



# ACROSS THE ATLANTIC: ISLAM, EUROPE, AND THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE ATTACKS

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## INTRODUCTION

On the 11<sup>th</sup> of September in 2001, I was visiting Cairo on a research trip. In the afternoon, someone informed my hosts that we should all turn on the television to see a live broadcast of events related to a plane striking one of the Twin Towers in New York. Another plane struck as we watched history forever change before our eyes. The entire nature of international affairs was about to change, and the repercussions within the United States were about to challenge much of that country's policy establishment.

Close to ten years on, I was again visiting Cairo when President Barack Obama announced that Osama bin Laden had been killed in Pakistan. His passing was almost a non-event in the region, which was in itself monumental. The recent Arab uprisings, largely predicated on nonviolent protest, had delivered a message: al-Qa'eda's hopes of "Islamic revolution" there had been dashed, for the Arab masses had chosen a completely different path. Bin Laden's death passed almost unnoticed because the Arab world considered his project irrelevant to them. But in the United States, the situation was very different: spontaneous celebrations broke out nationwide.

The events of 9/11 remain a searing memory in the national consciousness of the U.S., and Bin Laden's death was a milestone on a society-wide level. But 9/11 did not simply affect the country domestically, for it had many repercussions on the global level as

well, namely the relationships between and among countries, the global order, and various aspects of how other societies developed.

A decade on, it is time to evaluate these repercussions not simply in the United States, where they are obviously the most widespread, but also the ramifications elsewhere. The most significant of these lie within Europe, the other major element within the "West" that al-Qa'eda has declared an "enemy of Islam." Europe as a continent and European societies individually have seen many repercussions on the political, legal, social, and cultural levels, many of which were aggravated and intensified by the bombings in Madrid (2004), London (2005), and elsewhere. Although many of these might actually predate 9/11, no one can deny 9/11's centrality in the public consciousness of European societies. This work seeks to address this aftermath.

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It would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to address all of those aspects given that the European Union (EU) comprises twenty-seven countries and that Europe

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contains even more. Trying to cover them all would be an encyclopaedic effort, and thus beyond the scope of this work. Therefore, we will focus on introducing the Islam-Muslim-Europe relationship in the context of this fallout by providing an overview of Islam in European history that details how it and its followers figure within the continent. We then go on to consider five post-9/11 macro issues surrounding them: the multiculturalism debate, the reformation of Islam, the integralization of Muslims, the Sufi-Salafi sectarian divide, and security policy. These topics are not limited in terms of relevance to the European scene, but go far beyond it. Finally, we present two case studies of European societies, one within the European Union (the UK) and one without (Turkey).

We hope that this approach will enable policymakers, academics, and the general public to take a step back and see how European societies reacted to, and were affected by, this horrific event. It should be noted at the beginning that this work serves only as an introduction to these key issues, and that comprehensive work is still required in order to properly explicate upon them in detail. Nevertheless, raising these critical issues at this time fulfils a purpose in and of itself, among them the asking of serious (and perhaps controversial) questions as to whether the path taken was the only way to go and to evaluate the extent to which Europe's response has benefited Europeans. While no society could have responded to 9/11 perfectly, no society can hope to improve without engaging in that difficult, self-critical process. The case studies presented herein serve as a potential step along that process of self-evaluation, one designed to ensure that European societies remain strong, secure, and committed to their values. This would be a shattering blow to all who seek to bring forth its ultimate demise.

## CONTEXTUALIZING ISLAMIC EUROPEAN HISTORY<sup>1</sup>

*"It can no longer be seen as Islam versus the West; it is Islam and the West or Islam in the West."<sup>2</sup>*

*“...the Hebrew-Christian background is the root of European cultural identity.”<sup>3</sup>*

The common and pervasive perception in the media and academia is that even though Islam and Europe may be intertwined now, Islam is nevertheless an intrinsically alien and foreign element that has no historical standing there. While it is true that the majority of contemporary Europe’s Muslims would find that their great-grandparents were born elsewhere, the idea that Islam has no long pedigree on this continent is factually incorrect. Historically, Islamic traditions can be found all over Europe. From Islam’s early days, Europe was part of the Muslim consciousness: Suhayb bin Sinan al-Rumi, a noted Companion of the Prophet, has been described as a blonde-haired, fair complexioned Greek-speaking Byzantine slave.

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Unrelated to this anecdote is the first entry of Muslim forces into the Mediterranean Sea on the European side during the seventh century. Cyprus is the first EU member to have had significant contact with Muslims. This eventual conquest of Europe ceased at Poitiers in France (732), and Islam became established in most of the Iberian Peninsula, especially in the south. The spread of Muslim rule took three years, with few battles and significant local support<sup>4</sup> (Muslims are said to have first arrived at the invitation of a local chieftain<sup>5</sup>). Al-Andalus is of singular interest to historians of Islam

in Europe because it represents the first and longest period of Muslim rule in Europe. But it is curious for other reasons as well, for it represents a novelty<sup>6</sup> in western Europe until the twentieth century: a multi-religious and multi-ethnic society.

Historians continue to examine and re-examine this phase in Iberian and European history for a variety of reasons. From the western European perspective, the roots of the Renaissance sprung from this land, as did countless innovations. Muslims (including Christian converts), Christians, and Jews<sup>7</sup> collaborated to create an Islamic civilization that left its mark for centuries to come. Similar to Christianity and Judaism, the roots of the Muslim presence are in the Near East; however, just as Islam acted as a cultural stimulator in the Fertile Crescent, Central Asia, China, and Africa, so were Muslim cultures created in Europe.

Al-Andalus’ culture came to an end with the Spanish Inquisition; however, other Muslim societies were emerging in northern, eastern, and southern Europe. It is related that Slovenia had good relations with the Muslims of this region as far back as the eighth and the ninth centuries. In 827, Arab Muslims landed at Sicily and ruled it until 1093. The spread of Mongol armies during the thirteenth century into northern and eastern Europe also left permanent Muslim communities, such as the Tatars of Lithuania. Lithuanian history records that Islam entered its territory in 1397, when the Lithuanian Duke Witold took Tatars as prisoners.<sup>8</sup> A number of Tatars were to go to southern Poland; when King Sigismund III ordered a census in 1631, more than 100,000 were listed.<sup>9</sup> These Tartars swore on the Qur’an to fight for Polish independence in 1795 and opposed the Russians during the 1830 and 1863 uprisings, a history that earned them respect and a favored place within Poland for two centuries.<sup>10</sup>

The final premodern chapter of European Muslim history was the Ottoman administration in southeastern Europe. The final spread<sup>11</sup> of this highly significant Muslim European state took place with the conquest

of Crete from the Venetians in 1669, which has left a legacy in several of today's EU states such as Greece, which has a large Muslim community. The same applies to Austria and Cyprus, where a little less than 20 percent of the population is Muslim. Other countries also retained Muslim populations, such as Romania and Hungary, but these are beyond the scope of this work. In addition, there is a long history of interchange between Europe and the Muslim world due to trade and colonialism. More in-depth research is required to uncover the history of the Venetians and the Genoese in the Arabian Gulf prior to the Portuguese and their connections with Muslims beyond Europe.

