, 2009. <http://www.pewhispanic.org/2009/04/30/dissecting-the-2008-election-most-diverse-in-us-history/>. Last accessed March 26, 2013.

72 “Islamofascism Week” is an annual national campaign held on almost 200 campuses county-wide, including several in the Bay Area. Its basic thesis is that Islam is the new fascism and that measures must be taken to protect “Western civilization.” Speakers often endorse profiling, discrimination, and even internment of all Muslims.

73 Farid Senzai, “Engaging American Muslims: Political Trends and Attitudes,” *ISPU Report* (Washington, DC: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2012).

74 “Emerge USA 2012 Poll,” 2012

75 Ihsan Bagby, *The American Mosque 2011 (Report 1): Basic Characteristics of the American Mosque, Attitudes of Mosque Leaders*. (Washington, DC: Council on American Islamic Relations, 2011). <http://faithcommunitiestoday.org/sites/faithcommunitiestoday.org/files/The%20American%20Mosque%202011%20web.pdf>. Last accessed March 26, 2013.

76 Ihsan Bagby, *The American Mosque 2011 (Report 2): Activities, Administration and Vitality of the American Mosque*. (Washington, DC: Islamic Society of North America, 2012). <http://www.hartfordinstitute.org/The-American-Mosque-Report-2.pdf>

77 Marwa Abed, “Get Out the Muslim Vote.” *Islamic Horizons*, (May/June 2012), P. 28. http://www.isnawebpaper.com/web/components/com_file_index/isna1205/973isna1205low28.pdf. Last accessed March 26, 2013.

78 Ibid.

79 Umm Sumaya, “Youth Civic Engagement.” *Islamic Horizons*, Vol. 40, No. 1, (2011).

80 The Holy Land Foundation was a Texas-based Muslim charity that gave humanitarian relief to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza for over a decade before being shut down in December 2001. Its closure was based on accusations of financing terrorists and providing “material support” to terrorists. After two trials, five of its leaders were convicted on terrorism charges. However, prominent organizations and individuals—ranging a former Reagan-era Secretary of the Treasury and Dallas-based federal prosecutor to the American Civil Liberties Union—have strongly criticized the trials as a politically motivated prosecution. For a concise overview, see *Blocking Faith, Freezing Charity: Chilling Muslim Charitable Giving in the “War on Terrorism Financing”* (Washington, DC: American Civil Liberties Union, 2009), 61-63. <http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/humanrights/blockingfaith.pdf>. Last accessed March 26, 2013.

81 For a further assessment of the cognitive and mental health effects of anti-Muslim and anti-Arab stereotyping, see: Rebecca Clay, “Muslims in America, Post 9/11.” *APA Monitor on Psychology*, (September 2011). <http://www.apa.org/monitor/2011/09/muslims.aspx>; M.K. Hamza, Niveen Yaseen, Ashraf F. El-Houbi, Betty Duncan, and Carlos Diaz, “The Psychology of Media Bias on Arab-American and Muslim Psyche.” *The Arab Journal of Psychiatry*, Vol. 20, No. 1, (2009). <http://www.arabpsynet.com/Journals/ajp/ajp20.1-P18.pdf>; Aasim I. Padela, “The Association of Perceived Abuse and Discrimination After September 11, 2001, With Psychological Distress, Levels of Happiness, and Health Status Among Arab Americans.” *American Journal of Public Health*, Vol. 100, No. 2, (February 2010), P. 284-291; Rebecca Johnson, “A Theoretical Framework for Anti-Muslim Prejudice: Framing Tolerance via Moral Malleability and Entitativity Perceptions.” *Yale Review of Undergraduate Research in Psychology*, (2011). [http://www.yale.edu/yrurp/issues/Johnson%20\(2011\).pdf](http://www.yale.edu/yrurp/issues/Johnson%20(2011).pdf). For a cross-national comparison assessing the impact of bias

on British Muslims, see: D.W. Johnson and G. Lordan, "Discrimination Makes Me Sick! An Examination of the Discrimination-Health Relationship." *Journal of Health Economics*, Vol. 31, No. 1, (January 2012), P. 99-111.

82 This was based on the community leader focus groups and interviews with heads of several Muslim non-profit organizations.

83 Orientalism is a *traditional representation* of the Orient (generally the Middle East) in *Western academic writing, art, or popular forms of culture and communication*. It is now regarded as a *form of bigotry, stereotyping, and/or exoticizing that embodies a colonial and/or imperial attitude*.

84 For further discussion on this topic, see Kathleen Foley "The American Mosque: Behind the Controversy," *ISPU Report* (Washington, DC: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 2012).

85 Anny Bakalian and Mehdi Bozorgmehr. *Backlash 9/11 Middle Eastern and Muslim Americans Respond* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009).

86 For instance, see Diala Shamas and Nermeen Arastu, "Mapping Muslims: NYPD Spying and its Impact on American Muslims." CUNY School of Law, 2013, <http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/clinics/immigration/clear/Mapping-Muslims.pdf>. Last accessed March 26, 2013.

87 This study's researchers made it a point to call each center via phone. These calls affirmed our existing knowledge that many of them are run by volunteers with a lack of institutional support and often bereft of basic management skills. Most of the institutional leaders are contacted or known only through word of mouth, and thus no formal process or appropriate office structure exists to contact them. During the course of our follow-up process, we observed that centers were more organized and professional. Unfortunately, they are the exception and not the norm. Most of the centers' websites are not well-developed.

88 Imam al-Bukhari, "Al-Adab al-Mufrad," hadith number 479.

89 The only exceptions to this are recommendations directed at the academic community. Based largely on both authors' combined decades of formal education and community experience, they reflect the needs gleaned from many conversations with broader communities and their leaders, as well as involvement in building academic programs in Berkeley, San Francisco State University, San Jose State University, Stanford, Saint Mary's College, University of San Francisco, Santa Clara University, Diablo Valley College, and Zaytuna College.