This historical relationship between Muslims and Europeans now means very little in the public sphere, owing to a single day's events: the attacks launched on the 11<sup>th</sup> of September 2001. That day led to a new dynamic within the discussion of how Muslim Europeans and the European mainstream interact with each other, one that built on existing discourses, amplifying some and quietening others. One discourse that was already in the public sphere was how Europe could incorporate its Muslim populations, the so-called multiculturalism debate. The events of 9/11 clearly impacted that debate and showed that certain anti-Muslim sentiments (viz., Islamophobia) could irrevocably change its direction. It is to that debate that we must now turn our attention.

## ISLAMOPHOBIA AND THE MULTICULTURALISM DEBATE

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In the process of discussing the roots of radical violent extremism perpetrated by Muslims, the discourse of violent and nonviolent ideologues in Muslim communities has often been scrutinized for its ideational support. The nonviolent radical group Hizb ut-Tahrir, for example, has been described as providing the "mood music that suicide bombers dance to."<sup>12</sup> Others blame the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928, for providing the initial impetus for al-Qa'eda terrorism

through the writings of Sayyid Qutb, an early member. The Brotherhood's leadership denounced Qutb, and al-Qa'eda has frequently attacked the Brotherhood for not being radical enough.<sup>13</sup>

In 2011, two terrorist attacks in Norway killed seventy-seven people and injured ninety-six others. The initial suspicion across great swathes of the press was that a Muslim extremist had launched an al-Qa'eda-style attack against Norway. It became clear, however, within a few hours that the suspect, who admitted to the killings but not to committing a crime, was a home-grown extremist named Anders Behring Breivik. His motives will become more transparent over the coming year and be analyzed more fully in the future. But in this age of multimedia and social media, many pieces of evidence are available to elaborate upon his highly ideological motivations and impulses. In addition, his writings on various websites and his 1,500-page manifesto contain clear markers and indicators as to his political thought and proto-philosophy.

For years, two key political questions have occupied the public sphere when it comes to Muslim communities in Europe: multiculturalism, as most of Europe's Muslim communities consist of ethnic minorities or migrants, and Islamophobia.

What was particularly striking about Breivik's attacks, mostly on non-Muslims, was his ideological relationship to these two issues. His manifesto clearly indicated his affinity for cultural conservatism, right-wing populism, anti-Muslim sentiment, and Islamophobia, as well as his opposition to multiculturalism. His anti-Muslim sentiment extended to the point of calling for the restoration of the Crusades and explaining how all of Europe's Muslims could be repatriated over the next seventy-two years. His ideology also included some Christian references, although this seems to have been more on a cultural level than a deeply spiritual one. While his actions were radically violent, his ideas were not so far removed from the public discourse. For years, mainstream European political life has been shifting to the right, and with this shift has come (or perhaps was caused by) a more

virulently anti-multiculturalism perspective, which has invariably been combined with Islamophobia.

Islamophobia is not simply a new outbreak of bigotry against Islam on European soil; rather, it is a noticeably historic chauvinism. As Europe has become more respectful of diversity, its traditional Islamophobia has been reduced, but not eliminated. The 9/11 attacks have ensured that it will remain active. After that tragedy, the number of scholars and politicians who voiced concerns about the very presence of Muslims (as well as members of ethnic minorities) increased several times over. Academics such as Lamin Sanneh and journalists such as Melanie Phillips began to intensify an agenda that brought together opposition to multiculturalism and the fear of Islam.

In his speech at a conference of several hundred Anglican theologians and laity, Sanneh asserted<sup>14</sup>:

*We must get into the mind of the terrorists. The fundamentalists are making a religious case for their hostility towards the West. Blaming the attacks on the US because of objectionable foreign policy or belated moral decline in the US, domestic moral promiscuity, or the failure to address poverty and giving attention to gay and feminist agendas, is to miss the point ... It's not that the West has not got a religious heritage anymore, but that this religious heritage, such as it is, has been privatized and marginalized and commodified, rendering the West tone deaf. Islam has not suffered the same fate.*<sup>15</sup>

He went on to say:

*Christianity's private subjective faith commands no respect. Islam is out front in public life. The problem of Islam in the West is not Christian hostility but Muslim overconfidence. Islam has the ability to overcome obstacles, to overcome defenses. It is only a thin secular wall that prevents the Islamic tide from sweeping over the West, it is the only the thing that prevents a pan-Islamic global triumph ... The challenge of Islam is that they saw Christianity being trivialized and taken advantage of and moved*

*to fill the vacuum ... The problems we face with Muslims and the Muslim world are the issues of pluralism. Islam flourishes in the modern world of difference and diversity.*<sup>16</sup>

Although his words contain no indication of violence, it is difficult to miss the similarities between the basis of what he is portraying as his worldview and that of Breivik's attacks. This is not to say that Sanneh's discourse is responsible for Breivik's atrocities, but only that the discourse provides source materials to create an ideology. Sanneh, a well-known and respected academic, is not a radical.

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Melanie Phillips, again, never argued for killing innocent people. But she did suggest that Europe should reconsider the immigration of Muslims<sup>17</sup> and, in the aftermath of 9/11, became rather strident. Pim Fortuyn of the Netherlands openly declared that if it were legal to do so, he would forbid further Muslim immigration.

Sanneh is not directly cited in Breivik's manifesto; Phillips, however, is. Among Breivik's most common citations are the works of Robert Spencer, Bat Ye'or, and Pamela Geller. He also expresses his admiration of Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Bruce Bawer, and Srda Trifkovic. A common theme in all of these writers' publications is the fear of Islam as an over-powering force in Europe that will eventually displace European civilization, largely by the implementation of multiculturalism.

Again, although none of these writers were responsible for Breivik's slipping into violence, he did draw directly

from the sea of ideas that they propound. One commentator put it quite clearly:

*But what is most striking is how closely he [Breivik] mirrors the ideas and fixations of transatlantic conservatives that for a decade have been the meat and drink of champions of the war on terror and the claim that Islam and Islamism pose a mortal threat to western civilisation. It's all there: the supposed Islamisation of Europe, the classic conspiracism of the "Eurabia" takeover fantasy, the racist hysteria about the Muslim birth rate, the inevitable clash of civilisations, the hatred of "multiculturalism" and the supposed appeasement of Islam by the European elite, which is meant to have fostered a climate where it is impossible to speak about immigration.*

*All these themes are of course staples of conservative newspapers, commentators and websites. None of these writers are of course in any way sympathetic to the carnage carried out in Norway last week. But the continuum between the poisonous nonsense, commonplace in the mainstream media in recent years, the street slogans of groups like the English Defence League [EDL] and Breivik's outpourings is unmistakable. The same phenomenon can be seen across European politics, where the rise of right-wing Islamophobic parties from France and the Netherlands to Norway and Switzerland has encouraged the centre-right establishment to play the Islam card, wrap itself in "Christian" values and declare the chimera of multiculturalism an abject failure.<sup>18</sup>*

These have been poignant reminders for Europe. As noted above, anti-Muslim sentiment predates 9/11, yet the Eurabia fear became far more intense after 9/11:

*The French historian Alain Besançon is one of a number of European intellectuals who detect a significant threat to the continent's traditional Christian culture. The Egyptian-born writer Bat Yeor has for some years referred to the rise of a new "Eurabia" that is hostile in equal measure*

*to the United States and Israel. Two years ago, Pat Buchanan published an apocalyptic book titled "The Death of the West," prophesying that declining European fertility and immigration from Muslim countries could turn "the cradle of Western civilization" into "its grave." Such Spenglerian talk has gained credibility since 9/11.<sup>19</sup>*

As such talk was not considered particularly dangerous, it became far more palatable for the wider public. Politicians across the political spectrum were not averse to engaging with these two issues on a populist manner to strengthen their positions. Indeed, following the attacks in Norway, several European politicians either expressed support for Breivik or attempted to excuse him as a reaction to multiculturalism. For example Francesco Speroni, an Italian member of the European Parliament, a leading member of the Northern League, and the junior partner in the Italian government coalition, said: "*Breivik's ideas are in defence of western civilisation.*"<sup>20</sup>

For years, this kind of discourse has spread throughout Europe unchecked and unidentified as potentially dangerous. Right-wing conservatism is not, in and of itself, dangerous; however, this offshoot trend, which can be described as "Eurabism," is the ideological current that has produced individuals like Breivik. A few years after 9/11, one of the first academic analyses of this trend concluded that "what began as an outlandish conspiracy theory has become a dangerous Islamophobic fantasy that has moved ever closer towards mainstream respectability..."<sup>21</sup>

That mainstream respectability has now clearly arrived. If Breivik is dismissed as insane, as the temptation is at present,<sup>22</sup> then we lose the opportunity to thoroughly understand the discourse and arguments that helped transform, at least partially, "an ordinary Norwegian, a well-behaved boy" into a terrorist. Having that understanding could aid us in the future, in terms of ensuring that legitimate public discussion and debate does not promote ideas that can lay down an ideological

worldview that betrays the best of the values of Europe in pseudo-defense of it.

Nevertheless, many would argue that the outbreak of individuals like Breivik may also have something to do not simply with the European mainstream, but with the failure of Muslims and Islam to “Europeanize” themselves. Indeed, this was one of Breivik’s stated motivations: that Muslims already in Europe have shown themselves incapable of actually becoming sufficiently European and thus are a threat to its continued existence. In that regard, he was not a lone commentator; many others have advocated “reforming” Islam in order to further Muslim integration. Along with that, nevertheless, many other issues arise that are only seldom or superficially discussed but nonetheless remain entirely pertinent to our discussion here.

## REFORMING ISLAM AND EUROPEANIZING MUSLIMS: REFORM AND INTEGRALIZATION

After 9/11, feelings against Muslims and Islam may have intensified. Italy’s Northern League exploited the situation to reduce immigration to the “fight against terrorism.” In August 2002, the party’s number two suggested that it was time for Italy to close down Islamic centers and mosques “frequented by possible supporters of terrorism.” Clearly, 9/11 provided an excuse for the public expression of anti-Muslim sentiments under the pretext of protecting Italy from a fifth column. Academics asked “Will it be an Islamized Europe or Europeanized Islam?”<sup>23</sup> and similar questions. The query comes from a particular interpretation of “Europeanized Islam” or “Euro-Islam,” as it is often called. In 2007, the European Commission even engaged with the idea of creating a “European Islam,” defined as an Islam that would be a more tolerant “European” branch of the faith.<sup>24</sup>

In Europe, two authors dominate the discussion in terms of their approach to “European Islam/Euro-Islam”: Swiss-born Tariq Ramadan (University of Oxford) and

Syrian-born Bassam Tibi (Gottingen University, ret. 2009). Although the approaches are striking in their contrasts, they nevertheless play intriguing roles as regards the ways Muslims have felt the need to reconsider their understanding of Islam.

One post-9/11 suspicion was that no radical heresy was responsible for al-Qa’eda’s ideology – which many Muslims and non-Muslims argued – but that Islam itself was responsible. The solution, therefore, was to either declare an all-out war on Islam as a religion (a particularly unfavored option, considering the awesomeness of the task) or to engineer an Islamic reformation.

Tibi introduced the idea of Euro-Islam in 1992, while Ramadan engaged with it in 1999 in a rather different manner. Their approaches are quite different. Ramadan’s conception of a European Islam is not particularly radical; indeed, he often speaks of the need to remain “faithful” and writes about his dedication to the normative tradition. While he is not a theologian or a traditionally trained jurist of Islamic law, and is admittedly a reformist of the modernist strand of Salafi thought, Ramadan clearly attempts to justify his positions from within normative Sunni Islamic thought. In this regard, his religious input is less relevant to his European Islam project as is his socio-political input. Ramadan’s Euro-Islam is more about the European aspect than the Islamic aspect. While he critiques traditional scholars and the like, he does not seek to remove the basis of normative Islamic thought. With regards to Muslims living in Europe, however, he has far more essential criticisms to make, both of Muslims as well as of Europe. For example, he insists that Muslims participate as much as possible in their country’s social and cultural life, in accordance with Islamic values and imperatives, and that Europe consider Islam a European religion. In this regard, Ramadan presents a type of Euro-Islam that has generally continued upon the same path since the 1990s.<sup>25</sup>

Tibi’s somewhat different approach provides a useful basis for interrogating the Euro-Islam project that is growing more influential across Europe due to 9/11

and subsequent terrorist atrocities. This school regards Euro-Islam as a concept and a project designed to integrate Muslims into Europe by assuming a liberal and progressive reinterpretation of Islam.<sup>26</sup> In essence, Euro-Islam is a democratic Islam.<sup>27</sup> This is rather surprising, as such a view politicizes Islam and is just as removed from Islam as a faith as is the Islamism that many oppose. On the one hand this politicization is rejected as dangerous, but on the other hand some insist that religious politicization is the way to go.<sup>28</sup> More important for our purposes is the assertion that Muslim Europeans who want to fully commit themselves to the Euro-Islam project will have to undergo some sort of religious reformation exercise.<sup>29</sup> This again is quite interesting, as, to an admittedly far lesser extent, other Islamists have argued the same thing. Nevertheless, it is not clear that reformation is always a good thing in religion. Consider the Christian Reformation, which was often incredibly violent and full of social upheaval. In the Muslim world, al-Qaeda itself is a reformation experiment; reformation can unleash extremely dangerous forces. While the early years of the Christian Reformation were largely free of war and conflict, it eventually led to huge conflicts that lasted for well over a century.

Additionally, it seems that Muslim Europeans, the necessary audience, have been rather lukewarm toward the Euro-Islam project. Historians remind us that reform movements do occur among Muslims, citing such individuals as Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi (Spain, d. 1388), Shah Wali Allah al-Dihlawi (India, d. 1762), Uthman Dan Fodio (West Africa, d. 1817), and Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri (Algeria, d. 1883), who, they claim, mobilized people by appealing to normative notions of religious authority. One example of this is the polymath al-Ghazali (d. 1111), a mystic, jurist, and theologian renowned throughout the Muslim world as an incredibly well-accomplished religious figure. A number of beneficial reforms took place in religious education because of him, and thus he is known as the "Proof of Islam" and the "Renewer of the Faith." Tibi's Euro-Islam project does not draw on Islam's

normative tradition, whether for Sunnis or Shi'is, to justify its own authority. If anything, it seems to implicitly view that tradition as an obstacle (e.g., "Without a number of required basic religious reforms...").<sup>30</sup> It is not altogether clear why Muslim Europeans would disavow such a tradition as a condition for being accepted as citizens, given that Orthodox Jews and Catholics do not appear to have done so.

Finally, the Euro-Islam project is meant to adequately prepare Muslim Europeans for becoming "European citizens of the heart."<sup>31</sup> In this regard, Tibi in particular draws favorable lessons from the experiences of the Muslims of Senegal and Southeast Asia. But historically, both of those communities were entirely normative religious Muslim ones, in that they adhered to Sunni schools of canon law (Maliki and Shafi'i, respectively) as well as traditional theology (Ash'ari) and a variety of Sufi orders. None of these seem to have been obstacles to the indigenization process they underwent, and the same is arguably true in China, South Africa, and elsewhere in southern Europe.

All of these issues have to be addressed before the Euro-Islam project can be judged appropriately. Nevertheless, it is intriguing to see how this initiative has been replicated elsewhere, including within the United States, where Islam as a *religion* has become the subject of intense debate and critique as the claimed source ideology of terrorist atrocities. At the same time, there are developments afoot within Muslim European communities to engender a reorientation of sorts, but one that is far more organic and cultural.

Islam is not separate from European history, with which it is interwoven. On the contrary, it is an essential component of the history of Europe. The question of Islam's presence and condition in Europe therefore seems to be an aspect of the character of our institutions and of our system, and not just a marginal chapter concerning the treatment of transitory colonies of migrant foreigners.<sup>32</sup>

It is no longer really a consideration of whether or not

the “host” can include the “minority” or the “guest” when many, if not most, Muslim Europeans were probably born and raised in Europe. Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, the concerns surrounding assimilation, integration, and ghettoization remain and are offered as viable choices for Muslims on both the community and the individual level. The debate has moved on to a new level: it is no longer simply about excluding the “Other,” but about defining “Us.” For a long time, the obsession with the “Other” (in many cases, a “Muslim Other”) has been an excuse for avoiding the real questions: Who are “We”? How do we define “Us”? Who defines what represents

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the “Other”? What is society based on or defined by in order to recognize “Us” and “Other”?

Herein lies a hint of a deeper conundrum: the difficulty of defining “European.”<sup>33</sup> European political philosophers have been facing this crisis of identity into which modernity has thrown their societies. The rise of extreme right-wing movements, whether in Holland, France, or England (to name just a few), may use Muslim communities as scapegoats for various issues. But the issue at the root of their collective obsession is not really the “Muslim Other” – this is more an excuse than anything else – but the “Us,” a concept of “Self” that has become withered and emaciated in European eyes. As the EU expands to include more Muslim populations and potentially a huge Muslim country (Turkey), the discussion surrounding European identity has become more intense, if not more accurate. As history teaches, although it is far easier to concentrate on an external

“Other,” imagined or not, than to deal with internal problems, the problems nevertheless remain.

Many argue that for Europe’s Muslims to become indigenous, Islam must become institutionalized. But this guarantees nothing. In fact, current practice shows that such steps have historically been an effect of normalization, rather than effecting normalization. Moreover, this undertaking might be ineffectual or even detrimental if not done with caution. If such representative bodies are instituted through the prism of identity politics, the risk of ghettoization is genuine. The recognition of such bodies is unlikely to be of much benefit if they do not take into account the need to create a degree of cooperative spirit among citizens. As Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406) so expressively noted centuries ago, a sense of ‘asabiyya (common identity) is necessary if societies are to thrive. Recognizing Muslim communities and establishing Muslim European institutions cannot replace a more foundational requirement: the grassroots will to establish indigenous institutions and for Muslim Europeans to identify themselves, and to be identified as, integral to Europe. In this regard, they enter into an “integralization” process.

This has already occurred with the Islamic cultures of West Africa, the “Golden Age” of Muslims in China, and other historical Muslim communities, all of which eventually became integral to their (predominantly non-Muslim) societies. In China, where Islam took root around the same time as in North Africa, Muslims practiced “an Islam with a profoundly Sinicised fragrance, but without, in general, compromising the religion’s core requirements as understood by the guardians of the canon.”<sup>34</sup> This was hardly an isolated encounter:

*From an almost unlimited list, examples might include the ancient Muslim communities in Poland and Lithuania, which became so solidly embedded in their Catholic surroundings that they could produce two of Poland’s national heroes: Jalal ad-Din, who supported the Grand Duke against the Teutonic Knights at Tannenberg in 1421, and Marshall Josef*

*Pilsudski (d.1932), after whom one of the great city squares of Warsaw still takes its name.<sup>35</sup>*

For both the Muslim and non-Muslim communities of the EU, a certain amount of cultural integration is far more conducive to creating healthy, stable societies. This is the fourth avenue for demographic minorities to pursue: an alternative to integration, assimilation, and ghettoization.

Contemporary identity politics encourages non-mainstream voices to present themselves to the wider society, for the idea of purposeful marginalization is no longer attractive, except to a few. But encouraging diversity in *this* manner inevitably results in voices presenting themselves as distinct and separate from, and with less and less concern for, each other. Thus it is no surprise that European societies have seen a backlash against such movements, even those that claim to be liberal. Multiculturalists can find little value in supporting diversity if its objective is to further polarize and segregate society. Muslim communities may exist as Muslim communities in the future, but it is doubtful that European societies will really recognize them as equal citizens if Muslims do not recognize their role as common members of a community.

Nor, it should be noted, does it appear that newer generations of Muslims, perhaps particularly after the fallout from 9/11, will be satisfied with marginal identities. A psychological migration has yet to occur in the minds of those who are content to consider themselves as “Other,” as appendages of a mythical “homeland” and rejected as aliens in their countries of residence. But Muslim “voices” are already giving way to Muslims who state their concerns within an ethical and moral framework, one embedded in their societies, which nonetheless is informed by and derived from Islam. Yet they use the same moral vocabulary as do non-Muslim Europeans. Instead of seeking to be yet another divisive voice among many others competing for space in the public sphere, they might try to speak authentically on behalf of themselves and their neighbors.

For them, the myth of return is not only dead and buried,<sup>36</sup> but the reality of their situation as native and indigenous is clear. Once this perspective is properly understood, it can be seen that the absence of native-born leadership and scholarship is linked to the disadvantaged position of Muslim European communities with good reason.<sup>37</sup> Relations with the mainstream, in terms of representation on this track, take place beyond the minority-majority equation. For those who are unwilling to commit “cultural apostasy,”<sup>38</sup> the discourse of minority relations with minority concerns is rejected from the outset. These new discussions involve *citizens*, not minorities, for as far as these communities are concerned, there is no such thing as minority citizenship.

The tragedy of 9/11 has not halted these discussions. In fact, it seems to have intensified them, at least in some quarters. Many Muslim community voices have recognized that their lack of social capital in the mainstream made Muslims more, not less, susceptible to being problematized as “alien” and “foreign.” Their religious ties to the wider Muslim world do not endear them to their compatriots in Europe, just as American Catholics were once problematized due to their ties to the Vatican. During President John F. Kennedy’s tenure, this suspicion became so tense that at one point he felt obliged to declare:

*I do not speak for my church on public matters, and the church does not speak for me. Whatever issue may come before me as President, if I should be elected, on birth control, divorce, censorship, gambling or any other subject, I will make my decision in accordance with these views – in accordance with what my conscience tells me to be in the national interest, and without regard to outside religious pressure or dictates. And no power or threat of punishment could cause me to decide otherwise.<sup>39</sup>*

No Muslim European has yet risen to the political heights reached by Kennedy, but many of their intelligentsia seem to have learned the lesson well. That

these various Muslim communities contain a variety of religious approaches, given that they originated from different trends within the Muslim world, should be kept in mind. They have had many different points of views over the years on these various topics, and we have seen them at odds in a plethora of ways. But 9/11 brought a new dynamic to that sectarianism; one that was unexpected, unpredicted, and hitherto not particularly noticed. Yet it exists and affects our policies and our strategies for the future.

## SALAFI/SUFI SECTARIANISM

Generally, observers agree that the motivation for al-Qa'eda's attacks is a combination of dissatisfaction with western foreign policy initiatives (a political imperative) and a religiously argued ideology. While other contributing factors may create vulnerable (mostly socioeconomic) individuals or groups, the key ingredients, as it were, appear to be political and religious. Different profiles might emphasize one aspect more than the other (and indeed, the political seems to be far more prevalent than the religious), but invariably both will be present. Numerous books and studies claim to explain these motivations<sup>40</sup> and the like, but this is not the intended subject here. In addition, other work has analyzed how the religious dimension has evolved as well as its historical pedigree (and lack thereof) vis-à-vis Islam.

Modern Islamic religious formations include, at the minimum, the Sunni and Shi'i interpretations of Islam, along with less numerically significant groupings such as the Ibadis (generally found in Oman and in isolated pockets in North Africa). Al-Qa'eda has been defined exclusively as originating from within the Sunni community, particularly among those who lean toward Salafism. Salafism can be broken up into different types. Literally, "Salafi" means "one who follows the predecessors (i.e., the early Muslims [the Salaf])." In the last 200 years, two different movements have arisen among Sunnis: puritanical Salafism and modernist Salafism.

Puritanical Salafis, often called Wahhabis by their detractors, are an off-shoot of Sunni Islam Hanbali legal school. They dominate the Saudi and Qatari religious establishments, reject the authority of the four recognized Sunni schools of law, and adhere to a theology that differs from that of the Sunni religious establishment. Interpreters of the message of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab (b. 1703) began the movement in the 1700s. Abdul Wahhab's actual contribution to the movement, however, is disputed. Modernist Salafis draw inspiration from the writings of Muhammad Abduh (Egypt, d. 1905) and Rashid Rida (Syria, d. 1935). Like the Puritanical Salafis, they criticize other Muslim followings, but in a much less strident way. Yusuf al-Qaradawi is perhaps the most famous upholder of this group's methodology. Hasan al-Banna, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood, was strongly influenced by modernist Salafism.

Some commentators argue that al-Qa'eda's religious doctrine combines both methodologies, as modernist Salafis were forced to leave Egypt and went to Saudi Arabia, where they mingled with their puritanical counterparts. This remains a point of contention within many academic and policy circles. What is of interest to Europe in the aftermath of 9/11, however, is the ensuing Salafi-Sufi interchange.

During the 1980s and 1990s, as organized Muslim lobby groups and organizations began to come of age in Europe, many Salafis of both types were at work in various organizations. This was only natural,<sup>41</sup> given that the modernist Salafis had been nurtured in organized political Islamist movements and thus benefited from the experience and infrastructures of Islamist movements in the Subcontinent and the Arab world, where the overwhelming majority of Muslim European communities originate. What is less discussed is the "religious culture war" of the 1990s among Muslims. While on a political level Salafism was widespread in European Muslim communities, on the ground level more historically normative interpretations of Sunni Islam were predominant. These often expressed themselves

in commitment to particular schools of Islamic law and Sufi orders, both aspects of normative Sunni Islam with which Salafi movements had issues.

During the 1990s in particular, these deep tensions often created disturbances within Europe's Muslim communities. In fact, 9/11 took place at a time when Salafi/non-Salafi tensions were turning a corner: non-Salafi communities had been sending their young people overseas to study in Syria, Yemen, Egypt, and elsewhere to learn how to expound upon, defend, and elaborate their own approaches to Islam. Salafi communities had been doing this as well, particularly with regards to the University of Madinah, but were beginning to find themselves outnumbered at the grassroots level.

Thanks to 9/11, this paradigm shift intensified. As the media began to concentrate its focus on Muslim communities, the narrative that a Salafi organization (al-Qa'eda) was responsible for the attacks, it became more publically problematic for Muslim groups to self-identify as Salafi. The religious culture war began to come to an end, or at least to dissipate, as the pressures of public exposure and scrutiny began to wear heavily on the community's internal dynamics.<sup>42</sup>

In mid-2007, one Muslim community activist and preacher stated:

*Over the last 15 yrs the West has become a waste land for the wars that have taken place between both [the Sufi and Salafi] schools. In their attempt to derive authenticity, each has staked a claim to traditionalism as defined by the parameters of their learning and understanding. The problem with both is that a monolith is eventually given birth to that allows each to, in the name of tradition and tolerance, destroy each other with words, pens and so forth. Initially, one must admit, that our salafi brethren were exceedingly rude and outrageous in their attacks upon the sufis and the asharis. Then, sometime in the late 90's and definitely post 911 some of the Sufis were given a window of opportunity and, instead of seeking to mend fences*

*with the (moderate) salafis they begin to launch attacks on them from every angle, questioning their ijzas, resorting to tabloid type journalism and excluding them from the discourse. There is a famous Usoli principle [in legal reasoning] that says, "An extreme will only give birth to its opposite."<sup>43</sup>*

This person was American, but his comments reflected a certain reality taking place across the West, including Europe. The time frame was particularly accurate, for the "counter-Salafi" effort began in the early-mid 1990s and intensified toward the end of the century. Once 9/11 took place, however, Salafi groups found themselves in a politically dangerous position, one from which non-Salafi groups were able to benefit. Many Salafi groups had constructed themselves as "anti-Sufis." As a result, the swathes of European commentators, academics, and others who had characterized Salafis as problematic began to characterize Sufis as "good Muslims."<sup>44</sup>

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The non-Salafi Sunni contingents generally responded to this new situation in one of three ways: they (1) opted to be rather sensitive as to how they attacked Salafi groups in public, realizing that their critiques would be used to strengthen the hand of right-wing non-Muslim groups against Muslim communities in general; (2) sought to use the prevailing political atmosphere to attack Salafis even more strongly, partly in return for the treatment they had publically received in the previous culture wars and partly out of a deep conviction that Salafis were a force that needed to be battled at almost any

cost; and (3) withdraw from public life, preferring to remain focused on what they saw as the key issues facing Muslims: a lack of an inner spiritual life and of understanding the proper response of Islam to the challenges of western modernity. But 9/11 caused much of the Muslim intelligentsia to engage *more* with public life in an attempt to raise the community's social capital to a more appropriate level. For this final group, 9/11 may have hinted that a less public role was needed. The public arena was less open, and thus efforts were better aimed at an arena where Muslims were more equal actors, one beyond the attention of the national media that so problematized through securitization.

One group of non-Salafis became involved in Amman Message,<sup>45</sup> a wider Muslim world initiative that sought to create a *modus vivendi* between Salafis and non-Salafis. The initiative tried to reduce sectarian violence in Iraq, where extremist Salafis were characterizing Shi'i Muslims as apostates, but its terms of reference included accepting Sufism as valid within Sunni Islam and declaring that adherents of the traditional Sunni legal schools were not apostates. This did not seem to create a stir on the ground within the UK, however, as the most pre-eminent purist Salafi scholars did not sign on. But modernist Salafis did, even though they were not as responsible for the culture wars as much as the purist Salafis were. Invariably this tied into 9/11, the unwritten corollary being that part of what led to al-Qa'eda's birth was the disregard for traditional religious authority.

It took some years, as well as the 7/7 bombings, for European and other western Muslims to come together in the UK and sign a Sunni Unity Pledge, according to which some of the West's key Salafi and non-Salafi preachers agreed to restrain themselves from criticizing one another under the banner of Muslim unity. The pledge did not last very long. In fact, some of its signatories interpreted it in a way that allowed them to continue criticizing the other camp. In addition, opposition to it was profound outside the relatively small number of Muslim religious activists who had supported it.

But 7/7 did change the post-9/11 political atmosphere in Europe and the general Muslim religious dynamic. Some key Salafi preachers in the UK, for example, publically admitted that they had been responsible for creating a mood that could lead to extremism, even if they themselves had not advocated extremism *per se*. Furthermore, they began to engage seriously with non-Salafi ulama in the West and elsewhere, regarding them as legitimate. These figures, among whom were Abu Aliyyah/Surkheel Sharif, Usama Hasan, and Abu Muntasir/Manwar Ali, had been very prominent in the religious culture wars. To convince them to change their discourse seriously harmed the Salafi contingents of the English-speaking world. Moreover, various Sufi movements created new political groupings designed to promote their interests to the government and engage in a new anti-Salafi political front. The Sufi Muslim Council, which lasted only a few years, was most prominent in this regard, but by no means was it the only group that pursued this line.

As the fallout from the 9/11 attacks continues and is intensified by events such as 7/7, sectarianism and re-evaluations of what is an appropriate route for Muslim Europeans seeking to become indigenous in the European landscape can be expected to become more complex.

## SECURITY AND 9/11

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It would be folly to compare the security changes in Europe as a result of 9/11 with those that took place in the United States, given that the latter had been the subject of attacks, while the member states of the EU had been allies. The Europeans hoped to be protected against an attack, but they had not suffered directly from 9/11. Nevertheless, European countries could not hope to escape the new realities since they were the United States' primary partners in the new "international coalition against terrorism" and, by and large, supported its moves in Afghanistan. The new security order had it leading the charge with the EU firmly in a supporting role.

Ten years on, however, this has been altered somewhat. The EU continues to support the “war on terror” insofar as it continues to understand that the United States is not the only potential target (proven by later attacks on European soil). Nevertheless, the initial post-9/11 solidarity has dissipated somewhat, particularly after the invasion of Iraq. But it has resulted in some key questions about the EU’s ability to defend itself against terror attacks.

Even before 9/11, the EU had been trying to create common foreign and defense policies in order to, one might assume, create a multinational force that could intervene (without non-European involvement) in European issues or in areas where European interests were construed as being most significant. While one might have hoped that this would be more possible due to the post-9/11 feelings of common solidarity, this proved not to be the case. On the contrary, Washington’s perceived unilateralism after 9/11 split European opinion on several policy issues in which the United States was heavily involved. As such, the necessary unity was absent and will likely remain so.<sup>46</sup> For a time, it seemed that the inability to achieve consensus would cause the EU to reform its institutions, among them the six-month rotating presidency. But while many non-EU members would have welcomed the abolishment of this particular procedure in order to maintain a continuity of relationships with external forces, yet another a new institution was created: the “presidency trio,” according to which three countries will co-operate with each other for eighteen months and share common political programs.

Beyond the issues of hard power, 9/11 caused the EU to intensify its common soft-power efforts. Co-operation between police and judicial agencies in different countries has intensified and development aid, derived from both the EU as an institution and member states, has increased. More trade agreements have been signed between the EU and countries such as Pakistan, as “rewards” for Pakistan’s involvement in the “war on terror.” These diplomatic undertakings and others focused not only on Pakistan, but also involved

Afghanistan, Iran, the broader Arab region, and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

As a direct response to 9/11, the EU quickly adopted a European-wide arrest warrant, a common definition of terrorism, and a list of terrorist organizations. Key differences remain between the EU and the United States as regards police-related actions. For example, Washington has branded Hamas and Hizbollah as terrorist organizations, while the EU prefers to blacklist particular individuals and sections within them due to the fact that different sections exist under their banners. A special Europol anti-terrorism unit was created, as well as a coordinating body between the law enforcement agencies of member states. Air transport security was improved through Europe-wide measures, as well as ensuring that economic and financial measures were implemented to reduce money laundering for terrorist financing. The European Council proposed and accepted a European arrest warrant, a common definition of terrorism was instituted across member states, and a specialist anti-terrorist unit was created within Europol. Other measures would be implemented later due to other terrorist atrocities.<sup>47</sup>

As Europe’s security situation became more complex, owing to the Madrid (2004) and the London bombings (2005), it has become somewhat harder to identify measures instituted purely on the basis of the 9/11 attacks.<sup>48</sup> Yet it is clear that 9/11 intensified the impetus for the EU’s security apparatus to go forward in a far more wide-reaching manner, a manner that has not always been welcomed by different civil society groups in Europe, particularly those dealing with civil rights. Such groups argue that the “war on terror” has been used to justify the sacrifice of civil liberties for many European or foreign residents. The issue of extraordinary rendition has been particularly controversial, as have the curbs on privacy laws and permissions given to security agencies to monitor citizens as they see fit. In the UK, for example, emergency laws passed after 9/11 allow the indefinite detention of foreign nationals

without charge. When the courts challenged these laws, control orders allowing indefinite house arrest and other restrictions on individual freedoms were passed on the grounds that the mostly secret intelligence could not be challenged in court. Many of these measures would have been unthinkable only a short decade ago; but in the post-9/11 world they became far easier to pass and implement.

Ten years after 9/11, terrorism in Europe still informs the way law and security interact. Terrorism can and should be fought within the framework of a legal system based on human rights, rather than using the law to circumvent core fundamental freedoms through fear.<sup>49</sup> Otherwise, the values that inform us and distinguish us from terrorist groups are weakened and undermined, rather than strengthened and promoted. On a national level, these and other security issues play roles and shape affairs in a variety of ways. Two countries are of significant interest on the European scene in this regard, one without the EU (Turkey) and one within it (the UK), albeit in a very tightly linked kind of relationship. The 9/11 tragedy affected them both a great deal, and the ways in which they interpreted their security arrangements delineates how these issues can assume a life of their own in a vastly changing world. To understand how Turkey and the UK have separately dealt with the repercussions of 9/11 is not simply to understand these two particular countries, but to see a mirror of many other countries as well.

## TURKEY, 9/11, THE EU, AND ITS TURNING EAST

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The EU initially came about as an expression of unity rising from the ashes of the Second World War, the Holocaust, and the various conflicts that confronted European societies in the early to the mid-twentieth century. Out of this chaos and disunity came a common collective desire among European leaders to forge a union that would ensure that war could never again

overtake Europe at large.<sup>50</sup> For the most part, it seems to have been successful. Although there have been wars in Europe after its founding, they have not been between/among EU members. There have been, however, low-level conflicts within it, such as within Spain's Basque region<sup>51</sup> and in Northern Ireland.<sup>52</sup>

Outside of the EU, however, the situation is somewhat different. Just to give two examples: With the break-up of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, the most serious genocide in Europe since the Holocaust erupted when Serbs targeted Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) for mass murder in many parts of Bosnia.<sup>53</sup> Turkey and Cyprus entered into conflict in the mid-1970s, the repercussions of which have yet to be resolved.<sup>54</sup> Such events make the impetus behind it ever more important, and is another reason for enlarging the EU in 2004 to include many of the former Eastern European countries. During this year, Serbia took another step toward EU membership by turning over Ratko Mladic,<sup>55</sup> who is currently on trial at the Hague for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Slovenia joined the EU in 2004; Croatia will do so in 2013. Both countries were born out of the wreckage of the former Yugoslavia.

Some countries may be "rehabilitated" before being allowed to enter the EU fold, but others are still encountering obstacles. Turkey has long been considered a close ally. It was, and remains, a key American ally; a vital part of NATO; and has strong trade links with various European countries. For decades it has been moving toward aligning its laws with European-wide standards and, by all accounts, has been fairly successful in this regard.<sup>56</sup> And yet it remains doubtful that Turkey will ever become an EU member and increasingly more likely that Turkey will finally lose its desire to become one.

Several factors are involved in this scenario, all of which 9/11 impacted. For example, many European countries and people have long considered Turkey the "outsider," given its status as the inheritor country to the Ottoman Empire, which may, during various historical times, have ruled over more Europeans than possibly any

other European power. Thus, many European national narratives present it as the occupier. The image of Turkish armies marching on Vienna in 1683 remains vivid in the European psyche. In addition, there is a long European tradition of portraying Turks (in particular) and Muslims (at large) as foreign and alien.

Turkey is also one of the major sources of migrant workers, particularly in Germany, which places it squarely within an internal EU debate on multiculturalism and only exacerbates the situation. If one can assume that the mere presence of a large and visible Turkish minority causes discontent within a significant portion of the German population, one can be certain that there is likely to be even more discontent over the possibility that Turkey could actually join the EU, given all of the consequent freedom of movement for Turkish citizens that membership would entail.

Over the course of the past decade, none of the above seems to have improved. Instead, anti-Turkish sentiment seems to have intensified. The 9/11 attacks reinforced Islam's image as being "a problem." As Turkey is 99 percent Muslim, the country itself is viewed problematically, even though the current ruling Justice and Development Party, despite its conservative Islamist roots, is very pro-EU and has been pushing Turkish institutions to meet all requirements in anticipation of EU membership. Nevertheless, the impression that the EU is a "Christian club," as per the statement of Jacques Delors<sup>57</sup> and coupled with the rise of clear anti-Muslim sentiment in Europe, has caused Turks to wonder if the EU is the place for Turkey after all.

In light of this, it is not surprising that this key American ally has begun to face eastward and focus on building its links with other Muslim countries. The ongoing reorientation of Turkish foreign policy has little to do with the ruling party's conservative roots and is far better explained by the feeling of rejection pervading the Turkish establishment and intelligentsia. None of this is without consequences. In the sphere of regional geopolitics, Turkey is a key ally of the West and acts as

a stabilizing force in several areas.<sup>58</sup> This is particularly true vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict and will likely remain so in the future, as the Arab uprisings continue and change the long-term status quo.

But the reality of the situation is that while 9/11 might have initially strengthened the case of those who viewed Turkey as a vital partner in the "war on terror" and a strategic Muslim NATO ally, it also set in motion events that problematized Turkey as a partner that should be kept at a certain distance. It's not entirely clear where such an attitude will lead and how it will affect the future of both the EU and Turkey. Nevertheless, it is very likely that the growth of Turkey's regional stature will represent a loss to the EU, a loss that could have easily turned into a gain had Turkey's accession path been more clearly defined.

## THE UK AND 9/11: EFFECTS AND PRE-HISTORIES

For two reasons, 2001 was a noted year in the UK with regards to perceptions of Muslim communities: (1) the events of 9/11 and (2) the events that took place in the northern English cities of Oldham, Burnley, and Bradford. Several weeks before 9/11, the UK had seen the end of violent interactions between white and predominantly Muslim South Asian working-class communities. These riots built on a certain history and would find themselves part of a new narrative that would draw lines between them and a new set of international events.

None of those clashes had anything to do with religion, religious identity, or religious institutions. In fact, research done up to and following the violence suggests that it was attributable to basic social issues: unemployment, isolation, and social exclusion.<sup>59</sup> The key questions that had to be answered in the aftermath surrounded *why* there was so much social exclusion and isolation. The answers would be particularly relevant in the months and years to come.

These former industrial towns had borne a good

deal of pressure due to the previous Conservative government's economic reforms. When the Labour government assumed power in 1997, its members sought to "regenerate" them via various plans backed up by public money. The plans, it was hoped, would encourage northerners to work together across racial divides. But as these communities ended up competing *against* each other for the funds, the plans only deepened the divides. While the riots were going on, from May 2001 to July 2001, the UK went to the polls for its first general election after the first landslide that had brought Labour to power. Predictably, immigration was on top of the agenda due to the backdrop of violence in the north, where Britons of South Asian migrant extraction and white Britons were attacking each other.

At the same time, across the continent, the far Right was beginning to impact the political scene by entering through the door where it has often been most popular: identity. In the UK, the British National Party (BNP) had similarly entered the debate. While its electoral success in the ten years since 9/11 has never been high enough to enable its members to enter mainstream society, they have forced other mainstream political parties to shift some of their views. To put it bluntly, even though the BNP did not win a seat, its activity did cause many members of those parties who did enter Parliament to shift further to the right in order to ensure their success.

After 9/11, there was a slow but constant development of the narrative that Muslim communities posed a threat to the UK. First, Muslim communities outside the UK could attack Britain in the same way they had the United States. For several years, however, this fear was clearly expressed as one that would come from *external*, as opposed to *internal*, Muslim communities. Less than four years after 9/11, this view changed. The 2004 attack on Madrid by Muslim residents of Spain, who carried out a revenge attack in response to Spanish involvement in Iraq, sparked and then fanned the fear of a "fifth column" within the UK. When bombs went off in London on 7 July 2005, the situation changed completely.

Explanations for the emergence of this "fifth column" soon began to emerge. Within a few weeks, many within the Muslim community cited opposition to the UK's foreign policy. This was strongly felt even by members of London's own "Preventing Extremism Together" taskforce, which delivered its report during November 2005.<sup>60</sup> The prevalence of "bad religion" among certain subsections of the Muslim community was cited, as were other factors. What was unavoidable, however, was the sealing in the public mind of the relationship between Islam as a religion and violence. Al-Qa'eda members were Muslim who justified their violence through a claimed reading of Islamic doctrine, the riots in the north involved Muslims, and thus the violence there had something to do with Islam.

While community cohesion was at the heart of these riots, the entire discussion became imbued with an indisputable link (at least in the framework suggested by many commentators) with Islam. This "indisputable" link would only be disproven a decade later due to a parliamentary report<sup>61</sup> into government policies in 2010, which clearly stated that community cohesion activities and policies needed to be clearly delinked from counterterrorism and counter-radicalization ones. It remains to be seen, however, whether the policy establishment will take the parliamentary report at face value, given that there is a deep divide within the ruling cabinet on this particular issue.<sup>62</sup> But while those disagreements are often felt to have begun in the aftermath of 7/7, the reality is that they began in the aftermath of 9/11 and its confluence with the 2001 riots in northern England.

There are a number of watershed moments in the recent history of the British Muslim population. The Salman Rushdie affair in 1989 and the Bosnian genocide in the 1990s are often cited as early instances during which the community found itself in situations that provoked a great deal of discussion around its identity and role in British society. The 9/11 attacks, however, was a global game changer, one that saw the initial laying

of the groundwork for securitizing the Muslim community in the UK and beyond. This trend was intensified after the 7/7 attacks. While ten years may have passed, the effects of 9/11 remain very vivid and will likely remain so for many years to come.

## CONCLUSION

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It is difficult to quantify the number of changes brought about by the 9/11 tragedy. It seems that the world has experienced a global sea change in terms of how countries function – the structural aspects in terms of their security; the political debates that have taken place; the relationships between states; and many others. That one event is a true historical watershed moment, because it happened to the world's most powerful country. Had 9/11 happened anywhere else, we probably would not have seen such ripple effects. Indeed, the London and Madrid bombings did not produce such wide-ranging consequences around the world.

But another aspect of 9/11 goes beyond terrorism. This event signified the beginning of a new global battleground between the West and al-Qa'eda-style terrorism. Al-Qa'eda had been responsible for terrorism before 2001 and against western targets; however, it had never done so on American soil. Indeed, no large-range attacks had occurred on western soil by Muslim actors prior to 2001.

Ten years on, this game changer has instigated several internal EU shifts. Prior to 9/11, a corpus of academic work was revealing how the historical relationship between Muslims and Islam in Europe was complex, complicated, and often positive. Although these facts have not changed, they have been completely overshadowed by the aftermath of 9/11 and the association of Islam with terrorism. Before New York City was attacked, Muslim communities were engaging in a creative exercise of cultural creation, forging new identities that were as much at home in Europe as they were Islamic. The last ten years have seen that

process stifled by a securitization paradigm that has completely redefined the parameters. As a result of 9/11 and subsequent attacks, Europe's Muslim communities find themselves under the microscope in the public sphere, where they are constantly at pains to explain their peaceful nature and non-complicity in the attacks (even though they were themselves under attack). Nevertheless, they continue to find ways to push forward and, while the pressures remain, quietly persist in forging ahead with their integralization. While before 9/11 their religious establishments were focusing on integralizing themselves and their community in light of contemporary Europe, they now have to define themselves almost exclusively in terms of opposing al-Qa'eda and other such negative phenomena.

Within the Muslim community itself, the relationships between different Muslim groups have also been altered. Intrafaith relations between Salafis and non-Salafis within European societies have been severely impacted by the public discussion, which has defined "good Muslims" as Sufis and "bad Muslims" as Salafis. The relationship between the EU and Turkey has also been impressed upon, which creates a certain dynamic that has repercussions for further European relations with the Muslim world. We have seen how such discussions become further pronounced on a national level, such as within the UK, in stories that can be replicated across the European continent.

It is not clear where things will go from this point. The 9/11 tragedy took place, and few considered the possibility that home-grown terrorism would happen. But it did, and this fact has intensified these discussions in the form of discourses producing widespread consequences: the minaret ban in Switzerland; the hijab and niqab bans across Europe; and finally, the outbreak of a far-right anti-Muslim terrorism that saw its first atrocity in Norway earlier this year.

The future remains unclear, and yet, provided that we pay attention, there are telltale signs of things to come. Policymakers need to understand these wide-ranging

consequences of what happened on 9/11 and perceive how Europe, as a continent, can use such consequences to strengthen its commitment to certain values, or cause such values to be depreciated in favor of short-term knee-jerk reactions. In particular, the following steps are critical to the future of a confident Europe that is able to simultaneously live up to its innate values and stand firm against terrorism:

1. Europe must recognize that Islam is just as “European” as Christianity is, given that they both originated in the Middle East. If we fail to realize this particular fact, the inevitable end result will be a lack of social cohesion in our midst and an invitation for more division in the future. Islam’s practice, therefore, must be considered just as sacrosanct as the practice of other faiths in Europe.

2. Just as Islam is now European, Muslims are also Europeans. Couching discussions around their role and place in European societies in a securitization paradigm does not diminish their “Otherness”; rather, it exponentially increases the difficulty of having a well-thought-out discussion centered on diversity and plurality within a cohesive, united European society. Moreover, such securitization does not help security initiatives; rather, it handicaps them by problematizing the one community that must be involved in our security strategies.

3. Europe’s Muslim communities retain certain responsibilities: (1) they must continue to interrogate their religion and religious establishment for ways to relate authentically to the European context. This careful but necessary step has been replicated many times in history, which should inspire them positively. It should also go without saying that this particular effort is an internal Muslim discussion, and thus one in which the state should not be involved, given its lack of competence in matters of faith, and (2) their integralization efforts have to be based on cultural creativity, as per the current trend, and encouraged by the community’s intelligentsia

whenever possible. The challenges notwithstanding, Muslim Europeans stand at a critical point in their history as Islam becomes recognized as part of the European narrative.

4. The EU’s relationship with predominantly Muslim countries must move beyond securitization. Turkey in particular remains a key European ally, whether it eventually joins the EU or not. This relationship should be advanced and should proceed based on the common interests of the EU and its allies, rather than on nativist fears.

5. Finally, the security discussion for European citizens at large, while necessary, cannot be allowed to progress to the exclusion of ensuring fundamental rights. The serious concerns and considerations around civil liberties should become more mainstreamed, as they cannot be put on hold any longer. Eventually, one suspects that Europeans will look back in disappointment at how civil liberties were curtailed during this period, in much the same way as Americans are now ashamed of how Washington interned Japanese Americans during the Second World War. The hope is that there will be less to be disappointed about.

Indeed, 9/11 was a true watershed moment for European societies, and its ramifications are still not fully understood. They will continue and expand for years to come, serving either as challenges to be overcome or as the impetus to create further internal divisions. In the final analysis, only Europeans can decide what the end result will be.

## ENDNOTES

1. Much of this section is expanded on in H.A. Hellyer, *Muslims of Europe: The "Other" Europeans* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010).

2. Akbar Ahmed, *Living Islam* (London: BBC Publishing, 1993), 157.

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